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ABSTRACT  
By the mid-nineteenth century, the empiricist tradition, in con-
junction with physiological investigations into the nervous system, 
had culminated in a mechanical/elementaristic account of consciousness. 
Darwin's theory of evolution provided the catalyst for the explicit 
conclusion that man is a conscious automaton. William James enthusias-
tically accepted the new science but was unwilling to accept the autom-
atist conception of mind. Instead, inspired by Renouvier's doctrine 
of free will, he set out to construct a naturalistic, evolutionary ac-
count of mind wherein consciousness was efficacious both in promoting 
man's survival and in making genuinely moral changes in the world. 
This thesis analyzes the major structures of James' psychological and 
philosophical theories and shows how, in the process of attempting to 
reconcile his conflicting commitments to Darwin and Renouvier, James 
transformed selected Darwinian postulates into epistemological con-
structs. 
Developed along evolutionary lines, the efficacious, structurally 
unified stream of consciousness, described in The principles of psych-
ology, was James' first major achievement. But having based his theory 
of consciousness on a mind/matter dualism, James was faced with the 
problem of how the mind knows the world, and the basic inconsistencies 
between Darwinian and Renouvian theory began to assert themselves in 
the form of a structure/function dichotomy. The dichotomy between the 
unified structure of consciousness and the two conflicting functions 
the mind fulfills is most obvious in the theory of volition, constructed 
to show how the mind acts upon, and thus knows the world. James' refu-
tation of the theory of innervation and his conclusion that all know-
ledge is mediated through afferent sensations was a major advance, 
vii. 
providing the foundation for his evolutionary epistemology, pragmatism. 
James had originally interpreted the physical world in the mathematical/ 
mechanical terms of Newtonian science: in pragmatism, he began to re-
define the physical world in evolutionary terms. Plagued by the pro-
blems of the mind/matter dualism on which he had based his psychology, 
he constructed an evolutionary metaphysic--radical empiricism--wherein 
he abolished the ontological dualism between thoughts and things, claim-
ing that the thought of an object and the object itself were one piece 
of pure experience taken in two different functional contexts. But if 
James' attempt to equate thoughts and things proved unsuccessful, he 
was nevertheless convinced that the physical world could be described 
in temporal/mutable terms. Furthermore, he demonstrated that any par-
ticular separations between mind and matter were not absolute, while 
simultaneously showing that some such cuts were a necessary condition 
for knowledge and action. Finally, there is evidence in his final 
philosophy that he was returning to the mind/matter dualism of the 
psychology, having abandoned the excesses of radical empiricism, to 
come to grips with the problem of reconstructing the now temporal/mu-
table universe in scientific terms. 
PREFACE  
Enough articles, books, and theses have been written on the 
psychology and philosophy of William James that an annotated biblio-
graphy of them would itself fill a good sized volume--and indeed, such 
a volume has also been written (Skrupskelis, 1977). The question may 
fairly be put, then, as to why another rather long work on the subject 
is necessary. The question has two answers, one completely positive 
and one rather negative, which complement each other. 
First, the profusion of critical and analytic writings on James 
cannot be taken simply to indicate that an exhaustive treatment has 
been given to a limited subject. Instead, this profusion testifies to 
the continuing stimulation provided by James' writings in a variety of 
fields of psychology and philosophy. Wilshire's William James and  
phenomenology (1968) and the relevant parts of Ayer's The origins of  
pragmatism (1968), to cite but two examples, are not merely analyses 
of James' contributions to the two fields indicated by their titles. 
They are also serious attempts to go beyond James by expanding on his 
insights--to show how his problems and his attempts to resolve them can 
provide the basis for a comprehensive phenomenology and phenomenalism, 
respectively. The focus in these studies in short, is not just histor-
ical, but contemporary; James continues to have an influence. 
Second, attention has not been focused equally on all of James' 
major contributions; his philosophical writings have been studied more 
extensively than his psychological ones, and when his psychological 
writings are analyzed, the analysis is often performed by philosophers 
who use the psychology (quite justifiably) to gain insight into the 
philosophy, but do not examine it from an essentially psychological 
perspective. Moreover, as White (1973a, pp. 31-40) and Kuklick (1977, 
ix. 
pp. 645-647) have complained, much of the treatment of James' thought 
has been casual and superricial, more a celebration of his open-
mindedness, plurality of interests, etc., than a serious analysis. 
The present thesis analyzes James' psychological and philosophical 
writings in a way that attempts to contribute to the first of these 
trends, and serve as something of a corrective to the second. It offers 
an analysis of the development of James' thought, from some of his ear-
liest writings to his last work, Some problems of philosophy, and con-
centrates on the central problems he tried to resolve in his varied 
psychological and philosophical writings. The greatest emphasis is on 
•the psychology; James' philosophical writings are therefore analyzed 
to illustrate the continuation and development of psychological con-
structs in his thought or to shed light on the meaning of certain psy-
chological theories. That James' many works are best viewed as succes-
sive attempts to resolve a single set of problems is, indeed, the first 
major contention of this thesis. The second is that the details, often 
somewhat technical, of his early psychological theories provided the 
very specific bases for his later philosophical constructions. The 
third is that James' several attempts, and his successes and failures 
in them, provide insights into both the later development of psychology 
and the intractability of some of the problems themselves. 
Throughout the thesis, the analysis is based both on a close 
reading of James' statements, and as far as possible, on the insights 
contained in the critical literature. However, because the type of an-
alysis given here is unusual in focusing on a detailed comparison of 
James' theories with those current in pre-evolutionary and early post-
evolutionary mental philosophy and psychology, it has been necessary 
to make a substantial number of original constructions and interpreta-
tions. The major original contributions are as follows: 
x . 
Chap. 1 introduces the common assumptions model for interpreting 
theoretical developments and draws together the threads that make up 
a 'biological' theory of knowledge in writers just before James. The 
interpretation of the significance of the distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities is in part original. Chap. 2 offers a refuta-
tion of James' early theory of interests as a viable basis for the new 
psychology, and an assessment of its role in the development of James' 
thought. Chap. 3 discusses the stream of consciousness as an evolu- 
tionary construction. Chap. 4 introduces the hypothesis that James' 
theory of consciousness is based on a structure/function dichotomy, 
and that the development of his world-view can be studied in terms of 
an analysis of the progressivist/Newtonian versus the relativistic/ 
evolutionary elements in his work at any given point. This latter 
hypothesis is supported by an investigation into the role of the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities in James' theory of 
reality. Chap. 5 centres on James' refutation of the theory of inner-
vation and his development of an afferent theory of knowledge. This 
interpretation is also applied to James' theory of volition with effort 
(Chap. 6), and it is subsequently demonstrated (through the use of the 
structure/function dichotomy model) that James constructed a function-
ally dualistic account of volition. This conclusion is also supported 
by an account of the two meanings of 'moral' in James' psychology and 
philosophy. Chap. 7 begins the analysis of James' philosophy: pragma-
tism is treated as an evolutionary epistemology, while Chap. 8 shows 
that radical empiricism can be treated as an evolutionary metaphysic. 
The philosophical theories were developed almost simultaneously and 
it is shown that they reflect the two strands of thought which emerged 
in The principles of psychology. The final philosophy is examined in 
Chap. 9 to show that James was returning to the earlier constructions 
xi. 
of the Principles in an attempt to lay the foundation for a new 'ra-
tionalization' of the physical world, now that he had largely succeeded 
in constructing a temporal/mutable universe. Finally, a retrospect in 
Chap. 9 makes use of the common assumptions model to show James' impor-
tance in the history of thought. 
Two published articles by the author, in one case as junior author, 
summarize some parts of the analysis contained in this thesis. These 
articles are reproduced in an appendix. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
2. 
Introduction  
James' Early Career  
Born in 1842, William James began his scientific and philoso-
phical career when the evolutionary debate was still raging. ' 
Darwin's 1859 publication of The origin of species (Darwin, 1959/ 
1977), forced science, theology and philosophy to examine the claims 
of the evolutionists because Darwin proposed a specific mechanism-- 
natural selection (see Young, 1971, p. 445)--to account for species 
differentiation, and he included an overwhelming mass of specific 
biological evidence to back up his theory (see Burrow, 1968/1977, 
p. 11). It was this particular combination of the proposed mechan-
ism and the empirical data that pushed evolutionary theory into the 
scientific limelight, and gained Darwin his enthusiastic converts 
(see Mackenzie, 1976, pp. 334-335). At the same time, Darwin's 
theory shook the theological complacency that the Age of Reason had 
foundered in, and brought scientific, theological, and philosophi-
cal interests into conflict. 
The young James typified the reaction of many thinkers of the 
time. He accepted Darwinian theory: in 1868 he wrote from Dresden 
to his brother Henry: "The more I think of Darwin's ideas the more 
weighty do they appear to me, though of course my opinion is worth 
very little--still, I believe that that scoundrel Agassiz is un-
worthy either intellectually or morally for him to wipe his shoes 
on, and I find a certain pleasure in yielding to the feeling" 
(quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 265-266). The impact of Darwin's 
1. In 1861 James entered the Lawrence Scientific School 
(see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, p. 463). 
3. 
ideas remained with James throughout his life and in contrasting 
his work with that of Bergson, Perry comments: 
Both philosophers attached importance to biological 
evolution, but with differences. Bergson was more 
biological than James, and there would be a certain 
point in saying that James developed a biological 
psychology while Bergson developed a psychological 
biology. Furthermore, James's biology was profoundly 
Darwinian--stressing accidental origins, variations, 
adaptation, and survival (Perry, 1948, p. 340). 
But if James' scientific bent guaranteed his enthusiasm for the 
new theory, his religious and philosophical yearnings tempered that 
enthusiasm. James rejected the overt Swedenborgianism of his father, 
Henry James Sr.;
2 
he was too much a product of the scientific optim-
ism of his age to do anything else (see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 151, 
155, 465). Nevertheless, he retained a deep feeling for moral and 
theological questions,
3 
eventually expressed in The varieties of  
religious experience (James, 1903), and the Essays •on faith and morals  
4 
(James, 1949), and in his continuing acceptance of commitments to 
give public lectures at the expense of working out a scholarly - 
systematization of his philosophy.
5 
2. See the 1867 correspondence between William James and 
Henry James Sr. in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 705-716. 
3. After the death of his father, James wrote: "For me, the 
humor, the good spirits, the humanity, the faith in the divine, 
and the sense of his right to have a say about the deepest reasons 
of the universe, are what will stay by me" (quoted in Perry, 1935/ 
1974, 1, p. 152). 
4. This volume is a collection of essays selected by Perry to 
demonstrate James' preoccupation with moral and ethical questions 
(see James, 1949, p. v). 
5. ,See, for example, the letter from James to F.S.C. Schiller 
(in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 583) in which he complained that his 
promise to deliver the Hibbert Lectures (which eventually appeared 
in print as A pluralistic universe, 1909) was preventing him yet 
again from tightening up his philosophical system. 
4. 
In spite of Henry James Sr.'s unconventional views and his 
failure to win recognition as a philosopher or theologian, the 
James family occupied a respectable position in New England society. 
On Emerson's recommendation James Sr. became a member of the Satur-
day Club, a group which included most of the prominent thinkers, 
writers, and artists of the time (see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, p. 87). 
William James thus grew up in an atmosphere of philosophical debate 
and speculation. Furthermore, he was born at a time when philosophy 
was still a 'gentlemanly' occupation.
6 
This cultural commitment 
to philosophy and the fact that philosophical discussions between 
the leading thinkers regularly took place in James' home had a pro-
found influence on the young James. The goal of these philosophical 
discussions was largely practical; they centred around moral and 
religious concerns, and with the advent of Darwinian theory, debate 
on the meaning of scientific ideas and their meanings for philosophy 
was include
d
.
7 
Although James was to take many steps towards the 
'professionalization' of philosophy, he retained throughout his life 
a deep personal commitment to philosophy,
8 
and his contribution to 
the amplification of the new view of science was influenced by his back- 
6. See Kuklick, 1977, p. xviii and Chaps. 2 and 3. This period 
includes the 'Age of Emerson'; more importantly, it also includes 
the founding of the 'Metaphysical Club' where pragmatism was born. 
The seriousness of these societies and their importance in the de-
velopment of American philosophy is described by Kuklick. 
7. See Kuklick, 1977, p. xix and Chaps. 2 and 3 for descriptions 
of the problems discussed by these philosophical societies. 
8. See Kuklick, 1977, pp. xxii, 79-242, 565. Kuklick demonstrates 
that James and many of his contemporaries stood half-way between 
the 'gentlemen' philosophers of Emerson's era and the professional, 
university affiliated philosophers of today (see also Perry, 1935/ 
1974, 1, pp. 364, 377). James depended in part upon employment at 
Harvard and public lectures for his livelihood; he also made the 
distinction between his 'popular' or 'ministerial' philosophy (as 
Kuklick, 1977, p. 565, calls it), and his 'professional' work--that 
is, the philosophy he addressed to other professional philosophers. 
5. 
ground of New England philosophy. 
James' Problem  
James' actual assumption of philosophy as .a professional career 
came late in life. He began studies in chemistry in 1861 and in 
1865, joined Agassiz's expedition to Brazil (see Perry, 1935/1974, 
1, pp. 217-226). James' enthusiasm for the new science, combined 
with his disinclination for a career in medicine or business, had 
convinced him that his future might lie in the biological sciences.
9 
But the Brazilian expedition convinced him that he was temperamental-
ly unsuited to the scientific life,
10 
and that his contribution to 
the extension and development of evolutionary theory was not to be 
in the natural sciences themselves. When James came home from the 
Amazon he resumed study at the Harvard medical school but his 
interests were already becoming firmly fixed in philosophy and 
psychology.
11 
His period of depression which began in 1867 and 
lasted until 1870 was characterized not only by various physical 
ailments but by a kind of 'moral' despair as well. Trained for a 
medical or scientific career he had lost heart for it and found 
9. In 1863, James described his dilemma in a letter to his 
parents, and gave his reasons for deciding to join Agassiz's 
expedition (see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 215-216). 
10. In 1865 James wrote to inform his parents that he had had 
enough of life as a biologist and would go on no more scientific 
expeditions: "If there is anything I hate it is collecting" 
(quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 1, p. 223). 
 
, 11. As early as 1875, while still on Agassiz's expedition James 
wrote to Henry James: "When I get home I'm going to study philosophy 
all my days" (H. James (Ed.), 1920/1969, 1, pp. 227-236; see also 
chap. XIII). 
6. 
himself unable to work systematically towards such a career.
12 
While evolutionary theory proved itself tremendously exciting 
to James' scientific side, the physiological determinism that ac-
companied it made him feel that life in this new context had somehow 
become meaningless (see H. James (Ed.), 1920/1969, 1, pp. 152-153). 
For James and many of his contemporaries, the problem was to find 
a means of reconciling the traditional spiritual values that consti-
tuted such a major part of their heritage with Darwin's theory.
13 
In his article "Darwin's metaphor: Does nature select?" R.M. Young 
expands on the problems confronting the nineteenth century thinkers 
and concludes that by 1871 the principle of evolution was accepted: 
critics still debated the "adequacy of natural selection and the 
application of evolution to man's mental nature" (Young, 1971, p. 
498), but in general, the concept of evolution had carried the day. 
Darwin's mechanism, natural selection, which gave evolutionary 
theory a claim to scientific respectability and forced science and 
theology into a confrontation, itself ceased to be the central pillar 
upon which the theory continued to rest. As Young shows: 
12. James' crisis came to a head in 1869 in Cambridge where he 
had returned to complete his medical degree. His correspondence 
shows his total disinterest in medicine and science as possible 
careers, his concern with his health and his interest in philosophy 
(see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 233-234, 654, and chapter XVII). 
13. New England philosophy traditionally concerned itself with 
practical, moral issues. Philosophy as it was actually still 
practised in the New England of the 1860's and 1870's, consisted 
in the debates of societies set up for the purpose of discussing 
selected problems. As Kuklick (1977, p. 47), demonstrates, these men 
were not professional philosophers although some of the members of 
the Metaphysical Club were later to become so. Thus, there was a 
strong tension between philosophy and science; the issues were felt 
to be of personal significance to the participants. The idea that 
philosophical conclusions were significant and personal, that they 
mattered, to James and his circle, is perhaps the most important 
cultural effect the New England tradition had on the philosophy 
that was to come. 
7. 
It is clear that Darwin's putative mechanism of natural 
selection suffered grievously for philosophical, theo-
logical, and scientific reasons--and often for all three 
--at the hands of the critics who combined their reservations 
and/or their enthusiasms. But, as they concentrated on 
skirmishes the main issue was settled. Putting the matter 
another way, Darwin's mechanism--in its nineteenth century 
context--turned out to be a very frail reed, but in bending 
with the winds it allowed his real commitment to the uni-
formity of nature to contribute to the general movement 
of nineteenth-century naturalism. If we notice the extent 
to which the special status of natural selection was weakened 
by scientists, theologians, and philosophers, Darwin's 
achievement turns out to be much more like that of Lyell 
and of the other evolutionists: together, by a rather 
confused mixture of metaphysical, methodological, and 
scientific arguments which depended heavily on analogical 
and metaphorical expressions, they brought the earth, life, 
and man into the domain of natural laws (Young, 1971, p. 500). 
Evolutionary theory rapidly became the great nineteenth and twentieth 
century 'idea' or 'conception' of the natural world. 
That evolutionary theory as Darwin presented it was problematic 
is important. James' period of indecision corresponds with the 
'reworking' of Darwin's theory into an acceptable scientific model, 
so that science itself was in turmoil during this period. Darwin's 
mechanism acted as the 'catalyst' for the realignment of the sciences, 
but it was not accepted as the basis for the new science. Instead, 
the notion of natural selection made such an impact because of the 
particular stage science had reached by the time Darwin put forth 
his theory. In short, Darwin's theory seemed to confirm the tenden-
cies of nineteenth century thought towards: 
a confident belief in the possibility of a rigorous' and 
exact science of human nature, in which scientific methods 
would be as fruitful in the study of man as they had 
already been in the study of the physical world. Scientific 
method, that is, came to be held during this period as the 
key to learning everything about man--not merely everything 
there was to learn, but everything there was. And this 
implicit equation of everything there was to learn with 
everything there was at all marks the dimension of the 
change (Mackenzie, 1976, p. 331). 
It was this optimism that caught James' imagination and at the same 
8. 
time created the problem of where, in the midst of opportunities 
for scientific exploration, his energies could be best focused. But 
the theories of man that were being generated in the 1860's and 
1870's were inevitably bound to be problematic for James, given his 
background, and this added another dimension to his difficulties. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, theories of consciousness were 
already biologically based. The brain and nervous system were des-
cribed by fairly rigorous physical laws so that to take its place 
in the biological scheme of things, consciousness had to be related 
to neurological processes. Philosophers, psychologists, and neuro- 
physiologists began to theorize that the 'products' of consciousness 
were directly dependent on the underlying neurological workings of 
the brain and nervous system as these were understood according to 
the biological models of the time. The scientific method had long 
been successful in providing interpretation of the physical world 
through physics and chemistry. Biology had been steadily moving 
up to take its place beside the older sciences as a lawful and causal 
science and the acceptance of evolutionary theory confirmed and 
extended the role of biology in relation to the physical sciences. 
The first post-evolutionary conjecture about consciousness was the 
hypothesis that man is a conscious automaton. Automaton theory was 
a natural result of the new faith in biology: associationist 
theories of mind had already created a situation where consciousness 
was a fairly 'passive' process. Nothing could therefore be more 
natural than to make consciousness subservient to the underlying 
physical processes when biology was having such success in deriving 
laws for organic functioning in general. Consciousness in the auto- 
maton model is the result of brain cell interaction--it is a product-- 
9. 
thus it supervenes physiological functioning rather than intervening 
to produce behaviour on its own. In this way, evolutionary theory 
in the hands of James' senior contemporaries embraced a passive 
conception of mind in an otherwise active and adapting organism. 
And originally James was inclined to go even further than the 
declared automatists in advancing the position. By 1869 his scienti-
fic studies had convinced him "that we are Nature through and through, 
that we are wholly conditioned, that not a wiggle of our will hap-
pens save as the result of physical laws" (quoted in H. James (Ed.), 
1920/1969, 1, pp. 152-153). He planned at this time to write an 
attack on the automaton theory "showing how almost everyone who 
speculated about brain processes illicitly interpreted into his 
account of them links derived from the entirely heterogeneous uni-
verse of feeling" (James, 1890, 1, p. 130). 
Of course, James never wrote the proposed paper. Instead, he 
wrestled with the problems as they had been framed in the discussions 
held by the Metaphysical Club: 
Although he never accepted the Nihilism which Chauncey 
Wright delighted to espouse to his young friends, James 
respected tight argumentation; and Wright's presentation 
made James confront the dilemma facing all nineteenth 
century intellectuals--if Darwinian science is true, how , 
could he justify a spiritual orientation to life; if he 
accepted the scientific world view, how could he avoid a 
materialistic philosophy? These were serious questions: 
for James materialism meant determinism and determinism 
meant fatalism--he had no power over the course of his life 
and was, perhaps, destined to lead his aimless existence. 
But if this interpretation of Darwinian science was the 
final word, there was no great tragedy in personal failure 
because human existence had no meaning or significance 
(Kuklick, 1977, pp. 160-161). 
While other scientists of the time were able to accept the type of 
determinism that seemed to follow on the heels of their scientific 
model, James was not. And this was his major problem: it delayed 
his selection of a career and it prevented him from working 
1 0. 
productively on the studies he was engaged in at the time. 
Immediate rescue for James came in the form of Charles 
Renouvier's demarcation of the role of belief in philosophical specu-
lation, and his assertion of the validity of free will. But the prob-
lem of how consciousness efficaciously interacts with reality was 
to occupy James for the rest of his life. To understand the diffi-
culties James laboured under in seeking a new structure and function 
for consciousness, and to understand his achievements and failures, 
it is necessary to focus fora while on the nineteenth century world 
view and its antecedent conditions. 
When James declared his allegiance with the automaton theorists, 
he 'gave in' to the world view of the 1860's. His subsequent work 
can thus be viewed as a struggle to free himself of the bonds of 
this world view. More positively, James' work is an attempt to 
sketch a new framework for interpreting consciousness and its rela-
tionship with the external world. Therefore we shall leave James 
at this point for awhile, unhappily committed to the conscious auto-
maton position, and look at the conditions which gave rise to this 
particular view of mind in the first place. 
The Rationalist-Empiricist Tradition: Galileo and the Primary  
and Secondary Qualities Distinction  
The epistemological basis for modern psychology and for physics 
can be dated to Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, given in his polemical tract, Ii saggiatore, in 1623. 
This was an epistemological distinction because it provided specific 
guidelines about what could actually be known about objects in the 
world. Objects were now seen as having particular qualities which 
inhered in the actual objects; these were the objectively measurable 
properties such as shape, number, and motion, and were designated 
as the primary qualities. But objects appeared to have other pro- 
perties as well--colour, odour', taste, etc.,--which were not measur-
able in physical terms; they were thus not considered to be pro-
perties of the object itself, but were said to be evoked in the mind 
of the observer by the object, and were then imposed back upon the 
object by the mind. Primary qualities resided in the object itself, 
while secondary qualities existed only in the mind that perceived 
the object. 14 
14. The effects of the primary and secondary qualifies distinction 
on science, philosophy, and psychology cannot be overstated and it 
is appropriate to include Galileo's statement of the doctrine as it 
appeared in Il sagoiatore. He wrote: 
Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or 
corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it 
as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large 
or small in relation to other things, and in some specific 
place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest; as 
touching or not touching some other body; and as being onein 
number, or few, or many. From these conditions I cannot separ-
ate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination. But that 
it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and 
of sweet or foul odor, my mind does not feel compelled to bring 
in as necessary accompaniments. Without the senses as our 
guides, reason or imagination unaided would probably never 
arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes, 
odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as 
the object in which we place them is concerned, and that they 
reside only in the consciousness. Hence if the living creature 
were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihi-
lated. But since we have imposed upon them special names, dis-
tinct from those of the other and real qualities mentioned pre-
viously, we wish to believe that they really exist as actually 
different from those. 
...To excite in us tastes, odors, and sounds I believe 
that nothing is required in external bodies except shapes, 
numbers, and slow or rapid movements. I think that if ears, 
tongues, and noses were removed, shapes and numbers and motions 
would remain, but not odors or tastes or sounds. The latter, I 
believe, are nothing more than names when separated from living 
beings, just as tickling and titillation are nothing but names 
in the absence of such things as noses and armpits (quoted in 
Drake, 1957, pp. 274-277). 
Galileo's role in the development of modern science and epistemology 
has been emphasized for several reasons. First, as will be shown 
below, the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities strongly 
(contd.) 
12. 
Galileo made the distinction to facilitate his studies in 
physics: it provided an epistemological justification for reduc-
ing objects to those properties which could be treated mathematical-
ly and mechanically (see Mackenzie & Mackenzie, 1974, pp. 335- 
336), and for eliminating from the real world those properties which 
depended upon an observer for their existence. Galileo's rationale 
for making a clear distinction between the properties that objects 
exhibit in the absence of an observer, and those which are products 
of the interaction between object and observer, had its roots in 
Renaissance Neo-Platonist philosophy, which was not in itself 
concerned with the development of an empirical science. It was 
therefore Galileo's primary and secondary qualities distinction 
that gave science its independence from scholastic philosophy (see 
Thayer, 1968, p. 20), and ushered in the modern age. Science pros 
pered as a result of Galileo's pragmatic distinction and the grow-
ing independence of an empirical technological science from mediaeval 
philosophy ensured that the distinction between primary and second-
ary qualities would find its way into philosophy where it would 
provide the basis for a new conception of the mind and its relation 
14 (contd.) influenced James' conception of the 'worlds of 
reality' in the Principles. Second, while Newton provided a 
systematic description of the laws which appear to govern natural 
phenomena, so that it was the Newtonian, rather than the Galilean 
model of the physical world that James inherited, Newton himself 
was an empiricist in his epistemology and thus inherited the pro-
blems implicitly contained in the Galilean model (see Thayer, 1968, 
pp. 24-25). Finally, the epistemological tradition, as it was 
established by Descartes, Hobbes, Locke and their contemporaries 
used the distinction as a starting-point in their efforts to determine 
how the mind 'knows' the world. 
13. 
to the world.
15 
Thus, in 1690, Locke incorporated the primary 
and secondary qualities distinction into his epistemological 
treatise An essay concerning human understanding (see Locke, 1690/ 
1964, Bk, 2, VIII, 9-15, pp. 112-114). 
But if Galileo's distinction facilitated the growth of the 
physical sciences, 16 philosophers found the distinction more problem-
atic. Bas:cally, as Thayer writes: "The general problem is this: 
if the 'objective' world of bodies and the 'subjective' realm of 
mind and ideas are of a radically different character, how does the 
knowing mind, or how do ideas, ever give us reliable information 
about bodies?"
17 
The problem was epistemological: philosophy's 
15. See Mackenzie and Mackenzie, 1974, pp. 331-332, 335-336. It 
should be noted that Galileo's doctrine provided the catalyst for 
the reassessment of man's epistemological relationship with reality, 
as such a reassessment was implicitly demanded and partially develop-
ed by the Renaissance philosophers, notably Nicolas of Cusa, 
Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola and Giordano Bruno. For 
discussions of the role of Platonism and its relationship to the 
scientific revolution, see Cassirer, 1963; Cassirer, 1942, pp. 123- 
144, 319-346; Kristeller, 1943; Kristeller, 1944, pp. 220-226; 
Yates, 1966; and Yates, 1969. 
16. The success of Galileo's distinction as a means of understanding 
the physical world was assured in 1687 with the publication of 
Newton's Principia, wherein Newton formalized some of Galileo's 
definitions of the primary qualities in his concepts of motion (see 
Koyrg, 1965, pp. 9-10). 
17. (Thayer, 1968, p. 20). Beyond this more explicit problem, philo-
sophers had to look for a new assessment of man's very place in 
nature. Koyre describes the dilemma as follows: 
I have been saying that modern science broke down the barriers 
that separated the heavens and the earth, and that it united 
and unified the universe. And that is true. But, as I have 
said, too, it did this by substituting for our world of quality 
and sense perception, the world in which we live, and love and 
die, another world--the world of quantity, or reified geometry, 
a world in which, although there is a place for everything, 
there is no place for man. Thus, the world of science--the real 
world--became estranged and utterly divorced from the world of 
life, which science has been unable to explain--not even explain 
away by calling it "subjective" (Koyrg, 1968, p. 23). 
The point is that man has become an 'observer of' rather than a 
'participant in' the natural world. Given this reinterpretation of 
man's relational status to the rest of nature, it was a logical move 
(contd.) 
14. 
task became the exploration of the relationship between the 'knower' 
or 'observer' and what comes to be, and can be known. 
One of the most important results of the Renaissance and the 
Scientific Revolution was the birth of the idea among scientists and 
philosophers that man was capable of understanding the workings of 
nature and discovering the universal laws that governed the system.
18 
Epistemology supported and expanded this search--knowledge about the 
mental processes that enabled man to make certain deductions about the 
physical world supported the developing scientific system. Knowledge 
was to be gained through reasoning and observation, but both of these 
means were defined by the scientific doctrines and methodologies of 
the time. Newton's Principia convinced his contemporaries and those 
who followed of the efficacy of the new approach to knowledge. The 
obvious task for philosophers was to make epistemological enquiries 
into how the mind achieved this particular kind of knowledgel 9 While 
17. (contd.) for philosophy to turn to epistemological matters such 
as the limitations of perception and sensation in providing accurate 
knowledge about the world, and to objectify the study of conscious-
ness along the lines Galileo's primary and secondary qualities 
distinction suggested. 
18. For a contrast of mediaeval and modern views of man's relation-
ship with the cosmos, see Koyrg, 1968, pp. 1, 58, 90; Kuhn, 1959, 
p. 106; and Cassirer, 1963, pp. 53-55. 
19. Newton's Principia acted as a confirmation of the efficacy of 
the new approach to knowledge. Mathematics, mechanics, and observa-
tion were confirmed as the means of revealing the secrets of the 
universe, and scientists and philosophers firmly believed that Newton 
had discovered the universal laws that described natural events. 
Descartes had previously established that epistemological enquiries 
must constitute the basis for philosophical speculation, and this had 
a tremendous effect on the empiricist philosophers who followed him 
(see Williams, 1967, p. 354). If man had the capacity to understand 
the lawful workings of the universe, as the Principi.i appeared to 
confirm, then the means by which he derived its workings were of 
paramount importance. Newton's Principia, then, served as confirm-
ation that Descartes had taken the correct approach to philosophy. 
For the effect of Newton's Principia on the scientific community, 
see Koyrg, 1965, pp. 3-24, and for Descartes' epistemological starting 
• point, see Descartes, 1637/1964, pp. 50-67, and Descartes, 1641/ 
1970, pp. 134-143. 
philosophers had always studied the mind's relationship to the 
external world, that relationship was completely redefined during the 
scientific revolution. Traditionally, the scope of science had been 
limited to the possibilities for exploration within pre-existing 
metaphysical and epistemological systems; after Galileo and Newton, 
the reverse was true. Now the progress of science determined the 
questions which must be asked about mind. The traditional relation-
ship between metaphysics and epistemology was replaced by a new 
relationship between science and epistemology while metaphysics occu-
pied the limited and subordinate place formerly reserved for science. 
Mathematics and mechanics had replaced the scholastic methods for 
obtaining knowledge about the workings of the cosmos--science, and 
not metaphysics, became the key to complete knowledge about the world, 
and scientific knowledge became the 'indispensible' knowledge of the 
new era. Science, through the means of the primary and secondary 
qualities doctrine, took over from traditional metaphysics in defin-
ing what is real (see Mackenzie & Mackenzie, 1974, p. 332). This 
does not mean that metaphysical questions were no longer asked. They 
were. But they were posed from the standpoint of the mechanical and 
mathematical advances that had been made in science, and took, as 
their starting point, the laws and forces that appeared to govern 
the rest of nature. 
The primary and secondary qualities doctrine had the effect of 
dividing perceptual and sensational experience into two categories 
which were not reconcilable within experience itself. At the 
same time, it appeared to cut through the dilemma that had troubled 
epistemologists from the time of Aristotle because it provided a 
method of determining which types of perceptions yielded 'real' or 
16. 
'true' knowledge about objects and which did not. Perceptions of 
the primary qualities yielded 'real' knowledge while perceptions 
of the secondary qualities did not. This appeared to provide posit-
ive guidelines for the new epistemologists; through the application 
of mechanical and mathematical principles, the mind itself could be 
studied as a 'natural object' and its workings could be defined with-
in the context of the systems describing the rest of nature (see 
Mackenzie & Mackenzie, 1974, p. 332). Descartes' Discourse on method  
of rightly conducting the reason (1637), Locke's Essay on human under-
standing (1690), Berkeley's Principles of human knowledge (1710), and 
Hume's Enquiry into human understanding (1748), were all largely 
studies of how the mind attains knowledge and how secure that know-
ledge is. The focus of philosophic interest gradually narrowed so 
that the study of mind became explicitly psychological, and thus more 
explicitly 'scientific'. The works of Hartley, and the Mills,
20 
are 
almost exclusively analyses of how ideas are built up into ever more 
complex and inclusive ideas. Modern psycriology therefore has its 
beginnings in the epistemological philosophy that grew out of 
the scientific revolution. 
Within this eoistemolooical tradition, two main conceptions 
20. Hartley, as Boring (1950, pp. 195-7), and Peters (1962, p. 437), 
show, developed his physiological psychology of sensation as an 
extension of Newton's Principia. While Boring and Peters characterize 
Hartley as a physiological psychologist, his work still fits into the 
epistemological tradition because the nature of each association 
depends upon the character of the nervous 'vibrations' which immed-
iately precede it(see Peters, 1962, p. 441). The associationism of 
James Mill, based on a theory of mental mechanics, and John Stuart 
Mill's insistence on mental chemistry as the basis of the associations 
(see Boring, 1950, pp. 219-223), extend the epistemological concerns 
of philosophy into physiological models. That is, Hartley and the 
Mills brought the epistemological questions of philosophy into the 
domains of the physical sciences themselves, so that the question of 
how the mind knows what it knows and what exactly it is that it knows 
were now to be answered-empirically. 
17. 
of mind vied for supremacy and served as fbci for disagreement. 
These were the Cartesian rationalist, and Lockean empiricist, 
traditions. 
Distinctions Between the Rationalist and Empiricist Traditions  
' It is somewhat misleading to speak of rationalist and empiricist 
traditions as the philosophers involved were of such stature and 
individuality as to make categorization almost meaningless. However, 
the distinction is made in order to classify the solutions these 
philosophers developed to answer the epistemological puzzle of how the 
mind knows the world that is perceived. If all knowledge comes from 
the senses (as the empiricists maintained), then it is difficult to 
understand how man can have knowledge of anything which is not direct-
ly mediated through sensory experience. Knowledge of God, and the 
ability to derive the laws of nature in mathematical and mechanical 
terms are not obvious outcomes of perceptual experience. But if the 
mind contains certain innate ideas or predispositions which super-
sede and interpret perceptions (as the rationalist maintained), these 
ideas should lend themselves to classification; at least thefr exis-
tence as specific ideas or tendencies should be verifiable and this 
had not been the case.
21 	
This gave the empiricists a case for re- 
placing the 'innate ideas' hypothesis with a 'tabula rasa' conception 
of the mind. 
The question of whether sensory and perceptual experience was 
sufficient for the development of all knowledge, or whether the mind 
21. See Nelson, 1967, pp. 196-197.. The problem of innate ideas has 
never been satisfactorily resolved in psychology or philosophy, and 
as will be seen below, was'one of the.major difficulties James encount-
ered in setting up his pragmatic methodology and his radical empiricist 
philosophy of experience, 
18. 
contained certain innate ideas or predispositions gave rise to two 
sophisticated schools of thought: broadlyspeaking, the rationalists 
maintained that some knowledge was innate, while the empiricists 
contended that all knowledge was derived from experience. The leading 
figure of the Rationalist tradition was Descartes whose introspections 
led him to affirm that notions of God and self were innate,
22 
and 
later to include mathematical postulates and the apprehension of such 
primary qualities as time, space, and motion (see Peters, 1962, p. 
366). Leibnitz concurred by concluding that ideas in consciousness 
were known consciously only when the mind was "provoked by experience 
to reflect upon the necessary principles underlying the sensible 
world",
23 
 Malebranche made a more radical separation between the 
mind and the world. He insisted that all we know are ideas, and that 
these ideas are not dependent upon physical things (see Malebranche, 
1688/1923, pp. 75, 83, 210). Unlike Spinoza, however, Malebranche 
insisted that God exists separately from our ideas, and our knowledge 
of God comes as a result of his revelations to us (see Malebranche, 
1688/1923, pp. 165, 210-212; see also Peters, 1962, p. 391). 
Gassendi took a fairly moderate position, claiming that all knowledge 
comes from sensory experience, but ideas are derived from sensory 
experience by a higher mental faculty (see Peters, 1962, p. 377). 
22. See Peters, 1962, pp. 365-366. Descartes vacillated between 
affirming the existence of distinct innate ideas and the more moderate 
position that by innate ideas, he meant only that mind had the potent-
ial for thought. Peters accepts the latter statement as Descartes' 
final conclusion and emphasizes Descartes' firm anti-materialism in 
regard to the structure and function of the mind. 
23. Magill, 1968, p. 519. See also Leibnitz, 1765/1934, pp. 141- 
148. Leibnitz was replying to Locke's criticism of Descartes. Locke 
argued against the existence of innate ideas on the basis that children 
and savages do not have them nor are the ideas used in ordinary 
reasoning (see Locke, 1690/1964, Bk. 1, II, 1-27, pp. 67-76). 
19. 
Malebranche, by contrast, developed a rigid psycho-physical parallel-
ism wherein the translation of sensory images into ideas depended 
on God's and man's wills working together (see Malebranche, 1688/ 
1923, pp. 168-172). 
The rationalist contention that mind and body were substantially 
distinct is consistent with their conception of the mind as a single, 
undivided entity (see Boring, 1950, p. 168; Boring ascribes this con-
ception of mind to Descartes and Leibnitz), so that their conception 
that understanding and thinking were irreducible to the more basic 
psychological processes, rests upon a radical mind-body dualism. This 
does not mean that knowledge was not derived from the senses: the ra-
tionalists all agreed that experience was a necessary precursor of at 
least some types of thinking. The degree to which experience was per-
ceived as necessary for knowledge varied among philosophers. It does 
mean though, that the rationalists made a 'substantial' distinction be-
tween thought and perception: thoughts were not simply the summation of 
sensory experiences but were qualitatively distinct from such experi-
ences (see Peters, 1962, pp. 367, 377, 388, 389, 410; see also Boring, 
1950, p. 163). The rationalist mehtod for getting at the basis of con-
sciousness was introspective: it involved the discovery of irreducible 
ideas in consciousness in order to arrive at the thinking self. 
The empiricist position was essentially the opposite; the 
empiricist philosophers proclaimed that all knowledge was derived 
from experience. Hobbes was perhaps the first 'modern' empiricist 
to argue that all knowledge comes from the senses.
24 
Locke began 
24. Hobbes first maintained that all knowledge comes from the 
senses in De corpore, writing: 
So that if the appearances be the principles by which we know 
all other things, we must needs acknowledge sense to be the 
principle by which we know those principles, and that all the 
knowledge we have is derived from it (Hobbes, 1655/1962, 1, p. 389). 
20. 
his Essay by declaring that there are no innate principles in the 
mind (see Locke, 1690/1964, Bk. 1, 11, 1-5, pp. 67-68), and went on to 
write that experience contains all the material necessary for reason 
and knowledge (see Lock, 1690/1964, Bk. 2, 1, 1-2, p. 89). Berkeley's 
empiricism was opposed to Locke's--he insisted that objects must be 
perceived or perceiving if they are to be credited with existence (see 
Acton, 1967, p. 296), and he argued against Locke's ratification of 
the primary and secondary qualities doctrine, stating that nothing 
can possess primary qualities without possessing secondary qualities 
at the same time (see Berkeley, 1709/1843, CXXII-CXXIII, pp. 278-279, 
CXXX, p. 281). Sensible qualities exist only in the mind. At the 
same time, nothing like them can exist outside the mind (see Berkeley, 
1713/1843, pp. 156-161, and 1710/1843, XXVIII-XLI, pp. 100-101). But 
if Berkeley hereby established himself as an idealist, his idealism 
rested on empiricist principles. He took exception to the innate 
ideas hypothesis of Descartes (see •Acton, 1967, p. 297), and argued 
that the relations between the senses were sufficient to produce 
ideas (see Berkeley, 1709/1843, CLVI-CLX, pp. 290-291). Hume was a 
strict empiricist, believing that not only were all of our ideas 
derived from sensory experience, but that it was impossible to have 
ideas that were different from the totality of experience (see Hume, 
1739/1962, pp. 176-181; see also MacNabb, 1967, p. 76). 
Mind, for the empiricists, was a composite of large numbers of 
sensations and ideas. The sensations and ideas were derived from 
individual experience and combined through the compounding of simple 
ideas into complex ideas. Understanding and thinking were reducible 
to these ideas and their compounding with one another. Locke intro-
duced the idea of association as a principle to account for the 
21. 
adventitious connections between experiences (see Locke, 1690/1964, 
Bk. 2, XXXIII, 1-19, pp. 250-255), while Berkeley, and Hume in parti-
cular, extended the concept (see Hume, 1748/1962, pp. 38-46; see also 
Acton, 1967, p. 297; and Boring, 1950, p. 193). But it was Hartley 
who developed the principle of association into a systematic doctrine 
(see Boring, 1950, p. 193). Now the empiricists had a psychological 
model to work on, and philosophy began to be more specifically 'psycho-
logical' (see Boring, 1950, p. 219). Finally, associationism came 
into its own in the works of James and John Stuart Mill (see Peters, 
1962, pp. 450, 451, 462; see also Boring, 1950, pp. 223-224, 228-231). 
Common Assumptions of the Rationalists and the Empiricists  
The constructions of the rationalists and the empiricists--that 
is to say, those areas wherein their theories showed agreement--can 
be summarized under the headings of 'common assumptions'. To qualify 
as a common assumption in this context, a statement must generally 
describe a universal idea about the nature of reality. For example, 
while the scholastics had various 'mechanical' ideas about the per-
ceptual faculties, these were not connected with their view of the 
cosmos as the mechanical analogies used during the period after the 
Scientific Revolution were. In the first case, the mechanical approach 
to perception simply constituted a descriptive process. In the 
second case, it connected man to a mechanically described natural 
world, epistemologically and ontologically, and was thus a funda-
mental part of the world view. 
If the rationalists and the empiricists were divived on the 
question of the genesis of knowledge, they were united in a set of 
common, significant assumptions about the nature of the physical world 
and about some of the means of characterizing the structure and 
22. 
function of mind in relation to that world. These common assumptions 
defined the parameters of mental philosophy and described the corres-
pondence between mental philosophy and the physical sciences. They • 
• continued, in conjunction with the common assumptions about the nature 
of the physical world, to constitute a definable world view until 
the aftermath of the evolutionary debates challenged their efficacy 
as descriptive postulates. Their incompatibility with evolutionary 
theory seems obvious to us now, because they were challenged, modified, 
or translated into concepts with new implications, or replaced by 
new constructs during the period of intellectual ferment of the late 
nineteenth century. Until that time, the common assumptions of 
physics and mental philosophy described what is commonly called the 
Newtonian world-view. 
These assumptions were generated out of the scientific tradition 
and made explicit within mental philosophy. Newton's characteriza-
tion of the physical world thus had a direct effect on philosophy. 
In Newton's •view according to Burtt: 
the world of matter was a world possessing mathematical 
characteristics fundamentally. It was composed ultimately 
of absolutely hard, indestructable particles, equipped 
with the same characteristics which had now become familiar 
under the head of primary qualities, with the exception 
that Newton's discovery and exact definition of a new 
exact-mathematical quality of bodies, the vis inertiae, 
induced him to join it to the list. All changes in nature 
are to be regarded as separations, associations, and 
motions of these permanent atoms. 
At the same time it must be acknowledged that Newton's 
strong empiricism tended continually to tame and qualify 
his mathematical interpretation of the atomic theory. The 
atoms are predominantly mathematical, but they are also nothing 
but smaller elements of sensibly experienced objects (Burtt, 
1932, p. 228). 
The success of science in describing nature in mechanical-
mathematical terms had far-reaching effects for the philosophy of mind. 
Sensation, perception, and movement were described in terms of 
23. 
mechanical analogies. That these mentalistic factors could be so 
described became one of the common assumptions of mental philosophy. 
Correspondingly, mechanical analogies of mind were couched in element-
aristic or atomistic terms, and the ideas that were constructed out 
of the mechanical-atomistic paradigm were necessarily artificial 
units, more akin to Newton's descriptions of the physical world than 
to man's actual experiences in the world. The crucial exception to 
this statement is of course the Cartesian reservation of certain 
faculties, which constituted the unitary mind, and were considered 
to exist 'outside' the reach of the scientific analogy. Nevertheless, 
the Cartesians did use the mechanical-atomistic analogy to describe 
many mental events, including perception and emotion. Descartes 
explicitly regarded' the body as a machine which could be studied 
scientifically (see Peters, 1962, pp. 360-361). Gassendi made a 
separation between body and soul and used the laws of motion to ex-
plain sensations; he also followed Aristotle's biological model of 
consciousness (see Peters, 1962, pp. 377-378). Leibnitz theorized 
that the body was governed by the laws of motion (see Russell, 1967, 
p. 428). 
The empiricist philosophers took their start from science as 
well. Hobbes (see Peters, 1962, p. 381), excited by Galileo's 
laws of motion, described all aspects of human activity in terms of 
irreducible motions (see Hobbes, 1651/1962, III, p. ix; I, 21 IV, 
p. 38). Thus "desires and aversions are motions toward and motions 
away from objects" (Peters, 1962, p..381). Locke, too, described 
sensation as the movement of animal spirits (see Peters, 1962, p. 42; 
see also Locke, 1690/1964, Bk 2, VIII, 12, p. 113) and Hartley's 
theory of vibrations, in concert with his laws of association, linked 
24. 
sensory and mental events (see Peters, 1962, pp. 437-439). The 
'mental mixtures' of James Mill and John Stuart Mill's 'mental 
, chemistry' (see Boring, 1950, p. 229), are perhaps the two most 
radical theories to develop from the position that mental phenomena 
could be described mechanically. 
The corresponding tendency towards atomism--that is, the tend-
ency to reduce mental phenomena to their smallest particles or com-
ponents reached its climax in the works of the Mills (see Boring, 
1950, pp. 226, 230), but it had its beginning in Descartes' theory 
of the 'animal spirits'--minute particles which were ultimately 
responsible for bodily movement.
25 
Malebranche (see Peters, 1962, 
p. 390), accepted the doctrine of animal spirits and Hobbes contri-
buted to the reductionist conception of mind by connecting sensory 
objects and the brain through .a series of infinitely small motions 
(see Peters, 1962, p. 382). Leibnitz's monadology (see Peters, 1962, 
p. 410), is an extreme example of reductionism even though Leibnitz 
intended it to provide the unifying principles for the cosmos. Locke 
subscribed to Descartes' notion of the animal spirits (see Peters, 
1962, p. 421), and used the primary and secondary qualities doctrine 
to break sensations into their components (see Peters, 1962, p. 421). 
Hume's division of mind into simple and complex ideas is consistent 
with Locke's-and Berkeley's division of mind into components derived 
from experience (see Hume, 1739/1962, p. 177). Simple ideas were 
indivisible, while complex ideas could be broken down into simple 
ideas. Finally, Hartley propounded a complex theory of physical 
25. See Peters, 1962, p. 361. While the rationalists and empiricists 
disagreed on the range of mental phenomena which could be treated 
mechanically and elementaristically, they agreed that sensation and 
perception could both be treated accordingly. 
25. 
vibrations and a corresponding mental associationism to describe 
mental processes (see Peters, 1962, pp. 437-441). 
In all of these theories, the 'ideas' which formed the basic 
units of cognition'were in a sense artificial. Highly abstracted 
from experience, they made only tenuous contact with activities 
from daily life. The conceptions generated out of them had to be 
painstakingly constructed; in this they paralleled the atomistic 
units of the physical sciences (see, for example, Locke, 1690/1964, 
Bk. II). 
Rationalists and empiricists alike made a clear distinction 
between human and animal minds. Descartes described animals as 
possessing bodies alone (see Peters, 1962, pp. 372-373), and Gassendi 
concurred (see Peters, 1962, p. 373). Locke allowed that animals 
exhibited perception but added that their powers of perception were 
inferior to man's (see Peters, 1962, p. 377). Hume went further, 
giving animals some powers of inference, but he denied that they were 
capable of 'argument' or 'reasoning' (see Hume, 1748/1962, p. 112). 
The empiricists and rationalists described a kind of 'general-
ized' or 'universal' individual--that is, they studied how a non-
specified individual obtained knowledge and then generalized to the 
rest of mankind.
26 
Social interaction was not conceived as part of 
the essential conception of man so that the individual could be 
described apart from the social environment.
27 
 Both assumed that 
26. See Peters, 1962, p. 409. Peters says that Leibnitz's mona-
dology is individualistic because the monad is the microcosm reflecting 
the macrocosm. Further, the soul is the centre or heart of the cosmos, 
and therefore, he says, psychology is the key to the universe. The 
idea of one universal figure representing all of mankind is quite 
vividly demonstrated here in Peters' comments on Leibnitz' work. 
27. See Peters, 1962, p. 385. Hobbes came closer than any of his 
contemporaries to formulating a social psychology, as he was concerned 
with the relationship between individuals and society. 
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apart from accidental variation, all men were the same and thus 
there was no emphasis on individual differences. 
Like individual differences--Locke's notion of association by 
chance or custom was considered important as a process to account for 
how individuals made mistakes--the processes of how the emotions were 
generated were considered important. But in comparison to the vast 
amount of effort spent in constructing the processes by which ideas 
come to be associated, little was done with them. The roots of emotion 
and motivation--pleasure and pain--were conceived of as primitive 
constituents of experience which entered into associative linkages 
with ideas. The mechanism of motivation was therefore the same as 
the mechanism for thought, and this mode of treating motivation can be 
found consistently in the works of empiricist philosophers from Hobbes 
and Locke through to Bain (see Hobbes, 1651/1962, 3, pp. 40-43; Peters, 
1962, pp. 421, 433, and Bain, 1875/1888, pp. 9-13). The rationalists 
were even less interested in the passions per se, placing more emphasis 
on purely epistemological concerns. Thus, the two traditions combined 
in the assumption that the means of describing how man came to know 
the world, through reason of ideation, was the primary task of mental 
philosophy. Finally (as Smith emphasizes), epistemological methods 
were introspective rather than experimental or empirical, and it was 
assumed by rationalists and empiricists alike that introspection was 
the proper method of studying the mental processes (see Smith, 1970, 
pp. 20-21). 
Problems within the Rationalist-Empiricist Tradition, and the Changes  
in Meaning in the Common Assumptions  
By the middle of the nineteenth century the empiricist tradition 
had culminated in the great system of associationism constructed by 
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Locke, Hartley, Hume and the Mills. Mental philosophers were now 
equipped with a set of laws to describe mental processes and these 
laws were correlated with the lawful description of the physical 
world. 
But all along, there were problems; from the time of Galileo, 
philosophers had struggled to overcome major difficulties in construct-
ing an epistemology correlated with the picture of the physical world. 
The rationalist position was becoming more and more problematic be-
cause its proponents could not substantiate the hypothesis of innate 
ideas which was based on an ontological mind-matter dualism. In 
Britain, the growing demand by scientists for uniformity in nature 
was coming into severe conflict with the Cartesian structure of the 
cosmos. Correspondingly, the empiricists had difficulties with their 
contention that all knowledge was derived from sense experience (see 
Thayer, 1968, pp. 23-24). If all knowledge was derived from sensory 
experience, how were they to account for knowledge where the sensory 
base seemed inadequate--for example, abstract mathematical relations? 
And both traditions had to deal with the distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities. Formulated by Galileo and ratified by 
Newton, it facilitated the progress of science but it left human 
experience with a totally unreliable status. Man was both creator 
of the universe--in the sense of discovering its hidden properties-- 
and the by-product of his own creation. And by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, man's place in the universe was as problematic 
as it had been in the early seventeenth-century (see Koyr6, 1965, 
pp. 22-23). 
Science and philosophy are not 'static' disciplines; in the 
period under review, at least, they progressed rapidly. And as they 
progress, their common unifying assumptions may undergo subtle changes 
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in meaning; these changes can facilitate the progress or development 
of the discipline without forcing an explicit paradigm shift within 
the discipline. Newtonian science went through various developmental 
stages, so that mid-nineteenth century science had little in common 
with the science of Galileo and Newton either in its methodology or 
in its content. Mental philosophy equally exhibited congruent develop-
ment in terms of the common assumptions described above until the 
mid-nineteenth century, when a new crisis point was reached. This•
crisis came about as a result of the development of neurophysjological 
research into the workings of the nervous system. The two streams 
which defined the Newtonian world--science and mental philosophy-- 
could no longer continue to exist as interactive but nevertheless 
ontologically separate strands of the world view. They now had empir-
ically based implications for one another which could not be ignored. 
The common assumptions of mental philosophy therefore subtly changed 
throughout the nineteenth century as a result of being linked with 
experimental, largely physiological, investigations of the brain and 
nervous system. 
Therefore, while the earliest attempts to incorporate evolu-
tionary theory into an integrated view of man and nature display sub-
stantial continuity with earlier speculations, they also display con-
siderable modifications of these. Automaton theory was the earliest 
attempt at a reformulation of the relationship between man and nature 
in evolutionary terms. While ostensibly based on evolutionary 
theory, it actually owed little to it except a ratification of natural-
istic and materialistic tenets of thought, and a rationale for expand-
ing these into a general theory. The remainder of this introduction 
will present the views of the automaton theorists and their immedi- 
ate predecessors and show how they represent the interaction between 
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philosophical speculation and nineteenth century physiology, general-
ized by means of evolutionary theory to provide expectations of an 
integrated world-picture. The major emphasis will be on showing how 
tenets of the philosophical tradition, while not rejected, had their 
meanings changed by their application to experimental data. 
The Development of Neurophysiological Models  
The essential difference between the works of Hartley and the 
Mills and the works of Bain, Lewes, Carpenter, and Spencer is the 
importance the latter group placed on empirical observations about 
how the brain and nervous system actually function. Bain's work in 
particular, marks a pivotal point in the history of epistemological 
speculation, for it was Bain who recognized the importance of linking 
empirical studies in physiology to the laws of association as they 
had been generated by the mental philosophers--notably Hume, Hartley, 
and the Mills. In 1851, Bain wrote to John Stuart Mill: "There 
is nothing I wish more than so to unite psychology and physiology 
that physiologists may be made to appreciate the true ends and drift 
of their researches into the nervous system" (Bain, quoted in Young, 
1970, p. 103). At the same time Bain recognized the importance of 
physiological studies for psychology: 
Before 1855 Bain had shaped his philosophy of the mind. 
Empiricism was the fundamental characteristic; induction 
was the logical principle; the study of the body was to 
precede that of the mind, and the accumulation of physio-
logical data was to be the beginning of wisdom (Peters, 
1962, p. 457). 
To understand Bain's accomplishment it is first necessary to 
look at the achievements and theories of nineteenth century physiology. 
Physiological research in the nineteenth century was dominated by the 
sensory-motor model (see Boring, 1950, pp. 72-80; Young, 1970, pp. 
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79, 197-223, and Peters, 1962, pp. 625-626). Just how closely the 
sensory-motor view of the physiologists correlated with the rationalist-
empiricist tradition is evident in the break physiologists first made 
• between sensory-motor activity and the functions of the cerebral 
centres. Flourens, a confirmed Cartesian working in the 1820's 
claimed that the spinal cord and lower brain centres controlled mus-
cular movement while the higher brain centres acted as the seat of 
perception, reasoning, and will. The will, therefore, did not direct-
ly cause movements but it did provoke them (see Young, 1970, pp. 67, 
72-73). 
Magendie retained the separation of 'higher' and 'lower' 
nervous systems but asserted that "will is a cerebral action which 
causes motion" (Young, 1970, p. 87). Magendie took his model from the 
sensationalism of Condillac, translating the doctrine into physiologi-
cal terms so that he "considers mental phenomena to be functions of 
the brain and argues that their study 'is, like the study of any other 
organ, part of physiology" (Young, 1970, p. 83). In this way Magendie 
intended to bring the higher mental processes into science as objects 
available for study. 
But what was the nature of the mental processes that Magendie 
hoped to treat as natural objects? Young gives us the answer: 
The functions which he investigates and which he attempts 
to relate to the nervous system are the traditional 
normative categories of philosophical analysis: sensibility, 
memory, judgement, and desire or will. He makes no attempt 
to consider whether or not these categories are adequate 
for the explanation of experience and behaviour. While he 
considers thought a function of the brain, he does not• 
enquire into the functional role of thought in the lives of 
organisms. Thus, in practice, his psychology had stronger 
links with metaphysics than with biology (Young, 1970, 
pp. 83-84). 
Specifically, Magendie based his purportedly physiological analysis 
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of mental processes on Destutt de Tracy's 'ideology'--the analysis 
of ideas into their sensory bases--which was in turn an extension 
of Condillac's sensationist empiricism. Magendie's unquestioning 
acceptance of the concepts of mind generated byphilosophical specu-
lation, which had arisen in the first . place from the epistemological 
difficulties engendered by the scientific revolution, was typical of 
the physiology of the time. This acceptance of philosophical assump-
tions about the nature of mind characterized most of early nineteenth 
-century psychology and physiology. 
Mueller also made use of the sensory-motor distinction, maintain-
ing that sensory impressions are translated into ideas in the cere-
bral hemispheres which also direct the mind towards selected sensory 
impressions (see Mueller, quoted in Young, 1970, p. 91). It took the
discoveries of Fritsch and Hitzig in 1870, and Ferrier in 1873, of 
motor areas in the cerebral cortex,to force recognition of the fact 
that the higher brain centres had a role to play in the elicitation 
of movement (see Young, 1970, p. 109, Hearnshaw, 1964, p. 73). 
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, physiologists 
set out to verify selected abstracted philosophical assumptions. They 
were successful enough in translating these assumptions into phsyio-
logical terms so that by the middle of the century, Bain felt confi-
dent that - a sound empirical base for psychology had been constructed. 
But we have already' seen that the concept of mind generated 
by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume was described by 'artificial' 
• units borrowed from science. Ideas were 'abstract'--they were not 
defined in terms of the particular experiences of distinct individuals. 
Instead, these 'ideas' were fitted into mechanical, atomistic, non-
developmental models of cognition of the type given in Hobbes' 
Leviathan (see Hobbes, 1651/1962, p. ix). Concepts of consciousness 
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had largely been developed in response to the problems and successes 
in science. And if physiology was to become an exact science, the 
'mind' that it dealt with necessarily had to be constructed as a 
parallel to the construction of the physical world. Whether or not 
such a concept of mind Was suitable from a strictly biological per-
spective was not initially questioned, and neurophysiological theoriz-
ing occupied a kind of middle ground, extending the potential domain 
of the natural sciences by 'concretizing' the assumptions of mental 
philosophy. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between physiology and mental 
philosophy was not a simple one; the problem for physiological psycho-
logy was not merely one of finding 'data' which corresponded with 
philosophical postulates. The epistemological dualism necessitated 
by the primary and secondary qualities distinction, ratified by Locke 
and Newton, and the equally strong ontological mind-matter dualism 
of the Cartesian tradition, made an easy identification between brain 
events and mental events impossible. The nineteenth century investi-
gators could not treat mind solely as a natural object in a world of 
other natural objects, for both streams of the philosophical tradition 
had been based on the essential differences between mind and matter 
the knower and the known. The empiricist insistence that all know-
ledge was gained from the senses did not do a lot to overcome these 
difficulties; Newton agreed with the rationalist position that the 
mere association of sensory information was insufficient to generate 
the universal laws. At the same time he was unwilling to embrace the 
Cartesian hypothesis of innate ideas. The problem was further inten-
sified by the recognition that the process of discovering the laws 
of nature was attributable to man's reasoning powers. On every level, 
as Koyre shows, the split between mind and nature was complete (see 
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Koyr6, 1965, pp. 22-23). 
When physiologists began to look for the physiological corre-
lates of mental activity, they were faced with the problem that 
reason and will were in a sense 'metaphysical' aspects of man's nature 
and therefore must be at some remove from direct observation, or 
at least functionally separated from the more 'animalistic' processes.
28 
That man shared some 'mental capacities' with the animal kingdom had 
been recognized from the beginning by both philosophical traditions. 
The functional split in the nervous system between higher and lower 
centres and the corresponding tendency of theorists to try to ignore 
evidence for cerebral localization (see Young; 1970, pp. 202, 210-224), 
was almost inevitable. 
Thus Bell's and Magendie's simultaneous discovery of the 
sensory-motor distinction was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm 
(see Young, pp. 78-80). The sensory-motor distinction was so import-
ant because it ratified the separation between the 'higher' and 
'lower' centres. Young writes: 
There was no role for the hemispheres in the direct 
production of muscular motion, just as there was none 
for any of the senses except sight. The sensory-motor 
analysis of the spinal cord and its partial extension 
to structures higher up the neuraxis was a distinct 
topic from the analysis of the phenomena of the under- 
standing. It employed different methods and assumptions 
and was part of a separate intellectual discipline 
(Young, discussing the structure of Magendie's theory 
of mind, 1970, p. 87). 
The sensory-motor distinction, and the corresponding functional 
'split' in the nervous system satisfied the initial demands of the 
scientific and philosophical traditions. Physiologists were explicitly 
28. Reason and will were metaphysical aspects of man's nature 
in the sense in which Hodgson defines metaphysics as the study of 
"phenomena which can be satisfactorily treated only from a subject-
ive point of view" (Hodgson, 1870, I, p. 3). 
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conducting empirical studies on those aspects of 'mental' function-
ing which had already been agreed to belong to the natural world. 
And they were at least implicitly leaving those more 'metaphysical' 
qualities where they traditionally belonged--that is, to mental 
philosophy. 
But the situation could not last: the effect of 'moving up' 
the nervous system was to gradually 'automatize' the very attributes 
of consciousness--reason and will--which had distinguished man in the 
first place, or to drive their characterization, in terms of their 
structure and function, back into metaphysics, thus ratifying the 
mind-matter distinction. 
Bain and Mueller--the Marriage of Psychology and Physiology  
This was the general state of the physiological model and its 
relationship with philosophy when Bain began his task of integrating 
psychology with physiology. And the nascent psychology had its prob-
lems too: 
• Lockean tradition had been toward the sensory side, and 
• ran the risk of a passive sensationalism. Neglect of 
spontaneous activity, motor phenomena, and overt behaviour 
was a natural consequence of the epistemological interests 
of the empiricists and their commitment to sensation as 
the primary (ultimately the only) source of knowledge 
(Young, 1970, p. 114). 
This meant that 'psychology', as it had peen developed by the Mills, 
had to be reworked before the discoveries of Magendie and Mueller 
could be integrated with it. The great edifice of associationism 
that James and John Stuart Mill had developed was not fundamentally 
incompatible with neurophysiological data, but the Mills, preferring 
to confine themselves to purely epistemological matters had neglected 
some of those aspects of consciousness that concerned the physiologists. 
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A bridge had to be built between the two systems. And this bridge 
was to be Bain's most important contribution to psychology (see 
Young, 1970, pp. 94, 98, 114-115). 
Bain bridged the two disciplines by stressing the importance 
of activity and movement. He did this by making internal movement 
prior to sensation: 
Action is a more intimate and inseparable property of our 
constitution than any of our sensations, and in fact 
enters as a component part into every one of the senses, 
giving them the character of compounds while itself is 
a simple and elementary property (Bain, 1868, p. 59). 
The organism is active before it is anything else: spontaneous 
movements are a primary feature of nervous activity and they exist 
prior to, and independent of, sensation. Bain is disputing the old 
empiricist conception wherein activity was stimulated solely by in-
coming sensation: in the older paradigm, activity was dependent upon 
sensation and it is in this sense that the organism is passive. 
Bain's inspiration that activity preceded sensation overturned the 
older assumption, and the concept of the active organism provided 
Bain with the means of making the connection between physiology and 
psychology. Bain cpuld then go on to expand his position so that: 
We suppose movements spontaneously begun, and accidentally 
causing pleasure; we then assume that with the pleasure 
there will be an increase of vital energy, in which 
increase the fortunate movements will share, and thereby 
increase the pleasure. Or, on the other hand, we suppose 
the spontaneous movements to give pain, and assume that, 
with the pain, there will be a decrease of energy, extend-
ing to the movements that cause the evil, and thereby 
providing a remedy. A few repetitions of the fortuitous 
concurrence of pleasure and a certain movement, will lead 
to the forging of an acquired connection, under the law 
of Retentiveness or Contiguity, so that, at an after time, 
the pleasure or its idea shall evoke the proper movement 
at once (Bain, 1875/1888, p, 315). 
Volition is now defined in terms of neurophsyiological activity 
combined with the sensations received as 'input' from the environment. 
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When Magendie defined will in terms of cerebral movements (see 
Young, 1970, P. 87), psychology and philosophy were faced with the 
danger of a materialist notion of volition. Bain's solution to the 
problem was rather brilliant. By making activity prior to sensation, 
he ensured that the organism at least moved, was receptive, etc., 
as a natural consequence of the life process. Spontaneity was possible 
in this model: the effect of any stimulus upon an individual would 
be partly determined by the state of the individual at the time he 
is stimulated, so that action depends on the interaction of the indi-
vidual with the environment. This spontaneity is the basis of Bain's 
voluntarism; the individual is capable of acts which cannot be de-
fined solely as a consequence of incoming stimulation, nor need there 
be any appeal to metaphysics as such (see Bain, 1875/1888, pp. 303- 
307). 
At the same time, Bain regarded the laws of association as 
descriptive of the development of mental processes, and the thence 
continuing interaction of the individual with the world. The laws 
of association described the means whereby voluntary actions were 
'conditioned' or 'learned'. The position becomes clearer if we look 
at the source of Bain's inspiration for his concept of activity. He 
found it in Mueller's work (see Young, 1970, p. 116),--not, interest-
ingly, in Mueller's work on the cerebral cortex, but in his work 
on the development of volition. Mueller wrote: 
Thus a connection is established in the yet void mind 
between certain sensations and certain motions. When 
subsequently a sensation is excited from without in any 
one part of the body, the mind will be already aware 
that the voluntary motion which is in consequence executed 
will manifest itself in the limb which was the seat of the 
sensation; the foetus in utero will move the limb that 
is pressed upon, and not all the limbs simultaneously. 
The voluntary movements of animals must be developed in 
the same Manner (Mueller, 1842, pp: 936-7, quoted in Young, 
1970, p. 116). 
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Here then, in Bain and Mueller, psychologist and physiologist respect-
ively, is the marriage between associationism and physiology: "With 
the incorporation of Mueller's theory into Bain's psychology, the 
union of sensory-motor physiology with associationism is, in principle, 
complete" (Young, 1970, p. 119). Bain contributed the 'psychology' 
in the sense that the laws of association could be productively used 
to describe the means whereby voluntary actions were first produced and 
later became 'habitual' activities. He also retained an appropriate 
organism for physiology: his concept of activity enabled theorists 
to describe the genesis of movement from within the individual organ-
ism so that psychology and physiology could begin with the examin-
ation of the internal state of the organism. 
It is appropriate then, to look at the nature of the concept 
of consciousness generated by Bain and Mueller. Young remarks that 
Bain brought psychology out of the passive sensationalism that 
characterized empiricist epistemology and transformed it into a neuro-
physiological science which concentrated on activity, feeling, will-
ing, and knowing (see Young, 1970, p. 120). This is true enough as 
far as it goes. But Bain's notion of activity is defined in terms of 
the early 'blind' or purposeless 'reflex movements' of the organism: 
these are then conditioned into meaningful, or purposive movements 
and the conditioning process consists of the interaction of reflex 
movements and sensations. Ideas, generated by the outcomes of these 
interactions, are developed as results or products. The laws of 
association describe the process whereby behaviour actually becomes 
purposive and conscious ideation develops. But the role of the 'mind', 
or 'consciousness', or 'thought' has undergone a drastic reduction 
as an efficacious determinant of activity. Purposive movement, in 
Bain's system, is the result of movements and ideas uniting with one 
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another in conjunctions described by the laws of association. Will 
is redefined in terms of the choices made from the possible alter-
natives (see Bain, 1875/1888, pp. 381-382, 497-498). The 'alter-
natives' develop according to the associative process, and all 
volitional activity can be meaningfully discussed within this psycho-
logical paradigm. 
Bain combined associationism with Mueller's sensory-motor para-
digm so that 'will' could no longer be discussed independently from 
the nervous system (see Young, 1970, pp. 118-119). He then specifi-
cally denied that any special agency or 'free will' existed to aid 
the individual in performing extraordinary activities (see Bain, 
1875/1888, p. 500), and argued instead that: "Every act that follows 
upon the prompting of a painful or pleasurable state, or of the 
association with these, is a voluntary act, and is all that is meant 
or can be meant by moral agency" (Bain, 1875/1888, p. 501). While 
Bain's concept of activity seemed to include enough spontaneity to 
guarantee the efficaciousness of mind to contemporaries like J.S. 
Mill (see Peters, 1962, p. 459), he had dispensed with the idea of a 
soul or unifying agency for consciousness and wrote in The senses  
and the intellect: 
When the mind is in the exercise of its functions, the 
physical accompaniment is the passing and re-passing of 
innumerable streams of nervous influence. Whether under 
a sensation of something actual, or under an emotion or 
an idea, or a train of ideas, the general operation is 
still the same. It seems as if we might say, no currents, 
no mind. The transmission of influence along the nerve 
fibres from place to place seems the very essence of 
cerebral action. 29 
This statement seems very reasonable in the context of present- 
29. Bain, 1868, p. 53; see also Bain, 1855, pp. 61-62, where 
Bain comes to the same conclusions regarding the importance of 
currents. The 1868 edition is quoted here because Bain's general 
statement is clearer. 
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day psychology. But it was considered far more radical when Bain 
first made it in 1855, and it demonstrates the extent of the trans-
fer from the purely epistemological conceptions of mind to a bio-
logical base for mental activity. Bain took care to show that the 
physical structure of the nervous system was related to mental funct-
ioning (see Bain, 1868, pp. 10-53). At the same time he tried to 
rid psychology of any metaphysical descriptions of mental functioning, 
notably in regard to the will. Volition and reason would now be 
discussed from a physiological point of view. To discuss a volition-
al act was coming to mean that the biological factors, as well as 
the psychological associative factors had to be included; at the same 
time, any discussion of the 'special' status of the volitional action 
was precluded. Will and reason were now defined as natural, non-
mysterious, scientifically describable qualities of man, firmly 
rooted in cerebral physiology. 
Spencer's Radical Associationism  
While Bain did not regard himself as a determinist, George 
Henry Lewes took astrong stand in favour of a determinist approach 
to questions concerning the efficacy of consciousness. Lewes reduced 
all volition to physiological dynamics, and sought the conditions for 
volition within the neurophysiological theories of his time. He 
once wrote, rather dramatically, that: 
All the massive evidence to be derived from human conduct, 
and from our practical interpretations of such conduct 
points to the conclusion that actions, sensations, emotions, 
and thoughts are subject to causal determination no less 
rigorously than the movements of the planets or the fluctu-
ations of the waves. Indeed, no modern thinker of any worth 
would affirm that our volitions are uncaused,--are freed 
from the inexorable subjection to conditions. The question 
is, what are the conditions? (Lewes, 1879, p. 102). 30 
30. See also Smith, 1970, p. 52. Smith writes that Lewes believed 
(contd.) 
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Lewes is important in this account if only because he first acquaint-
ed Herbert Spencer with philosophy (see Young, 1970, P. 162). More-
over, Lewes' commitment to the physiological approach to mind 
influenced Spencer in the construction of his own biological model 
of consciousness. 
Spencer's wholehearted commitment to the task of formulating 
and systematizing his biological theory of evolution determined his 
approach to psychology. , His famous statement that life can be defin-
ed as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external 
relations" (Spencer, 1870, 1, p. 293), included all possible physical 
and mental activities and the 'growth' or 'adaptive' processes that 
fitted the organism into an active interaction with the environment. 
He concentrated on the neurophysiological basis for consciousness 
and used the laws of association to explain the conscious interaction 
between the individual and the environment. According to Spencer, 
consciousness accompanies movement, but it does not instigate it 
(see Peters, 1962, pp. 665-666). Spencer distinguishes between vol- 
untary and automatic activity, but the distinction is an experiential 
one only; the neurophysiological process is the same in both types 
of activity: 
Between an involuntary movement of the leg and a voluntary 
one, the difference is that whereas the involuntary one 
occurs without previous consciousness of the movement to 
be made, the voluntary one occurs only after it has been 
represented in consciousness; and as the representation 
of it is nothing else than a weak form of the psychical 
state accompanying the movement, it is nothing else than 
30. (contd.) that there were no differences between voluntary 
and involuntary actions; mind and body "were merely contrasting 
aspects of the functional whole", and the brain, as well as the 
lower centres, functioned in terms of reflex actions. 
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a nascent excitation of the nerves concerned, precdding 
their actual excitation. Involuntary movement implies 
that the psychical states accompanying the impressing 
and the action, are so coherent that the one follows the 
other instantly; while voluntary movement implies that 
they are so imperfectly coherent, that the psychical state 
accompanying the action does not follow instantly--is 
partially aroused before it is fully aroused; and so 
occupies consciousness for an appreciable time. Thus the 
cessation of automatic action and the dawn of volition are 
one and the same thing (Spencer, 1870, 1, p. 497). 
Actions or movements are determined by experience (individual 
or generational), which is registered in the individual nervous system 
(see Spencer, 1870, 1, p. 502). As the individual develops, "Both 
memory and reasoned action tend to lapse into automatism" (Young, 
1970, p. 180; see also Spencer, 1870, 1, p. 499). Spencer completes 
his deterministic stand when he argues that if psychology is to make 
any sense as a science, then free will is impossible (see Spencer, 
1870, 1, p. 503). Furthermore, he states, free will: 
would be at variance with the beneficent necessity displayed 
in the evolution of the correspondence between the organism 
and its environment. ...As it is, we see that the continuous 
adjustment of the vital activities to activities in the 
environment must become more accurate and exhaustive. - The 
life must become higher and the happiness greater--must do 
so because the inner relations are determined by the outer 
relations. But were the inner relations partly determined 
by some other agency, the harmony at any moment existing 
would be disturbed, and the advance to a higher harmony 
impeded (Spencer, 1870, 1, p 503). 
Spencer did not specifically declare himself as an automatist; 
he was endeavouring to bring psychology into the biological sciences 
as anaturalistic science in its own right and his argument that the 
acceptance of 'supernatural' forces such as free will would prevent 
a naturalistic interpretation of mind is in keeping with his recogni-
tion that evolutionary theory required a functional naturalistic, 
definition of mind. The importance of Spencer's position must not be 
underestimated because Spencer's willingness to sacrifice free will 
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in favour of an orderly evolutionary progress was a critical factor 
in the immediate development of evolutionary psychology as will be 
shown below. 
William Carpenter's Dilemma  
Spencer's assurance that the "Newtonian" concept of progress 
could be redefined in evolutionary terms reflects a radical optimism 
and a faith in science that was not shared by all of his contemporaries. 
The problems faced by the nineteenth century psychologists and 
physiologists find better expression in the works of William Carpenter 
than in those of Spencer. As physiology advanced, more and more of 
conscious activity seemed to be explainable within the paradigm of 
physiological research. That is, reason, memory, and movement all 
seemed to have physiological correlates in the brain itself; when 
certain areas of the cerebral cortex and cerebellum were stimulated 
or ablated, mental processes were substantially altered. Advances in 
physiology were rapid; if progress in the biological sciences was 
to continue along the paths opened byphysiology and evolutionary 
theory, it appeared likely that a valid naturalistic understanding of 
the mental processes was in sight (see Mackenzie, 1976, pp. 331-332). 
Carpenter was a physiologist, and a successful one. He was a 
conscientious and dedicated scholar, and he recognised the signifi-
cance of the biological and physiological discoveries of the era. He 
accepted Darwin's theory of evolution when Darwin published it in 
1859 (see Smith, 1978, p. 11). And he was later to recognise that 
the discoveries of Fritsch and Hitzig and Ferrier, of motor areas in 
the cerebral cortex were both important and problematic in terms of 
the construction of an efficacious model of consciousness (see Young, 
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1970, pp. 211, 214). But these discoveries only provided additional 
support, in Carpenter's view, for the advance of scientific material-
ism. By 1855, Carpenter was already concerned about the dangers of 
an emerging scientific materialism which seemed to be growing more 
rapidly than in any previous period of epistemological history. Thus 
Carpenter wrote: 
The chief subject of embarrassment, however, is rather 
the nature and source of the Will itself, than the 
condition of its operation; for whilst a careful analysis 
of our own consciousness throws much light upon the latter, 
the scientific investigation of the former has seemed to 
lead to results which are inconsistent with our intuitive 
conviction of freedom, as well as with our scarcely less 
intuitive notion of moral responsibility (Carpenter, 1855, 
p. 618). 
Carpenter saw, more clearly than most, that biology was taking 
its place in the sun. At the same time, he was determined to 
"exhibit the power and reality of the human will" (see Peters, 1962, 
p. 663). The accumulation of physiological data (by 1855) 'proved' 
that cerebral action produced movement only indirectly; Carpenter's 
solution to the problem was to suggest that the will 'works' through 
voluntary attention (see Carpenter, 1855, p. 621): it focuses or 
holds the attention on certain ideas and it is through this means 
that 'willed' or 'voluntary' actions are performed. The ability to 
maintain a particular thought or train of thoughts in consciousness 
prevents the individual from behaving as a conscious automaton in 
all instances. Carpenter concluded that it is only when the will 
specifically focuses the attention that the individual behaves in a 
voluntary fashion: 
For we have seen that, in so far as the directing influence 
of the Will over the current of thought is suspended, the 
individual becomes a thinking automaton, destitute of the 
power to withdraw his attention from any idea or feeling 
by which his mind may be possessed, and as irresistibly 
impelled, therefore, to act in accordance with this, as 
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the lower animals are to act in obedience to their 
instincts (Carpenter, 1855, p. 627). 
Carpenter limited the efficacy of the will to its power to 
maintain selected ideas in consciousness; the nervous system was 
responsible for automatic or reflex actions, and most actions, such 
as walking, which at first require volition, were eventually perform-
ed by habit. Furthermore, Carpenter stated: 
that even in voluntary movements the Will cannot single-out 
any one muscle from the group with which it usually cooper-
ates, so as to throw this into separate contraction, but is 
limited to determining the results, it seems pretty obvious 
that even here the grouping is effected by the endowments 
of those Automatic centres from which all motor impules 
immediately proceed to the muscles, and not by cerebral 
agency (Carpenter, 1855, P. 742). 
Will provided the determination to perform a particular act, but did 
not determine the muscular action itself whereby the act was perform-
ed. Moreover, will seemed to be an acquired capacity for the 
individual: 
For it becomes obvious that the acquirement of Voluntary 
power over the movements of the body is just as gradual 
as it is over the direction of the thoughts; all the 
activity of the body, as well as of the mind, being in the 
first instance automatic; and the Will progressively 
extending its domination over the former, as over the 
latter, until it brings under its control all those 
muscular movements which are not immediately required 
for the conservation of th.1 body, and turns them to its 
own uses (Carpenter, 1855, pp. 742-743). 
The will saves us from being automatons, but the operations of 
the will itself are fairly restrictdd; willed action is exceptional, 
difficult, and volitional abilities are developed abilities (see 
Carpenter, 1855, p. 742). Carpenter seems to be making a rather des-
perate attempt to save some aspect of the mental operations from 
automatism. He was caught not only within the almost overwhelming 
neurophysiological evidence for psychophysical determinism, but found 
himself compelled to agree that the power of the will could be 
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suspended, in cases of hypnotism and somnambulism. Carpenter attended 
•seances and spiritualist meetings (see Carpenter, 1855, p. 619, and 
Smith, 1978, p. 6) and was impressed by the ability of the hypnotists 
to cause their subjects to act as automatons; the subjects performed 
• actions requiring 'voluntary' movements but they did so solely at the 
instigation of the hypnotist. Thus, Carpenter maintained that it 
was an empirical fact that one individual could cause the psychologi-
cal suspension of another's will. 
While Carpenter, then, was anything but an automatist, his 
theory of volition has many of the elements of an automaton theory.•
Volition is necessary for the learning process to proceed, but it is 
limited to selecting ideas; will has no direct influence upon the 
musculature. And even when the will is active, it can only control 
those aspects of the organism which are not focused upon conservation 
of the body. 
Carpenter's belief that free will could be 'correlated' with 
the directly physically describable 'mental phenomena' in a compre- 
hensive philosophy of nature is emphasized by Smith (see Smith, 1970, 
p. 12 and Smith, 1978, p. 9; see also Peters, 1962, p. 663). Carpen-
ter's position contrasts directly with Bain's so that Carpenter and 
Bain can be taken as representing the two 'poles' of the mid-nine-
teenth century debate on the relationship between science and meta-
physics. As Smith says, there are strong Cartesian elements in 
Carpenter's philosophy of mind (see Smith, 1970, p. 109). Carpenter 
initially isolated the cerebrum as the 'site' of mind-body inter-
action (see Smith, 1970, p. 109), although he later modified his 
theory under the influence of the data on hypnotism and somnanbulism 
to make the cerebrum a centre for the reflex action and 'unconscious 
cerebration' as well. Therefore the theory of ideo-motor action 
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was developed as an exception to the strict reflexology of the 
lower centres so that Carpenter's theory of the structure and function 
of the nervous system is intended to be hierarchical rather than 
coritinuous (see Smith, 1970, pp. 110-118). 
Smith stresses that Carpenter did not make the cerebrum the 
locus of the mind (see Smith, 1970, p. 119); while his view of the 
nervous system as a whole was given more and more over to the 'auto-
matic' nature of mental activity, and as his theories were modified 
to accord with the cumulative body of physiological and 'spiritual-
istic' research, Carpenter retained a Cartesian notion of purpose. 
According to Smith, "purpose was a mental phenomenon which could 
causally interact with the physical world" (Smith, 1970, p. 119). 
While Carpenter encouraged the reduction of psychology to physiology„ 
he vehemently refused to consider that mind itself could be reduced 
to matter (see Smith, 1970, p. 263). Carpenter connects mind and 
matter through the aegis of the 'Vital Force'--mind, for Carpenter, 
as Smith demonstrates, worked as a force in the physical world-- 
so that Carpenter ended up with a theory of psychophysical interaction-
ism (see Smith, 1970, pp. 239-240). 
While Carpenter's notion of mind as a vital force seemed to 
overcome some of the materialist dangers that the growth of physio-
logy brought to psychology, the status of the notion and its effective-
ness in meliorating the deterministic trend of the new psychology is 
questionable. The vital force had its analogue in the mechanical 
forces of Newtonian mechanics and served the epistemological function 
of accounting for psychological knowledge of the primary qualities 
of real objects (see Smith, 1970, pp. 132-135, 143), But in Carpenter's 
usage, it has more in common with metaphysics than with the science 
of psychology per se. The will, in Carpenter's system, is basically 
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a metaphysically defined structure. Its status depends on there 
being 'more' to human activity than can be described within the 
physiological psychology of the day. Thus there is a sharp, though 
unintentional, ontological break in Carpenter's psychology between 
those activities which can be attributed to naturalistic causes and 
those which rely on the 'divine'. The ontological break is made 
within the mind itself. That is to say, the older Cartesian dualism 
was based on a strict break between mind and matter; the new Cartes-
ianism.relies on the distinction between those mental processes which 
are 'automatic' and those which are not. The break is not simply 
made between 'higher' and 'lower' mental life; the distinction is 
made between the sometimes voluntary, and sometimes involuntary, 
nature of the same act. 
In light of subsequent developments in psychology, it is import-
ant to emphasize those aspects of Carpenter's theory which diminish 
the role of the will as a causative agent of activity. It is inter- 
esting that James included Carpenter along with Bain, Spencer, Hodgson, 
Clarke, and Maudsley (see James, 1890, 1, p. 131), in his list of 
theorists whom he considers guilty of postulating a neurophysiologi-
cally deterministic view of volition. James make no mention of 
Carpenter's conception of free will in the Principles although it is 
obvious that he must have been familiar with it as his own notion of 
effortful volition has many structural points in common with it. 
James was concerned with establishing the primacy of ideation as the 
means through which actions are instigated and he describes Carpenter's 
conception of ideo-motor action quite accurately when he says that 
Carpenter placed ideo-motor action "among the curiosities of our 
mental life" (James, 1890, 2, p. 522; see also Carpenter, 1855, p. 
610, for verification of James' interpretation). The point is that 
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the parts of Carpenter's work which seem to have made the deepest 
impression on James at least, are those which tend towards physio-
logical determinism rather than the attempts he made to find a way 
out of determinism. This in itself is interesting, for James was 
desperately concerned with finding a means of retaining the concept 
of free will as an integral attribute of human consciousness. But 
Carpenter's dualism makes a naturalistic depiction of free will 
impossible, and this accounts for James' neglect of Carpenter's 
theory of free will 
Carpenter's dilemma was difficult; the epistemological postu-
lates of mental philosophy were being re-expressed in physiological 
terms. This meant that there were now agreed on criteria of evidence. 
The distinction between 'automatic' and 'volitional' or 'reasoned' 
activities could no longer be made in terms of analogies with science, 
remaining all the while at the speculative or introspective level. 
It meant that the same kind of evidential criteria available in the 
scientific world were now available to mental philosophers and these 
criteria therefore could not be ignored. Thus, the 'cuts' between 
the various types of mental activity had to be made according to 
methodologically determined criteria; they were no longer contained 
within the stream of epistemological speculation. The 'meaning' 
of the automatic sensory and perceptual processes had shifted from 
analogy to biological data. The components of mind discussed were 
not substantially altered. What was altered was the way in which they 
were discussed. 
Not all psychologists, mental philosophers, and scientists 
had Carpenter's deep seated faith in the 'divine' aspects of human 
consciousness. And his scientific honesty compelled him to modify 
his theory of consciousness to include the very discoveries in 
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science and physiology which were to undermine the whole notion of 
free will. His insistence on keeping some aspects of mental function-
ing on a distinctly different Ontological plateau made it that much 
easier for those who followed to .discard the 'metaphysical' notion 
of the vital force and concentrate on those aspects of mind which 
could be scientifically and biologically discussed. 
The Declared Automatists  
Bain, Lewes, Spencer, and Carpenter brought psychological theor-
izing to the point where an automaton view of mental and physical 
functioning was at least implicit within their conclusions. But it 
remained for the next 'generation' of thinkers to explicitly declare ' 
that man functions as a conscious automaton. Hodgson, Tyndall, 
Clifford, Huxley, Spalding, Maudsley, and Clarke gave voice to the 
view that: 
in everything outward we are pure machines. Feeling 
is a mere collateral product of our nervous processes, 
unable to react upon them anymore than a shadow reacts 
on the steps of a traveller whom it accompanies. ...The 
theory also maintains that we are in error to suppose 
that our thoughts awaken each other by inward congruity 
or rational necessity, that disappointed hopes cause  
sadness, premises conclusions, &c. The feelings are 
merely juxtaposed in that order without mutual cohesion, 
because the nerve-processes to which they severally 
correspond awaken each other in that order (James, 1879, 
p 1  
Shadworth Hodgson was the first theorist to explicitly advocate 
an automatist view of consciousness. In his Theory of practice, 
published in 1870, he argued that causation could not be attributed 
to consciousness; instead, causation was limited to the actions and 
reactions of atoms, molecules, and physical masses (see Hodgson, 
1870, 1, p. 337). Changes in the nervous system accounted for the 
existence of feelings; the feelings themselves, however, were 
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powerless to act upon the nervous system: 
the immediate cause of both feeling and changes in feeling 
is found in the nervous organism alone. Feelings are not 
the causes of feelings; there is no causation between them; 
the series of feelings which constitutes a life can be 
arranged in a classified order, but the former members of 
the series do not contain the cause of the later members. 
Neither do feelings react upon, or contain the causes of, 
subsequent states of the nervous organism upon which other 
feelings depend. The sequences and combinations of feelings 
form, as it were, a kind of mosaic picture, the separate 
stones of which both support the picture and keep each other 
in their places; the stones are the states of the nervous 
organism, the colours on the stones the states of consciousness 
which are supported by the nerve states, without being 
themselves causes either of one another or of changes in the 
nerve state which support them (Hodgson, 1870, 1, pp. 335-336). 
Shortly after, in 1874, Huxley stated that in both animals and 
men, changes in consciousness are caused by molecular changes in the 
brain tissue so that: 
Our mental conditions are simply the symbols of conscious-
ness of the changes which take place automatically in the 
organism; and that, to take an extreme illustration, the 
feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary 
act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the 
immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata 
(Huxley, 1874/1894, p. 244). 
And Clifford, who argued against the possibility of free will, 
advocated a kind of psychophysical parallelism which kept physical 
and mental events completely separate so that: 
The two things are on utterly different platforms--the 
physical facts go along by themselves, and the mental 
facts go along by themselves. There is a parallelism 
between them, but there is no interference of one with 
the other (Clifford, quoted in James, 1890, 1, p. 131). 
Tyndall's position is basically the same as Clifford's. He 
agrees with Spencer that the human understanding must be a product of 
the interaction between the organism and the environment (see Tyndall, 
1874/1879, p. 197), but he also maintains that: 
We can trace the development of a nervous system, and 
correlate with it the parallel phenomena of sensation 
and thought. We see with undoubting certainty that they 
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• go hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum 
the moment we seek to comprehend the connection 
between them (Tyndall, 1874/1879, p. 196). 
Tyndall finally expressed himself as a parallelist, seceding from 
the automaton position because he could not see how molecular activity 
could produce feelings or thoughts as by-products of activity (see 
Tyndall, 1879, p. 409): At the same time he could not see how feel-
ings could possibly produce molecular activity, and therefore incite 
movement (see Tyndall, 1879, p. 408). He feels that the problem 
is unresolvable: 
We can form a coherent picture of all the purely physical . 
processes--the stirring of the brain, the thrilling of the 
nerves, the discharging of the muscles, and all the subse- 
quent motions of the organism. We are here dealing with 
mechanical problems which are mentally presentable. But 
we can form no picture of the process whereby consciousness 
emerges, either as a necessary link, or as an accidental 
by-product, of this series of actions. The reverse process 
of the product -kin of motion by consciousness is equally 
unpresentable to the mind. We are here in fact on the 
boundary line of the intellect, where the ordinary canons 
of science fail to extricate us. If we are true to these 
canons of science, we must deny to subjective phenomena all 
influence on physical processes (Tyndall, 1879, p. 410). 
Consciousness seems to have no necessary function whatsoever in this 
•model. Thus, Tyndall 's denial of the validity of the automaton posi-
tion does not essentially change the status of consciousness in his 
theorizing--he has simply removed it from one non-efficacious standing 
to another so that it seems justifiable to treat the avowed auto-
matists and the parallelists such as Clifford and Tyndall together. 
Spencer himself had settled for the parallelist position in the end, 
writing: 
• The nature of Mind as thus conceived, will be elucidated 
• by comparing it with the nature of Matter; and the fact 
that a parallelism exists between that which chemists have 
established respecting Matter and that which we here suppose 
respecting Mind, will help to justify the conception (Spencer, 
1870, 1, pp. 154-155). • 
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Maudsley, on the other hand, developed a theory of mind wherein 
all conscious events depended entirely on the workings of the nervous 
system (see Smith, 1970, pp. 65-66). Of memory in the nerve centres 
he writes: "This capacity of retention, which is the foundation of 
the mental faculties called acquisition, retention, recollection, is 
a purely physiological property, essentially independent of conscious-
ness"(Maudsley, 1883, p. 116). He therefore denies that free will is 
operative in human consciousness: 
To any affection whatever of consciousness a prior state of 
brain is essential; and to say so much as that is to involve 
the external world in every act of consciousness, since it 
is by involution of the external that the structure of the 
mental organization has been framed. All which, if true, 
clearly leaves no place where the will may get the self-
sufficing nature which the theory of its freedom demands 
(Maudsley, 1883, p. 55). 
But Maudsley's most radical statement probably concerns his hypothesis 
on what the consequences would be if human beings were without 
consciousness. The notion itself is startling, coming as it does 
within the rationalist-empiricist tradition, and it is therefore worth 
quoting Maudsley at some length: 
If we could imagine human beings to have been constructed 
just as they are, with the one exception that they were 
without consciousness, and to have been placed in exactly 
similar circumstances to those which they have been placed, 
we may be sure, I think, that their doings would have 
exhibited a logical connection; that in the synthesis of 
impressions made upon them, and in the deductions of conform-
able action, there would have been implicit that which, when 
illuminated by consciousness, we call reason. No organic 
being could live and thrive without having some sort of 
synthesis, though an entirely unconscious one, of the world; 
it is implicit in every purposive reflex act, which is 
itself virtua"!ly an unconscious judgment and the basis of 
conscious judgments. It is from this solid standpoint that 
the ways and doings of animals and savages ought to be 
studied. They are examples of reason latent or implicit in 
adaptive organic function, and they do not necessarily postu-
late the bright consciousness with which we illuminate them 
when reflecting on them. The reason is rooted in the mechanism, 
not in the light by which consciousness reveals its operations: 
the conscious theory is the transcript, not the original 
(Maudsley, 1883, p. 117). 
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This then, is basically the automatist position. While there 
are disagreements among its exponents on the exact nature of the 
relationship between consciousness and the nervous system, they all 
agree that consciousness has no direct effect on behaviour as it is 
mediated through the nervous system, and that it is unnecessary for 
the orderly production of responses. 
Darwin's Contribution  
The paradigm that has been building in the new psychology is 
one which combines a naturalistic physiological account of activity 
with the laws of association. So far, we have concentrated upon 
the factors within mental philosophy and physiology responsible for 
the deterministic account of the mental processes. But the decisive 
factor in the birth of automaton theory was of course, Darwin's the-
ory of evolution. Darwin's influence has been left until this point 
because Bain, Carpenter, and Lewes were not 'Darwinians' in the 
same sense that the declared automatists were. Bain and the others 
accepted Darwin's theory but merely integrated the notion of evolu-
tion into their works. Spencer was tremendously influenced by Dar-
win, but developed an independent theory of evolution. And he is 
treated here with Bain, Carpenter, and Lewes because the declared 
automatists looked to his psychology for guidance in generating their 
own views on mental efficacy; it is therefore historically 'expedient' 
to treat Spencer with the earlier thinkers. 
But the declared automatists cannot be meaningfully discussed 
without taking Darwin's influence into account. Darwin unintention-
ally provided the catalyst that made the birth of automaton theory 
virtually inevitable.
31 
31. It should be noted that Darwin was not an automatist: what 
(contd.) 
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It has become a truism to say that Darwin's theory was so 
successful because he had a mechanism to explain the evolutionary 
process (see Young, 1971, pp. 444-445). The process of natural 
selection appeared to explain species differentiation (see Young, 
1971, pp. 452-456), and thus provided scientists with a means of 
accepting the mass of biological data contained in Darwin's book and 
the works of earlier scientists. And while many theologians, 
philosophers, and scientists were skeptical, the importance of 
Darwin's conclusions could not be denied; in any event, Darwin' 
Origin appeared as the climax of a growing tendency towards the ac-
ceptance of evolutionism (see Millhauser, 1959, pp. 58-85). 
Carpenter and Bain recognized this: Carpenter believed that 
religion and Darwinian theory were compatible (see Smith, 1978, 
PP. 11-12), while Bain eventually revised his work to include the 
new theory (see Peters, 1962, p. 456). This was not difficult for 
Bain because he was ardently committed to making physiology the 
basis for psychology, and his agnosticism (see Hearnshaw, 1964, p. 
8) meant that he had few difficulties in accepting the evolutionary 
position. 32 
Other thinkers were sufficiently convinced by the new theory 
so that they made spirited defences of Darwin against his attackers, 
They were sure that the combination of Darwin's empirical data and 
31.,(contd.) he had to say about psychology he took from Bain, 
Spencer, and Mueller (see Darwin, 1873, p. 353). 
32. Perhaps Bain found evolutionary theory acceptable partly 
because it was Mueller's work which provided the basis for Bain's 
concept of volition. Mueller's psychological theories in turn 
were influenced by Erasmus Darwin (see Young, 1970, p. 117), so 
that there was already an evolutionary current running through 
physiology before evolutionary theory as such was proclaimed in 
the scientific world. 
55. 
the mechanism of natural selection would bring the biological 
sciences into line with the rest of science. We have already seen 
that the framework of neurophysiological investigation was determin-
ed by the same rationalist-empiricist tradition that developed along 
with and interacted with the development of the physical sciences. 
Evolutionary theory provided another means of bringing mental philo-
sophy--heavily neurophysiologically oriented by now--into line with 
the hard sciences.
33 
Evolutionary theory did this because it was a biological theory; 
biology had already served, through physiology, to unite the scienti-
fic approach to the mind with mental philosophy. But the biological 
physiology that we have examined was not 'formalized' into a para-
digm until the advent of evolutionary theory. Physiologists took 
their theoretical frameworks from philosophy so that the 'theories' 
behind research were varied--for example, Flourens' and Carpenter's 
Cartesianism and Magendie's sensationalism. Evolutionary theory, on 
the other hand, had all the necessary components of a scientific 
theory so that it could unite research efforts and at the same time, 
elevate biology to the status of a real science. 
As Tyndall wrote: "The strength of the doctrine of Evolution 
consists, not in experimental demonstration (for the subject is 
hardly accessible to this mode of proof), but in its general harmony 
with scientific thought" (Tyndall, 1874/1879, p. 196). Tyndall 's 
notorious "Belfast Address", and T.H. Huxley's "On the hypothesis 
33. The tension between the scientific community's desire to 
ensure the uniformity of nature, and the advocates of Natural Theo-
logy is discussed by Young in relation to evolutionary theory (see 
Young, 1971, pp. 471-487), and Smith, in relation to mind-matter 
dualism (see Smith, 1970, pp. 242-244). 'Psychology' essentially 
occupied the middle ground between the two poles of the,debate. 
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that animals are automata, and its history", also given in Belfast 
in 1874 before the British Association, are interesting not only 
because they are radical defences of evolutionary theory but because 
both Huxley and Tyndall use explicitly presentistic arguments. 
Tyndall 's presentism is demonstrated in his analysis of what he con-
siders to be the two main approaches to understanding the world: 
he places the writings of Democritus, Lucretius, Newton and Maxwell 
against the metaphysical-theological works of Aristotle, the School-
men, and Bishop Butler, to create a system where evolution and mech-
anics are combined to present the productive course throughout 
history. The climax comes, for Tyndall, with the appearance of 
Darwin's theory, which at last completes the developing historical 
tendency towards a uniform model for understanding all aspects of 
nature, by bringing mechanics and biology together (see Tyndall, 1874/ 
1879, p. 190). According to Tyndall, evolutionary theory is a fit-
ting development within the context of the rationalist-empiricist 
tradition (as Tyndall defines the tradition), and is thus historically 
as well as scientifically justified. 
Huxley's article makes an even more obvious link between 
evolutionary theory and the Enlightenment, for Huxley argues that 
Descartes' philosophy is largely compatible with nineteenth century 
physiology. 34 And,while Huxley is not prepared to accept Descartes' 
hypothesis that animals are machines, he does concur with •the notion 
that they may be conscious automatons and he soon extends that analysis 
34. See Huxley, 1874/1894, pp. 203-218, where he shows that 
Descartes gave expression to those principles which lie behind 
nineteenth century physiology--that is, that the brain is the organ 
of sensation, that animal movement is caused by changes in the muscles, 
•that animal sensations are "due to a motion of the substance of the 
nerves which connect the sensory organs with the brain"(Huxley, 1874/ 
1894, p. 208), that volition is not required for sensory nerves to 
incite motor behaviour, and that memory is the product of the motions 
•of the brain as the brain is excited by motions of the sensory nerves. 
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to include men as well. What Huxley is essentially doing, like 
Tyndall, is selecting those propositions which seem to anticipate, 
or progress toward, developments in nineteenth century evolutionary 
theory. At the same time, both writers show that advances in science 
provide the data which justifies certain philosophical speculations 
of the earlier period, so that these speculations are given some 
sort of 'veracity'. ,Both Huxley and Tyndall are concerned with 
establishing the connections between evolutionary theory and tradi- 
tional science and epistemology, to give credence to their hypothesis 
that evolutionary theory is compatible with the Newtonian world-view. 
In this context, Huxley and Tyndall argue that viable models 
of consciousness must necessarily be naturalistic, physiological, 
and mechanistic. Furthermore, their theories of consciousness are 
based on Spencer's, and not Darwin's evolutionism. The selection of 
Spencer's theory of mind is hardly surprising. Darwin had little to 
say about psychology in his published works. He relied. on tradition-
al associationism to describe conscious behaviour and cited Bain, 
Spencer, and Mueller in his discussion of volition.
35 
What Darwin did contribute was the naturalistic system which 
could be extended by others to include psychology. Tyndall regarded 
Darwin as the towering figure of the age (see Tyndall .1874/1879, 
pp. 182-183), because he made sense of the biological activity that 
35. See Darwin, 1873, p. 353 where expressions are described as 
the products of instincts and habits. Gruber however maintains that 
there is far more psychology in Darwin's works than first appears 
to be the case and he says that this can be appreciated once Darwin's 
notebooks have been studied (see Gruber, 1974, p. 231). This is a 
valid argument; the reasons for not looking more closely into 
Darwin's works for a system of psychology is that we are concerned 
here with the interpretation his contemporaries gave to his works 
and his contemporaries did not see him as making a contribution to 
psychology in the same way that Spencer made one. 
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takes place in the physical world. But after paying tribute to , 
Darwin, he then goes on to say that: "Besides the physical life 
dealt with by Mr. Darwin, there is a psychical life presenting simi- 
lar gradations and asking equally for a solution" (Tyndall, 1874/1879, 
p. 184). With that, Tyndall turns to Spencer (see Tyndall, 1874/• 
1879, pp. 184-190, 197),and ratifies Spencer's conception that "The 
Human Understanding, ...is itself a result of the play between organ-
ism and environment through cosmic ranges of time" (Tyndall, 1874/ 
1879, p. 197).
•Huxley's Belfast Address is a little more difficult to analyze 
in this way: he does not specifically mention Darwin or Spencer and 
we are forced to look for their related influences in Huxley's termin-
ology. Thus he echoes Darwin when he speaks of "the struggle for  
existence in the animal world" (Huxley, 1874/1894, p. 237), but he 
correspondingly echoes Spencer when he states that "the living body 
is not only sustained and reproduced: it adjusts itself to external 
and inner changes; it moves and feels" (Huxley, 1874/1894, p. 200), 
although he gives Descartes credit for the concept. And when Huxley 
concludes that: 
We are conscious automata, endowed with free will in 
the only intelligible sense of that much-abused term 
--inasmuch as in many respects we are able to do as we 
like--but none the less parts of the great series of 
causes and effects, which in unbroken continuity, 
composes that which is, and has been, and shall be-- 
the sum of existence (Huxley, 1874/1894, p. 244), 
it is Spencer's voice, not Darwin's, that we hear behind his words. 
Huxley was of course an ardent supporter of Darwin, and stated in 
his paper "The progress of science", that: 
So far as biology is concerned, the publication of the 
"Origin of Species", for the first time, put the doctrine 
of evolution, in its application to living things, upon 
a sound 'scientific foundation. It became an instrument 
59. 
of investigation, and in no hands did it prove 
more brilliantly profitable than in those of Darwin 
himself (Huxley, 1887/1894, p. 101). 
But Huxley gave Spencer credit for systematizing "Evolution, as a 
philosophical doctrine applicable to all phenomena, whether physical 
or mental, whether manifested by material atoms or by men in society" 
(Huxley, 1887/1894, p. 102). Thus, for the polemicists of evolution-
ary theory, Darwin and Spencer represented the two halves of a broad, 
universal system. 
The reasons why Huxley, Tyndall, and others followed Spencer 
should be clear now: Spencer derived the specific structures, contents, 
and functions of mind according to evolutionary principles. The 
incompatibilities between Darwin's and Spencer's evolutionary systems 
were yet to be worked out; both systems underwent substantial modi-
fication in the years that followed, as the foundations for the con-, 
cepts and conclusions of both systems were more closely examined.
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In the early days of evolutionism it seemed clear to Tyndall, 
Huxley, and their contemporaries that the two systems could be 
accepted as providing complementary analyses of different aspects 
of the natural world. 
How great was the debt of the automatists to evolutionary 
theory? Tyndall and Huxley combined evolutionary theory with Newton-
ian mechanics and neurophysiology and saw the combination as the be-
ginning of a comprehensive world view (see Huxley, 1887/1894, pp. 96- 
134; and Tyndall, 1877/1879, p. 374; 1879, pp. 387-396). And they 
were both popularizers of evolutionary , theory. 
Shadworth Hodgson was not. And this is interesting because 
36. See Young, 1971, pp. 467-503, for discussion of the modifi-
cations made on tha concept of natural selection. 
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Hodgson was the first of the 'declared automatists'.
37 
Hodgson 
makes few explicit references to either Darwin or Spencer in his 
Theory of practice where he first presents his automaton theory of 
consciousness. 
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Instead, "Independent and workmanlike, Hodgson was 
remarkably free from the characteristics and fashions of late Victor-
ian philosophy. ..39 But while Hodgson makes few explicit references 
to evolutionary theory, he speaks from a post-evolutionary stand-
point: "The analysis here given of the moral sense applies to it 
at every stage of its development both in the individual and the 
race.' Moreover, he uses Spencer's work as the foundation for 
his automaton theory of consciousness. He argues, on the basis of 
Spencer's analysis, that experienced pleasures and pains cannot be 
considered as evidence for an efficacious consciousness. Instead, 
pleasures and pains are the products of nerve moments (see Hodgson, 
1870, 1, pp. 424-426). Hodgson uses the same analysis for the work-
ings of the will: 
The moment of choice or decision between representations 
is exhaustively described by the analysis which has been 
37. See James, 1890, 1, p. 130: "But it was not till 1870, I be-
lieve, that Mr. Hodgson made the decisive step by saying that feel-
ings, no matter how intensely they may be present, can have no 
.causal efficacy whatever." 
38. See Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 615, 630-633. In Time and space  
(1865) Hodgson rejected an automatist view of consciousness and 
it was not until 1870 that he affirmed it in his Theory of practice; 
after that, he remained a convinced determinist. 
39. Davie, 1967, pp. 47-48. Davie adds that Hodgson was consider-
ably influenced by Ferrier, who provided the neurophysiological 
evidence that he based his 'psychology' on. 
40. Hodgson, 1870, 1, p. 254. Hodgson refers to Spencer as follows: 
"See the admirable Chapter on Pleasures and Pains, and the connection 
of their phenomena with the general doctrine of Evolution, in Mr. 
Herbert Spencer's Principles ofPsychology" (Hodgson, 1870, 1, p. 426; 
see also pp. 416-436). Hodgson's automaton theory is described here. 
He bases his conclusions on the nature of the relationship between 
consciousness and the nervous system. 
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offered of the course of nerve movements in conflict. 
There is no feature in it which does not find a 
corresponding feature in the conflict of nerve move-
ments to which it may be referred (Hodgson, 1870, 1, 
p. 428). 
Consciousness depends upon nerve movement and in no case does it ever 
excite nerve movement. Consciousness is the evidence of physical 
causation: it is the cogent reflection, as it were, of the physical 
system (see Hodgson, 1870, 1, pp. 428-431). 
While Huxley and Tyndall wrote from the perspective of defend-
ants of the new evolutionary approach, Hodgson had already transcend-
ed the 'polemical' period and wrote a sober treatise where evolutionary 
ideas were treated as established or useable concepts in their own 
right. Thus he stands as one of the first figures to begin the 
'philosophication' of evolutionary theory. 
W.K. Clifford's position in the establishment of the automaton 
view of mind is similar to Hodgson's. He began his career as an 
advocate of Catholicism, sustained by the writings of Aquinas; he 
later dropped this allegiance, declared himself an agnostic, and em-
braced evolutionary theory through the works of Darwin and Spencer 
(see Smokler, 1967, p. 123). This led him to promote an epistemology 
where the structure of knowledge is determined by the biological 
adjustments made by the individual and the race to the environment 
(see Smokier, 1967, p. 123). In line with Clifford's acceptance of 
evolutionary concepts and his corresponding agnosticism, is his state-
ment that beliefs must not be accepted until the would-be believer 
can be sure that all possible evidence corroborates the belief, Partial 
evidence is not sufficient; for Clifford the danger in accepting 
partial evidence lies in the propensity Of the individual to fill in 
the framework of the theory with inductive inferences (see Smokler, 
1967, p. 124), so that 'unproveable' systems of philosophy and theology 
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are developed. Like Spencer, Clifford was willing to deny the 
possibility of free will because it interfered with the development 
of an evolutionary, naturalistic explanation of mental and physical 
phenomena. And like Hodgson, Clifford immediately turned to the 
philosophical implications of evolutionary theory. Clifford's early 
death prevented further development of his system, but from what we 
have of it, it would seem that he stands halfway between Hodgson and 
Huxley and Tyndall. Half polemicist, he was also concerned with the 
'philosophication' of evolutionary theory. 
Maudsley took a somewhat different position; he dismissed 
Spencer's model of life as the adjustment of inner to outer relations 
as superficial (see Maudsley, 1883, p. 129), ratified Darwin's mechan-
ism of natural selection (see Maudsley, 1883, p. 137), and then 
claimed that natural selection was an applicable concept only after 
the 'variation' had been established (see Maudsley, 1883, p. 137). 
Maudsley wanted to go farther than Darwin; he sought an explanation 
of the cause of the "organic start" and "its progressive increase" 
(Maudsley, 1883, p. 137) This lies, according to Maudsley, in the 
"inmost depths of physiology, in the most intimate physio-chemical 
processes that take place between the internal properties of the organ-
ism and the external stimuli of the environment, so that we must search 
for the origin of the initial variation and its growth by exercise" 
(Maudsley,.1883, p. 137). Maudsley was calling for a deeper study 
of the whole evolutionary process; unlike Tyndall and Huxley, he was 
not taking the polemical role, and unlike Hodgson, he refused to 
take Spencer as the starting point for his interpretation of mind. 
And perhaps most significantly, Maudsley most explicitly sought the 
starting point for all natural phenomena within physio-chemical pro- 
cesses. His view of causation was therefore both mechanical and 
reductionist. 
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The Translation of the Assumptions  
Automaton theory was never systematically developed into a 
full-fledged psychological theory. Hodgson's Theory of practice was 
the most comprehensive presentation of the position, and one treatise 
does not constitute a paradigm or system. Maudsley was better known 
to his contemporaries, and to future thinkers, for his work in 
mental pathology, and this work eclipsed the 'automaton' elements 
of his theory.
41 
 Thus, the automaton theory is best described as 
a 'position' adopted because the physiological data was initially 
convincing and because it served dominant concerns of the science of 
the time. The positions of the pre-automatists (Bain , , Spencer, 
Lewes, Carpenter) however, continued to exert an influence on the 
psychology that followed (for example, early American Functionalism). 
Later, the willingness to develop psychological theories which were 
unconcerned with consciousness (most striking is of course Watson's 
Behaviourism) perhaps indicates that the willingness to dispense 
with consciousness as the central motif of psychology is in part 
a legacy from the nineteenth century. If automaton theory was a 
non-sustainable position, the factors that facilitated its develop-
ment must still be taken seriously. 
The development of the automaton position is of critical import-
ance in this dissertation for two reasons. First, it embodies the 
changes in meaning that took place in the common assumptions of the 
rationalist-empiricist tradition during the nineteenth century. 
Secondly, it was the automaton position that initially represented 
the climax of the psychological tradition to James, so that his 
41. See, for example, Hearnshaw's assessment of Maudsley's role 
in the history of psychology (Hearnshaw, 1964, pp. 27-29). 
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desire to construct a new world-view was predicated on his rejection 
of the late nineteenth century meanings of the common assumptions. 
It also provided some of the 'givens' for future psychological 
theories in that the pre-automatists and the automatists had turned 
psychology into an explicitly empirical science. Theories of mind 
from then on had to be substantiated by empirical data. 
We see in this survey of the positions of the declared and 
near-automatists how the common factors of the rationalist-empiricist 
tradition were translated into neurophysiological terms, and how 
automaton theory was a major result of that translation. But the 
survey does not merely show the continuance of old assumptions in 
later theories: rather, their meaning and import were subtly but 
significantly changed. On a superficial level, the change is simply 
that as the assumptions of the philosophical tradition became flesh-
ed out in empirical data they became more restricted and specific, 
less open to widely variant interpretations. But there is more to 
the process than empirical data bringing philosophical speculation 
to heel, curbing its excesses by ratifying some of its results and 
rejecting others. That was the interpretation of Tyndall and Huxley, 
but they were wrong. The data themselves were largely determined by 
the philosophical assumptions of the investigators. What the data 
were, what they said, was for this reason not crucial. What was 
crucial was that there were data, and that these data were relevant 
to the problems that had previously been discussed in speculative 
philosophical terms. It does not count against this point that the 
relevance was in part guaranteed by the data's being in part determin-
ed by the philosophy. That fact was simply a necessary condition to 
the data's being recognised as important. Had the data been unassim-
ilable to the philosophical tradition, it would not have been 
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assimilated. In that case, since the theoretical views of the 
investigators were predominantly determined by the traditional cur-
rents of philosophical speculation,the data would not have been 
seen to have scientific relevance.
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The nature of the data, and hence their relevance to traditional 
topics of inquiry, was thus a consequence of the continuing influence 
of the philosophical tradition. The existence of the data, however, 
was not, and it was the fact that such data existed and could be 
further elaborated that changed the import of the philosophical 
assumptions. It did this in two ways. First, it tied theoretical 
interpretation to the process of data gathering, so that scientific 
attention was concentrated on those features of the organism most 
amenable to experimental manipulation. In this way the intellect-
ualistic bias of the philosophical tradition was reversed and atten-
tion was focused on the lower cortical and spinal centres. The 
division between unitary higher centres and reflexological lower 
ones, it should be noted, was not initially challenged by this shift 
of emphasis. Second, it put the investigation of at least some 
aspects of the human mind on a par with all other scientific invest-
gations. In this way it led to a naturalization of humans as objects 
in the world, suitable like any others for detailed scientific en-
quiry, so it served as a counterpart to the theoretical integration 
of man with the rest of animal nature in evolutionary theory. We 
42. See Boring, 1950, Chap. 8, for a discussion on the 'personal 
equation' in astronomy. The relevance of such studies to the psycho-
logy of individual differences could onlybe appreciated long after 
the fact. And as Young demonstrates (see Young, 1970), theories 
of cerebral localization were largely ignored in favour of a 
sensory-motor view coupled with the dictum that cerebral action 
was largely indivisible. The sensory-motor view dominated psycho-
logy not because it was 'truer' than the cerebral localization 
hypothesis but because it fitted the theories of the period better. 
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may now consider the details of the changes in the philosophical 
assumptions, principally those associated with mind-matter dualism 
on the one hand, and the status and function of knowledge on the 
other. 
Mind-Body Dualism in the Conscious Automaton Theory  
The 'naturalization' of the human mind that took place in the 
late nineteenth century can be described as a retreat of the tradi-
tional introspective epistemological approach of the mental philo-
sophers in favour of the elaboration of an experimental, empirical, 
biological approach. The 'naturalization' of mental phenomena 
proceeded by means of a translation of concepts borrowed from mental 
philosophy and physics into biology. At the same time, many of the 
problems that faced psychologists, physiologists, and scientists 
regarding the relationship between mind and brain took their specific 
forms from the changed meaning of the common assumptions of mental 
philosophy. Tyndall and Clifford worried about the gap between 
neuronal functioning and the experience of consciousness. As Tyndall 
wrote: "Between molecular mechanics and consciousness is interposed 
a fissure over which the ladder of physical reasoning is incompetent 
to carry us" (Tyndall, 1879, p. 391). Tyndall and Clifford therefore 
advocated a 'parallelism' between brain events and the experience 
of consciousness, convinced that neither one could directly cause 
the other (see Clifford, quoted in James, 1890, 1, p. 131, and Tyn-
dall, 1874/1879, p. 196). 
While Hodgson, Huxley, and Maudsley argued that states of 
consciousness are caused by "molecular changes of the brain substance" 
(Huxley, 1874/1894, p. 244; see also Hodgson, 1870,1. pp. 335-336, and 
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Maudsley, 1883, pp. 55, 116), their theories made a clear distinction 
between biological knowledge, and conscious knowledge, so that the 
solid Cartesian dualism between mind and matter was retained, in the 
case of Tyndall, at the ontological level, and in the case of the 
other theorists, at the epistemological level. The difference was 
that mind no longer seemed to have any necessary role to play. But 
this is a substantial, qualitative change, and this is where evolu-
tionary premises become important. Darwin was concerned with strict-
ly biological adaptation and did not incorporate a 'new' evolution-
ary paradigm of mind into his theory. Spencer did, so that his 
evolutionary associationism virtually defined the functions of mind 
within the new naturalistic approach. 
As Young shows, Spencer's theory of mind is a mediation between 
the sensationism of the later empiricists and the nativism of the 
Cartesians. His biological theory of mind has it that "The effects 
of associations are supposed to be transmitted as modifications of 
the nervous system" (Young, 1970, p. 172). Knowledge is described 
in biological terms and it is on biological grounds that Spencer 
closes the gap between the rationalist and empiricist positions re-
garding the genesis of ideas; heredity is the means used to account 
for specific ideation and individual differences (see Young, 1970, 
p. 180). Mind is important in evolutionary terms because it is the 
conscious repository of inherited experience and the means through 
which outer impressions made upon the inner relations are known. 
Spencer's system is continuous and hierarchical so that there is no 
definite demarcation between neuronal and conscious experience,and 
he goes through considerable analysis to make this explicit (see 
Spencer, 1870, 1, pp. 148-152; see also Young, 1970, p. 172). 
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But the ingrained dualism of the philosophical and scientific 
traditions was too strong to allow the fundamental distinction be-
tween mind and matter to be overcome through a simple 'blunting' of 
the differences between them. And Spencer himself advanced the 
psychophysical parallelist position (see Spencer, 1870, 1, pp. 154- 
155; Young, 1970, pp_ 96, 246; and Smith, 1970, p. 242). The paral-
lelism which characterizes the automaton position would therefore 
appear toconfirm the mind-body dualism which was made explicit in 
•the earlier phase of mental philosophy. But the 'knowledge function' 
of mind has been redefined in the new psychology, and this is what 
enables us to consider the theories of Huxley, Tyndall, Clifford, 
Hodgson, and Maudsley together within the 'general' category of 
automaton theory. The mind still has the function of knowing the 
world. But this 'knowing' is no longer connected with any effica-
cious activity on the part of mind. Actions are initiated and exe-
cuted through the machinery of the nervous system. Mind and brain 
run parallel courses so that the mind knows the stimulus and the mind 
knows the response but does not intervene to select or instigate 
the response. Thus the knowledge function of mind is of secondary 
importance because mind now has the explicit status of a passive 
onlooker not only of the world, but even of the brain; mental exper- 
ience, feeling, sensation, etc. are real but have no causative functions. 
Knowledge, in the adaptive sense, is impressed upon the nervous 
system itself which is active and reactive. We therefore have a 
paradigm wherein two types of knowledge processes are implied; the 
first type of knowledge is that which appears in consciousness, now 
divorced from any meaningful role in the production of activity and 
describable in the traditional associative or faculty psychology terms. 
The second type of knowledge is biological, or 'unconscious' 
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knowledge, now contained in the patterning of the nerve atoms them-
selves, and describable according to 'biological' laws of mechanics. 
Tyndall 's parallelist account of consciousness and its relation 
to the body supports the conclusion that there are two kinds of 
knowledge in the new paradigm (see Tyndall, 1877/1879, pp. 353-359). 
At the same time, Tyndall's 'positivism' makes his exact position 
regarding the status of consciousness somewhat difficult to assess. 
While he is quite definite in pointing out that psychical events 
cannot cause physical events (in light of analogies from the physical 
sciences), he is equally concerned with making it clear that there 
is no reason to assume that the opposite case is true either--that 
is, physical events cannot produce consciousness (see Tyndall, 1877/ 
1879, pp. 358-359, and 1879, pp. 410-411). Tyndall is thus forced 
to conclude that the relation between mind and body is a 'mystery' 
(see Tyndall, 1877/1879, p. 358, and 1879, pp. 410-411), Obviously, 
he says, "We can form a coherent picture of the physical processes-- 
the stirring of the brain, the thrilling of the nerves, the discharg-
ing of the muscles, and all the subsequent mechanical motions of the 
organism" (Tyndall, 1877/1379, p. 358). But this is as far as we 
can go. Tyndall briefly discusses the relationship between the 
muscles, the sensory-motor nerves and the brain as an information and 
'work' system (see Tyndall, 1877/1879, pp. 352-353). And Tyndall 
is quite clear that consciousness has a distinct knowledge function: 
consciousness enables us to know and experience the world (see Tyn-
dall, 1377/1879, p. 359). Somehow, then, mind and body are related 
in such a way as to facilitate conscious knowledge of an external 
world. At the same time, the activity carried out by the individual 
is not dependent upon consciousness. The individual 'knows' and he 
'reacts' but the two processes occur simultaneously. There is no 
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causal connection that can be defined between them. 
The two types of knowledge are more clearly defined by Hodgson, 
Huxley, and Maudsley. These three were not parallelists: they be-
lieved that the physical changes in the nervous system 'caused' or 
'produced' the phenomena of consciousness (see Hodgson, 1870, 1, pp. 
335-336; Huxley, 1874/1894, p. 244; and Maudsley, 1883, pp. 55, 116). 
They discuss the changes in the structure of the molecules of the 
nervous system that take place when stimuli are received. Memory 
patterns are etched into the nerve molecules and the reactivity of 
the nervous system changes according to the nature of these paths. 
Maudsley describes the 'biological knowledge' as 'unconscious' know-
ledge and writes: 
the so-called intelligent design and execution of an act 
neither implies the existence of a pre-designing conscious-
ness nor requires the intervention of any extra-physical 
agency in the individual Organism;.. .they [instincts and 
reflexes] are examples of what the body can do by itself in 
virtue of its constitution as a complex Organic mechanism. 
The unconscious is the fundamental and active element, the 
conscious the concomitant and indicative (MaUdSley, 1883, 
p: 85). 
Hodgson had earlier taken the same position regarding 'biological' 
knowledge: 
But, in speaking of nerve movements as the cause of conscious 
states, it must not be forgotten that every such movement 
takes place only at the expense of some waste of the living 
nervous substance, and that this waste is repaired by a new 
growth in which the habit of movement in the old way is 
strengthened, so that the oftener a movement has been 
repeated the more easily is it repeated again. Every movement 
which has once taken place becomes thus represented by a 
perhaps very minute change in the structure of the nervous 
substance, which grows with exercise; and every movement may 
thus, conceivably at least, be capable of reawakening on the 
occurrence of an appropriate stimulus (Hodgson, 1870, 1, 
p. 350). 
Huxley makes the same point: 
That memory is dependent upon some condition of the brain 
is a fact established by many considerations--among the 
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most important of which are the remarkable phenomena of 
aphasia. And that the condition of the brain on which 
memory depends, is largely determined by the repeated 
occurrence of that condition of its molecules, which gives 
rise to the idea of the thing remembered, is no less 
certain (Huxley, 1874/1894, p. 214; see also pp. 215-216, 
225-226). 
• Biological knowledge forms the basis for conscious knowledge 
of the world. As Maudsley says, movement is engendered within the 
'unconscious' nervous system; consciousness 'knows' what has taken 
place. Hodgson makes the same point (see Hodgson, 1870, pp. 338-339). 
The two types of knowledge complement each other: consciousness re-
flects nervous activity and the external world; the nervous system, 
on the other hand, is patterned so as to act 'purposively'. The 
individual therefore survives in the world consciousness knows. 
The role of knowledge has been steadily undergoing a kind of 
metamorphosis; as Marcell shows (see Marcell, 1974, pp. 53-54), 
rationalists and empiricists alike traditionally believed that the 
human mind was capable of discovering the laws of the universe. The 
capacity to reason and thereby discover universal laws as Newton, 
Galileo, and Kepler had done defined man's place in the cosmos. 
•Gradually, through the use of his rational power, man would fully 
comprehend the workings of the universe; progress could be defined 
as the continuous process of discovery. And this progress relied up-
on the use of man's active reasoning powers. This link between the 
powers of human reason, exemplified by scientific discoveries, and 
the expectation of unlimited progress in all human affairs, was 
made explicit by Condorcet and other eighteenth century Enlighten-
ment philosophers (see Manuel, 1962, pp. 62-92). But the importance•
that was given to physiological data and the successes of evolution-
ary theory changed the emphasis of epistemological speculation. The 
biological, adaptive side of man's nature was 'discovered' to be of 
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profound significance. This 'second' side of man's nature had 
been recognized in both streams of the philosophical tradition but 
in a somewhat different context. The rationalists made a strict 
distinction between the rational and automatic functions while the 
empiricists based the beginnings of knowledge in sensation, and 
built up the structure of mind from there. But the empiricists ori-
ginally granted the mind certain 'powers' to account for the compound-
ing of ideas, so that the mind was not a simple 'receptacle' for 
sensations. While the tendency of empiricist thought from Locke to 
James Mill was to minimize any such active powers of the mind, the 
agreed functional and epistemological significance of the mind's 
activity provided a continuing check to the attempts at constructing 
a thoroughgoing passive sensationist account of the mind's operations. 
Furthermore, both philosophical streams used mechanical analogies to 
describe the 'lower' processes so that Descartes' theory of animal 
spirits vas used by Locke who described sensation as the movement 
of animal spirits (see Locke, 1690/1964, Bk. 2, VIII, 12, p. 133), 
while Hobbes wrote that "Desires and aversions are motions toward 
and motions away from objects" (Peters, 1962, p. 381). The concept 
of mind, handed down within the rationalist-empiricist tradition, was 
already based on a duality of function and the distinction between 
'rational' and 'animal' processes was an integral part of the philo-
sophical tradition. Physiological and evolutionary theories did 
not change this basic separation of faculties. What they did do was 
to redefine the 'knowledge' function of both aspects of mind. Con-
scious knowledge no longer had any functional significance, so that 
there was nothing to impede its purely passive nature. The 'passive 
organism' model of sensationist empiricism was free to become 
epiphenomenalism. On the other hand, the lower 'animal' functions 
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had their role vastly increased, so as to incorporate all function-
ally significant, adaptive knowledge. In this way, again, the 
intellectualist bias of the philosophical tradition was reversed. 
Changes in the Meaning of the Assumption that Mind could be 
Described in Mechanical Terms  
Traditionally, mechanical analogies of sensation and perception 
were found throughout mental philosophy; when physiologists began 
to investigate the nervous system these analogies were translated 
into empirical data. The strength of the mechanistic approach must 
not be underrated; it was an integral part of all theoretical and 
scientific endeavours including evolutionary theory.
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The develop-
ment of the sensory-motor view, and the corresponding reflexology, 
is directly related to the strength Of mechanism in nineteenth cent-
ury paradigms. As Young points out, physiologists tended to neglect 
research which indicated that 'psychological' and motor functions 
were localized in the cortex and to concentrate on elaborating the 
sensory-motor view of the nervous system (see Young, 1970, pp. 226-227). 
The empirical evidence for cerebral localization was incompatible 
with the associationist sensory-motor model of psychology with its 
roots in empiricist philosophy and its 'realization' in the works 
of Bin and his contemporaries (see Young, 1970, p. 224). 
The mechanical analogy was confined, in the Cartesian tradition, 
to the !lower' mental processes. It was therefore logical for 
physiologists to begin their search for the physical correlates of 
43. See Darwin, 1859/1977, pp, 173-204. Darwin attempted to 
develop a systematic account of natural selection which took place 
according to the laws of variation and was not, he stated, a 
fortuitous occurrence, Thus, he was intent on developing a lawful, 
mechanistic, explanation of natural events. 
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mind in the lower regions of the nervous system. The cortex was 
then left free to act as a qualitatively distinct site for the 
higher mental faculties, to wit, reason and will. As Hearnshaw 
points out, the whole sensory-motor concept originated as a mechan-
ical description of the lower centres which circumvents the cortex 
(see Hearnshaw, 1964, p. 71); the mechanical description was support-
ed of course by the empirical discoveries of Bell and Magendie. 
The Bell-Magendie discovery was hailed as a major achievement be- 
cause it fulfilled the demands of the emerging psychology so perfectly. 
First of all, it was an empirical discovery so that it fulfilled 
methodological criteria. Secondly, it provided an 'automatic' des-
cription of nervous functioning which left the cortex untouched, 
thereby satisfying philosophical criteria. As such, it served as the 
foundation for the reflexology which characterized the psychology 
of Bain, Spencer, and Carpenter. Laycock was the first thinker to 
extend the reflex paradigm to the cortex in 1837; his achievement 
went unrecognized by many of his contemporaries (see Hearnshaw, 
1964, p. 23), and it was not until the 1860's that Jackson postu-
lated that a motor cortex must exist; shortly after that,his theory 
was substantiated by the researches of Fritsch and Hitzig in 1870, 
and Ferrier in 1873 (see Young, 1970, pp. 224, 235; and Hearnshaw, 
1964, P. 71). 
There are several points to be made here; first, the difference 
in response that greeted the Bell-Magendie law and the cerebral 
localization data is significant. The sensory-motor distinction was 
immediately hailed as a great discovery and theorists began building 
a theory of action (reflexology) upon it (see Young, 1970, p. 79). 
The 'theoretical' advocates of cerebral localization were not well 
received by the scientific community and the discoveries of motor 
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areas of the cortex, although accepted (accepted because they were 
empirical discoveries in the accepted sense and thus could not be 
denied) were greeted with less enthusiasm.
44 
Scholars (such as 
Carpenter, for example) found themselves in the position of having 
to revise their notions of consciousness and its function to take 
account of these whilst the Bell-Magendie discoveries found an im-
mediate place in science and psychology. 
The Bell-Magendie discoveries initiated a simple translation 
of epistemological notions into biological terms without disrupting 
the philosophical or scientific tradition. The discoveries of motor 
areas in the cerebral cortex had graver implications and were a 
serious 'anomaly' in a tradition that had been strengthened by pre-
vious empirical discoveries. 
It is vital to recognize that the sensory-motor, reflex para-
digm was not without anthropomorphic overtones, and it was these 
overtones which allowed the eventual integration of cerebral local-
ization data into psychology. Smith discusses the concept of 
'force' as it was used in physics and psychology to account for 
attractions and repulsions and the activity of the nervous system. 
According to Smith, the 'force' was defined in a combined metaphysi-
cal and scientific sense, neither wholly one nor the other. The 
notion of force linked the two ontologically divided strata of matter 
and mental phenomena, or matter, and 'God'. The notion of 'force' 
was used as a teleological explanation to account for the 'purposive' 
44. See Young, 1970, p. 234. Furthermore, Jackson put forth his  
theory of cerebral localization on the basis of observations made 
on insane and epileptic patients (observations which were later 
physiologically verified--but not by Jackson), but the criteria of 
evidence had not been sufficiently 'broadened' at this stage to 
admit his observations as evidence. 
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behaviour that nervous activity seemed to exhibit. The concept of 
force must be described as anthropomorphic because of its teleologi-
cal usage in the hard sciences and in physiology. The matter of the 
nervous system was given a correspondent status to all other matter 
in the physical universe; at the same time, conciousness was not 
used as a means of describing the teleological activity of organisms. 
The purposiveness was a property of the organized matter itself. 
Organisms were a priori purposive, and this interpretation of nervous 
activity was well suited to the evolutionary view as it emerged in 
Darwin's and Spencer's writings.
45 
The concept of force appears in the automatist writings. Huxley, 
deeply committed to the principle of the uniformity of nature, 
used the concept to account for the essential reactivity of matter, 
and extended his analogy to include mental phenomena as well.'Force' 
is the unifying concept which is used to make the doctrine of the 
uniformity of nature coherent and comprehensive. Huxley writes: 
But if, as I have endeavoured to prove to you, their 
protoplasm is essentiaP4 identical with, and most readily 
converted into, that of any animal, I can discover no 
logical halting-place between the admission that such 
is the case, and the further concession that all vital 
action may, with equal propriety, be said to be the result 
of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays 
it. And if so, it must be true, in the same sense and to 
the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now giving 
utterance, and your thoughts regarding them, are the 
expression of molecular changes in that matter of life 
which is the source of our other vital phenomena (Huxley, 
1868/1894, p. 154). 
Tyndall unites the organic and the inorganic through the concept of 
force although he denies that this force is the same as the 'vital 
force' earlier posited to explain life: "The matter of the human 
45. Smith details the anthropomorphic nature of the concept of 
force as it was used in physics and mental philosophy (see Smith, 
1970, pp. 131-150, 225-240). 
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body is the same as that of the world around us; and here we find 
the forces of the human body identical with those of inorganic 
nature" (Tyndall,. 1877/1879, p. 350). He specifically distinguishes 
between matter and force so that describing the digestive process 
he says: - 
We place,.then,-food in our stomachs as so much combustible 
matter. It is first dissolved by purely chemical processes, 
and the nutritive fluid is poured into the blood. Here it 
comes into contract with atmospheric oxygen admitted by 
the lungs. It unites with the oxygen as wood or coal might 
unite with it in a furnace. The matter-products of the 
union, if I may use the term, are the same in both cases, 
viz, carbonic acid and mater. The force-products are also 
the same--heat within the body, or heat and work outside 
the body. Thus far every action of the organism belongs to 
the domain of either physics or chemistry (Tyndall, 1877/1879, 
p, 352). 
But the question of psychical causes of activity is then raised, 
and Tyndall, true to his positivistic parallelism says that the 
will does not directly instigate activity but rather mediates action 
through the physical r4ervous system. The brain is the seat of 'govern-
ment' as it were, and appears sufficient as an organ to 'comprehend' 
and instigate sensory-motor actions so that activity can be viewed 
scientifically according to the laws of mechanics (see Tyndall, 
1877/1379, pp. 352-353). At the same time, he makes a careful dis-
tinction between the role of mental processes--in the traditional 
sense of 'soul' or ego--in instigating acts and the physical pro-
cesses, conceived in terms of mechanical laws: Tyndall was convinced 
that psychical faculties could not cause physical reactions In 
Tyndall 's writings, then, the uniformity of nature is not completely 
guaranteed by the concept of force. He does, however, utilize the 
concept of force to 'explain' the activities of all those processes 
--organic and inorganic--which can be mechanically described, 
Hodgson's use of the concept of force is more akin to Huxley's. 
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Consciousness is a product of the 'forces' or 'motions of nerve 
molecules. Or, as Hodgscn writes: 
The various forces in nature are held to be cases of such 
action and reaction; the mechanical, the chemical, the 
physical, the vital, forces are all held to be modes of 
change in the relations of atoms, molecules, or masses, 
to each other. One kind of visible and tangible matter, 
nerve substance, which is one of the seats of vital forces, 
or the motions in which are some mode or modes of life, 
is also the seat of sensation or consciousness, and the 
motions in it are followed by consciousness. The more 
finely organized this nerve substance is, and the more 
minutely complex, interdependent, and individualized, 
its motions are, so much the more complex and organic 
is the system of states of consciousness which arises 
from them (Hodgson, 1870, 1, p. 337). 
The anthropomorphic character of reflexology was instrumental 
in smoothing the way for a reflex view of cortical activity, because 
it allowed the mechanistic analogy to be translated into biological 
terms The anthropomorphic character of the concept of force as it 
was used in reflexology also makes it possible to describe knowledge 
in biological terms. Though nervous processes were certainly uncons-
cious, they were not lacking in purpose. It is this notion that 
allows Maudsley to speculate that the absence of consciousness would 
make little difference to human activity. With the extension of 
the sensory-motor theory to the cerebral cortex, the emergence of 
an automaton theory of mind was virtually guaranteed. 
So what happens to all of the old structures that were tradition-
ally used to discuss mental processes? Spencer has the answer: 
the classification of mental events: 
can be but superficially true. Instinct, Reason, Perception, 
Conception, Memory, Imagination, Feeling, Will, etc., etc., 
can be nothing more than either conventional groupings of 
the correspondences; or subordinate divisions among the 
various operations which are instrumental in effecting the 
correspondences. However widely contrasted they may seem, 
these various forms of intelligence cannot be anything else 
than either particular modes in which the adjustment of 
inner to outer relations is achieved; or particular parts 
of the process of adjustment (Spencer, 1855, p.486, quoted 
in Young, 1970, p. 181). 
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• The conventional names are retained for conscious processes but the 
efficacy of these processes, as they had been categorized within 
mental philosophy, has been shorn from them, As Young remarks, 
Spencer had concluded that "Both memory and reasoned action tend to 
lapse into automatism" (Young, 1970, p. 180). The automatists 
followed Spencer and consciousness was still described in 'tradition-
al' terms. This is shown in the first chapter of Hodgson's Theory  
of practice. He intends, he says, to examine the material nature 
of the feelings; at the same time, Hodgson describes the feelings 
according to traditional categories. Thus, Hodgson says, the modes 
of feeling include sensations, emotions, passions, desires, pleasures, 
pains, efforts, volitions, and actions (see Hodgson, 1870, 1, pp. 4- 
5). Later, Hodgson discusses the relationship between the parts of 
the nervous system and the corresponding conscious experiences which 
are evoked when the system is differentially aroused. Consciousness 
is divided into the traditional faculties: these include memory, 
perception, imagination, reasoning, and volition (see Hodgson, 1870, 
1, pp. 355-356). 
Maudsley, as well, describes consciousness in the traditional 
categories of memory, reason, imagination, perception and will (see 
Maudsley, 1883, pp. v, 71-86, for example). At the same time he 
sees these faculties as having little importance in the new psychology: 
When we experience a state of consciousness that we are not 
able to refer to an exciting cause, as we refer the 
sensation of sound to the external body, we invent a 
faculty as the cause of it; for example, when we feel an 
emotion, we are conscious of no material cause of it, and 
we accordingly imagine an emotional faculty as part of 
the furniture of mind, as we in like manner refer an 
outcoming volition to a faculty of will. All the while 
there are perhaps sufficient physical antecedents of the 
emotion and will in the states of the internal organs of 
the body that are hidden from us; but having no perceptions 
of these organic affections, we please ourselves with the 
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mental faculties which we create and put in their 
places (Maudsley, 1883, p. 73). 
In Maudsley's view, the faculties of mind are pure inventions which 
we substitute for the proper physical explanations. 
In summary, the automaton theorists were not concerned with 
reconceptualizing consciousness, but rather with minimizing its 
status. Because the real, or causal events took place in the subcons-
cious regions of the nervous system, the actual forms of the 'display' 
of events in consciousness was not particularly important. The 
traditional faculties were retained, and man 'knew' the world in the 
same way as he had in 'pre-physiological' times. But like Cassandra 
in the ancient myth, the conscious mind could not affect the world 
with its knowledge. Human action was fully constrained, in the one 
case by a fatalism, in the other by a biological determinism. 
Essentially therefore, the shift to a biological account of 
knowledge was 4 shifting of the status of the concept of mechanism 
facilitated by the anthropomorphic character of mechanical forces 
as they were defined in science and natural theology. Whereas it 
had been used as an analogy in the earlier psychology, it was now 
used to describe the biological 'laws' of the nervous system so that 
mechanism attained the same reified status in psychology that it 
had in the natural sciences. 
The 'Atomic' Theory of Mind  
The shift in meaning of the mechanical theory of mind was 
accompanied by a shift in the status of the elementaristic analogies 
that were a part of mental philosophy. The elementaristic 'units' 
of nature (chemical and atomic 'particles') were correlated with 
concepts about the nature of ideas by the empiricist philosophers-- 
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the Cartesians retained a unitary concept of mind. By the time 
physiologists were investigating nervous activity, mental philosphy, 
particularly in the hands of the Mills, had reached a state where 
the units of thought and the complex ideas themselves were highly 
'artificial', and had strong correlations with 'atomic' theories 
in physics and chemistry. Complex ideas were compounded out of 
simple ideas so that the Millian theory of mind was essentially elem-
entaristic. Ideas were products of the mind (see J.S. Mill, 1843/ 
1974, Bk. VI, Chap. IV, 3, pp. 853-854). It is difficult to see 
how these ideas could be directly related to active experiences in 
the world. The function of ideation within the Newtonian world was, 
ultimately, understanding and contemplation of the world as described 
by Newton's laws. Ideas as such were not studied as the means whereby 
the individual adjusted himself to the demands of reality and the 
result was that passive sensationism seemed to be an implicit, if 
not explicit, component of mental philosophy by the mid-nineteenth 
century. As matter was the end product of the chemical bonding be-
tween atoms, so the contents of the mind were the end products of 
the combination of simple elements, or simple ideas. 
Thus, the minimization of the role of ideation in the promotion 
of activity is not simply the result of physiological investigation. 
When physiologists and mental philosophers (Carpenter and Bain, for 
example), made activity 'physiological' they were following the impli-
cations of mental philosophy, as well as science. 
Mechanism and elementarism went hand in hand in the nineteenth 
century. The activity of the nervous system could be described in 
reductionist or elementaristio terms because the 'fiat' for such an 
analysis existed in the physical sciences and in the tradition of 
mental philosophy. Thus it happened that the meaning of the 
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reductionist account of mentality shifted from an analogue in 
mental philosophy--borrowed from the physical sciences--to an 
'empirical' biological description of what 'really' takes place in 
the nervous system of the thinking individual. In short, as it was 
with the mechanical description of mental processes, so it was with 
the units of which they were composed. What was originally an analogy, 
taken from the models of physical science, became a purportedly 
literal, true, description of the workings of the brain, based on 
the application of those models to neurophysiological processes. 
Late nineteenth century models of mind are dominated by this reduct-
ionist biological approach and the parallelist theories of mind and 
matter, generally adhered to by the 'automaton' theorists, provide 
the most radical accounts of biological atomism. Earlier on, Bain 
cited Du Bois Reymond's conclusion that: 
'Every minute particle of the nerves and the muscles must 
be supposed to act according to the same law as the whole 
nerve or muscle.' The total currents are in fact, the 
combined effect of these currents circulating round the 
ultimate particles (Bain, 1868, p. 49). 
And Spencer described sensation inatomistic, reductionist terms (see 
Spencer, 1870, 1, pp. 148-153) while Carpenter had also followed 
Du Bois Reymond, and wrote: "The 'nervous current', like the muscu-
lar, must be considered as derived from the electromotive action of 
the molecules of the nerve" (Carpenter, 1855, p. 430). From here, 
Carpenter went on to build his system of reflex action, describing 
the complexes of nerve fibres which 'initiate' muscular activity. 
The point is that 'molecules of the nerve' were taken to have a 
real empirical meaning, unlike Hartley's vibrations or Descartes' 
animal spirits (see Huxley, 1868/1894, pp. 153-154; Tyndall, 1879, 
pp. 390-391; Hodgson, 1870, 1, pp. 337-338; and Maudsley, 1883, 
pp. 102-104). 
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The 'activated' molecules of the nervous system were now cor-
related with the rest of the material world. They were real sub-
stance, and as such, were logically distinguished from mental events. 
The mind-body distinction was now of renewed importance, largely 
because of the successes of evolutionary theory. The atomistic, 
biological nervous system fitted in with evolutionary postulates 
for it was amenable to material changes and these changes or powers 
of development could be described biologically. The biological 
description of nervous molecules carried the same anthropomorphic 
overtones that characterized the overall mechanistic approach. The 
character of the whole nerve and the molecules which composed it 
were essentially the same so that molecular actions were additive. 
But what to do with mind itself? Causation was discussed at the 
atomic level and it was deemed impossible by Tyndall, Hodgson, 
Maudsley, and Clifford that mental events could 'cause' physical 
events or vice versa. 
The existence of mind had been made subject to the existence of 
currents in the brain by Bain, Carpenter, and Spencer. The automaton 
theorists, less concerned with preserving any notion of a causal re-
lationship between brain states and mental events, found it more 
'scientifically rational' to reaffirm the mind-body distinction, 
in hopes of creating a systematically scientific account of functions 
once ascribed to mind and now describable in atomistic, mechanistic, 
biological terms. As the writings of Huxley and Tyndall in particular 
demonstrate, their main concern was to chart the progress of scienti-
fic discovery, showing in some detail, that the contribution of 
science and biology, supported by theoretical postulates gleaned from 
philosophy, were sufficient to guarantee the uniformity of nature. 
Again, therefore, 'knowledge' becomes a function of the physical 
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nervous system and that 'knowledge' resides in the molecules of the 
nervous tissue (see Maudsley, 1883, p. 116; Hodgson, 1880, 1, p. 350; 
and Huxley, 1874/1894, pp. 214-216). 
The Distinction Between Human and Animal Minds  
The ontological distinction between human and animal minds, 
elaborated by Descartes, was a commonplace assumption throughout the 
Newtonian era until the time when serious physiological investigations_ 
were carried out on the nervous systems of animals. The empiricist 
distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' aspects of 'mental' activ-
ity allowed physiological data, generated by animal research, to be 
applied to human faculties without radically upsetting the relation-
ship between science and philosophy. And for the automatists, the 
question of a possible relationship between human and animal minds 
was settled by evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory described 
a relationship between man and the rest of the animal world; man had 
evolved along with the other species. Furthermore, the development 
of 'reflexology' was compatible with a view of some kind of psycho-
logical continuity between animal and human minds (see Carpenter, 
1855, pp. 436-441; Maudsley, 1883, pp. 112-117; and Huxley, 1874/ 
1894, pp. 239-243). 
The problem lay in deciding how man's volitional and reasoning 
abilities could be dealt with in an evolutionary paradigm. Man's 
special place in nature was endangered by evolutionary theory, and 
it was this special place, rather than the biological 'underpinnings' 
of his behaviour, that troubled many theorists. At the same time, 
science was becoming overtly positivistic and theorists agreed that 
questions concerning the possibility of free will were not scientific 
questions. Carpenter's belief in free will was sustained by his 
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theological commitments and his introspective experiences, rather 
than by any scientific evidence. Huxley settled the question for 
himself by concluding that freedom consists in following the pre-
determined impulses without impediment (see Huxley, 1874/1894, p. 
241), and Maudsley, like so many 'psychiatric' practitioners of the 
time, used data gleaned from observations of mental patients to con-
clude that free will is the illusory product of other determinable 
factors (see Maudsley, 1883, p. 10). The notion of free will, as 
Spencer wrote, was agreed to be antagonistic to science. 
If man was separable from the beasts, he could not, according to 
the automatists, be given a special place in nature just because he 
displayed volition. Man's experiences of choice, or volition, are 
not denied in post-Darwinian psychology. But they are reduced to 
non-efficacious phenomena. The structure of mind and the essential 
differences between animals and humans have not essentially changed, 
but the meaning of the distinction has undergone a change. In the 
new paradigm, human and animal minds are both to be treated at the 
biological level, and while the possession of consciousness may still 
distinguish man from beast, that consciousness is no longer seen as 
productive or efficacious, so that the distinction lacks any function-
al or scientific significance. 
Motivation, Emotion, Innate Ideas, and Instincts  
Until the mid-nineteenth century the 'faculties' of motivation 
and emotion had generally been subordinated to the structures of 
reason (see above, p. 26). As mental philosophy was 'translated' 
into physiology and as evolutionary theory gained converts, motivation 
and emotion became more critical areas of interest (see Peters, 1962, 
pp. 651-655). The first attempt at a systematic biological theory 
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of motivation was based on the doctrine of psychological hedonism: 
the doctrine proclaimed that man acted to achieve pleasure and to 
avoid pain. And this was readily enough translated into a sufficient 
theory to explain the differential adjustments made by men in the 
world--it seemed to explain human activity without the need to appeal 
to the reasoning processes. The lack of an established tradition 
of social psychology or individual differences, or, the common as-
sumption that one 'universalized' individual could serve as the pro-
totype for mankind, made it possible for early investigators to be-
lieve that adjustment behaviour was governed by lawful universal 
postulates such as psychological hedonism implied. Such a theory of 
motivation quite logically predisposed later theorists to accept 
evolutionary premises and at the same time to minimize the role of 
consciousness in making decisions or choices. Bain, Spencer, and 
Carpenter all incorporated psychological hedonism into their theories 
as a means of explaining desires or motives. They described it in 
neurophysiological terms so that the doctrine of motivation changed 
from a philosophical conception into a physiological paradigm. The 
main difference between these thinkers and their philosophical pre-
decessors lay in the importance they accorded the subjects of moti-
vation and emotion. Why an organism did this and not that, reacted 
with this emotion and not that were important in an evolutionary 
paradigm. Motivation and emotion were now important topics in the 
new psychology. 
Concurrent with the elevated 'status' of motivation and emotion 
as subjects for discourse was the translation of innate ideas or 
predispositions towards ideas or activities into instincts. While 
Descartes insisted that the mind at least had tendencies towards 
certain ideas the i empiricists had tended to push sensation as the 
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foundation of all ideation. But the distinction between the two 
schools was not quite so clear-cut. If Locke insisted that sensation 
was the basis for ideation, he also maintained that the mind had 
certain powers of organizing the input it received. The mind was a 
tabula rasa in terms of content but not in terms of operational 
structures (see Locke, 1690/1964, Bk. 2, II, 1-2, p. 99; and Bk. 2, 
XII, 1-2, pp. 132-133). 
Within both streams of the rationalist-empiricist tradition 
there was agreement on the issue of whether or not the mind had a 
role to play in the production of abstract, complex, or metaphysical 
ideas. It did. The differences came in the nature of the structures 
of mind and their relations to the other lower' mental faculties. 
The concept that innate tendencies governed the highest levels of 
human functioning is to be found in both strands of the tradition. 
Descartes viewed the passions or emotions as volitions which come 
from, or are produced by, the soul and controlled by the will (see 
Peters, 1962, p. 369). According to Locke, events were accounted 
good or evil according to their pleasure or pain producing procli-
vities. The pleasure-pain tendencies or passions are described as 
internal sensations and the actions connected with them are governed 
IV the will, so that will could override desire (see Locke, 1690/1964, 
Bk. 2, XX, 1-17, pp. 159-161; and Bk. 2, XXI, 25-35, pp. 171-173). 
In both systems desires and passions were recognized and in both, the 
will acted to regulate their expression. Thus, the mental philosophy 
included a fairly comprehensive internal structure for the mechanisms 
of activity. If the mind of the organism was dependent on sensation 
to a greater or lesser degree for knowledge, - the individual was still 
organized in specific ways to deal with incoming sensation. In the 
late nineteenth century, this internal 'mentalistic' organization 
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was further defined and reassessed in biological terms: thus, in 
evolutionary theory, reactive or releasing mechanisms came to be 
described as instincts. That the individual had certain specific 
inborn tendencies to behave in particular ways can be seen as a 
'naturalization' or 'biologification' of the structures of mental 
philosophy. 
On the other hand, by the mid-nineteenth century, the 'Cartesian' 
elements in Locke's empiricism had been minimized. Condillac, in 
particular, claimed in 1754 that instincts were actually habits once 
derived from sensations and these habits appeared as 'instincts' 
because the individual had stopped reflecting upon the sensations 
which gave rise to them. J.S. Mill, adopting a less extreme sensa-
tionism admitted that instincts existed and that their presence could 
not be explained within the associationist model (see Young, 1970, 
pp. 176-177). Young shows that Gall, Cuvier, and Mueller recognized 
the correlation between the concepts of innate ideas and instincts. 
He adds that it was this connection which made the notion of instinct 
"the traditional enemy of evolution and association" (Young, 1970, 
p. 176, see also p. 174). 
Bain, having reinterpreted mental life as essentially active, 
was better able to cope with the notion of instinct so that in his 
system, the will provided the stimulus for particular activities but 
the exhibition of complex activity depended upon the natural endow-
ments of the system. These 'natural endowments' could in turn, be 
• analyzed in terms of the 'smaller' units of reflexes and feelings; 
thus Bain incorporated 'instincts' into his psychology without intro-
ducing extra-mentalism or innate ideation (see Bain, 1868, pp. 246- 
247). • 
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Spencer, determined on a passive organism model, declared that 
when an external stimulation produced a combination of contractions 
(or a more complex or 'developed' reflex action), an 'instinctive' 
response could be said to have taken place (see Spencer, 1870, 1, 
p. 434). Instincts had to be distinguished from simple reflex 
actions because of the automatic and unconscious character of simple 
reflex actions such as heart beat. Instincts were sometimes accom-
panied by consciousness and they were specifically elicited by 
external factors (see Spencer, 1870, 1, pp. 434-435). 
Darwin, of course, disputed the correlation of instincts with 
habits and reflexes and defined them as actions which are performed 
by members of a species, without previous experience, and which 
would appear to require experience for their implementation (see 
Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 234. Young (1970, p. 177), records Darwin's 
disagreements with Bain and Mill). 
In the end, Darwin's view prevailed. It was not too long before 
a proliferation of 'instinct theories' replaced the traditional 
psychological hedonism of the earlier period. 45 And the ease with 
which Darwin's instinct hypothesis found acceptance was in part due 
to its fit with rationalist and early empiricist views on mental 
structures and innate ideas. Because the 'mentalistic' instincts 
• were 'surrounded' by a biological system, they tended to be trans-
lated into biological or physiological terms, somehow divorced from 
the other mental systems. Thus, for many theorists, the instincts 
became teleological units of behaviour, just as, for a later gener-
ation of psychologists, 'drive' came to have the same teleological 
45. See for example, James' theory of instinct in James, 1890, 
2, pp. 383-441, and his refutation of psychological hedonism in 
James, 1890, 2, pp. 549-559. 
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import (see Herrnstein, 1972, pp. 23-52). The 'biologification' 
of mental philosophy did not merely mean that physiological factors 
were given responsibility for ideation. It meant that 'innate 
ideas' or 'mental events'--that is, events traditionally given over 
to the province of mental philosophy--were transferred to biology. 
Conclusions  
All of the changes in meaning discussed can be categorized as 
shifts from what Smith (see Smith, 1970, p. 40) calls the introspect-
ive approach, to a biological approach to 'mental activity'. The 
transition was effected over a period of about 65 years and went 
through several stages, culminating in an automaton theory of mind. 
The essential factors in this transion took place so that new meanings 
were derived for the 'common assumptions' about consciousness while 
the structures of consciousness themselves were not changed. The 
function of consciousness changed, so that the pre-physiological 
conceptions concentrated on the capacity of mind to 'know' the world, 
and to effect progressive enlightenment about the cosmos through the 
growth of 'discovered' knowledge. Gradually, the function of 'know- s 
ing' the world in a meaningful sense was transferred to the nervous 
system, for the nervous system was the seat of both received input 
from the environment, and output into the environment. A kind of 
biological associationism was developed which described habit for-
mation, volitional activity, and patterns of reasoning. Conscious-
ness became the 'expression' of this underlying activity, although 
how molecular events were translated into conscious ideas or thoughts 
remained problematical for the automatists and they argued that the 
dilemma could not be resolved. 
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Consciousness was still described according to the laws of 
association; a reconstruction of the basic postulates describing the 
structures of consciousness was not undertaken until James began 
work on what was to become the Principles of psychology in 1878. 
And in 1878, James was still in the polemical phase of his career, 
arguing simply that evolutionary theory demanded anefficacious view 
of consciousness. The advent of evolutionary theory at first (through 
Spencer) supported the biologification of the rationalist-empiricist 
tradition. If consciousness had any , purpose in the new paradigm 
that purpose lay in acting as a 'voice' for the unconscious neuro-
physiological workings of the nervous system. The early polemicists 
of evolutionary theory--Huxley, Tyndall, and Clfford, for example, 
were not concerned with finding a functional place for consciousness 
in the new paradigm. That consciousness may have continued to 
evolve because it was useful in facilitating survival was not a 
concept that initially emerged with the promulgation of evolutionary 
theory 
46 
That a functional concept of consciousness took some time to 
emerge can be explained by the 'artificiality' of mind as it grew 
in rationalist-empiricist philosophy. The point has already been 
made that ideas, in the Millian context, bore little relation to 
everyday experience; the mind was a passive recipient of information 
which was combined according to the universal laws of association. 
The mind could know the world, but there is little in pre-evolution-
ary psychology that shows the mind as an effector of adaptive 
46. Spencer is of course somewhat of an exception to this statement, 
but it has been shown that the consciousness that Spencer construct-
ed was entirely dependent upon the underlying physical processes 
and served to reflect those processes for the individual. 
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responses, nor as an instrument of change in the external world. 
The regulative processes were ascribed to the lower faculties which 
were in turn described according to mechanistic and elementaristic 
analogies. 
The physiological data had the effect of confirming one possible 
variant of this construction. As we have seen, the data were not 
relevant primarily as new discoveries, for they were generated with-
in the rationalist-empiricist tradition. But the thrust of physio-
logical experimentation shifted the emphasis of interpretation. 
While the concept of activity was given a central place in psycho-
logical theory by Bain, the concept was applied, not to mental pro-
cesses themselves, but to the nervous tissue. As physiological re-
search progressed and discoveries were made of motor areas in the 
cortex, the concept of activity was applied ever more stringently 
and in more and more detail to neurophysiological events. 
The automaton theory of consciousness is thus the climax of a 
long tradition of mental philosophy in complex interaction with 
experimental physiology. Hartley and the Mills, in particular, pro-
vide anticipation of some of its tenets, but only in rough outline. 
The details of the theory and its implications for traditional philo- 
sophical views,t stemmed from the process of the interaction. The philo-
sophical tradition selectively legitimated, and provided the context 
for the interpretation of, physiological data; the attention given 
to the data forced a redistribution of the relative emphasis accorded 
the different themes in the philosophical tradition. Thus, while 
the elements of the automaton theory can be traced to earlier philo-
sophical speculation, the way they were put together cannot. The way 
the elements were put together and given differential importance led 
in turn, to a reformulation of the nature of mind and knowledge such 
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as could not have commanded allegiance previously. 
James, Renouvier, Darwin, and the Newtonian World-View: Hypotheses  
The optimistic, scientifically-uniform world-view, summarized 
by men like Huxley and Tyndall, was James' immediate inheritance. His 
early determination to enter science, his defence of evolutionary 
theory, and his willingness to concede that consciousness was the pro-
duct of neurophysiological activity, place him firmly within the late 
nineteenth century framework. But we left James foundering in his 
neurasthenic despair because (unlike Huxley, Clifford, and Tyndall) 
James did not find that the assimilation of the biological and physi-
cal sciences with the promise of a comprehensive view of reality was 
a sufficient compensation for the loss of an efficacious consciousness. 
As soon as he allowed that we must be conscious automata, the 'will' 
to work deserted him: the period of despair lasted from 1867-1870. 47 
Rescue came in the form of Charles Renouvier, a leading neo-
Kantian philosopher.
48 
It is relevant that Renouvier was not an 
evolutionist: in an 1878 letter to James, he wrote that Spencer: 
owes his great renown in Europe to the fact that he has 
systematized the theory of evolution. But evolution is 
a craze. It will last fifteen or twenty years, and then 
we shall again speak of it as one spoke of the system of 
Lamarck at the time of Cuvier (quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 
1, p. 667). 
The philosophical solution that Renouvier provided for James was 
47. For descriptions of the neurasthenic condition which prevented 
James from working see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 274-288, 320-323; 
see also Kuklick, 1977, pp. 160-161. 
48. Although Renouvier belonged to the neo-Kantian school, it was his 
criticisms of Kant that established his reputation and which had such 
an effect on James (see Boas, 1967, p. 180). This is important 
because it meant that James, unlike the majority of the members of 
the Metaphysical Club, did not look for a solution in Kant's work, 
but based himself instead within the British empiricist tradition. 
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neither naturalistic nor empirically (in the experimental sense) 
derived: instead it arose from Renouvier's critique of Kant: 
Renouvier's importance for James lay in the Frenchman's 
attack on the Kantian distinction between understanding 
and reason. Kant questioned transcendent metaphysics 
by arguing that the understanding, applicable to the 
phenomenal world alone, is bound to become involved in 
contradictions when applied beyond this limit. For James 
the best example is the dispute between determinists and 
indeterminists. As phenomenal creatures we are determined. 
But we cannot apply the constitutive category of cause 
and effect beyond the limits of the understanding, and , 
Kant argued for indeterminism by analyzing the regulative 
character of the "rational will" as it confronted noumenal 
ethical and religious demands. Here, however, we had faith, 
not knowledge. Renouvier said we could not partition the 
mind into the faculties of understanding and reason. Both 
intellectual and moral activity rested on faith. In effect, 
all guiding principles were regulative. If the rational will 
was justified in affirming freedom in the moral sphere, then 
intellectual speculations--Kant's understanding--may also 
affirm human freedom (Kuklick,1977, p. 162). 
Perry summarizes Renouvier's philosophy as follows: for 
Renouvier as an empiricist, belief was assurance, knowledge dubious. 
Belief 'happened' through an act of will and nothing else, in the 
absence of logic or experience, could coerce it. For the empiricist 
absolute certainty exists only momentarily in the presence of parti-
cular facts. But cases arise when logic and experience are not 
decisive, when they have nothing to offer, and when a need for belief 
or resolution still arises. Renouvier stated that under these cir-
cumstances, belief is justified, indeed demanded, by the moral cir-
cumstances.
49 
And thus James found in Renouvier the argument against 
determinism that he sought. In 1870 he wrote in his diary: 
I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished 
the first part of Renouvier's second Essais and see no 
49. See Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 656-657. Renouvier's works have 
not been translated into English with the result that the author has 
had to rely on secondary sources for accounts of Renouvier's 
philosophy, and on James' correspondence with Renouvier. 
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reason why his definition of free will--"the sustaining 
of a thought because I choose to when I might have other 
thoughts"--need be the definition of an illusion. At 
any rate, I will assume for the.present--until next year-- 
that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall 
be to believe in free will (quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 
1, p. 323). 
In fact, James was to assume that free will was no illusion 
until the end of his life. In any event, he was now armed with the 
conviction that consciousness had an active role to play: conscious-
ness was not a purely mechanistic process whereby particular laws 
of physiological stimulation could account for which ideas would be 
enacted to the exclusion of others. The idea that consciousness 
was an epiphenomenon was now a psychological impossibility for James 
and in his rejection of automaton theory he was to declare that 
•consciousness brings real ends into the world for the first time. 
Survival is no longer a mere hypothesis; it is guaranteed by the 
possession of consciousness (see James, 1879, pp. 16-17; see also 
James, 1890, 1, p. 141), and with this statement, James made his 
first.real contribution to philosophy and psychology. 
It is critical to understand what James was doing with the 
notion of free will he extracted from Renouvier's writings. He did 
not turn to idealist philosophy; instead, he immediately translated 
the idea of free will into a conception of a congenitally active 
consciousness--a consciousness that had evolved as a 'functional 
50 
organ'. 
The following chapters will show how James married Renouvier's 
50. Perry, 1935/1974, 1, p. 117, quoted p. 96 below, states that 
James was hostile towards Kantian idealism. James' debt was to the 
Renouvier who criticized Kant's system. James did rot regard 
idealism as some of his contemporaries (for example, Bradley and 
Royce) did as a valid means of extricating philosophy from the 
Predicament that the success of evolutionary theory appeared to 
have left it in. 
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particular brand of empiricism to Darwinian biology and in the pro-
cess will demonstrate that evolutionary theory and Renouvier's con-
ce-pt of free will were the critical influences on James' thought. 51 
It was a brilliant move on James' part and one that is revealing in 
a number of ways. It shows how deeply James was committed to resolv-
ing the problems of the nature of consciousness within the terms of 
discussion set up by the nineteenth century evolutionists. And 
while James would eventually give voice to his own explicit version 
of the will to believe (in 1896), he first used the •concept to est-
ablish that consciousness had to be efficacious in promoting the 
survival and physical well-being of the individual. He was as com-
mitted to evolutionary and scientific postulates at this point in 
his career as the most outspoken defendants of evolutionary theory 
(for example, Huxley and Tyndall). While James was to demolish so 
many of the structures of the traditional rationalist-empiricist 
philosophy and to build new edifices in their places, he was clearly 
a direct heir of that tradition: 
In the course of his intellectual adventures James 
encountered two idealisms, or two dispensations of 
idealism, the old and the new. The older idealism of 
Berkeley and Hume, revived by Mill and many of his con-
temporaries of the British school, won his allegiance, 
but didnot hold it permanently. This idealism, being 
empirical, was consistent with James' fundamental philo-
sophical creed. The new idealism, on the other hand, the 
idealism emanating from Kant and transformed by Fichte, 
Schopenhauer, and Hegel into a constructive metaphysics 
that threatened to conquer the dominion of the intellect-
ual world, was to James profoundly alien. This was his 
favorite philosophical enemy, and an enemy worthy of his 
mettle (Perry, 1935/1974, 1, p. 711). 
51. ,It must be made clear that James makes few explicit references 
to either Renouvier or to Darwin in his work, and no explicit 
attempt will be made to catalogue those he does make. Instead, 
these two influences will be described in terms of the specific 
elements •in James' work that relate to them. 
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James brought consciousness into the natural world as a real 
object, available for scientific-psychological study because he 
defined an active role for consciousness in determining individual 
survival. In doing so he not only created a new functional concept- 
ion of consciousness based upon voluntaristic fiat, but made the 
biological theory of evolution the basis for his whole philosophical 
system. 
James' debt to Renouvier was not confined to Renouvier's asser-
tion of the reality of free will. Renouvier also provided James 
with the basis for a schema to study the relationship between subject 
and object or knower and known and to see that relationship as an 
essentially interactive one: 
To James, Renouvier was thus first of all an empiricist. 
His Renovvier was the philosopher who identified the real 
with the apparent, and knowledge with evident presence; 
who substituted "representations" for substances or other 
hidden entities; who constructed representations as embrac-
ing in their inherent duality of aspect both the subjective 
and the objective, and as standing in perceivable relations 
to one another, "multiple, composite, linked, interlaced". 
He was "the greatest living insister on the principle that 
unity in an account of things shall not overwhelm clearness". 
Even his "categories" were not deduced, but empirically 
observed and recognizing these evident connections of 
things, he escaped the skeptical atomism, the "nihilistic 
juxtapositionalism", of Hume and Mill: M. Renouvier's 
polemic against the metaphysical notions of substance, of 
infinite existence, and of abstract ideas seems to us more 
powerful than anything which has been written •in English; 
but he differs from his English allies in giving as great 
an emphasis to the laws of grouping as the phenomena grouped 
(Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 656-657). 
James' particular brand of empiricism grew out of Renouvier's claim 
that the objective and subjective elements in any 'representation' 
or 'thought', 'feeling', or 'idea' are inextricably compounded in 
the moment of experience. Man and nature merge within the moment of 
'experience'; later, abstractions from experience provide a growing 
fund of intellectual knowledge about the world which guides future 
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experiences. But the important moment for James would always be 
the moment of experience itself because he believed that this was 
where the ideas about the world were verified and where ideas were 
'acted out' so that ideas had real physical effects. 
While James was in the midst of preparing his psychology, the 
first fruits of the extension and transformation of evolutionary 
postulates were appearing. The emergence of new fields of scientific 
endeavour and new foci in 'older' fields represents the first con-
crete achievement that marked the broad direction of the changes 
that were taking place in the ways men thought about mind and its 
relation to the physical world. The common assumptions of science 
and mental philosophy were changing. 
Galton's work provided the basis for the study of individual 
differences by such men as James McKeen Cattell (see Galton, 1908,pp. 
245-246; and Cattell, 1890, pp. 373-381). The importance attached 
to individual differences was derived from Darwin's studies on the 
differentiation and individual variation within species. Social 
interaction was becoming important: the equation between the natural 
environment and human society was made and the notion that society 
provided the arena for the battle of survival excited a tremendous 
intellectual outpouring. 52 Hall's recapitulation model of child de-
velopment was a landmark in itself: Hall claimed that development 
proceeded in stages which corresponded socially to the biological 
evolution of the race. 53 
52. Note the growth of social Darwinism, literary realism and 
naturalism during this period (see Persons, 1950, for an account 
of the development of these movements). 
53. See Lomax, 1978, pp. 1-44 for a review of the contrast 
between pre- and post-evolutionary theories of child development; 
see also Hall, 1904 and 1923. 
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The idea that the physical world and its occupants changed 
from one era to the next was gaining credibility. Men began to 
believe thatthey lived in a mutable universe and that the human 
species itself might also be mutable. Ideas of the relative nature 
of all aspects of the universe, including human achievements and 
values were replacing the earlier concepts of progress. Progress 
had earlier been defined as the slow unravelling of the secrets of 
the static, eternal universe; progress consisted in making known 
that which was there to know, eternally through all time (see Marcell, 
1974, pp. 52-56). Evolutionary theorists demonstrated that nature 
changed in significant ways so that whatever the 'new' universal 
laws were to be--and there would assuredly be new universal laws-- 
they would at least have to take account of the observable changes 
in the natural world. A concern for pragmatic, functional solutions 
to the problems of life on earth began to replace the eighteenth 
century concern with accumulating abstract knowledge of the workings 
of the universe as they existed behind the shifting, and therefore 
unreliable, appearances of reality. 
But the progress wherein this shift was made was complex: . 
Darwin had been concerned with preserving the uniformity of nature, 
and his mechanism of natural selection was intended to enlarge the 
scope of the mechanistic model of the physical world, so that the 
shift in world view cannot be directly attributed to Darwin. Josiah 
Royce states that the evolutionary era can be divided into an 
initial 'polemical' phase and a philosophical stage when evolutionary 
postulates were extended and applied to a wide range of problems. 
• Because Royce's distinction between the two evolutionary phases will 
be used as the basis for analyzing James' role in the history of 
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psychology and philosophy, it is appropriate to quote Royce at 
some length: 
In defining the historical position which William James, 
as a thinker, occupies, we have of course to take account, , 
not only of national tendencies, but also of the general 
interests of the world's thought in his time. William James 
began his work as a philosopher, during the seventies of the 
last century, in years which were, for our present purposes, 
characterized by two notable movements of world-wide signi-
ficance. These two movements were at once scientific in 
the more special sense of that term, and philosophical 
in the broad meaning of that word. The first of the move-
ments was concerned with the elaboration--the widening 
and the deepening--of the newer doctrines about evolution. 
This movement had indeed been preceded by another. The 
recent forms of evolutionary doctrine, those associated 
with the names of Darwin and Spencer, had begun rapidly to 
come into prominence about 1860. And the decade from 1860 
to 1870, taken together with the opening years of the next 
decade, that constituted what you may call the storm-and-stress 
period of Darwinism, and of its allied tendencies, such as 
those which Spencer represented. In those years the younger, 
defenders of the new doctrines, so far as they appealed to 
the general public, fought their battles, declared their 
faith, out of weakness made strong and put to flight the 
armies of the theologians. You might name, as a closing 
event of that storm-and-stress period, Tyndall 's famous 
Belfast address of 1874, and the warfare that waged about 
that address. Haeckel's early works, some of Huxley's most 
noted polemic essays, Lange's "History of Materialism", the 
first eight or nine editions of von Hartmann's "Philosophy 
of the Unconscious",are documents characteristic of the more 
general philosophical interests of that time. In our country, 
Fiske's "Cosmic Philosophy" reflected some of the notable 
features that belonged to these years of the early conquests 
of evolutionary opinion. 
Now in that storm-and-stress period, James had not yet 
been before the public. But his published philosophical work 
began with the outset of the second and more important period 
of evolutionary thought--the period of the widening and deep- 
ening of the new ideas. The leaders of thought who are charact-
eristic of this second period no longer spent their best efforts 
in polemic in favor of the main ideas of the newer forms Of 
the doctrine of evolution. In certain of its main outlines-- 
outlines now extremely familiar to the public--they simply 
accept the notion of the natural origin of organic forms and 
of the general continuity of the processes of development. 
But they are concerned, more and more, as time goes on, with 
the deeper meaning of evolution, with the study of its factors, 
with the application of the new ideas to more and more fields 
of inquiry, and, in case they are philosophers with the re-
interpretation of philosophical traditions in the light of 
what had resulted from that time of storm-and-stress. 
James belongs to this great second stage of the evolu-
tionary movement, to the movement of the elaboration, of the 
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widening and deepening of evolutionary thought, as opposed 
to that early period of the storm-and-stress. We still 
live in this second stage of the evolutionary movement. 
James is one of its most inventivephilosophical represent-
atives. He hardly ever took part in the polemic in favor 
of the general evolutionary ideas. Accepting them, he 
undertook to interpret and apply them (Royce, 1911/1969, 
pp. 10-14). 
In the earlier sections of this chapter we showed how the 
common assumptions of the Newtonian, or pre-evolutionary era under-
went gradual changes in meaning. The appearance of evolutionary 
theory both ratified and extended these changes, and the era was 
climaxed by the appearance of the automaton theory of mind. The 
first stage of evolutionism thus describes the appearance and ac-
ceptance of Darwin's theory, and with it, the introduction of auto-
maton theory. Automaton theory is regarded as the climax of the 
Newtonian tradition because it was the last 'position' reached in 
mental philosophy to be based on the common assumptions of the New-
tonian period. That is to say, Huxley and Tyndall both regarded 
evolutionary theory as the final element in a comprehensive, uni-
form, 'Newtonian' world-view. It is therefore the major hypothesis 
of this thesis that the second stage of evolutionism described by 
Royce ultimately involved the generation of a new set of common 
assumptions--that is, philosophers such as James, Peirce, Wright, 
and Royce set themselves the task of re-defining the world-view. 
We have already seen that James was disenchanted with the automaton 
theory of mind; the following chapters will show that his attempt 
to develop an efficacious model of consciousness did not involve 
an attempt to find a place for free will within the mechanistic, 
elementaristic, neurophysiological model as Carpenter had done, but 
to recast the assumptions about the nature of mind and the physical 
world that had sustained the mechanistic view of mind for so long. 
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Thus, a new set of common assumptions was generated during the 
second stage of the evolutionary era, and James played a major 
part in the determination of this new set of assumptions. The 
term 'philosophication of evolutionary theory' will be employed 
to describe the process wherein the new set of assumptions was 
generated. 
The common assumptions which are included in our modern world 
view came to be common assumptions because the late nineteenth 
century thinkers, like James, extended, emphasized, transformed, 
and systematized the ideas that they selected out of evolutionary 
theory. These common assumptions, then, can be seen as implicit 
in Darwin's theory only from our historical perspective. They were 
not 'obvious' or 'common sense' ideas to James and his circle. 
This is partly why Renouvier exerted such an influence over James. 
He provided James with a particular perspective for his analysis 
of the new science. He also provided certain concepts which James 
could apply to the new science so that in the end, James' system 
bears little resemblance to Renouvier's or to nineteenth century 
evolutionism as it first appeared in psychology. 
The statement that the shift in the common assumptions which form 
the base of our twentieth century world view took place during the 
second period of the evolutionary era is both problematic and contro-
versial, when its verification centres around figures such as James, 
Hall, Baldwin and the members of the Metaphysical Club--notably 
Peirce. Our present views of mind and consciousness are inherited 
in part from the controversies that raged over evolutionary theory, 
and the subsequent attempts to resolve the dilemmas through the 
formulation of broad scientific and philosophical systems that went 
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far beyond the dimensions of the debate itself. However, many 
critics would argue that the revolution that took place in physics 
towards the end of the nineteenth century was at least of equal 
importance in determining the way we conceive of the world (see 
Kuhn, 1970; and Mackenzie, 1977, pp. 24-27, for a discussion of the 
attempt made in psychology to model itself on physics). To be sure, 
remnants of the functional, purposive view of consciousness that 
emerged in the late nineteenth century remain in certain broad 
areas of psychology today--perhaps most notably in the fields of 
child development, individual differences, and educational psycho-
logy. But functionalism as conceived by James, Hall, Dewey, and 
the Chicago functionalists has not carried the day, and the domin-
ant psychological theories encompassed by Behaviourism owe more, 
at least in spirit, to the passive organism models, automaton 
theory, and the physiological determinism of the associationists 
and early evolutionists so that a tension exists today between the 
historical alternatives as we have inherited them. 
James' major role in the history of psychology does not there-
fore reside in the creation of a continuing psychological tradition 
or 'research paradigm'. His greatness, and his continuing import-
ance for contemporary psychology is to be found in the part he play-
ed in changing the underlying assumptions that we bring to bear in 
considering psychological problems. The following analysis of James' 
work will concentrate on the changes he made in psychology and philo-
sophy as the means of understanding his contribution to the 'philoso-
phication' of evolutionary theory and his attempts to further the 
instigation of a new world view. That he was attempting to insti-
gate a new way of regarding consciousness and its relationaship to 
the physical world will be shown in the analysis of the strong 
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*polemical statements in his philosophy, his reaction against auto-
maton theory, his rejection of elementarism, and his efforts to-
wards the reconstruction of consciousness. At the same time, it 
is necessary to look at James' relationship to the rationalist- 
empiricist tradition in the light of those assumptions and problems 
he succeeded in changing and providing answers for, and those areas 
where his solutions proved either unsatisfactory or unpalatable to 
the thinkers who followed him. James' failure to generate a psycho-
logical theory which would provide a 'paradigm' for the new science 
is in part due to historical circumstances (for example, the suc-
cess of the new physics), and in part due to the internal diffi-
culties of his theory, and this analysis will concentrate on the 
latter problem. 
If James' task was to be the 'philosophication' of the prin-
ciples of the new science, his obvious starting place was epistem-
ology. After all, Locke and Descartes had reacted to the new science 
of their day with epistemological questions and they created a philo-
sophical framework that was both compatible with and an extension 
of the Galilean-Newtonian physical theory. By the time James began 
his systematic work on the problems of knowledge, psychology was 
beginning to replace philosophy as the area in which questions con-
cerning human knowledge could most profitably be studied, and so 
James began with psychology. 
But James' commitment to psychology was never absolute. While 
James stands as one of the founding fathers of modern psychology he 
was increasingly drawn towards philosophy. His dislike of labora-
tory work is well documented
54 
and he eventually turned his 
54. See James, 1890, 1, P.  192; see also Perry, 1934/1974, 2, 
pp. 6-14, 115. Perry describes the difficulties involved in 
(contd.) 
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laboratory over to Munsterberg (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 15, 
138-144) in order to devote himself full-time to philosophy. This 
is significant. James began his career with an ardentadmiration 
for the progress made by nineteenth century neurophysiologists and 
for a time was convinced that man must in fact be a conscious auto-
maton. His adventure with automaton theory was soon over; his 
interest in neurophysiology persisted until the end of his career. 
The abandoning of psychology for philosophy was not a particularly 
radical step at the time. The empirical approach to the study of 
mind was still fairly new. James had a share in defining the para-
meters of psychology as a science but the narrow positivism (see 
James, 1890, 1, pp. vi , 1-11) he insisted on for psychology was 
too restrictive for his purposes even at the time when he so opti-
mistically defined the limits of psychological investigation for 
the Principles. Paradoxically enough, he limited the subject- 
matter of psychology to such an extent that many of the questions 
he asked had no place in psychology (see for example, James, 1890, 
2, pp. 569-579 on the place of free will), and he turned to the 
more 'open' world of philosophy. But even though James later turn-
ed his attention completely to philosophy, his philosophy is always 
grounded in his psychology; radical empiricism, for example, is based on 
his earlier structure of consciousness and the radical account of 
the structures and functions of the mind is extended into a des-
cription of the physical world. His first ventures into psychology 
eventually resulted in a comprehensive model of mind and the world 
so that he produced a psychology, an epistemology (pragmatism), 
54. (contd.) deciding exactly when James set up his first labora-
tory at Harvard. James first used the physiological lab. in 1872 
for 'psychological studies'; the first formal lab, was set up in 
1875-6. 
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a methodology (pragmatism), and a metaphysic (radical empiricism 
and pluralism). These accomplishments in turn lead to the hypo-
thesis that James' system contained all of the necessary elements' 
for a new world view. Whether or not this hypothesis is justified, 
from the perspective of an internal examination of James' work, 
will be discussed below. 
James' endeavour to construct a new world view was complicated 
by the fact that he began with psychology, and was to insist through-
out his career that consciousness could be taken as the 'centre' 
of the universe. The edifice of Newtonian science did not begin 
to crumble until the end of the century; as an all-inclusive world-
view, its foundations were shaken by the onslaught of evolutionary 
theory. But the rumblings were soon stilled. Physics and chemis-
try retained their respected positions in the scientific hierarchy. 
Biology took up a place beside them, and the elevation of biology 
in this way actually strengthened the faith placed in the sciences 
and their methods (see Mackenzie, 1976, pp. 331, 335; and Marcell, 
1974, pp. 94-145). Thus, when James 'perceived' incompatibilities 
between the old associationism and the new biology, he was not 
only attacking an old psychology from a new perspective, he was 
attacking the whole conception of reality upon which that concept 
of consciousness rested. His abandonment of psychology, and his 
turning to philosophy was not, therefore, solely a matter of positi-
vistic restrictions limiting his scope. The problems he needed to 
confront, in order to broaden and consolidate his psychology seemed 
to go beyond the boundaries of any scientific psychology. 
A new epistemology was essential, for James and others argued 
that the traditional conception of mind was incompatible with 
their interpretation of the new scientific 'truths' and prophesied 
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that a new theory of reality must and would emerge. Caught with-
out a new theory of physics and hence without one of the principle 
sources for a new epistemology and a new metaphysic, their re-
course was to restructure the mind that perceived reality and then 
to look for insights into what that reality must be. James' 
theories of reality will therefore be examined in terms of their 
genesis in his theories of consciousness. As James' philosophy 
matured, his conception of what the physical world is really like 
underwent a radical change. It will be shown that the external 
world of the Principles is constructed along Newtonian lines while 
the world of the final philosophy, Some problems of philosophy, 
explicitly a temporal, mutable world. The new set of common 
assumptions therefore emerged slowly as James progressed from his 
first theory of consciousness through to his final philosophy. 
The journey was difficult and there were substantial problems 
all along the way: it will be shown that the problems engendered 
by James adoption of a mind-body dualism in the Principles are 
never resolved in either his pragmatism or his radical empiricism 
and that an analysis of this less explicit dichotomy in the 
Principles is necessary to assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
the philosophy. This dichotomy will be referred to throughout as 
the structure-function dichotomy. Essentially, it will be argued 
that behind James' deliberate use of dualism in the Principles  
there exists a form of dichotomy which seems to go unrecognized by 
James himself, and that the existence of this unrecognised dicho-
tomy is responsible for some of the difficulties that are encount-
ered in the analysis of his pragmatic theory of truth. James' 
psychology will be shown to incorporate two distinct functional 
perspectives of consciousness with the result that the 'reality- 
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oriented' or 'adaptive' functions clash with the 'metaphysical' 
or 'ethical' capacities. These two sets of tendencies co-exist 
in each indvididual so that a continuous (and it must be allowed, 
possibly productive) tension is an inevitable characteristic of 
James' conception of consciousness. 
The problem with this situation is that the two sets of 
characteristics (which also appear to have different psychogenetic 
origins) are never - clearly defined in relation to one another so 
that James' concept of the functional consciousness is problematic 
in much the same way that other nineteenth century conceptions such 
as Carpenter's are. That is, the moral aspects of consciousness 
begin to appear as anomalies which cannot be easily reconciled 
with the rest of the naturally evolved and functionally adaptive 
characteristics in either James' or Carpenter's systems. The prob-
lem is enhanced because James is attempting to construct a unitary, 
hierarchical structure for consciousness, and the brilliant develop-
ment of the stream of consciousness serves to mask the functional 
dualism and to create the impression that James had succeeded in 
creating an evolutionary, unified, conception of the mind. There-
fore, the stream of thought and the structures of reality and 
action will be analyzed with the intention of revealing this dicho-
tomy and its impact on the pragmatism. 
James' inconsistency and tendency towards paradox has often 
been remarked on (see Allport, 1943, pp. 95-120). However, rather 
than accepting Allport's conclusion that James' writings contain 
a multiplicity of discrete paradoxes, the present analysis will 
attempt to show that the apparent inconsistencies and paradoxies 
can be related to the underlying structure-function dichotomy; 
they thereby disappear as mere inconsistencies or paradoxes and 
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reappear as discrete manifestations of a deep and consistent prob-
lem in James' writings. Using this mode of analysis will make it 
possible to systematize the difficulties in James' works and there-
fore leave us in a better position to judge the merits and failings 
of his system as an alternative to the pre-evolutionary world-view. 
James' early rejection of automaton theory could have led him 
into a position rather like Carpenter's given Renouvier's influence. 
Carpenter attempted' to find a place for the efficacy of conscious-
ness within the deterministic neurophysiological model itself (see 
above, pp. 42-49). James reacted instead by supposing that 
consciousness must in fact be efficacious from the beginning. The 
hypothesis that conscious organisms are interested in surviving 
and therefore do survive, marks the beginnings of James' attempt 
to delineate a new conception of the world. The initial reaction 
against the automatist position led him to question other assump- 
tions of the Newtonian world, and this eventually, culminated in the 
construction of pragmatism, an epistemology based on evolutionary 
principles. Pragmatism was new; it reacted against the nineteenth 
century philosophical 'establishment'. The view to be presented 
here, that pragmatism is a specifically evolutionary epistemology, 
will be put forward at some length below. Similarly, it will be 
argued that radical empiricism and pluralism are evolutionary meta-
physics. 
Finally, the influence of Darwin on James' constructions will 
be analyzed throughout the text, and reference will be made to 
Darwin's writings to show the substantial transformations of meaning 
that Darwin's theory underwent in the hands of James and his contem-
poraries. These 'transformations' have their genesis in the 
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Principles and come into flower in the philosophical writings. 
This thesis overall is the account of these transformations in 
the hands of William James. 
CHAPTER 2  
WILLIAM JAMES AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERESTS  
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Although James recovered from his spiritual crisis in 1870, 
as a result of reading Renouvier's Essais (see H. James (Ed.), 1920/ 
1969, 1, p. 147), he did not begin active work for two more years. 
James spent the time studying and reading as much as his health 
permitted, and in 1872, obtained his first teaching post at Harvard.
1 
 
- He wrote a fair number of book reviews during the period between 1872 
and 1877, but most of these were unsigned (see McDermott, 1967, pp. 
813-817 for a list of these reviews), and it was not until 1878 that 
his first major papers appeared in the journals. The 1878 papers 
mark the real beginning of James' psychological and philosophical 
system. The publication of "Spencer's definition of mind as corres-
pondence", "Brute and human intellect", and "Quelques considerations 
sur la methode subjective", were closely followed in 1879 by "Are 
we automata?", "The spatial quale", "The sentiment of rationality", 
and in 1880, "The feeling of effort". Thus, by 1878, James' career 
was in full swing, for in that year James also signed the contract 
with Holt for the Principles. 
James had had several years of study and teaching between the 
time he was first inspired by Renouvier and the publication of his 
first major papers. The physiological aspects of his teaching and 
reading were undoubtedly important influences during this period when 
he was 'consolidating' his views. While Renouvier provided James with 
philosophical grounds for rejecting automaton theory, the psychology 
of his day was heavily indebted to neurophysiology, and James 
realized that he could not simply graft Renouvier's doctrine of 
1. (See H. James (Ed.), 1920/1969, 1, pp. 165, 179). James was 
• originally employed as an instructor in physiology but by 1876 he 
was teaching physiological psychology and had started his 
psychological laboratory. 
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free will onto Darwinian postulates to ensure the efficacious nature 
of consciousness. To satisfy the physiological 'demands' of psycho-
logy, James had to demonstrate that consciousness was fundamentally  
efficacious. That is, he had to find some means of expressing the 
insight that an efficacious consciousness was a necessary prerequis-
ite for survival, and he had to do this within the naturalistic, 
physiological, evolutionary framework of late nineteenth century 
psychology. 
James was seeking an alternative to automaton theory, and it is 
therefore necessary to view James' earliest attempts to restructure 
consciousness in the context of his reaction against automaton 
theory. 2 His task was two-fold: he had to construct a theory to 
'prove' that the notion that consciousness was efficacious was not 
only plausible, but demanded by evolutionary principles, and he had 
2. Dooley makes this point in reference to James' article, 
"Remarks on Spencer's definition of mind as correspondence". He 
says that James claimed that his was an 'interactionist view of man" 
(Dooley, 1974, p. 8), and that an interactionist view was required 
if consciousness was to be really shown to be efficacious. But, 
Dooley goes on to say, James: 
defines an interactionist view of man only in reference to a 
parallelist view of man. That particular parallelist view 
of man he specifically refers to is the conscious automaton 
theory which holds that consciousness is an impotent epipheno-
menon, which merely accompanies purely neutral processes. 
James argues that if our concept of man is not to be distorted, 
we must opt for an interactionist view of man in which conscious-
ness is causally efficacious in directing behaviour. Although 
it is clear that in an interactionist view of man consciousness  
is efficacious, it is not clear what interacts nor precisely 
how consciousness is efficacious. In other words, the whole 
notion "an interactionist view of man in which consciousness 
is efficacious" is only defined in reference to the whole notion 
"a conscious automaton theory view of man in which consciousness 
is an impotent epiphenomenon"; the individual terms in neither 
of the notions are defined (Dooley, 1974, pp. 8-9). 
This unfortunately, is as far as Dooley goes in criticizing James' 
early interest theory. Later, Dooley ratifies the theory insofar 
as he includes the notion of interest as a viable part of James' 
larger theory of cognition ,(see Dooley, 1974, p. 48). 
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to refute automatism. He began with an attempt to work out the 
structure of a functional psychology based on the interaction between 
mind and nature, and Knox shows how closely the new psychology was 
modelled on Darwinian principles: 
Since the environment to which an organism consciously 
reacts is the environment as it exists for that organism's 
consciousness, and since the environment as so viewed is the 
product of selective elimination on the part of the conscious-
ness concerned, it follows that conscious selection creates  
the known world in precisely the same sense in which 'natural  
selection' creates the species. "Each of us literally chooses, 
by his way of attending to things, what sort of universe he 
shall appear to himself to inhabit" (Knox, 1914, P. 23; 
internal quotation, James, 1890, 1, p. 424). 
Darwinian evolution is based on selectivity in the environment: 
the well-adapted or best fitted to their surroundings survive and 
the lesser so perish, and James expanded this idea into the psycho-
logical conception of a selective, active mind. This extension of 
Darwinian principles gave James an alternative to automaton theory 
while allowing him to retain a naturalistic, neurophysiological struct-
ure for conscious activity. Interests, as the means of conscious 
selection, are first mentioned in James' 1878 article "Remarks on 
Spencer's definition of mind as correspondence". 
James opened his argument by insisting that to be meaningful, 
Spencer's formula that life, including mental evolution, consists of 
the 'adjustment of inner to outer relations' had to be rewritten to 
distinguish between 'mental action' per se and 'right mental action'. 
This redefinition: 
is frankly teleological. It explicitly postulates a 
distinction between mental action pure and simple, and 
right mental action; and furthermore, it proposes, as 
criteria of this latter, certain ideal ends--those of 
physical prosperity or survival, which are pure subjective  
interests on the animal's part, brought with it upon the 
scene and corresponding to no relation already there. No 
mental action is right or intelligent which fails to fit 
this standard (James, 1878/1920, p. 50). 
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He then adds that "These interests are the real a priori element 
in cognition" (James, 1878/1920, p. 50). A fairly logical criticism 
of Spencer's position follows, as James shows that an interested 
consciousness is necessary for the particular survival and adjustment 
of any individual, and he arrives at the conclusion that: 
I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration forced 
upon me at every turn, that the knower is not simply a 
mirror floating with no foot-hold anywhere, and passively 
reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply 
existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the 
truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the 
truth which he helps create. Mental interests, hypotheses, 
postulates, so far as they are bases for human action-- 
action which to a great extent transforms the world--help 
to make the truth which they declare. In other words, there 
belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a 
vote. It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on; and 
its judgments of the should-be, its ideals, cannot be peeled 
off from the body of the cogitandum as if they were excrescences, 
or meant, at most, survival (James, 1878/1920, p. 67). 
This passage typifies James' early writings on the active, 
participating consciousness, itself determined by its interests and 
hence determining the known world. The passage is lyrical, inspira-
tional, and perhaps even convincing. But James is convincing only on 
aesthetic , grounds. No substantial analysis or definition is given 
and a fuller, more dynamic causal account is essential: how are 
interests determined, and once determined, how do they dominate the 
stream of thought? James appears to feel that he has provided an 
adequate account of the interests, for in his 1879 paper "Are we 
automata?" he again uses the idea of interests as a means of justify-
ing his contention that consciousness is efficacious, and refers the 
reader to his 1878 paper as follows: "I have treated this matter of 
teleology being an exclusively conscious function more at length in 
an article on "Spencer's Definition of Mind" ...to which I take the 
liberty of referring the reader" (James, 1879, p. 7; see also James, 
1878/1920, pp. 49-50). 
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That he is satisfied with the account of interest given in 1878 
seems clear when we examine the usage of the concept in the remainder 
of his "Are we automata?" where interests are used to account for 
the selection of activities: 
We have found that the unaided action of the cerebral hemi-
spheres would probably be random and capricious; that the 
nerve-process likely to lead to the animal's interests would 
not necessarily predominate at a given moment. On the other 
hand, we have found that an impartial consciousness is a 
non-entity, and that of the many items that ever occupy 
our mental stage Feeling always selects one as most congruous 
with the interests it has taken its stand upon. Collating 
these two results, an inference is unavoidable. The "items" 
on the mental stage are the subjective aspects of as many 
nerve-processes, and in emphasising the representations 
congruous with conscious interest and discouraging all 
others, may not Attention actually reinforce and inhibit 
the nerve-processes to which the representations severally 
correspond? (James, 1879, p. 14). 
That some kind of mechanism is required to account for purposive 
behaviour is clear enough: the automatists and 'determinists' them-
selves had developed detailed systems to explain the behavioural 
repertoires ofmen and animals. The question is whether or not James' 
concept of interest is sufficiently developed to support his con-
clusion that consciousness is efficacious. In James' "Are we auto-
mata?" interests account for the selections we make, and James tries 
to explain divergent pieces of behaviour solely in terms of the pre-
sence of divergent interests. That is, if A performs action C, and 
B does not, the difference is ascribed to a difference in interests.
3 
3. See James, 1879, pp. 15-19. This is an important paper; it 
contains, in shorter and more hypothetical form, the rationale of 
James' refutation of automaton theory, and the genesis of his later 
theories of reasoning and volition. The expanded versions of these 
ideas were later to appear in the Principles. The remainder of this 
chapter will discuss James' refutation of automatism on the basis that 
consciousness is efficacious because it is interested, using the 
Principles as the major reference to show how James extended his 
earlier theory. The Principles contains James' most developed 
refutation of the automaton theory; it also contains his last 
explicit work on the interests. 
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The idea that selection is dependent upon the possession of 
discrete interests is carried over into the Principles: 
These aesthetic and practical interests, then, are the 
weightiest factors in making particular ingredients 
stand out in high relief. What they lay their accent on, 
that we notice: but what they are in themselves, we cannot 
say. We must content ourselves here with simply accept-
ing them as irreducible ultimate factors in determining 
the way our knowledge grows (James, 1890, 2, p. 345). 
This statement is both radical and unsatisfactory: James is charging 
that all selections are made in accordance with factors which cannot 
be defined or explained. Interests, because of their 'mysterious' 
nature are exempted from the type of empirical study which is to be 
applied to all other aspects of the conscious process. Nevertheless, 
James of course does not end his discussion of interests with the 
statement quoted above, and goes on to discuss the role played by 
the interests in co-ordinating conscious activity. 
James indicates in the Principles that interests first arise with 
the primitive feelings--those basic 'raw sensations' which later 
develop into conceptually 'meaningful' ideas and extend to incorpor-
ate our practical, aesthetic, intellectual, emotional, volitional, 
and ethical lives: 
Man, by his immensely varied instincts, practical wants, 
and aesthetic feelings, to which every sense contributes, 
would be sure to dissociate vastly more characters than any 
other animal; ...The diverse interests lead, too, to a 
diversification of experiences, whose accumulation becomes 
a condition for the play of that law of dissociation by 
varying concomitants (James, 1890, 2, p. 345). 
Interests as they first appear occupy the same dynamic place in 
consciousness as instinctive impulses. Interests must originally be 
spontaneously aroused with instincts, at least insofar as the indivi-
dual experiences certain feelings (for example, hunger), which prompt 
certain instinctive responses (for example, sucking and biting on 
presentation of food). The feeling of hunger must contain an implicit 
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interest in having the feeling satisfied; and this interest, coerced 
by the physical needs, becomes attached to the particular objects 
in the external world which satisfy the need. An interest there-
fore eventually encompasses internal sensations or feelings, and the 
particular objects in the external world which correspond to intern-
al sensations. As conceptualization develops, our, interests develop 
and lead us into a greater range of experience. We 'get' more, or 
'know' more about the world because our varied interests lead us to 
dissociate more and more particulars out of objects than the first 
instinctive associations yield. Our interests thereby determine 
what we will experience; they determine which objects will be separ-
ated as worthy of our attention: 
My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those 
items which r notice shape my mind--without selective 
interest, experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone 
gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and 
foreground--intelligible perspective, in a word (James, 
1890, 1, p. 402). 
The role of interests as determinants of what we shall agree 
to attend to in potential experience is a consistent strand in the 
Principles. Our interests determine which object shall be chosen 
at any level as the most 'significant', 'satisfying', or 'true'. 
An object, theory, relation, or event must be satisfactory in two 
ways: it must satisfy the demands of the situation--for example, 
food in the case of hunger, explanation in the case of scientific 
investigation--and it must appeal to the related needs extant in the 
stream of consciousness at any given time. Thus, an object is 
interesting, and therefore 'selected' not only because it has the 
particular properties sufficient to satisfy the particular need, but 
because it possesses, in addition, properties that appeal to co-
existing needs, or interests: 
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It is conceivable that several rival theories should 
equally well include the actual order of our sensations 
in their scheme, much as the one-fluid and two-fluid 
theories of electricity formulated all the common 
electrical phenomena equally well. The sciences are 
full of these alternatives. Which theory is then to be 
believed? That theory will be most generally believed  
which, besides offering us objects able to account for  
our sensible experience, also offers those which are  
most interesting, those which appeal most urgently to  
our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs. So here, 
in the higher intellectual life, the same selection among 
general conceptions goes on which went on among the 
sensations themselves.4 
Unfortunately, this is about as far as James goes in defining 
interests and their role in conscious selection, so that interests 
appear to be simple additions to the other feelings, ideas, or 
thoughts that make up the stream of consciousness. Because James 
contends that the interests must simply be accepted as irreducible 
factors which determine the growth of knowledge and therefore defines 
the interests solely in terms of their relations to other feelings, 
it is difficult to decide whether their 'existence' provides the 
basis for an adequate refutation of automaton theory. 
If Knox's parallel between selective nature and selective mind 
is truly applicable as a description of James' epistemology then 
it must be added that the mind, in making its initial separations 
of reality, is at least at the onset, no more consciously selective 
than nature. And if the initial selections are made more or less 
randomly, or are determined by instinctive demands and responses, we 
are then compelled to assess the influences of these selections upon 
subsequent ones. James' account of the structures of action is 
4. (James, 1890, 2, p. 321). James in fact makes use of the 
'interests' to provide the structural continuity between the 
'sensational' and 'higher' mental lives. The dynamics of selection 
must remain constant, regardless of the nature of the selected 
object. 
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strongly deterministic, in deliberate contrast to his assertion 
that free will may obtain in special circumstances. The worlds of 
freedom and the worlds of mundane reality clash in the demands they 
make upon the individual. This conflict emphasizes the importance 
of the status of the interests when we ask to what degree we actu-
ally create our own reality, and to what degree that reality is im-
posed on us both from within and from without. 
At this stage the case for James' voluntarism rests solely on 
the accidental results of possessing an interactive mind. Interests, 
as they initially accompany instincts, can have no more foresight 
of ends than the instincts themselves. If the instinct is blind, 
and the individual incapable of cognizing ends until experience sub- 
stitutes other patterns of conscious interaction, then interests must 
be correspondingly blind at the onset. James' conception of an effi-
cacious consciousness is based on the possession of interests and 
on the resulting development of unique perceptual and conceptual 
schemas of reality; it relies on the fortuitous possession of dis-
crete interests, rather than upon a consciously directed structuring 
of experience. 
The problems that arise from James' failure to give an adequate 
teleological account of the interests become more explicit when we 
look at his dualistic model of psychogenesis. This theory proposes 
that the mind is assailed in two ways: the first means is through 
the 'front-door' of sensory experiences and includes those experiences 
gained through active interaction with the environment. 'Back-door' 
influences are comprised of the indirect causes of mental modifi-
cation: molecular accidents, and other random variations in the un-
stable brain-tissue. These influences are responsible for our moral, 
aesthetic, and intellectual experiences, while 'front-door' 
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propensities facilitate our comfortable adjustment in the external 
world (see James, 1890, 2, p. 627). At the same time, the 'back- 
door' propensities are irrelevant to biological adjustment, and may 
actually be opposed to comfortable adjustment. The final conscious-
ness is a product of these separate, independent, and sometimes anti-
thetical types of tendencies; the individual's interests therefore 
must originate in both of the two evolutionarily derived patterns of 
development. 
That James intended the interests to be taken as the "irreducible 
teleological factors of consciousness"
5 
 is confirmed by R.B. Perry. 
He reminds us that James rewrote Spencer's formula to read: "Right 
or intelligent mental action consists in the establishment, corres-
ponding to outward relations, of such inward relations and reactions 
as will favour the survival of the thinker, or at least, his physi-
cal well-being".
6 
Later, Perry argues that "morality is selective 
from among interests" (Perry, 1916, p. 351), but he does not provide 
any insight into how the problem of conflicting interests is to be 
resolved: in this case, the presence of particular moral or instinct-
ive interests can only be inferred after the fact of any particular 
action. 
While Perry cannot really be criticized for not dealing with the 
problem, it is perhaps significant that he does not see the interest 
theory as problematic. In fact he sees it as one of James' most 
positive achievements (see Perry, 1916, pp. 350-351). He appears 
5. (Perry, 1916, p. 350). Moreover, Perry later stated: "the 
teleological interpretation of mind does not contradict either its 
cognitive or its biological role--it explains them both" (Perry, 
1935/1974, 2, p. 76). 
6. Perry, 1916, p. 350; see also James, 1878/1920, p. 49, 
for James' original statement. 
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to be satisfied that James has dealt satisfactorily with the 
problem by recognizing that there is a problem in deciding which 
interest will prove predominant. For James himself wrote: 
The standard of survival or self-preservation is most 
potent. But there exists a host of other standards, 
aesthetic and moral, imperative so long as they do not 
conflict with this one and sometimes imperative over this 
one. In the preliminary selection by the senses of 
certain objective orders of movement, it is difficult to 
see what standard is subserved (James, 1879, pp. 18-19). 
James concludes that the enactment of any particular interest 
depends upon the individual's ability to apply the 'right' or 'desired' 
interests in appropriate situations; this ability depends upon sel-
ecting the correct concept of the situation and acting accordingly 
(See James, 1879, p. 20; see also James, 1890, 2, pp. 531, 561-567). 
But this does little to resolve the problem of how the two types of 
interests are related to one another, or how interests influence 
sophisticated problem solving at all. Once again, the concept of 
interest proves elusive. Instead, we soon find ourselves looking 
towards James' extensive analysis of the development of perception 
and conception to discover the 'mental' basis for selection. And 
this means that the analysis of perception and conception is confound-
ed: if we accept James' notion that interests are the teleological 
basis of consciousness, then the particular development of perceptual 
and conceptual capacities must be assumed to be at least partially 
dependent upon the play between interests. 
James makes a distinction between those interests which facili-
tate adjustment and those which appear to be "without any utility at 
all" (James, 1890, 1, p. 325). Those interests without utility, how-
ever, include such tendencies as a liking for alcohol or music, and 
such interests would obviously have a strong influence on the 
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development of the individual's perceptual and conceptual structures. 
Interests, in this case, serve as the impulsive and distinguishing 
characteristics of personality. The only restrictions James places 
upon the efficacy of interests at this point are those imposed by 
natural selection' which eliminates those tendencies which would 
iMperil the individual's survival or that of his species (see James, 
1890, 1, p. 325). The problem with this is that there is no further 
analysis of the mechanism of natural selection itself, or on how it 
works to 'weed out' harmful tendencies. The recognition that too 
much alcohol is harmful to the individual who has a strong 'interest' 
in it, comes about through the individual's conceptualization of his 
situation (See James, 1879, p. 20; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 565). 
Individually, if not for the race, it is difficult to see how natural 
selection is an operative mechanism here. All that James finally 
claims regarding natural selection is that, numerically, the instinct-
ive interests outweight the 'fortuitous' interests (see James, 1890, 
1, p. 325). Thus, the relation of interests to perceptual and con-
ceptual development is not satisfactorily resolved. 
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that interests are simply syno-
nomous with feelings or ideas, because James states in the Principles  
that interests 'distinguish' particular thoughts within the stream 
of consciousness. It is the interest attached to the thought, idea, 
or conclusion, that makes it significant: 
In either case it [the conclusion] stands out from the other 
segments of the stream by reason of the peculiar interest 
attaching to it. The interest arrests it, makes a sort of 
crisis of it when it comes, induces attention upon it and 
makes us treat it in a substantive way (James, 1890, 1, p, 260; 
see also James, 1890, 2, pp. 558-559). 
James limits any further discussion of differentiation of 
interests to their function. As parts of the structure of 
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consciousness (insofar as anything meaningful can be said about the 
structure of interests), the interests do not appear to be differ-
entiated. That is, they operate consistently in relation to the 
rest of the conscious process. James indeed confirms this: he uses 
the terms interest and instinct interchangeably in describing the 
distinction between the 'egoistic self' and the rest of the world 
and writes that sympathetic and egoistic instincts appear to arise 
"on the same psychologic level" (James, 1890, 1, p. 325). The 
'back-door', 'front-door' distinction is a functional distinction: 
interests can be functionally distinguished because they facilitate 
conflicting forms of behaviour. While James makes the 'front-door' 
and 'back-door' distinction on the basis of how the interests form 
a part of consciousness in the first place, there is nothing in his 
work to indicate that they can be physiologically distinguished once 
they are there. Nor, in psychological terms, is there anything in 
his writing to suggest that 'front-door' and 'back-door' interests 
act differentially on the stream of consciousness itself. 
If the interests provide the selective 'force' of consciousness 
then some definition of their impulsive power is necessary. James' 
theory of instinct is plastic and dynamic in the sense that conflict-
ing instincts may be aroused by the same stimulus. The instincts 
are painstakingly enumerated and described, and the dynamics of 
internal and external factors which determine their differential 
arousal are largely accounted for (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 383-441). 
If interests are to achieve a similar status, they must be differ- 
entiated from instincts per se. Similarly, they must be distinguished 
from the impulsive characteristics of the cognitive ideas and feel-
ings as well if they are to come into their own as real selective 
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mechanisms. Otherwise, they can only be considered as abstractions 
from past activities. The other alternative is to take the term 
'interest' in a purely adjectival sense and use it to distinguish 
the impulsive, and non-impulsive, mental states from an introspect-
ive point of •view. At times James appears to lapse into this type 
of usage: "If one must have a single name for the condition upon which 
the impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects depends, one had 
better call it their interest" (James, 1890, 2, p. 558). But what, 
then, happens, to the idea of interests as the teleological basis of 
consciousness? 
James uses the concept of interest to account for sophisticated 
selections, but there is no adequate connection of the 'back-door' 
propensities with the specific selections made. In the example above 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 321), of the choice between two theories 
which provide equally comprehensive and rational explanations for a 
given phenomena, James fails to give an explanation of how the 
interests develop along with the cognitive capacities so that they 
can give the necessary 'push' to conscious selection. There is a 
substantial gap between the initial propensity and the sophisticated 
interest that provokes the final selection. 
To sum up, interests are described as the basic teleological 
units of consciousness in some parts of James' work; in others, they 
are confounded with instincts or other feelings or ideas. They are 
similarly used to describe adaptation (through instinct) and the 
'accidental' activities or predispositions of individuals, so that 
'interest' is said to account for sophisticated 'conceptual' select-
ions. The term is also used in'a descriptive, or introspective 
sense, where 'interest' simply means 'selection'. Finally, interests 
are 'attached' to ideas in the stream of thought. 
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The case for an efficacious consciousness is substantially 
weakened if we try to use interests, as James and Perry suggest, 
as the teleological basis for consciousness, because it is too easy 
to see the interests as epiphenomena--that is, as products of, or 
extrapolations from, past behaviour, or as mere descriptions of 
conscious states. The dualistic nature of the interests relates to 
the problem of the possible epiphenomenal status of the interests 
because it intensifies the dilemma of how any particular interest 
acts to propel any particular conscious selection. 
It can be seen, therefore, that interests as James defined them 
do not provide an adequate refutation to automaton theory. It is 
consistent with James' description, although not with his intent, 
for interests themselves to be epiphenomena. The concept of interests 
has always been open to the potential criticism that the evidence 
for their existence is no more than an empirical abstraction from 
activity. Nature selects; the organism defined by a mechanistic 
theory may behave as if it selects, may feel as if it selects, as 
if it were interested, but the appearance of an interest need not 
imply that the interest is causally efficacious. Survival 'happens' 
and we may say, after the fact, that the individual had a conscious 
interest in surviving that ensured his particular survival. But the 
particulars of consciousness cannot be abstracted from behaviour or 
feeling alone; the specific genesis and operations of the interests 
must be delineated if we are to accept the concept as determinative 
in the way James intended.
7 
The conclusion that 'mysterious', 
7. James claims that when the organism possesses an efficacious 
consciousness, survival can be certain before the fact. In the 
Principles, James writes: 
Considered merely physically, all that can be said of them 
[the reactions] is that if they occur in .a certain way 
(contd.) 
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'underlying', teleological units account for specific behaviours 
is not a sufficiently credible explanation, given James' commitment 
to naturalistic explanations. 
When he set up the terms of his conception of consciousness, 
James recognized that "We ought to have some general term by which 
to designate all states of consciousness merely as such and apart 
from their particular quality or cognitive function (James, 1890, 1 , 
p. 185). The terms he selected were feeling and thought (see James, 
1890, 1, p. 186). We have already shown that James did not include 
the interests as types of feelings or thoughts. Thus, all that we 
can conclude is that James did not consistently intend to use the 
hypothesis as an integral part of his psychology, and this conclusion 
would correlate with his contention that the interests are 'myster-
ious'. In placing positivistic limitations on what psychology was 
to include he wrote: "Psychology, the science of finite individual 
minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a 
physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which 
7. (contd.) 
survival will as a matter of fact prove to be their incidental 
consequence. The organs themselves, and all the rest of the 
physical world, will, however, all the time be quite indiffer- 
ent to this consequence, and would quite as cheerfully, the 
circumstances changed, compass the animals' destruction. In a 
word, survival can enter into a purely physiological discussion 
only as a hypothesis made by an onlooker about the future. But 
the moment you bring a consciousness into the midst, survival 
ceases to be a mere hypothesis. No lcnger is it "if survival 
is to occur, then so and so must brain and other organs work". 
It has now become an imperative decree: "survival shall occur, 
and therefore organs must so work!" Real ends appear for the 
first time on the world's stage (James, 1890, 1, p. 141). 
This chapter is restricted to the question of whether the interests, 
as James defined them, give adequate support to statements like the 
above. It must be noted that it does not attempt to deal with the 
viability of James' larger andlater conception of the efficacious 
consciousness. Such a task requires extensive analysis of James' 
theories of perception and conception, and this will be undertaken 
in the next chapter. 
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(3) they know"(James, 1890, 1, p. vi). Interests are excluded and 
insofar as they cannot be embodied in feelings and thoughts (apart 
from their role in the 'fringe' of the stream of consciousness), 
would seem even to be precluded. In his later writings, James re-
verts again and again to renewed discussion of the nature of percepts 
and concepts as the fundamental units of the developing conscious-
ness interacting with the world, without any separate reference to 
interests.
8 
We can conclude, then, that James ceased to give serious 
expression to the doctrine that interests are the fundamental units 
of conscious selection, underlying the feelings themselves, after 
the Principles. 
So what function was served by the interest hypothesis and why 
do we need to look at it at all? The theory of interests, as a basis 
to found a psychology on, was unsuccessful--indeed, it is doubtful 
that James long intended to do so anyway. But the doctrine itself, 
and the reasons that it was unsuccessful, are of great importance 
in coming to an overall assessment of James' thought. The problems 
with interests and their dualistic basis recur on a grander scale in 
James' delineation of the more systematically defined mental faculties 
such as belief and volition. In both cases, it will be shown that 
James' model of consciousness can be viewed structurally as a hier-
archical, unified system, while operationally, the dualism is 
8. See James, 1890, 1, pp. 459-482; James, 1890, 2, pp. 76-133, 
134-282, 283-324; James, 1902/1923, pp. 53-54; James, 1909/1967, 
pp. 143-217, 231-261, 328-330; James, 1912/1967, pp. 11-19, 33, 35, 
52-57, 64-86, 158, 196-205; James, 1911, -pp. 47-112, 166-219; 
James, 1907/1913, pp. 128, 172, 210-211, 244-245; and James, 1909, 
pp. 1-50, 63, 100, 104-114. The meaning of truth is mostly about 
cognition; as it was written in response to comments and criticisms 
James received on the earlier Pragmatism, it is important in the 
present context that in order to support his philosophy, James 
reverted to discussions of how the individual comes to know the world. 
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apparent in the opposing functions of each faculty. Moreover, it 
will be shown that the structural unity of consciousness is main-
tained by the vehicle of the stream of consciousness so that each 
idea carries its own impetus for action. At the same time, whether 
any idea will actually be enacted depends upon the function fulfilled 
by the particular idea in facilitating the individual's adjustment 
to the external world, or correspondingly, in facilitating his 
attempts to 'transcend' that world, through the implementation of 
novel ideas or acts of will. 
An analysis of James' interest hypothesis is valuable in this 
context because the available material is extremely limited: the 
interest theory can thus represent a microcosm within the macrocosm 
of James' system. The problems that arise in the analysis of the 
theory of interests reappear in James' broader, more systemative 
psychology and philosophy. The difficulties encountered in attempt- 
ing to determine the relationship of the interests to the rest of con-
scious activity are repeated when we come to consider the relation-
ships between the various mental 'faculties' within the stream of 
thought, and to try to determine how one particular idea is chosen 
for enactment against competing ideas. The weaknesses in the theory 
of interests can thus serve as a key to understanding much of James' 
more systematic work, and the analysis of these weaknesses may help to 
determine .a methodology for examining the whole corpus of his thought. 
James' philosophy is built upon the various strands of his 
psychology. The world he creates is a particularly 'humanistic' 
world; pragmatism and radical empiricism take their shape from James' 
conception of consciousness. Therefore an understanding of James' 
psychology and his first attempts to work out a context for that 
psychology are basic to any analysis of the later philosophy. 
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And if the doctrine that consciousness is efficacious because 
it is interested was problematical, 'intuitive', 'unscientific', 
and ontologically 'mysterious'--perhaps to such an extent that James 
himself failed to expand it and make it an integral part of his 
psychology--it was productive as well. James explicitly developed 
the doctrine as a rebuttal to Spencer and the declared automatists 
(see James, 1878/1920, pp. 43-68; and James, 1879, pp. 1-22). If he 
was to develop a concept of consciousness that was both efficacious 
and freed of the limits of psychological hedonism, it was still 
necessary for him to find some means of expressing his viewpoint in 
a way that was compatible with Darwinian theory and current neuro-
physiology. James' problem was to find some means of describing 
consciousness as fundamentally and intrinsically efficacious. The 
idea that consciousness was interested served the initial 'purpose 
of giving James a means of polemicizing against automaton theory. 
At the same time, it focused his work on the fundamental units of 
consciousness, so that he was able to go on to develop a broad 
psychological theory where consciousness was fundamentally effica-
cious and where habit formation was a product of the first purpos-
ive interactions of the individual with the world. Initially, he 
hoped that the conception of an interested consciousness would ensure 
that true voluntary action was as 'naturalistic' and pervasive as 
automatic behaviour. It was not an easy task. 
To conclude then, the idea that consciousness is interested, 
selective, and efficacious, marks James' break with the earlier 
physiologically deterministic associationist psychology. It is also 
James' first attempt at a concept of mind which will grow from here, 
through many transitions, into a psychology that will move evolution-
ary ideas, as we define them today, into philosophy. This perhaps 
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accounts for the interest doctrine's respected place in the 
literature.
9 	
The idea that consciousness is interested is the 
beginning of James' attempt to create a new and comprehensive world-
view. Both as the first expression of the concerns that dominated 
James' mature thought, and as the first example of the flaws that 
prevented his achieving the synthesis he desired, the importance of 
the theory of interests cannot be overestimated. 
■ 
9. See Brett, 1942, p. 82; Perry, 1916, pp. 350-351; Knox, 1914, 
PP. 14-23; Thayer, 1968, p. 143; Reck, 1967, p.27; Roth, 1969, 
pp. 30-31; Wild, 1969, pp. 12-20; and Dooley, 1974. Dooley 
initially questions the validity of James' interest hypothesis 
(see Dooley, 1974, pp, 8-9), but later allows it to stand as a 
fundamental part of James' epistemology (see Dooley, 1974, pp. 
48-49). The works cited were selected as representative examples 
of how the interest hypothesis has fared in the literature. While 
these writers vary in their enthusiasm for the theory of interests 
(some merely describe the interest hypothesis as a part of James' 
psychology and others see it as a substantial breakthrough in 
philosophy), none of them disputes its validity and it therefore 
stands unchallenged in the literature. 
CHAPTER 3 
132. 
FEELINGS, PERCEPTS, AND CONCEPTS  
133. 
Introduction  
The claim was made above (see Chap. 2, pp. 126-128), 
that James did not intend to use the interest theory as the basis 
for his broad systematic conception of consciousness, and that he 
chose instead to define the units of thought or sensation as 'feel-
ings' or 'thoughts' (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 186-187). James' 
decision to use feelings as the basic units of consciousness thus 
constitutes the real starting point of his systematic theory of 
consciousness. It is now time to begin the analysis of James' con-
ception of consciousness, and this chapter will concentrate on an 
analysis of the structure of consciousness as James developed it in 
the Principles. This conception of consciousness was to provide the 
underlying structures for his later philosophy, so that it occupies 
a fundamental place in James' work. James was attempting to create 
a new model of consciousness and it is therefore important to examine 
his reconstruction in light of his reactions to the earlier pscho-
logical models; he was to reject many of the assumptions of the 
empiricist tradition in particular, and to replace them with recon-
structions of his own. Darwin and Renouvier provided the context 
for his dissatisfaction with the empiricist models; they also provided 
James with a positive framework for his reconstruction, so that 
James' Conception of consciousness must be discussed in terms of his 
rejection of the empiricist model and his acceptance of Darwin and 
Renouvier. 
James' definition of feelings or thoughts as the basic units 
of consciousness will be analyzed. It will be shown that James 
constructed the basic units of consciousness so that the objective 
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components were indistinguishable--on an introspective level at 
least--from the subjective components. Feelings are irreducible 
wholes according to James, and it will be shown that the unity of 
thought could only be maintained as long as James ratified the 
subject-object, mind-matter, distinction in his psychology. 
In addition to defining the basic units of consciousness as 
feelings or thoughts, James developed a broad, systematic account 
of the structure of consciousness itself. This was the stream of 
consciousness, composed of feelings or thoughts, but also constructed 
to reflect James' notion of what consciousness as a whole was really 
like. The characteristics of the stream of consciousness will there-
fore be discussed, with emphasis on the evolutionary character of 
the stream of consciousness. This chapter will concentrate on the 
structures of consciousness as opposed to the function s' of conscious-
ness. The structures of consciousness must be distinguished from 
its functions because James was concerned with the development of 
an efficacious model of consciousness: this meant that he was forced 
into a reevaluation of what kind of construction was necessary to 
enable consciousness to have a 'voice' in determining the individu-
al's actions, while at the same time allowing for the 'coercive' 
properties of the external world. 
James concentrated much of his attention on two categories of 
feeling--these were percepts and concepts. This chapter will there-
fore discuss the genesis of percepts and concepts out of the origin-
ally undifferentiated feelings, and the relationship between percepts 
and concepts as cognitive structures. This discussion at times 
1. The •functions of consciousness will be discussed in the 
following three chapters. 
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will take us beyond the Principles and into James' pragmatism and 
final philosophy when James' philosophy can be used to extend 
and clarify the discussion of the Principles. 
The Definition of Feelings or Thoughts  
James' selection of 'feeling' or 'thought' as the term to 
describe the basic units of consciousness was predicated on the 
necessity of choosing a term which would include the sensational 
aspects of consciousness as well as its cognitive properties. 
James came to the conclusion that there was no one term which was 
free of other connotations and which covered both sensation and thought 
indifferently: 
In this quandary we can make no definitive choice, but must, 
according to the convenience of the context, use sometimes 
one, sometimes another of the synonyms that have been 
mentioned. My own partiality is for either FEELING or THOUGHT. 
I shall probably often use both words in a wider sense than 
usual, and alternatively startle two classes of readers by 
their unusual sound; but if the connection makes it clear 
that mental states at large, irrespective of their kind, are 
meant, this will do no harm, and may even do some good 
(James, 1890, 1, pp. 186-187). 
As such, the term used to connote these mental states (that is, 
feelings or thoughts) in itself as yet implies nothing about the 
function or direction of mental states. The proper objects of study 
for the psychologist are: 
the minds of distinct individuals inhabiting definite 
portions of a real space and of a real time. With any 
other sort of mind, Absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached 
to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course 
of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do (James, 
1890, 1, p. 183). 
Apart from the specification that psychologists shall study conscious-
ness as its exists in particular individuals, James' selection of 
terms to describe the contents of consciousness says nothing about 
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what that consciousness is--whether or not it is active, purposive, 
passive, or contemplative. 
James was indebted to Renouvier for his definition of thought 
or feeling, for it was Renouvier who insisted that perceptions or 
phenomenal representations were inherently dualistic in that the 
subjective and objective aspects of the percept were irreducibly 
mixed together (see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 654-659; see also Boas, 
1967, pp. 179-181). James thus stated that "Whatever things are 
thought in relation are thought from the outset in a unity, in a-
single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, a feeling or state 
of mind" (James, 1890, 1, p. 278). The thought is to be taken as a 
whole, as an individual unity in consciousness and thoughts can 
therefore be described in terms of their objects: 
The object of every thought, then, is neither more nor 
less than all that the thought thinks, exactly as the 
thought thinks it, however complicated the matter, and 
however symbolic the manner of thinking may be (James, 
1890, 1, p. 276). 
The distinction between the structural and functional nature 
of thought is related to this definition of what the thought is. The 
subjective and objective aspects of the thought are irreducibly com-
bined at the structural level and at the experiential level so that 
any real distinctions between thoughts can only be made at the 
functional level. Thus, James claimed that feelings could be cogni-
tive or non-cognitive: "What a thought is, and what it may be develop-
ed into, or explained to stand for, and be equivalent to, are two 
things, not one" (James, 1890, 1, p. 279; see also p. 217). This 
operational definition of what a thought was, as distinct from its 
cognitive import, or functional significance, provided James with 
the foundation for his theory of consciousness. The structure of 
the thought is described in terms of the thought's relations to 
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other thoughts, objects, or relations. The thought of a particular 
object cannot, moreover, be equated with the physical object because 
James specifically denied "that in the thought any parts can be 
found corresponding to the object's parts" (James, 1890, 1, p. 279). 
James' primary goal was to construct an efficacious model of 
the mind, and he aimed to do this by showing that the mind had an 
active role in the production of every feeling, sensation, or thought. 
Objects were not simply experienced or recognized; they were recog-
nized or experienced in particular and unique ways, depending on 
the selective and intentional state of consciousness at any given 
moment. Furthermore, if all feelings were structurally equivalent-- 
that is, if James was able to construct a definition which would 
describe all forms of mental activity indifferently--then he was 
well on the road towards the construction of an efficacious model 
of consciousness in the sense that conscious or intelligent involve-
ment was by definition, present during every form that feeling or 
thought could take. He was looking for a system that would support 
his earlier teleological statement that "Right or intelligent mental 
action consists in the establishment, corresponding to outward rela-
tions, of such inward relations and reactions as will favour the 
survival of the thinker, or, at least, his physical well-being" 
(James, 1878/1920, p. 49). His reworking of Renouvier's argument 
that subjective and objective aspects of the phenomenal representa-
tion were indistinguishable gave him the means of beginning to 
realize his evolutionary goal. 
But there is a serious problem with this definition of thought 
•in relation to James' account of cognition. James insisted that 
thoughts were cognitive of the physical world. His insistence, how-
ever, that the subjective and objective aspects of the thought were 
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indistinguishable in conjunction with his proviso that the objects 
of thought were in no way like physical objects, raises problems of 
how the physical world is known, and what can be known about it. 
It will be shown below that James preserved his unitary definition 
of thought only through ratifying the subject-object, mind-matter 
distinctions in his psychology so that the claim that thoughts 
are cognitive--and that they are cognitive of physical particulars 
--is problematic. This problem does not admit of solution in this 
chapter; the following three chapters are largely devoted to James' 
attempts to resolve it, and for the present, effort will be con-
centrated on examining James' psychological conception of conscious-
ness from a structural perspective. 
James' Reaction Against Elementarism in his Construction  
of Feelings or Thoughts  
James reacted against the elementarism of James Mill's and 
John Stuart Mill's reductionist explanations of ideation, insisting 
that thoughts were objects and not complexes of ideas,'and stressing 
the unitary, non-reducible structure of the thought. James expresses 
James Mill's hypothesis as follows: "whenever an object of thought 
contains many elements, the thought itself must be made up of 
just as many ideas, one idea for each element, and all fused toget-
her in appearance, but really separate" (James, 1890, 1, p. 277; see 
also Mill, 1869, 1, pp. 264-266). Mill's theory makes feeling or 
thought dependent upon a kind of passive sensationalism; that is, 
information is received and combined according to the laws of associ-
ation. The structure and meaning of the thought is dependent on this 
combination: 
Words become significant purely by association. A word 
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is pronounced in conjunction with an idea; it is 
pronounced again and again; and, by degrees, the idea 
and the word become so associated, that the one can 
never occur without the other. To take first the example 
of an individual object. The word, St. Paul's, has been 
so often named in conjunction with the idea of a particular 
building, that the word, St. Paul's, never occurs without 
calling up the idea of the building, nor the idea of the 
building without calling up the name, St. Paul's. The 
effect of association is similarly exemplified in connect-
ing the visible mark with the audible (Mill, 1869, 1, 
p. 262). 
The process wherein complex ideas are derived appears to be 
additive, so that an indefinite number of simple ideas are combined 
to form one complex idea. The meaning of the complex idea therefore 
resides in the addition of simple ideas: 
There can be no difficulty in admitting that assocation 
does form the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals 
into one complex idea; because it is an acknowledged fact. 
Have we not the idea of an army? And is not that precisely 
the ideas of an indefinite number of men formed into one 
idea? (Mill, 1869, 1, p. 264) 
James argued instead that a particular thought could not be 
reduced nor combined with another without a qualitative change in 
its meaning. If the thought is broken up into elements or ideas 
it no longer exists as that thought. James repeates this injunction 
throughout the Principles: 
There are, then, mechanical conditions on which thought  
depends, and which, to say the least, determine the order  
in which is presented the content or material for her  
comparisons, selections, and decisions. ... 
But the whole historic doctrine of psychological 
association is tainted with one huge error--that of the 
construction of our thoughts out of the compounding of 
themselves together of immutable and incessantly recurring 
'simple ideas'. It is the cohesion of these which the 
'principles of association' are considered to account for. ... 
Association, so far as the word stands for an effect, 
is between THINGS THOUGHT OF--it is THINGS, not ideas which are  
associated in the mind. We ou§hi—TO talk of the association . 
of objects, not of the association of ideas. And so far 
as si-s-,3E-fition stands for a cause, it is between processes in  
• the brain--it is these which, by being associated in certain 
ways, determine what successive objects shall be thought 
(James, 1890, 1, pp. 553-554). 
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The importance of the distinction between associating ideas 
and associating objects is implicit in the contrast between Newton-
ian and post-Darwinian cosmology. Associationism relied upon the 
mechanical and chemical laws of Newtonian science; in J.S. Mill's 
reformulation of his father's theory, the laws of mind wherein com-
plex ideas are generated out of simple ideas: 
are sometimes analogous to mechanical, but sometimes also 
to chemical laws. When many impressions or ideas are operat-
ing in the mind together, there sometimes takes place a pro-
cess of a similar kind to chemical combination. When 
impressions have been so often experienced in conjunction, 
that each of them calls up readily and instantaneously the 
ideas of the whole group, those ideas sometimes melt and 
coalesce into one another, and appear not several ideas but 
one; in the same manner as when the seven prismatic colors 
are presented to the eye in rapid succession, the sensation 
,produced is that of white. But in this last case it is 
correct to say that the seven colors when they rapidly follow 
one another generate white, but not that they actually are 
white; so it appears to me that the Complex Idea, formed 
by the blending together of several simpler ones, should, 
when it really appears simple (that is when the separate 
elements are not consciously distinguishable in it), be said 
to result from, or be generated by, the simple ideas, not to 
consist of them. ...These are cases of mental chemistry; in 
which it is possible to say that the simple ideas generate, 
rather than that they compose, the complex ones (Mill, 1843/ 
1974, 8, VI, iv, pp. 853-854). 
John Stuart Mill could describe the workings of mind as being 
analogous to chemical laws because he defined matter as the perman-
ent possibilities of sensation (see Mill, 1872, p. 233). Matter, 
he believed, was "permanent and always the same while these [the 
sensations] are fugitive, variable, and alternately displace one 
another" (Mill, 1872, p. 235). Mill followed Berkeley in reject- 
ing any possibility of epistemologically independent or separate 
access to things (see Schneewind, 1967, 5, p. 319); his definition 
of 'matter' as the permanent possibilities of sensation allowed him 
to avoid an ontological and epistemological gap between minds and 
things. Rather than existing as something outside and independent 
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of mind, matter is defined as certain stable ways in which the 
mind may be modified--that is, through the permanent possibilities 
of sensation. Why the possibilities of sensation were permanent 
remained a metaphysical question for Mill, and as such did not inter-
fere with empirical observation and confirmation. The success of 
Newtonian theory in deriving laws for the workings of the physical 
universe lent order, and therefore justification, for the acceptance 
of, and belief in, the existence of 'permanent possibilities of 
sensation'. 
But Darwin's interpretation of geological and biological data 
essentially changed all this. The geological record showed that land 
masses changed their shapes overtime, while the fossil record (although 
incomplete) testified for the mutability of organic forms. Darwin's 
own biological data indicated that species changed over time.
2 
The 
upshot was that 'permanent possibilities of sensation' ceased to be a 
workable concept for James, at least as far as 'the history of the 
race' was concerned. Given this emphasis on the impermanence of 
nature, complex ideas could no longer be guaranteed by physics and 
corresponding empirical observation. Instead, a definition of feel-
ing, perception, and conception which was independent of the vagaries 
of the physical world was called for. The physical world could then 
theoretically be reconstructed from the structures of consciousness: 
this was James' aim and his treatment of feelings as irreducible 
objects was the first major step he took towards achieving it, 
2. The impact of these discoveries on Victorian thought is 
perhaps best expressed in popular form in Tennyson's "In Memoriam". 
For their impact on nineteenth century scientific thought see 
Milhauser, 1959, and Greene, 1959. 
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The Mind-brain Relationship and the Mind-dust Theory of Herbert 
Spencer  
James was not only concerned with refuting elementarism as it 
appeared in the works of the Mills. He attacked the mind-dust theory 
as it appeared in Spencer's evolutionary associationism with equal 
fervour.
3 
James was willing to admit that the.. causes of a single 
feeling, sensation, or thought could be, and often were, "multiple 
and discrete" (James, 1890, 1, p. 154). What he questioned was 
whether the "transformation, reduction or fusion" (James, 1890, 1, 
p. 154), took place at the conscious level, or at the physiological 
level (see James, 1890, 1, p. 154). Spencer argued that fusion took 
place in the mental world (see Spencer, 1870, 1, pp. 152-154). James 
insisted that the physiological evidence was against Spencer's view, 
and that fusion must occur in the physiological strata underlying 
consciousness (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 156-157). Furthermore, James 
argued that feelings could not be mixed as the mind-dust theory 
seemed to imply: 'Moreover, if feelings can mix into a tertium quid, 
why do we not take a feeling of greenness and a feeling of redness, 
and make a feeling of yellowness out of them?"(James, 1890, 1, p. 157). 
And just as feelings could not be combined in consciousness at will, 
James found it equally unintelligible to suppose that "what seems 
like one feeling, of blueness for example, or of hatred, may really 
and unconsciously be ten thousand elementary feelings which do not 
resemble blueness or hatred at all".
4 
3. (See James, 1890. 1, pp. 146-158). Basically, the mind-dust 
theory maintains that while material atoms fuse together to form 
matter, aboriginal mental atoms have similarly fused themselves into 
individual consciousnesses. 
4. (James, 1890, 1, p. 157; see , also Marshall, 1974, pp. 305-306, 
for an extended analysis regarding James' early rejection of the 
mind-dust theory). 
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Spencer likened consciousness to the feelings generated by 
'nervous shocks' (see James, 1890, 1, p. 153; see also Spencer, 1870, 
1, p. 152): nervous activity was directly felt, or experienced in 
consciousness which meant that no 'break' in the system needed to 
be accounted for. James was unwilling to accept this hypothesis 
and in his account, mind and brain are correlated activities, with 
the physiological processes underlying the conscious threshold (see 
Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 76). James makes a sharp distinction between 
the structures of consciousness and the structures of the nervous 
system so that his psychology is based on an explicit mind-body 
dualism (see James, 1890, 1, p. 182). This is a necessary step be-
cause it allows James to describe the functioning consciousness 
independently from its physiological correlates. 
What distinguishes James most sharply from the first generation 
of evolutionists--for example, Spencer, Huxley and Tyndall--is his 
reluctance to subscribe to the notion that consciousness is a direct 
by-product of nervous activity. He shows again and again that the 
behaviour of'an 'intact' conscious organism is qualitatively differ-
ent from the behaviour of an animal which has undergone some kind of 
cortical ablation (see James, 1879, pp. 4-5; and James, 1890, 1, pp. 
14-19, 77-78). The differences in behaviour between 'normal' and 
'decorticated' organisms had traditionally been used to make a 
structural/functional distinction between the 'higher' and 'lower' 
nervous systems. But James drew different theoretical conclusions 
from that data than the automatists had. He describes the physical 
nervous system in terms of the mechanistic behaviour it promotes, 
and conjectures that consciousness exists to some degree in all 
nervous structures. Thus he explains the resumption of certain 
purposive activities in decorticated animals on the basis that: 
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All the centres, in all animals, whilst they are in one 
aspect mechanisms, probably are, or at least once were, 
organs of consciousness in another, although the conscious-
ness is doubtless much more developed in the hemispheres 
than it is anywhere else (James, 1890, 1, p. 78). 
The nervous system can then be described from two structural 
view-points: it is the mechanical/physical system traditionally 
described by James' contemporaries, and it is the organ of conscious-
ness. James is stressing the plasticity of the nervous system; in 
his view, it is a developing, mutable network, respondent to changes 
and growth describable in evolutionary terms. He does not deny 
that mechanical explanations can be applied to the nervous system 
per se--instead, he says that the nervous system lends itself to two 
modes of interpretation and claims that the mechanical model cannot 
be extended to describe consciousness while it can describe the 
structure of the physical organs of consciousness. Structurally 
speaking, James has departed from a strict sensory-motor approach 
(see James, 1890, 1, p. 79), while refusing to ratify the faculty 
psychology of Gall and the phrenologists.
5 
 Instead, James' mechanical/ 
physiological nervous system is a continuous plastic structure. 
Differentiation in structure and function is explained by evolution-
ary postulates: 
All nervous centres have then in the first instance one 
essential function, that of 'intelligent' action. They 
feel, prefer one thing to another, and have 'ends'. Like 
all other organs, however, they evolve from ancestor to 
descendant, and their evolution takes two directions, 
the lower centres passing downwards into more unhesitating 
automatism, and the higher ones upwards into larger intel-
lectuality. Thus it may appear that those functions which 
can safely grow uniform and fatal become least accompanied 
5. (See James, 1890, 1, pp. 27-28, 40-65). James bases his 
psychological interpretation of brain functioning on the physiological 
work of Broca, Ferrier, Hitzig, Goltz, Luciani, Loeb, Exner, Munk, 
Brown, Schaefer, Meynert, and Jackson. 
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by mind, and that their organ, the spfnal cord, becomes 
a more and more soulless machine; whilst on the contrary 
those functions which it benefits the animal to have 
adapted to delicate environing variations pass more and more 
to the hemispheres, whose anatomical structure and attendant 
consciousness grows more and more elaborate as zoological 
evolution proceeds (James, 1890, 1, p. 79). 
The higher centres are distinguished by a consciousness which 'over-
rides' the mechanistic aspects of the nervous system: 
A priori analysis of both brain-action and conscious action 
shows us that if thelatter were efficacious it would, by 
its selective emphasis, make amends for the indeterminateness 
of the former; whilst the study a posteriori of the 
distribution of consciousness shows it to be exactly such as 
we might expect in an organ added for the sake of steering 
a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself 
(James, 1890, 1, p. 144). 
Consciousness is distinctly separated from the mechanistic as-
pects of the nervous system. James insists that consciousness is 
not simply a by-product of neurophysiological activity but can be, 
and must be, treated as a distinct organ in itself. The admittedly 
dualistic character of this approach makes it difficult to see how 
James can defend his view of consciousness within the parameters 
of a physiological paradigm. 
However, James is convinced that physiological investigations 
yield data conducive to the treatment of consciousness as an organ 
in itself. James agreed with earlier physiologists that the qualita-
tive differences in behaviour between 'whole' and 'decorticated' 
organisms were critical. The older physiologists took the behavioural 
differences as evidence for a qualitative separation between the high-
er and lower centres--and it is this absolute break in the nervous 
system that James objects to. James hypothesizes that in regard to 
their ability to act as organs of consciousness, the nervous struct-
ures are fairly plastic. He is also insisting upon the unity of the 
system as a whole and emphasizing the need to consider consciousness 
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as the controlling organ of an otherwise mechanistic system. If a 
break need be made to distinguish efficacious processes from auto-
matic processes, James argues that it must be made between conscious-
ness and the underlying physical system, rather than within the 
physical system, and this is the basis of his quarrel with Spencer. 
James argues against the elementaristic mind-dust theory, parti-
cularly Spencer's interpretation, claiming that: 
If each neural shock gives rise to its own psychic shock, 
and the psychic shocks then combine, it would be impossible 
to understand why severing one part of the central nervous 
system from another should break up the integrity of 
consciousness. The cut has nothing to do with the psychic 
world. The atoms of mind-stuff ought to float off from the 
nerve matter on either side of it, and come together over it 
and fuse, just as well as if it had not been made. We know, 
however, that they do not (James, 1890, 1, p. 157). 
James makes two relevant points here: he establishes the dependence 
of consciousness upon brain states while at the same time attempting 
to show that feelings must be wholes in themselves; they do not 
'reconstitute' at a higher level when their channels are disrupted. 
James then goes on to make the distinction between the relations that 
objects have with one another and the qualitative status of the object 
itself. While atoms 'combine' to produce new substances, James 
argues that the new substance is really old atoms in new relations 
to one another: the atoms do not "sum themselves together. Each 
remains in the sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists 
only for a bystander who happens to overlook the units and to appre-
hend the sum as such" (James, 1890, 1, pp. 158-159). The same con- 
cept is applied to feelings--"Atoms of feeling cannot compose higher 
feelings" (James, 1890, 1, p. 161). Each atom of feeling remains an 
independent feeling in itself. This is why feelings are not, accord-
ing to James, 'reconstituted' at higher physiological levels. There 
is nothing in the percept of an object to imply that the object is 
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composed of discrete atoms. Nor do feelings admit an intuitive 
breakdown as part of the experience of the feeling itself, James 
regards any ultimate reductionist schema as the product of sophi-
sticated conceptualization rather than an intuitive feeling of the 
nature of things. 
James' insistence that fusion cannot take place at the conscious 
level raises some interesting questions about Spencer's theory of 
consciousness in particular and theories of consciousness in general. 
Spencer contends that fusion takes place at the conscious level and 
this must mean that the fusion is in some way experienced by the 
organism. It at least means that some 'change' takes place in the 
dim region between physiological 'experience' and the 'feeling' or 
'sensation' itself and this change must be regarded as a qualitat-
ive change. Spencer admits that experiences of sensations are 
"simple, homogeneous, unanalyzable, or of inscrutable natures" 
(Spencer, 1870, 1, p. 148). He claims, however, that careful ana-
lysis will show that the elements of musical tones can be slowed 
down so that they are experienced in their simple parts, and that 
other feelings can be similarly broken down (see Spencer, 1870, 1, 
p. 148). Spencer does say that the fusion of elements into feelings 
is not normally experienced: the point is, in cases where fusion 
can be experienced, whether or not the two experiences are quali-
tative equivalent. That is, do we have any feeling of the 'parts' 
that make up the tone when we hear the tone, or, when we first hear 
the parts, and are then given the tone, can we say that indeed, 
those parts compose the tone? James denies that we can or do (see 
James, 1890, 1, p. 157), adding that if the elements of a physical 
process (for example, striking a pendulum, blowing on a fire), are 
speeded Up or slowed down sufficiently, the quality of the physical 
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reaction is changed, and he believes that the same analogy can be 
applied to the feelings (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 155-156). James 
is arguing that qualitative 'cuts' must be made in the continuum 
of experience--later in his radical empiricism, he will argue that 
the subject-object distinction is not a real qualitative distinction, 
but he is then left with the problem of qualitative differences in 
experience to deal with. In the Principles, however, he is prepared 
to argue, as the core of his dualistic position, that qualitative 
cuts must be made between physiological 'nerve-firings' and mental 
experience, between mind and body, between subject and object. 
The dialogue between James and Spencer is important not only 
because it describes James' reason for believing that feelings are 
irreducible wholes, but because it raises the broader problem as to 
whether qualitative separations can be made at all in analyzing the 
nature of the subject's relations to the objects that he perceives, 
and conceptualizes. It also shows that if 'qualitative cuts' must 
in the end be made, the places where they are to be made are not 
'ontologically obvious'. 
The World of Pure Experience  
In defining 'feelings' or. 'thoughts', James had to take the 
Properties of the external world into account. If John Stuart Mill 
was convinced that there were permanent possibilities of sensation 
(see Mill, 1872, pp. 225-239), James was not. Like Mill, he believed 
that we encounter the same objects again and _again, so that we 
believe in their independent existence. Where he differed from Mill 
was in his ideas about the way in which objects came to be cognized 
as permanent and independent. To this end, he wrote: 
If my reader can succeed in abstracting from all 
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conceptual interpretation and lapse back into his 
immediate sensible life at this very moment, he will find 
it to be what someone has called a big blooming buzzing 
confusion, as free from contradiction in its 'much-
at-oneness' as it is all alive and evidently there. 
Out of this aboriginal sensible muchness attention 
carves out object, which conception then names and 
identifies forever (James, 1911, p. 50; see also James, 
1890, 1, p. 488 for the earlier expression of this view). 
According to James, the individual begins his life with a 'sens-
ible awareness' of 'pure experience'--he is aware at the sensational 
level that a reality exists, external to himself, but he can attach 
no particular meaning to external events. His initial impressions 
are kaleidescopic--patches of colour move against one another, sounds 
merge, diverge, and buzz together. Because the individual can as 
yet attach no particular meaning to external events, his impressions 
are of unity. The 'big blooming buzzing confusion' is 'one': separ-
ation of 'pure experience' into meaningful events comes as a result 
of the individual's interaction with the external world, and his 
subsequent imposition of his feelings and unique experiences on 
reality; this in turn, leads to his developing conceptions about that 
reality. As events and objects are thereby separated from the initial 
mass presentation, unity gives way to separateness and the world of 
'pure experience' as an experience ceases to exist. Portions of 
the initial flux are separated out as being worthy of attention 
while other portions recede further into the background and the indi-
vidual ceases for all practical purposes, to attend to them at all. 
For James, monism is the primitive experience, pluralism the sophi-
sticated view, for feelings of pluralism are the result of inter-
actions with reality. The flux of reality gradually takes on a kind 
of 'four-dimensionality' as its elements are separated into distinct 
objects and relations by the perceiving consciousness. The process 
is interactive; if the individual imposes his consciousness upon 
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reality, that same reality coerces consciousness into particular 
conceptions as well .
6 
The interaction between mind and the world which makes it pos-
sible to separate the 'big blooming buzzing confusion' into meaning-
ful realities is a major theme in James' psychological and philoso-
phical writings. James' paradigm of cognitive development is the re-
verse of the associationist structure: experience must be broken  
down by the individual so that objects and events can be recombined 
into meaningful conceptions (see James, 1890, 1, p. 465). James' 
radical view of the conceptual process is interrelated with his defini-
tion of feelings or thoughts--that is: "the object of your thought 
is really its entire content or deliverance, neither more nor less" 
(James, 1890, 1, p. 275). 
In his pragmatism,. James hypothesizes that the 'truth' or 'fal-
sity' of an idea is dependent on the existence of an actual object 
or relation which corresponds to the thought, and the meaning of 
any particular feeling has to be 'realized' for the thinker (see 
James, 1909, pp. 103-105). James had not begun to systematically 
develop his pragmatic philosophy while writing the Principles but 
there is a strong pragmatic motif running through the Principles; 
what was to become the pragmatism is foreshadowed in his contruct-
ion of consciousness. Thus, the function of thought or feeling is 
to promote the separation and recombination of reality into meaning-
full patterns and to facilitate meaningful action on the part of the 
individual. An atomistic conception of thought cannot fulfil these 
demands because the associationist system was based on the notion 
6. The concept of a world of pure experience and the means through 
which the individual comes to know reality is discussed in Chaps. 4 
and 8. 
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that complex ideas were derived through the compounding of simple 
ideas. James' reality is initially monistic and this precludes a 
conception of mind that insists that simple ideas provide the base 
for complex ideas. In James' world simple elements are not intuit-
ively distinguishable as such: the 'cuts' that determine the break-
down of reality are products of experience, and, eventually, of 
sophisticated conceptualization. 
James was led to define thoughts as irreducible wholes for he 
believed that the initial experience of the individual was of such 
a nature that it precluded the summation of elements into complex 
ideas. The sensation, feeling, or thought was experienced as a whole; 
the cognitive value of the thought, or its functional significance 
for the individual was a separate issue. The function of a thought 
may be determined, often is determined, by the structure of the 
thought, but what happens as a result of thinking the thought is dis-
tinguished from the thought itself. What a thought is and what it 
leads to are two things, not one. The structural equivalence of feel-
ings along with their functional differentiation is the real basis 
of James' efficacious consciousness. If the function of feelings is 
to separate the world of pure experience into meaningful objects and 
relations, the feelings must be structured so as to facilitate the 
process. They need not always be cognitive--whether or not they are 
cognitive is dependent upon there being actual independent objects 
and relations to which they correspond. But they must be structured 
so that their objects will have potentially recognizable correlates 
in the external world. And if their objects do not make a fit with 
anything in the world of reality, those objects of the feelings must 
still be recognizable so that the feeling can be interpreted and 
dismissed as a falsity or dream (see James, 1909, p. 28). 
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Thus, the world of pure experience comes to be known. 
Evolutionary Demands on the Construction of the Feelings  
or Thoughts  
If,consciousness was to be efficacious, then feelings or thoughts 
had the function of 'pushing' the individual into the world: "All 
feeling is for the sake of action" (James, 1909, p. 22). But that 
world, in James' new cosmology, was beginning to take on different 
dimensions from those of the orderly mathematically defined Newtonian 
cosmos. While James dismissed the notion that the mind was a complete 
tabula rasa, arguing instead that it was structured towards speci- 
fic tendencies as a result of the evolutionary process (see James, 
1890, 1, p. 76), he explicitly denied that the external world exist-
ed in any intuitively logical and permanent form for consciousness 
(see James, 1890, 1, p. 488). Moreover, he had to confront the 
problem of whether or not external realities are constant: 
What is got twice is the same OBJECT. We hear the same 
note over and'over again; we see the same quality of green, 
or smell the same objective perfume, or experience the 
same species of pain. The realities, concrete and abstract, 
physical and ideal, whose permanent existence we believe 
in, seem to be constantly coming up again before our thought, 
and lead us, in our carelessness, to suppose that our 'ideas' 
of them are the same ideas. When we come, some time later, 
to the chapter on Perception, we shall see how inveterate 
is our habit of not attending to sensations as subjective 
facts, but of simply using them as stepping-stones to pass 
over to the recognition of the realities whose presence 
they reveal (James, 1890, 1, p. 231). 
This passage initially seems to imply that there are indeed 
permanent possibilities of sensation; objects are constant while the 
'subjective' portion of the thought varies. In fact, the situation 
is far more complex than this, as the latter part of the above pas-
sage shows. The 'object' of the thought or sensation remains 
constant, while the thought or sensation is never repeated exactly 
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in consciousness (see James, 1890, 1, p. 232). The physical object 
which is responsible for the thought or sensation is in fact the 
same object that was sensed or thought about before, but that object 
-Itself may be in a constant process of change so that: 
The grass out of the window now looks to me of the same 
green in the sun as in the shade, and yet a painter would 
have to paint one part of it dark brown, another part 
bright yellow, to give its real sensational effect. We 
take no heed, as a rule, of the different way in which the 
same things look and sound and smell at different distances 
and under different circumstances (James, 1890, 1, p. 231)., 
The problem here is to determine whether the changes that objects 
appear to exhibit when thoughts and sensations are subjected to 
introspective analysis are significant changes in the objects them-
selves or whether these changes are only significant in terms of 
our relationships to the objects. James at times implies that the 
physical world is undergoing constant and real changes, independent 
of the sentient observer: "Even now, the world may be a place in 
which the same thing never did and never will come twice" (James, 
1890, 1, p. 460). The analysis of the permanent or mutable status 
of the physical world occupies a significant portion of the discus-
sion on James' conception of the worlds of reality, given in Chap. 
4. For the present, however, it is sufficient to note that James had 
not yet come to the point of using sensational or perceptual exper-
ience as the 'data' for insisting that the physical world really 
was in a process of constant change and evolution. This was to come 
later, in his radical empiricism and his final philosophy. The 
changes that could be 'observed' through the aegis of sensation and 
perception might possibly reveal real changes in the structures 
of the physical world, or they might not--that is, the phenomenal 
shifts in the appearance of objects might well be incidental to real, 
physical changes in the world. From the perspective of the observer, 
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however, changes in the objects are experienced. 
Thus James has taken a significant step in meeting the evolution-
ary demands for a mutable physical world: he regards the phenomenal 
shifts in the appearances of objects as significant for his theory 
of consciousness and perception. If the observer is inclined to 
ignore differences in sensation when he meets the same object on 
different occasions, it is still significant that he does not in fact 
'get' the same sensation twice. The thought or sensation must be 
taken as an irreducible whole to ensure that the object is in fact 
recognized on subsequent occasions, despite changes in its phenomen-
al appearance. 
Any given thought therefore has two functions: it enables the 
Individual to recognize the object as the same object he last en-
countered. But it also enables him to recognize any changes that 
the object has undergone since his last encounter with it. And these 
changes may be significant for the individual. Darwin emphasized the 
importance of adaptation, adjustment, competition, and survival 
as the primary demands made on the individual (see Darwin, 1859/1977, 
pp. 114, 435, 441-445). If consciousness was really to be efficac-
ious in ensuring survival and adjustment, then the recognition of the 
shift in the appearances of objects could be critical to the survival 
and adjustment of the observer at any given moment. Furthermore, the 
'subjective' characteristics of the thought or sensation are as 
critical as the recognition of the object and its particular appear-
ance at any given time. The secondary qualities of objects and 
events--those properties which were devalued during the scientific 
revolution in terms of their ability to provide 'true' information 
about the world, suddenly became of immense importance to James' 
new paradigm. Thoughts or sensations had to be considered as 'wholes' 
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because the feeling included, or was fringed by, emotive aspects 
as well as purely cognitive information. 
If all feeling exists for the sake of action as James was to 
claim in his pragmatism (see James, 1909, p.22), the precise epist-
emological status of any given feeling is decided only when its 
interactive relationship with reality is decided. And whether any 
particular feeling will be transformed into action, and what the act 
will be, depends upon the emotive as well as the objective qualities 
of the feeling. The structure of feelings as whole units of con-
sciousness--as complete particulars in themselves--is necessary if 
James is going to distinguish them epistemologically in terms of 
function. James believes that conceptions are determined by the indi-
vidual's unique experiences in the world (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 
460, 465). This means that the 'meaning' of an object is not pre-
determined--meaning resides in the particular piece of experience. 
Given that the world is always changing (at the phenomenal 
level at least), and that the particular meaning of an object at any 
given time is selected from the possibilities inherent within the 
object, it is necessary for the definition of thought to include 
those aspects of the object or situation which are important to the 
individual at the time. Survival and adjustment depend on this. 
Today, the 'meaning' of the piece of paper in front of me may be that 
I can write on it; tomorrow, that I may use it to start a fire (see 
James, 1890, 2, p.333). It remains the same physical object but 
its 'meaning' changes according to my needs; the thought of the 
object is qualitatively different in the two cases. The 'meaning' 
is not added on to the percept--it is part of what individualizes 
each percept from other, similar perceptions. The subjective 
aspect of the thought is as much a part of the percept as the 
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objective part. To make this clearer, James writes: 
There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one  
thing. The same property which figures as the essence 
of a thing on one occasion becomes a very inessential 
feature upon another (James, 1890, 2, p. 333). 
But this statement leads us into James' argument that consciousness 
is essentially selective. It is therefore necessary to begin the 
analysis of the stream of consciousness in order to show how James 
structured consciousness so that selection became an integral and 
necessary characteristic of the mind in its relations with the worlds 
of reality. 
The Evolutionary Character of the Stream of Consciousness  
Once James had decided that feelings or thoughts were holistic 
entities, his next task was to find a means of describing their re-
lationships to one another. He was dissatisfied with the laws of 
association as a means of accounting thoughts to each other. 
But the whole historic doctrine of psychological association 
is tainted with one huge error--that of the construction 
of our thoughts out of the compounding of themselves together 
of immutable and incessantly recurring 'simple ideas'. It is 
the cohesion of these which the 'principles of association' 
are considered to account for. In Chapters VI and IX we 
saw abundant reasons for treating the doctrine of simple 
ideas or psychic atoms as mythological; and, in all that 
follows, our problem will be to keep whatever truths the 
associationist doctrine has caught sight of without weighing 
it down with the untenable incumbrance that the association 
is between 'ideas' (James, 1890),1, pp. 553-554). 
James' solution to the problem was to become one of his most 
fruitful psychological constructions; his efforts soon resulted in 
the famous stream of consciousness. While every thought or feeling 
is a 'unity' in itself, the thought is not a 'simple' object--"Every 
definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water 
that flows around it" (James, 1890, 1, p. 255). Thus, an object of 
thought is surrounded by co-existing states of consciousness and 
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takes it emphasis from those co-existing feelings. 
The stream of thought was designed as the 'structure' of the thought 
processes and it was constructed in response to the same 'demands' just 
described which first led James to define thoughts as indivisible ob-
jects. The rationale for James' definition of feeling is to be found 
in the evolutionary 'core' of his psychology. That is, he found pro-
found difficulties in describing consciousness according to the associat-
ionist model because in his mind, the assumptions about the function 
of consciousness that could be drawn from Darwinian theory conflicted  
with the premises of associationism. James' construction of conscious-
ness is therefore a reaction against the broad theory of associationism. 
At the same time, it is a productive attempt to generate a new theory 
of mind, and must be regarded as a positive expression and expansion 
of evolutionary theory. 
Darwin's theory is a somewhat curious construction; on the one hand, 
Darwin fervently wishes to preserve the uniformity of nature (see Young, 
1971, p. 500) in compliance with the demands of the Newtonian world-view, 
At the same time, there are foreshadowings of a relativistic view of 
nature in The origin of species. Darwin tried hard to show that the 
relativistic ideas could be reconciled with the old assumptions (see 
Darwin, 1859/1977, pp. 437, 460); nevertheless, the work exhibits a pro-
ductive tension between the 'old' and what were to become the 'new' 
assumptions. And it fell to James and his contemporaries to tease out 
the implications for a new theory of mind and nature from Darwin's theory. 
The stream of consciousness is therefore important historically for it 
represents the first major theoretical attempt to define the structure 
of consciousness in terms compatible with the 'new' assumptions implicit 
in Darwin's work. 
If consciousness was to have any functional utility, its struct- 
ural characteristics had to be directed towards the recognition, 
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interpretation, and satisfaction of internal and external demands. 
As Reck (see Reck, 1967, p. 23), points out, Spencer was the first 
to realize the importance of mind in survival; the whole theory of 
evolutionary associationism is based on the premise that mind has 
gradually evolved to facilitate the adjustment of inner to outer 
relations. James' disagreements with Spencer were profound (see, 
for example, Reck, 1967, p. 24), and he often uses Spencer as a 
vehicle for his wide-ranging attack on the elementarism and passive 
sensationalism that came to characterize British empiricism. But the 
idea that consciousness is somehow crucial in evolutionary development 
comes from Spencer. James therefore followed Spencer's lead when he 
worked out an alternative structure of consciousness to fulfill evolu-
tionary demands as he derived them from Darwin. 
According to James, an efficacious consciousness is necessary to 
facilitate efficient satisfaction of biological demands and James 
claimed that the lower brain centres were too 'limited' to trigger the 
numerous actions required in purposive adjustment in the higher 
species, while the 'higher' centres were too unstable. An organ of 
consciousness that could fill these demands was required: thus, the 
stream of consciousness was structured so that it is personal, con-
stantly changing, sensibly continuous, cognitive, and selective, or 
interested (James, 1890, 1, p. 225). 
The stream of consciousness is primarily structured to cope with 
the internal instabilities of the individual and the external instabi-
lities that are perceived in the physical world. The justification 
for considering the stream of thought as an evolutionary concept 
lies in James' conclusion that the 'physical' organism and the environ-
ment are unstable. For the earlier generation, the only recognized 
instability resided in the mental processes themselves (see J. S. Mill, 
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1872, p. 235 ,  quoted above, p. 140). The world contained permanent 
possibilities of sensation while the internal, or physical states 
of the organism were described by mechanical analogies. The impact 
of Darwinian ideas on James' thought is responsible for his 'revers-
al' of this order so that James was to conclude that concepts were 
the permanent, static, and stable elements in an otherwise unstable 
system (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 459-462). This is why consciousness 
stands at the centre of James' universe; as his philosophy was devel-
oped, the external world became more and more overtly discontinuous, 
and the 'organizing', 'permanently conceptualizing' capacities of 
consciousness, interacting with immediate 'percepts' of reality, were 
emphasized as the only certain paths to knowledge, and in fact, to 
the course of development the external world will take. Perry makes 
some interesting points in regard to evolutionism in James' philo-
sophy: 
In the early phase of his doctrine of evolution James was 
dominated by Darwin. His main concern was to demonstrate 
the "spontaneous variation" of life and mind. Through this 
breach in an otherwise mechanical world poured the whole 
flow of his predilection for subjectivity and freedom. 
He believed that Spencer had definitively failed in his more 
pretentious attempt to trace the origins of life and mind. 
James was here willing, provisionally at least, to fall back 
on the hypothesis of mechanism., With this earlier Darwinian 
phase of his thought is to be contrasted the radical evolution-
ism of his later years, when, aided and abetted by Charles 
Peirce, he extended the notion of spontaneous variation to 
the whole of nature, and proclaimed the view that the physical 
order was itself an effect of progressive selection (Perry, 
1935/1974, 1, p. 490). 
James follows traditional epistemological practice when he 
structures consciousness. The terms that describe the dynamics of 
the stream of consciousness can be used to describe events in the 
external World, so that the structure of consciousness reflects the 
world it knows, as did the consciousness of the rationalists and 
empiricists. Spencer's evolutionary associationism served as a kind 
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of model for James because it united physiological and biological 
data with the laws of association to show how the mind evolved into 
a structure which met the requirements of the nineteenth century 
mechanistic world-view. Spencer was an evolutionist first and a 
psychologist second so that his concept of mind is largely subser-
vient to his biology. In James' case, the psychology preeedes the 
final elaboration of the characteristics of the external world, and 
the final dimensions of the external world were developed out of his 
conception of consciousness. But the basic concepts of what the 
external world is like are present in his psychology, and these con-
ceptions were sufficiently developed to allow him to construct a 
consciousness capable of 'knowing' the world. As Brennan explains, 
the stream of consciousness serves as an analogue to radical empiri-
cism where experience consists of interconnected fluid experiences 
(see Brennan, 1968, p. 42). The characteristics of the stream of 
consciousness were eventually expanded into a full-fledged philosophy 
of experience in the later radical empiricism. And because the 
structures of the stream of consciousness were so important in James' 
over-all philosophy, they will be discussed individually below. 
Commentators and Critics of James' Stream of Consciousness  
James' commentators and critics recognize the strong influence 
of evolutionary theory on his work (see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 468- 
469, 482-490; Wiener, 1965, pp. 95-128; Kuklick, 1977, pp, 160-162; 
Reck, 1967, pp. 23-24; Royce, 1911/1969, pp. 10-14; Knox, 1914, pp. 
8-15; Roth, 1969, pp. 25-26; and Murphy & Murphy, 1969, pp. 260-262), 
but most of these writers do not analyze the characteristics of the 
stream of consciousness in terms of James' positive motives for 
reconstructing consciousness. Instead, they use the teleological 
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theory of interests to describe James' view of consciousness as 
efficacious and to describe his quarrel with Spencer (see above, 
Chap. 2, pp. 130-131). The stream of consciousness is then analyzed 
rightly enough, in terms of James' reaction against the elementarism 
of associationism on the one hand, and his refusal to accept the 
transcendental ego of Kant on the other (see for example, Wild, 1969, 
pp. 55-56; Dooley, 1974, p. 31; Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 77, 83; 
Kuklick, 1977, p. 178; Boring, 1950, p. 512; Watson, 1978, pp. 380-381; 
Reck, 1967, p. 28). Knox (1914, pp. 22-24) and Murphy and Murphy (1969, 
pp. 261-262) are exceptions in that they acknowledge the evolutionary 
character of the stream of consciousness. Unfortunately, neither 
of them goes into any detail about the relationship between the 
stream of consciousness and evolutionary theory. Even Wiener, who is 
concerned with the evolutionary characteristics of James' psychology 
and philosophy limits his remarks on the stream of consciousness 
to a brief summary of Baldwin's review of James' theory (see 
Wiener, 1965, p. 107). Perry regards the stream of consciousness as 
a novel creation on James' part; the similarities between it and 
the older, psychology are too minimal in Perry's view to account for 
James' structure (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 78), and he makes no 
reference to any of the other conditions which influenced James' con-
struction. 
While most of the literature on the stream of consciousness is 
cogent and to the point, some of it tends to be merely descriptive 
so that James' achievement is simply documented historically (see 
Watson, 1978, pp. 380-383; Reck, 1967, pp. 29-30), and no particular 
theoretical conclusions are drawn. Still other writers are inclined 
to dismiss the stream of consciousness as a "magnificent failure" 
(Kantor, 1942, p. 147), or to dwell on its negative implications for 
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the psychology that came after (see Boring, 1950, p. 514). 
The substantive debate in the literature is rightly concerned 
with how 'successful' James' construction of consciousness is, in 
terms of the 'subjective' and 'objective' qualities of thoughts as 
objects as they appear in the stream of consciousness. Wilshire 
relates James' psychology to phenomenology and argues that the strong 
subject-object dualism that characterizes the structure of the 
stream of consciousness means that James does not describe thought 
but only the thought's object (see Wilshire, 1968, pp. 68. 80). 
Wilshire points to a major problem in comprehending James' theory 
when he states that he is unsure as to whether the thought's object 
belongs to the mental side or the physical side of the experience 
(see Wilshire, 1968, p. 95) so that analysis of the percept can be 
confused with the analysis of the 'real' object (see Wilshire, 1968, 
p. 106).
7 Wilshire concludes, after a long analysis, that James' 
self-professed dualism collapses because James cannot keep the world 
out of the thought or the thought out of the world so that the way is 
open for phenomenology (see Wilshire, 1968, p. 118). 
Wild also finds difficulties with the subject-object dualism 
of the stream of consciousness but concludes that the intentionality 
of the stream validates the concept (see Wild, 1969, p. 58). He 
points out that the repeated experience of an object does not mean 
that the same state of consciousness is present and adds that the 
British empiricists made the mistake of equating objects and mental 
states, thus neglecting the intentionality of mental states (see 
Wild, 1969, p. 50). James, he feels corrects the empiricist error 
7. This problem is discussed in more detail below. See pp. 175-180. 
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by making the stream of consciousness 'sensibly continuous' so 
that transitional and relational states as well as permanent 'resting 
places' occur without any break in the stream. Wild theorizes that 
this concept is 'intentional' in the phenomenological sense--that is, 
the stream of consciousness is primarily intentional (see Wild, 
1969, p. 61). Thus, both Wilshire and Wild conclude that the concept 
of the stream of thought is ultimately compatible with phenomenolog-
ical logic. 
Both Wild and Wilshire are concerned with an internal analysis 
of James' Principles in terms of its effect upon the emergence of 
phenomenology, particularly Husserl's. Both are philosophers and 
are less concerned with the biological (or evolutionary) demands and 
implications of the structure of consciousness than James himself 
was, or than Dewey was. 
Dewey criticized James' structure of consciousness in his 1940 
paper, "The vanishing subject in the psychology of William James". 
Dewey, like Wild and Wilshire, is troubled by the 'two strains of 
dualism' he discerns in James' conception of the subject-object 
relationship (see Dewey, 1940, p. 589). Dewey is more concerned, 
however, to show that James' theory has implications for Behaviour-
ism from the point of view of relating feelings or thoughts to the 
biological basis of consciousness. Dewey stresses that if James had 
followed the 'naturalistic' strain in his analysis (which conflicts 
with theepistemological dualism James imposed upon psychology; see 
James, 1890, 1, pp. 218-220 for James' statement), his psychology 
"would have resulted in a biological behavioristic account of psycho-
logical phenomena" (Dewey, 1940, p. 591). 
What Wilshire, Wild, and Dewey have in common is a tendency to 
draw a limited set of assumptions out of James' work while showing 
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that other, conflicting assumptions can be negated. By this means, 
they hope to show correlations between James' work and their own 
theoretical positions. James' psychology has proven productive in 
building such 'modern' theories as phenomenology and behaviourism. 
By way of contrast the present analysis is concerned with presenting 
James' stream of consciousness in its historical context and with 
drawing out some of its broad implications for twentieth-century 
thought. Because the literature on the stream of consciousness 
largely neglects its evolutionary genesis, the present analysis will 
concentrate on the evolutionary aspects of James' theory, in order 
to eventually bring the structure of the stream of consciousness 
into line with James' evolutionary epistemology, pragmatism, and 
his evolutionary metaphysic, radical empiricism. 
The Stream of Consciousness is Personal  
The stream of consciousness is personal--every thought is part 
of a personal consciousness and no thought may belong to more than 
one personal consciousness. James is 'marking off' the limits of 
the personality with this proviso because he regards the stream of 
consciousness as the personality of the individual: "There are no 
marks of personality to be gathered aliunde, and then found lacking 
in the train of thought" (James, 1890, 1, p. 227). Only those feel-
ings, thoughts, emotions, and 'fringes of thought' that can be found 
in the stream of thought constitute the personality--actually James 
claims that if there were such a thing as a non-personal thought, no 
one could know about it (see James, 1890, 1, p. 226). Every thought 
belongs to a particular individual so that the 'personal' factor of 
the stream of thought describes a closed system and "My thought be- 
longs with my other thoughts, and your thought belongs with your other 
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thoughts" (James, 1890, 1, p. 226). James makes no distinction be-
tween the experience of the thought and the content of the thought 
so that, as Dooley reminds us, the thinker is the particular thought 
(see Dooley, 1974, pp. 30, 35). This gives James the beginnings of 
a methodology for the study of personality: "On these terms the 
personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the immed-
iate datum in psychology" (James, 1890, 1, p. 226). James limits 
the discussion of the personal nature of consciousness to remarks 
on the warmth or immediacy one's thoughts have for onself. He also 
uses the feeling that thoughts belong with the other thoughts which 
one has, to account for the continuity of consciousness in the 
introspective sense. 
But the notion that thought is personal has broader implications 
that are expanded later in the Principles. The personal  nature of 
thought means for James not only that we make the separation between 
ourselves and the rest of the universe (see James, 1890, 1, p. 289), 
but that each consciousness is unique. He is reacting against the 
tendency of the earlier empiricists to describe cognition in universal 
terms (see, for example, James Mill, 1869, 1, pp. 262-265). 
Darwin emphasized the importance of individual differences as 
the means of 'new' material for natural selection, while noting that 
accidental variations occurred where the variation in structure was 
of no utility to the individual (see Darwin, 1859/1977, pp. 102-103). 
Galton was inspired by this concept and in 1869 began to look at 
the individual differences in mental characteristics (see Anastasi, 
1967, p. 4). In his work on psychogenesis (see James, 1890, 2, pp_ 
617-688), James shows that there are accidental, as well as 'adaptive' 
tendencies in consciousness, so that personality is the combined 
result of the 'emergence' of the 'adaptive' and 'accidental' 
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characteristics (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 622-627), becoming cogni-
tive in the worlds of experience. The formation of personality, 
and the 'co-existence' of many personal 'selves', which are held 
together in one personality is analyzed in James' chapter on "The 
consciousness of self" (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 291-401). Personal, 
in James' usage, has two correlated meanings: it means that each 
personality is unique, and it means that personality can be defined 
as the sense of the 'belongingness' of one's thoughts and the 'felt' 
relations between the thoughts. That James was using the term 'per-
sonal' in this double sense is implied in his statement that: 
The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and thoughts 
exist', but 'I think' and 'I feel'. No psychology, at 
any rate, can question the existence of personal selves. 
The worst a psychology can do is so to interpret the nature 
of these selves as to rob them of their worth (James, 1890, 
1, p. 226). 
Structuring thought as personal allows James to go on to postu-
late that thought is always changing: if all thoughts are personal, 
the thought process can be subject to change without disruption to 
the personality. 
Thought is Always Changing  
The concept that the stream of thought is always changing has 
obvious evolutionary overtones; it is also an explicit reaction 
against what James perceived as a gross error in the traditional 
empiricism. James writes that: "no state once gone can recur and be 
identical with what it was before" (James, 1890, 1, p. 230). He 
gives credit for this inspiration to Hodgson, 8 but develops the 
8. See James, 1890, 1, p, 230. James says that.he_took the idea 
for a.changing consciousness from Hodgson's The philosophy of  
reflection, 1878, 1, pp, 248, 290. 
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concept into a major theme for his psychology and philosophy. 
According to Reck, "This theory of the constant flux of conscious-
ness contrasts vividly with the atomistic psychology which builds 
consciousness up from static simple perceptions and ideas" (Reck, 
1967, P. 29). Wild enlarges on this, commenting that James' concept 
is rooted in the intentional nature of experience while the British 
empiricists neglected this aspect of consciousness and thus postu-
lated that recurring objects meant recurring mental states (see 
Wild, 1969, p. 59). James' description of the stream of conscious-
ness as continually changing can therefore be seen as a reaction to 
British empiricism, particularly as James specifically takes Locke 
and his successors to task for their argument that the same idea 
could be experienced again (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 230-231). 
James claims instead that the object of the thought is re-
experienced, not the thought itself. Because our thoughts have the 
same objects, we believe that we experience the same physical objects 
again and again; we do not doubt the independent existence of the 
physical world (see James, 1890, 1, p. 231). And because these 
'realities' reappear in consciousness, we believe that our ideas of 
them are the same (see James, 1890, 1, p. 231). But, says James, 
this is not the case: realities do not reappear to us in an unchanging 
fashion; we think they do because we have the "habit of not attend-
ing to sensations as subjective facts, but of simply using them as 
stepping-stones to pass over to the recognition of the realities 
• whose presence they reveal" (James, 1890, 1, p. 231). How flexible 
or mutable the external or ideal worlds really are is not discussed 
at this point. Instead, James paints a picture of a world which 
contains the same objects, but 'presents' them in diverse perspect- 
ives to our consciousness (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 231-233). 
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Objects change 'phenomenally' but retain their identity, and it is 
this 'identity' that consciousness seeks and finds. Introspection 
allows us to recognize changes in the appearance of objects but the 
real means by which we can conclude that our feelings about objects 
change is in the affectional nature of the feelings themselves. Thus, 
we recognize the object, but "What was bright and exciting becomes 
weary, flat, and unprofitable. The bird's song is tedious, the 
breeze is mournful, the sky is sad" (James, 1890, 1, p. 232; see 
also Wild, 1969, p. 60). 
James adds that getting the same sensation twice is a physio-
logical impossibility because the brain is modified upon first receiv-
ing the sensation and the second presentation is influenced by this 
modification (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 232-235; see also Wild, 1969, 
p. 60). Introspective and physiological analysis leads James to 
conclude that thoughts are constantly changing, because of the nature 
of the biological apparatus, the phenomenal appearances of reality, 
and the 'subjective' states of consciousness. 
James was beginning to find it impossible to believe that "under 
the dissolving-view-appearance of the mind elementary facts of any  
sort remained unchanged under the flow" (James, 1890, 1, p. 230). 
He took exception to the empiricist belief that the possibilities 
of sensation were permanent, while sensations themselves were fugi-
tive and transitory. In Mill's system, the possibilities of sensa- 
tion are the stable part of the world, and all knowledge is generated 
by their appearance and reappearance. Any phenomenal differences 
between the appearances are not mentioned by Mill. Nor are any sub-
jective differences in consciousness: 
I see a piece of white paper on the table. I go into 
another room. If the phenomena always followed me, or 
if, when it did not follow me, I believed it to disappear 
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e rerum natura, I should not believe it to be an 
external object. I should consider it as a phantom 
--a mere affection of my senses: I should not believe 
that there had been any Body there. But, though I have 
ceased to see it, I am persuaded that the paper is still 
there. I no longer have the sensations which it gave 
me; but I believe that when I again place myself in the 
circumstances in which I had those sensations, ... I 
shall again have them; ...These various possibilities are 
the important thing to me in the world. My present sensa-
tions are generally of little importance, and moreover are 
fugitive: the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, 
which is the character that mainly distinguishes our idea 
of Substance or Matter from our notion of sensation (J.S. 
Mill, 1872, pp. 228-229). 
For James, the phenomenal differences in the presentation of the 
object from one time to the next were to become of increasing import-
ance particularly in his radical empiricism. In the present con-
text, however, he is reacting against the empiricists' failure to 
take into account the subjective meaning of the sensation. Mill, in 
the passage given above, is solely concerned with being able to re-
locate his piece of paper. Or, as James writes, the empiricists: 
Only spoke of their states as ideas of this or of that thing. 
What wonder, then, that the thought is most easily conceived 
under the law of the thing whose name it bears! If the thing 
is composed of parts, then we suppose that the thought of the 
thing must be composed of the thoughts of the parts. If one 
part of the thing have appeared in the same thing or in other 
things on former occasions, why then we must be having even 
now the very same 'idea' of that part which was there on those 
occasions. If the thing is simple, its thought is simple. 
If it is multitudinous, it must require a multitude of thoughts 
to think it. If a succession, only a succession of thoughts 
can know it. If permanent, its thought is permanent. And so 
on ad libitum. What after all is so natural as to assume that 
one object, called by one name,should be known by one affection 
of the mind?(James, 1890, 1, p. 236) 
The subjective meaning of the object was fundamental; this is 
where evolution comes into James' structure of consciousness. The 
'subjective' appraisal of the object--that is, the fringes which 
accompany it--completes the 'meaning' it has for the thinker. In 
fact (as will be shown below), the subjective aspects of the thought 
process determine which aspects, or properties of the object will be 
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thought about. Mill's piece of paper, for James, becomes more than 
a simple relocatable object in the world; it becomes an object with 
definable and 'selectable' relationships to the world and to the 
observer who seeks it. The empiricists were unconcerned with mean-
ingful relations in this sense. They sought a stable correspondence 
between 'ideas' in the mind and the 'objective' qualities of the 
external world and this is the essence of passive sensationalism. 
Even conceptions "do not develop themselves from within, but are 
impressed upon the mind from without" (J.S. Mill, 1843/1974, 8, IV, 
ii, 2, p. 653). 
James looked to the subjective differences in mental states to 
provide the 'information' required for adjustment in the world. It 
mattered to James that feelings could not be precisely reexperienced 
and he took care to show that there was no hard and fast evidence 
to support the position that they could be (see James, 1890, 1, PP. 
233-236). James is concretizing the concept of mutability into con-
sciousness as the foundation of individual adjustment, development 
and growth. Knowledge is not simply cumulative; its development 
is marked by qualitative changes. 'New' or changing feelings not 
only mean a more efficient adjustment of internal needs to external 
pressures, but the chance for novel ideas and new actions to emerge. 
Thought is Sensibly Continuous  
The notion that thought is sensibly continuous is perhaps the 
most complex and evanescent of the characteristics of consciousness. 
But it is also the most 'productive' and 'radical' notion from a 
philosophical standpoint for it contains the germs of James' radical 
empiricism. James' insistence that thought is sensibly continuous 
can be seen as part of his reaction against British empiricism 9 
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but it is far more than that. James' conception of the relations 
which give the stream its continuity, is, in fact, a major creative 
achievement. As Perry writes: 
The most signal "omission of introspective psychology", 
as James saw it, was the relational or transitive state, 
which when adequately recognized, gives to consciousness 
an aspect of streamlike continuity. Except possibly for 
the dependence of knowledge on will, this was James's 
most important insight (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 76-77). 
James begins his account fairly simply with an introspective 
description of the "temporal continuity of conscious life, which 
often seems interrupted by discontinuities and gaps of various kinds" 
(Wild, 1969, p. 62). He is convinced that consciousness is "without 
break, crack, or division. ...The only breaches that can well be 
conceived to occur within the limits of a single mind would be 
either interruptions, or time-gaps.. .or they would be breaks in the 
quality, or content of the thought" (James, 1890, 1, p. 237). He 
distinguishes between interruptions caused by 'abnormal' and-'unfelt' 
states such as the administration of anaesthetics (see James, 1890, 
1, p. 237), and 'normal', 'felt' interruptions such as sleep (see 
James, 1890, 1, p. 238). James concludes that in the first case, 
there is no consciousness at all; upon awakening, consciousness 
simply merges over the 'blind-spot' so that the gap itself is unex-
perienced, while in the second case (sleep), consciousness 'reaches' 
back and makes connection with itself (see James, 1890, 1, p. 238). 
Because consciousness has this continuous, reconnective function, 
James declares that it should be designated as "the stream of thought,  
of consciousness, or of subjective life" (James, 1890, 1, p. 239). 
9. See James, 1890, 1, pp. 244-245; Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 76. 
Wild points out that the empiricists have tended to follow Hume's 
decree that "experience is made up of isolated units succeeding 
one another" (Wild, 1969, p. 61). 
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• But now matters become more complex, for James must give a 
more exact, and less introspective account of the continuous nature 
of consciousness (see James, 1890, 1, p. 239). To this end, he 
claims that it is the things themselves--that is, those objects, 
events, and relations that comprise reality and are therefore thought 
about--which are discontinuous (see James, 1890, 1, p.240), while 
the stream itself is continuous: 
The transition between the thought of one object and the 
thought of another is no more a" break in the thought 
than a joint in a bamboo is a break in the wood. It is a 
part of the consciousness as much as the joint is a part 
of the bamboo (James, 1890, 1, p. 240). 
The continuity of consciousness is produced by the 'felt rela-
tions' between thoughts (see James, 1890, 1, p. 243; and Wild, 1969, 
p. 63). The "feelings of relation are found not only in the lived 
existence, which we know directly by acquaintance. They are also 
found in our conceptual knowledge about" (Wild, 1969, •p. 63; see also 
James, 1890, 1 , pp. 242-243, 251-258). James therefore divides the 
stream of consciousness into 'objects' of thought and 'transitive' 
states so that consciousness alternates between 'resting places' 
where an image is held before the 'mind', and 'transitive' states 
"which are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, 
that for the most part obtain between matters contemplated in the 
periods of comparative rest" (James, 1890, 1, p. 243). 
James is convinced that if feelings are real, the relations 
between them must be as real (see James, 1890, 1, p.  245), and uses 
language as the means of 'verifying' his point: 
There is not a conjunction or preposition, and hardly an 
adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, 
in human speech, that does not express some shading or other 
relation which we at some moment feel to exist between the 
larger objects of our thought. If we speak objectively, 
it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak 
subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches 
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each of them by an inward coloring of its own. In either 
case the relations are numberless, and no existing language 
is capable of doing justice to all their shades (James, 1890, 
1, p. 245). 
More importantly, he draws a parallel between relations in the extern-
al world and relations in consciousness so that: "If there be such 
a thing as feelings at all, then so surely as relations between  
objects exist in rerum natura, so surely, and more surely, do feel-
ings exist to which these relations are known" (James, 1890, 1, p. 
245). The conception of the relations which 'bind' the natural 
world together was not worked out systematically until James began 
serious work on his radical empiricism. In the Principles, James 
has carried his thinking to the point of a surety that there are real 
relations between objects and events in the physical world, but he 
does not elaborate on these: the sureness that relations were real 
was sufficient for the development of his psychological structure. 
Later (see Chap. 8), the structure of the natural world was modelled 
on the broad concept of the stream of thought. Thus the notion that 
consciousness is a continuous flow of objects and relations is of 
profound significance, because it serves as the unifying concept of 
structure between consciousness and the external world. 
Given that objects and relations exist in both consciousness and 
the external world, the structural relationships between them must 
be analyzed. James' aim was to show that thoughts or feelings were 
irreducible wholes; therefore it must be determined whether or not 
this concept is reconcilable with the hypothesis that thoughts are 
consubstantial 'amalgams' of objects and relations. The continuity 
of the stream of consciousness depends upon the satisfactory resolu-
tion of the problem as to whether or not thoughts are reducible into 
two distinguishable categories of 'events'. If the object of the 
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thought is an isolatable unit of the thought, then the holistic, 
irreducible nature of the thought itself, and the continuity of the 
stream of thought would be imperiled. James uses the term 'fringe' 
to describe the 'felt relations' of the thought's object and Wild 
says that "Every such object is set in a world-field, or in James' 
language, surrounded by a halo of fringes which gives it an original 
place and meaning in the world" (Wild, 1969, p. 63). The problem 
is to decide whether or not James' account of the fringes of con-
ciousness shows them to be indistinguishably merged with 'objects' 
of thought, so that the distinction between objects and fringes 
would exist solely at the theoretical level of discourse, or whether 
consciousness must be analyzed in terms of two qualitatively distinct 
sets of events. In one of his most famous passages, James says that 
the 'free waters' of consciousness, which are equated with the 
fringe, are inextricably mingled with the objects of thought so that 
no real separation between them can be made: 
The traditional psychology talks like one who should say 
a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quart-
potsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even 
were the pails and pots all actually standing in the stream, 
still between them the free water would continue to flow. 
It is just this free water of consciousness that psycho-
logists resolutely overlook., Every definite image in the 
mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows 
around it. With it goes the sense of its relations,near 
and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the 
dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, 
the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra, 
that surround and escorts it,--or rather that is fused 
into one with it and has become bone of its bone and flesh 
of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image of the same 
thing it was before, but making it an image of that thing 
newly taken and freshly understood (James, 1890, 1, p. 255). 
Given James' conviction that the object and its relations are inex-
tricably fused together, and given James' contention that if objects 
are knowable, relations are similarly knowable, Wild is inclined 
to accept that there is no 'gap' or 'real' distinction between the 
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object and the fringe: "The thing cannot be separated from its 
meaning. It is what it means" (Wild, 1969, p. 64). 
Wilshire agrees with Wild, noting that James "equates the 
fringe with the meaning of the sentence, and the meaning with the 
object" (Wilshire, 1968, p. 87). But he also points out that James' 
original description of how thoughts must be studied "with every 
word fringed, and with the whole sentence bathed in that original 
halo of obscure relations, which, like an horizon, then spread about 
its meaning" (James, 1890, 1, pp. 275-276), is misleading. For, 
Wilshire says, "the fringe can neither be, nor not be, spread about 
the sentence's meaning, because the fringe is the meaning (in the 
primal sense of "meaning", that is Object)" (Wilshire, 1968, p. 87). 
Wilshire (see Wilshire, 1968, p. 87) goes on to say that James en-
sures that this criticism cannot be levelled at him when he writes: 
Now I believe that in all cases where the words are 
understood, the total idea may be and usually is present 
not only before and after the phrase has been spoken, 
but also whilst each separate word is uttered. It is the 
overtone, halo, or fringe of the word, as spoken in that  
sentence. It is never absent; no word in an understood 
sentence comes to consciousness as a mere noise. We feel 
its meaning as it passes; and though our object differs 
from one moment to another as to its verbal kernel or nucleus, 
yet it is similar throughout the entire segment of the 
stream. The same object is known everywhere, now from the 
point of view, if we may so call it, of this word, now 
from the point of view of that. And in our feeling of each 
word there chimes an echo or foretaste of every other 
(James, 1890, 1, p. 281). 
But Wilshire raises provocative questions in regard to a pos-
sible distinction between the object and the fringe. Wilshire is 
concerned with the subject-object dualism that arises in comparing 
the object as it exists in the external world with the mental object 
as it is 'felt', and both with the psychologist's object. The three 
are assuredly not identical for they all come 'fringed' in a differ- 
ent set of relations. As Wilshire points out, we must be wary of the 
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sense in which James uses the term 'object' at each stage of his 
analysis: the object of thought studied by the psychologist, the 
object as it exists in the external world, and the object of the 
thought itself 'encircle' one another (see Wilshire, 1968, pp. 86, 
92). We have already seen that James insists that objects, not 
ideas, are associated, and that the same object is gotten over and 
over again while the 'subjective' meaning of thought changes continu-
ally. Furthermore, we have seen that when James discusses thought 
as Object, he insists that the object of the thought is the totality 
of the thought; by definition, the object is the thought (see James, 
1890, 1, p.276, quoted above, p. 136). 
The problem is to determine how James' definition of what a 
thought is can be reconciled with the distinction James makes be-
tween the fringe of the thought and its object, or 'kernel'. If 
the fringe consists of the felt relations of the topic, and if the 
thought is one single felt pulse, then, as Wilshire writes, it is 
possible that because the fringe is the changeable aspect of the 
thought, a new fringe appears each time new implications of the 
thought emerge to replace the old ones (see Wilshire, 1968, p. 97). 
The other alternative, which preserves the internal unity of the 
thought, is to allow the object to move along with the fringe. But 
this would initially seem to contradict James' intention of building 
a realist epistemology where 'real' objects were cognized, and where 
concepts--stable and static i°--provide the permanent possibilities 
for the fluctuating internal and external worlds. 
The first alternative, although it preserves the unity of the 
10. James likens concepts to the Platonic forms (see James, 1890, 
1, p. 462; see also Wilshire, 1968, p. 89). 
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thought as a single pulse has dangerous implications for James' psycho-
logy. James was specifically reacting against the notion of an 
atomistic psychology. If the fringe changes qualitatively so that 
'new' distinguishable fringes are formed to maintain the unity of 
the thought while preserving the integrity of the objective kernel 
of the thought, James would come perilously close to constructing a 
series of isolated and therefore elementaristic units of thought 
(see Wilshire, 1968, pp. 98-99). As Wilshire says, the movement 
of the 'fringe' "is the heart of the creative process and in its all-
important initial stages it is the flickering first flash of insight 
which only vaguely prefigures a topic" (Wilshire, 1968, P. 99). 
The second alternative--that the object moves, is perhaps more 
in keeping with James' intentions: if we examine James' concept 
more closely, some of the difficulties related to the 'continuous' 
aspects of the stream of thought may lend themselves to a satisfact-
ory resolution. James emphasizes the movement of thoughts through 
time: "It takes time to utter the phrase" (James, 1890, 1, p. 279). 
Thus, upon introspection •tfle thought may be broken into 'permanent' 
kernels and 'transitory' fringes but the experience of the thought 
does not include the distinction, nor does the experience of the 
following thoughts which perform the breakdown operations. The 
total object of the thought includes the fringes as well as the 'ob-
jective' or 'substantive' portions of the feeling and (see James, 
1890, 1, p. 281), the kernel of the thought or feeling is experienced 
throughout the , thought even though the words that correspond to 
that kernel (to use a verbal example for simplicity's sake) are not 
continuously 'felt' in consciousness with equal intensity, but give 
way to other portions of the sentence. This means that the kernel 
of the thought moves through time even though we do not feel or 
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register its passing: 
Of course the thought has time-parts. The 2-3 of it, 
though continuous with 1-2, is yet a different part from 
1-2. Now I say of these time-parts that we cannot take 
any one of them so short that it will not after some 
fashion or other be a thought of the whole object 'the 
pack of cards is on the table'. They melt into each 
other like dissolving views, and no two of them feel 
the object just alike, but each feels the total object 
in a unitary undivided way (James, 1890, 1, p. 279). 
The meaning of the thought is the thought, passing through time in 
its totality, so that the words of a sentence cannot be isolated 
as distinctive entities: 
And in our feeling of each word there chimes an echo or 
foretaste of every other. The consciousness of the 'Idea' 
and that of the words are thus consubstantial. They are 
made of the same 'mind-stuff', and form an unbroken stream 
(James, 1890, 1, p. 282). 
The meaning of the thought cannot be reduced into elements 
because each part of the thought is suffused with the meaning of 
the whole thought--the meaning consists precisely in the kernels, 
or objects, and the fringes, as they come together. Each thought 
is an inseparable unity, passing through consciousness over a period 
of time, and each word of the thought is coloured by the rest of 
the thought so that: 
Each word, in such a sentence, is felt, not only as a word, 
but as having a meaning. The 'meaning' of a word taken 
thus dynamically in a sentence may be quite different from 
its meaning when taken statically or without context. The 
dynamic meaning is usually reduced to the bare fringe we 
have described, of felt suitability or unfitness to the 
context and conclusion (James, 1890, 1, p. 265). 
Words, or kernels, or objects, then, cannot be considered to 
exist as replicas of the external world in the stream of thought. 
They are, taken dynamically, part of the moving 'meaning' of the 
passing thought. Thus, whatever relationship the object of the thought 
bears to the external or real object, it is not a simple replication 
of it, as James takes care to demonstrate. As Wilshire writes: 
179. 
James wishes to maintain that no two sensorial images 
are ever twice the same. Although he fails to demonstrate 
this sweeping assertion, still he shows convincingly that 
there are differences we might not have suspected. In 
one sense of "looks" the grass in the shade does look differ-
ent from that in the sun. But it all means the same to 
us observers—uniformly green grass—because the same cognitive 
or signifying function is involved; in other words, the 
imagery has the same fringe; what we mean as to the being 
of the thing remains constant. It is the same green lawn 
all over (Wilshire, 1968, p. 113; see also James, 1890, 1, 
p. 231). 
Of course, different thoughts about the lawn would 'reveal' the con-
trasts in colour--this would merely involve a different cognitive 
function for the thought, so that a different fringe would be co-
joined with the object in consciousness. And it is then logical to 
assume that this fringe could interact with other objective images 
as well--for example, the constancy or lack thereof of the white 
colour of the house that is surrounded by the lawn. This does not 
need to imply that fringes are static or felt in exactly the same 
way each time they are re-experienced any more than objects are. If 
we never get a sensorial image in precisely the same way twice, it 
is logical that we never get the same fringe exactly repeating 
itself. 
Both fringes and objects would appear to be 'permanent' in one 
sense, and 'transitory' in another, and the consubstantial nature 
of object and fringe produces thoughts which are 'transitory' and 
yet 'permanent'. As Wilshire says, "James maintains that there is 
no definite limit to the kinds of imagery which can be fringed in 
the same way" (Wilshire, 1968, p. 113; see also James, 1890, 1, 
pp. 260-261). It would seem safe toconclude that James manages to 
maintain the 'unity' of the thought as an irreducible whole in 
mental experience; at the same time, the internal constitution of 
the thoughts does not appear to damage his conception of the stream 
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of consciousness as sensibly continuous. Both fringes and objects 
are potentially, if not really, permanent constructions. Both are 
combined so that they are experientially irreducible although 'pre-
vious' thoughts may be reduced into components by the thoughts that 
follow, while these thoughts themselves are experienced holistically. 
Both fringes and objects are felt over time; the fact that there is 
no sensible awareness of time passing does not invalidate James' 
construction, for awareness of time passing would add a new fringe 
to the thought; that is, it would be a new thought. Neither the 
fringes nor the objects of thought can be reduced to atomistic units. 
Fringes in the end, simply accompany feelings insofar as they have 
a structure. And the objective content of the thought cannot be 
isolated as a particle in the flow, nor can it be seen as a dupli-
cate of an external object. This is because James sets up a defini-
tion wherein the object and its relations are ultimately irreducible; 
the characteristics of the object depend upon the relations; pri-
mary and secondary qualities are inseparable at the experiential 
and psychological levels. 
This means that James has implicitly ratified the subject-
object mind-matter distinction that he formally based his psycho-
logy on and that he is now in fact faced with the problem of how 
the world can be known at all since thoughts obviously do not 'copy' 
the characteristics of physical objects. If the 'experienced' 
stream of consciousness is not imperiled by an internal subject-
object dualism, the problem of what the stream 'knows' about the 
world necessarily arises. But before turning to James' notion that 
the stream of consciousness is cognitive, it is necessary to look 
at the evolutionary implications of a continuous consciousness. 
Although the parallel may appear somewhat insubstantial, and 
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although it cannot be substantiated by direct appeal to James' 
writings, there does seem to be a parallel between Darwin's descrip-
tion of the interactions of life forms in the natural world and 
James' denotation of the stream of thought as sensibly continuous. 
While James attacked the empiricists for their view of consciousness 
as composed of elementaristic, isolated ideas, and their dismissal 
of relations(see James, 1890, 1, pp. 244-245), Darwin attacked the 
doctrine of special creation (see Darwin, 1859/1977, pp. 445-446), 
and stressed the interaction between the organism and its environ-
ment, and the changing conditions of the organism and the environ-
ment: 
Why, if man can by patience select variations most useful 
to himself, should nature fail in selecting variations useful, 
under changing conditions of life, to her living products? 
What limit can be put to this power, acting during long 
ages and rigidly scrutinising the whole constitution, 
structure and habits of each creature,--favouring the good 
and rejecting the bad? I can see no limit to this power, 
in slowly and beautifully adapting each form to the most 
complex relations of life (Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 443). 
If relations were neglected by the empiricists (see Perry, 1935/1974, 
2, pp. 76-77), Darwin has certainly made them a fundamental part 
of his world. Moreover, changes in species are relative; organisms 
adapt and develop in relation to one another: 
As natural selection acts by competition, it adapts the 
inhabitants of each country only in relation to the 
degree of perfection of their associates; so that we need 
feel no surprise at the inhabitants of any one country, 
although on the ordinary view supposed to have been 
specially created and adapted for that country, being 
beaten and supplanted by the naturalised productions from 
another land (Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 445). 
At the same time, Darwin was intent on preserving the uniformity 
of nature (see Young, 1971, p. 500), so that change was dependent 
upon the interaction of the species and their environment. But he 
intended to preserve that uniformity by describing the lawful pro- 
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cess wherein change took place in a continuous and unbroken 
progression: 
All the individuals of the same species, and all the species 
of the same genus, or even higher group, must have descended 
from common parents; and therefore, in however distant and 
isolated parts of the world they are now found, they must 
in the course of successive generations have passed from 
some one part to the others. ...A broken or interrupted 
range may often be accounted for by the extinction of the 
species in the intermediate range (Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 437). 
It is a long way from Darwin's use of relations and the notion 
that species are 'continuous' to James' conception of consciousness 
as sensibly continuous, with the fringes providing the relational 
character of thought. Nevertheless, some relation may obtain be-
tween the two conceptions; at least it can be inferred that James' 
construction has a Darwinian flavour. Moreover, the accomplishments 
of the two men are similar: the notion that the stream of conscious-
ness is sensibly continuous acts, in James' epistemology, as a re-
placement structure for the laws of association which held conscious- 
ness together in the older paradigm. It fulfils the purpose of ensur-
ing the uniformity of consciousness in a way that is similar to 
Darwin's substitution of a relational and developmental schema to 
ensure the uniformity of nature, when he discarded the doctrine of 
special creation. 
The evolutionary significance of the sensibly continuous nature 
of consciousness is that it allows the same object to be perceived 
and interpreted differently on diverse occasions by the same individ-
ual. The same fringe does not accompany the object each time it 
appears in consciousness so that adaptation becomes a plastic pro-
cess from the point of view of psychology. The sensibly continuous 
structure of consciousness ensures that the object will be 'recog-
nized'--it is the same lawn I saw yesterday--but the meaning of the 
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object is not completely given in the object itself (see James, 
1890, 1, p. 232). Consciousness in this sense is fundamentally 
efficacious because the meaning of the thought is not strictly de-
termined according to the laws of association, and the meaning of 
the thought has direct consequences for activity, as will be shown 
below (see Chaps. 5 and 6). 
Thought is Cognitive  
The 'internal unity' of a thought has been demonstrated to de-
pend on the subject-object distinction being realized in James' 
psychology: it is therefore imperative for James to make it explicit 
that thought is cognitive, that "It always appears to deal with 
objects independent of itself u (James, 1890, 1, p. 225). In the 
description of the cognitive characteristics of thought in the chap-
ter called "The stream of thought" (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 271-283), 
James limits himself to the introspective or psychological evidence 
for the assumption that thought is cognitive. 11  James begins by 
stating that: 
The reason why we all believe that the objects of our 
thoughts have a duplicate existence outside, is that 
there are many human thoughts, each with the same objects, 
as we cannot help supposing. The judgment that my thought 
has the same object as his thought is what makes the 
psychologist call my thought cognitive of an outer 
reality (James, 1890, 1, pp. 271-272). 
The commonality of the objects of thoughts between individuals 
provides, in James' mind, substantial evidence that thought is 
11. Later, in the Principles, James goes on to broader arguments 
of how thoughts know the world, and describes how we know that 
our thoughts are true or false at various levels of reality. That 
thoughts are cognitive of real objects, relations, and events in 
the external world is the fundamental premise of James' psychology 
and philosophy; his pragmatism is based on this hypothesis and 
provides a methodology for ascertaining the truth or falsity of our 
thoughts about the world. 
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cognitive. At the very least, we can say that we know the same 
objects, and while this does not prove that objects exist, corre-
lative to thoughts about them, it serves as the beginning of a 
realist account for James. 
James' second argument is that objects reappear in thought; 
this reappearance "is what makes me take the object out of either 
and project it by a kind of triangulation into an independent posi-
tion" (James, 1890, 1, p. 272). The belief that there are real 
existents external to oneself is quickly developed through experience 
with the world. We come to believe in the objective realities of 
the world surrounding us; we do not doubt that a real world exists 
external to ourselves and at the same time we believe that we 'know' 
or can know that world directly: "This.. .is the psychological point 
of view of all natural science, beyond which this book cannot go" 
(James, 1890, 1, p. 272). Thus the mind 'knows' the world, and it 
also 'knows' that it is cognitive (see James, 1890, 1, p. 273); 
at this point according to James, the psychologist is free to study 
the cognitive experiences of consciousness without making any 
further inferences about the objects that are known, and in fact, 
must make no further inferences (see James, 1890, 1, p. 274). 
• James now discusses the meaning of the object as it is known 
in consciousness, and concludes that the object of the thought is 
the entire thought--nothing more and nothing less: 
Thus if anyone ask what is the mind's object when you say 
'Columbus discovered America in 1492', most people will 
reply 'Columbus', or 'America', or, at most, 'the discovery 
of America'. They will name a substantive kernel or nucleus 
of the consciousness, and say the thought is 'about' that, 
--as indeed it is,--and they will call that your thought's 
'object'. Really that is usually only the grammatical 
object, or more likely the grammatical subject, of your 
sentence. It is at most your 'fractional object'; or 
you may call it the topic' of your thought, or the 'subject 
of your discourse'. But the Object of your thought is 
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really its entire content or deliverance, neither more 
nor less (James, 1890, 1, p. 275). 
These ideas have been discussed above, but the importance of this 
statement as an epistemological position must not be neglected. We 
have already shown that theexperienced thought is not an exact re-
presentation of the physical object that is thought about. James 
was concerned, as are all epistemologists, with the nature of the 
relationship of the thought to the external object. As a psychologist, 
he has to find some way of isolating the most primary, or immediate ' 
experience of reality. If the function of thought is to know the 
world, then one of the functions of the psychologist is to give a 
careful description of exactly how the thought knows the world, and 
what it knows about it. But Perry, analyzing the passage quoted 
immediately above, gives a problematic description of the meaning 
of the thought in this context: 
Over and above its present meaningfulness, consisting in 
the irradiation of the fringe within the circle of its 
horizon, there is also its meant, the non-present exper-
ience which is defined by the fringe's orientation. This 
ulterior and contingent experience consists, for example 
of Columbus' experience of America in 1492, or, perhaps, 
his alibi (Perry, 1958, p. 90). 
Wilshire replies: 
This is an interpolation, it seems to me. James does not 
say that the "meant", in any sense of the word, could be 
Columbus' alibi. And this stands to reason. If we say 
that Columbus discovered America, then we mean that he 
discovered it (whether he actually did is irrelevant), and 
we precisely do not mean that he did not but had an alibi 
instead (Wilshire, 1968, p. 91; see James, 1890, 1, p. 275 
for James' use of this example). 
Whether or not Columbus actually discovered America may be very 
relevant depending on the connections of the thought, 'Columbus 
discovered America in 1492', and Perry (1958, p. 90), is quite right 
in pointing out that there is a distinction in James' writings bet- 
ween those thoughts that admit of direct, perceptual verification, 
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and those, like thoughts of Columbus, that can only be indirectly 
verified.
12 
But Wilshire is right in criticizing Perry for allow-
ing that our thought about Columbus could be, in James' usage, about 
Columbus' alibi. Our thought about Columbus' discovery can lead 
us to wonder whether or not it is true, or whether Columbus did in 
fact have an alibi, or it can come as the final conclusion of our 
researches about Columbus, and serve the function of bringing these 
to a satisfactory end--that is to say, we conclude that Columbus 
did in fact discover American in 1492. But the thought itself cannot 
mean two conflicting things at once. The meaning of the thought is 
the thought itself and nothing more nor less. This is important 
if James is going to be able to develop a realist epistemology. 
James makes the distinction between those perceptions, conceptions, 
beliefs, thoughts, ideas, or feelings that seem in themselves to be 
incontrovertibly true, and those which belong to scientific, meta- 
physical, or religious systems of reality according to their 'powers' 
to incite our belief (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 292-293). I may 
doubt the truth of the hypothesis that Zeus sits enthroned on 
Olympus--that is, I may say that this is true in the context of 
Greek mythology, but at the same time, I can say with assurance that 
if I go to Olympus and search for Zeus, I know beforehand that I am 
unlikely to find him (see James, 1890, 2, p. 292). Similarly, I 
cannot doubt that the paper upon which I type these words is a real 
concrete object, with an independent physical existence. My thoughts 
of the paper in front of me come fringed with a surety that it 
exists, and they do not come with the fringe that it may be an 
12. James takes up this issue in his pragmatism (see James, 
1907/1913, pp. 213-217). 
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hallucination or an optical illusion. Without such expectations 
about the reality of the paper, I should, according to Wilshire,be 
unable to think about the paper in its present form at all (see 
Wilshire, 1968, P. 94); it would have to be relegated to another 
level of reality, and follow the rules for verification within that 
realm. But the psychological process is the same for all levels of 
reality as shall be shown below, so that in all cases, the idea means 
what is 'says' it means, and nothing else. 
If thoughts are to admit of verification, direct or indirect, 
they must come with an implicit meaning of their own. What they 
may be developed into is only partially limited by the thought itself, 
so that I am perfectly at liberty to question whether or not my 
initial perception of the paper as an independent object was in fact 
correct. I may also think about the consequences that could accrue 
if my perception was false. But if my thought of Columbus can 
mean that he did discover America or that he had an alibi, then I 
am working with two conflicting meanings. My thought of seeing the 
paper in front of me--'I see a piece of white paper', does not imply 
that I perhaps see something else. It can, in fact, come to mean 
that I do, on further study of the issue, but the initial perception 
of the paper, or the initial thought about Columbus means exactly 
that, unless the 'fringe' carries a question about the 'truth' of 
the thought. Otherwise, the whole cognitive function of my thinking 
is disrupted, and the thought is only said to be cognitive after the 
fact of verification. And this, up to a point, is true, as we shall 
see when we go on to examine James' pragmatic methodology for deter-
mining the truth or falsity of any feeling or idea. 
The point in the present context is that the meaning of the 
thought contains, as Wilshire says, "a reference to the future" 
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(Wilshire, 1968, P. 94). That is, it comes, or it is a meaning in 
reference to the future and therefore provides (as shall beshown 
below), its own fiat for action. Thoughts explicitly lead us to 
other thoughts or to specific actions, and the expectation of the 
particular consequences of the act is contained in the thought's 
meaning. Wilshire writes: 
If I think, for example that the teakettle is full, this 
involves as a present relation in the fringe the expectation 
that the teakettle will be heavy and not fly up in my face 
when I lift it. The teakettle is thought of as fringed; the 
fringe is not a wraith floating somehow in psychical space. 
One of the definite relations in the teakettle's fringe is 
its relation to my body in a given set of circumstances-- 
a set which need not be presently realized in fact. Now, 
without expecting it to be realized, I cannot, according to 
James, think the thought at all. So'there must be this 
initial satisfaction in the fringe if the thought is to 
be thinkable. The thought is already satisfied to this 
degree. If I go over and pick up the teakettle with the 
expected amount of effort and it does not fly up in my 
face, then the thought is satisfied in still a further 
degree. It is now verified--true (Wilshire, 1968, p. 94). 
I cannot, then, think the thought 'the teakettle is full' and be 
said to mean that perhaps the teakettle is empty. I can wonder 
whether or not the kettle is full, but this •is a different thought, 
and incites different actions in regard to the kettle than if my 
thought is that it is full. 
From James' psychological point of view, the only means of stat-
ing that thoughts are cognitive is to contain the meaning of the 
thought within the thought itself. Thoughts are cognitive because 
they mean something specific about the world. They therefore do not 
have to be replications or 'copies' of objects, because their mean-
ings are expectations about the nature of reality, and they can lead 
to verifications of their meanings which further satisfy the expecta-
tions of the individual who thinks the thought. This is why James 
chooses to discuss the nature of the thought as a complete and 
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meaningful object in itself in the section dealing with the cognitive 
function of thoughts (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 275-283). 
What then, are the evolutionary implications? If thoughts have 
the function of knowing the world and instigating action in relation 
to their meanings, then they must know the world in such a way as 
to facilitate purposive actions. The individual must not only recog-
nize the existence of other objects, events, or relations; he must 
also recognize the meaning they have for him so that thought in the 
cognitive sense is both objective and subjective at the same time. 
In making thoughts cognitive in this way, James makes them purposive. 
This is what Wilshire means (see Wilshire, 1968, p. 94), when he 
says that thoughts contain references to the future. In James' view 
the individual is not cognitive in a purely observant or passive 
sense: he 'knows' the world in ways which are compatible with his 
purposes. 
Thought is Selective  
James says of this final characteristic of the structure of 
consciousness that the thought "is always interested more in one  
part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or  
chooses, all the while it thinks" (James, 1890, 1, p. 284). This, 
perhaps, is the most important characteristic of the stream of 
thought from an evolutionary point of view, for it is the character-
istic which fundamentally describes James' particular voluntarism. 
As Knox puts it: "conscious selection creates the known world in  
precisely the same sense in which 'natural selection' creates the  
species" (Knox, 1914, p. 23). The mind is essentially active; 
passive sensationalism is precluded in the very nature of the 
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perceptual and conceptual processes themselves,for James writes: 
To begin at the bottom, what are our very senses themselves 
but organs of selection? Out of the infinite chaos of 
movements, of which physics teaches us that the outer 
world consists, each sense-organ picks out those which fall 
within certain limits of velocity. To these it responds, but 
ignores the rest as completely as if they did not exist. 
It thus accentuates particular movements in a manner for 
which objectively there seems no valid ground; for, as Lange 
says, there is no reason whatever to think that the gap in 
Nature between the highest sound-waves and the lowest heat-
waves is an abrupt break like that of our sensations; or 
that the difference between violet and ultraviolet rays has 
anything like the objective importance subjectively repre-
sented by that between light and darkness. Out of what is 
in itself an undistinguishable, swarming continuum, devoid 
of distinction or emphasis, our senses make for us, by attend-
ing to this motion and ignoring that, a world full of con- 
trasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt changes, of picturesque 
light and shade (James, 1890, 1, pp. 284-285). 
James allows that the physical structure of the organs of sensation 
determine what we are able to perceive about the world, but adds 
that out of the sensations thus yielded, attention then selects 
those which are "worthy of its notice and suppresses all the rest" 
(James, 1890, 1, p. 285). 
James is at pains to emphasize just how important this selective 
process is in human terms; his contrast between those things which 
are cognized into meaningful objects and relations in comparison to 
those which are neglected, or never noticed is dramatic and to the 
point: 
Helmholz says that we notice only those sensations which 
are signs to us of things. But what are things? Nothing, 
as we shall abundantly see, but special groups of sensible 
qualities which happen practically or aesthetically, to 
interest us, to which we therefore give substantive names, 
and which we exalt to this exclusive status of independence 
and dignity. But in itself, apart from my interest, a 
particular dust-wreath on a windy day is just as much an 
individual thing, and just as much or as little deserves 
an individual name, as my own body does (James, 1890, 1, 
p. 285). 
Within the range of phenomena we are physiologically capable of 
perceiving we select those which are significant to us, and denote 
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them as things, ignoring the rest. And, after these 'gross' 
selections are made, James says that the mind selects again so that: 
It chooses certain of the sensations to represent the 
thing most truly, and considers the rest as its appear-
ances, modified by the condition of the moment. Thus my 
table-top is named square, after but one of an infinite 
number of retinal sensations which it yields, the rest 
of them being sensations of two acute and two obtuse 
angles; but I call the latter perspective views, and the 
four right angles the true form of the table, and erect 
the attribute squareness into the table's essence, 
for aesthetic reasons of my own (James, 1890, 1, p. 285). 
So what are the implications of such a position? James implies 
that a real world of objects and relations exists, external to 
ourselves, but the representation of that world in our conscious- 
ness is less than exact. That is, we do not get reality 'as it 
comes', but as we select it.
13 
The world we 'get' is coloured by 
the very nature of the conscious process itself--this, James feels, 
is borne out by the difficulties in abstracting ourselves to the 
point where we are recipients of 'pure experience'--he claims that 
adults rarely get pure sensations (see James, 1890, 2, p.1). 
James also decrees that the mind itself "is at every stage a 
theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists in 
the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, and 
the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency 
of attention" (James, 1890, 1, p. 288). He gives a hierarchical 
account of consciousness here so that: 
The highest and most elaborated mental products are 
filtered from the data chosen by the faculty next 
beneath, out of the mass offered by the faculty below 
that, which mass in turn was sifted from a still larger 
amount of yet simpler material, and so on. The mind, 
13. That we are coerced into certain beliefs about the physical 
world as a result of the effects of its properties on ourselves 
will be demonstrated in Chap. 4. 
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in short, works on the data it receives very much as 
a sculptor works on his block of stone(James, 1890, 1, 
p. 288). 
The higher reasoning processes select from the data provided by 
the lower 'sensational' processes: in this way, the conceptual map 
is developed and the abstract systems of describing reality are 
created. 
James also claims that "The human race as a whole largely 
agrees as to what it shall notice and name, and what not (James, 
1890, 1, p. 289). In this way, there is agreement on the nature of 
reality which otherwise would not exist. He states that the univeral 
exception to this commonality is the distinction each individual 
makes between himself and the universe, so that each individual has 
a set of unique interests which pertain to himself and to himself 
alone (see James, 1890, 1, p. 289). 
James does not elaborate on the selective aspects of conscious-
ness beyond these fairly broad statements. And this, in the end, 
is fair enough; the rest of the Principles concentrates on the 
problems of how the stream of consciousness knows the world, and how, 
from possibilities presented to it, the mind selects those which 
will be preserved as 'conceptions' of the world, those which will 
be acted on, and those which will be discarded. 
In making consciousness selective, James creates the most ob-
vious link beween psychology and evolutionary theory. If James can 
succeed in demonstrating that consciousness really is selective--
'and that its selections are meaningful--then he will have a viable 
voluntaristic epistemology based on evolutionary postulates. The 
problem will be to determine whether or not the selections conscious-
ness makes are so dependent upon neurophysiological organization, 
the inbuilt structures of mind such as the instincts, and the 
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development of habit formations, that free selections are a psycho-
logical impossibility. The characteristics of the external world, 
as they appear in perception must also be taken into account, for 
the selections the mind makes must be at least in part determined 
by the coercive characteristics of objects. This is necessary for 
an evolutionary epistemology, as the mind must select and attend to 
those objects and relations which have consequences for the survival 
and adaptation of the individual. 
This essentially concludes the discussion of the stream of 
consciousness as an evolutionary structure. We have seen that James 
presents a conception of consciousness that embodies those character- 
istics which we now take as the common assumptions of the evolution- 
ary position. Consciousness changes but remains a continuous flow 
of thoughts and relations so that uniformity is preserved. It is 
selective, and selective across changing realities--internal and 
external--while it is a repository of permanent ideas or conceptions. 
Finally, it functions in terms of evolutionary demands, and it is 
structured so as to facilitate adaptation, adjustment, and knowledge 
in the external world. To this end, it is personal; it strives to 
fulfil the demands of the organism. Consciousness is held together 
by the felt relations in conjunction with the objects of thought, 
and in this sense, parallels Darwin's description of the organism 
• and its relations to the environment. 
•The paramount problem remains in this analysis however, and 
this problem is concerned with the specifics of the mind's cognitive 
relationship to the physical world. We concluded that James was able 
to construct a consistent definition of thoughts as holistic entities, 
so that the subjective and objective aspects of the thought were 
irreducible on an experiential basis at least. This is, of course, 
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a theoretical definition of thought, and James is therefore free 
to construct the thought, and the corresponding sensible continuity 
of the stream of consciousness in this way. But we have shown that 
the unity of thought depends upon the ratification of the mind-matter, 
subject-object distinction which James formally based his psycho- 
logy on because if thoughts are to be taken as irreducible wholes, 
then it is impossible for the individual to make an absolute dis-
tinction between those aspects of the thought which were generated 
by the perception of the object--that is, the coercive value of the 
object in determining the thought--and those aspects which are pro-
ducts of his own subjectivity--that is, his purposes or 'intentions' 
towards the object. We have also shown that the relation of the 
thought to the physical world finally depends upon active verifi-
cation by the individual. All James can really say at this point 
is that thoughts appear to be cognitive because we believe that their 
objects have independent referents, that our actions in regard to 
these 'objects' yield supportive 'felt sensations', and that we 
seem to share a common world. From this psychological perspective, 
James' theory of consciousness is subjective. The problem of what 
the mind can really know about the world--what it does really know 
about the physical objects and their relations--is a problem that 
James is forced to tackle throughout the remainder of his psycho-
logy and philosophy, and his attempt to resolve it, while retaining 
the structural unity of consciousness, will occupy a large part of 
each succeeding chapter of this thesis. 
James was trying to create an efficacious model of conscious-
ness so that consciousness selected the objects that it 'knows' 
and subsequently propelled the individual into consciously determined, 
active relationships with the physical world. This aim could only 
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be met if the thought included the object cognized, and an 'intention' 
towards the object: thoughts about objects are not only thoughts 
affirming the existence of objects. Thoughts could only be consid-
ered efficacious if James provided some means of showing that the 
thought was a selected intention towards the object--that is, that 
the thought interpreted the object according to the needs or wishes 
of the observer. I can 'think' of the piece of paper as an object 
to write on, or to burn, and my thought of the object in each case 
will selectively concentrate on those aspects of the piece of paper 
that make it suitable for either treatment. That it is white is 
important when I wish to write on it--colour is irrelevant when I 
wish to burn it. And it is this selective intentionality towards 
the object that makes my thought efficacious. The problem thus 
comes in trying to decide, within James' theoretical framework, 
what the object really is, in itself, independent of the observer 
and his subjective interpretation of it. This comes to be a serious 
problem in trying to determine how the mind is influenced by the 
physical world, not in practical terms however--developmentally, 
we could conclude that the mind and the world are compatible con-
structions and the individual somehow learns to find his way through 
the physical world and to deal appropriately with its objects as he 
subjectively perceives them. 
James was not an idealist, although his psychology and philo-
sophy come close to idealism at times: he was concerned with develop-
ing a realist epistemology which included an independent world of 
physical objects and relations. Thus, he was faced with the problem 
as to how much the thought of any object owed to the properties 
of the object itself. As will be shown in detail in Chap. 4, James 
believed that thought was more freely selective in some areas of 
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the intellectual operations than in others. If the mind selected 
the world that it 'knows', James realized that selection was con-
strained in several ways. The nature of the physical objects 
themselves had a major role to play in the generation of thoughts 
about them. The problem of how the mind knows the world cannot be 
resolved in the present context. James' theories of reality and 
volition must first be discussed, and this task is undertaken in the 
following three chapters. The purpose of this analysis has been to 
describe the structures James devised for consciousness, to assess 
the internal consistency of his construction, and to isolate the 
problems or implications that the theory of the stream of conscious-
ness has for his functional psychology. 
The Roles of Percepts and Concepts in the Structure of•
Consciousness  
Thus far, we have not made any categorical distinctions between 
the types of thoughts or feelings that make up the stream of con-
sciousness. Sensations, perceptions, conceptions, volitional feel-
ings, and beliefs have all been treated together in an effort to 
analyze their common structure. But the notion that feelings are 
structurally equivalent--that they are irreducible unities in con-
sciousness--does not imply that they cannot be differentiated accord-
ing to their functions, and even more basically than that,according 
to the types of reality they represent in consciousness. James 
makes one broad categorical distinction between feelings in terms 
of their cognitive capacities. Broadly speaking, in James' defini-
tion, all feelings are 'cognitive' in the sense that they deal with 
independent objects. Essentially, however, the worlds of reality 
are known or given to the individual through percepts and concepts. 
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Percepts and concepts serve different functions in the adjustment 
of the individual but the distinction between them goes deeper than 
the functional level; to have a percept, the observer must be in 
the presence of the physical object which is experienced as the 
'objective' component or kernel of the thought. Similarly, concepts 
take their objects from the realm of necessary truths and relations, 
or from the abstracted properties of physical objects, so that they 
stand as universals in relation to the particulars of the physical 
world. Percepts and concepts are both experienced as feelings in 
the stream of consciousness and their isolation for purposes of 
analysis should not be taken as indicating that they do not follow 
the broad structural definition of thoughts or feelings outlined 
above. Rather, they are distinguished throughout James' works as 
the two major types of feelings which are cognitive of the worlds of 
reality. Before discussing the structures of the worlds that are cog-
nized by consciousness, it is necessary to define more specifically what 
percepts and concepts are as structures in consciousness. Further-
more, the specific discussion of percepts and concepts is necessary 
to show something of the relationship between thoughts in the stream 
of consciousness. 
The relationship between percepts and concepts, and the diffi-
culty of establishing criteria for distinguishing between what would 
constitute a percept as opposed to a concept is more complex than 
the simple distinction given above implies. Moreover, establishing 
criteria as to what the perceptual verification of a feeling or thought 
in consciousness was to mean, was a problem that James struggled with 
throughout his career. This section will thus deviate from the 
earlier parts of this chapter because it is necessary to go beyond 
the Principles and into James' pragmatic writings and his final 
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philosophy to show the development of James' thought regarding the 
relationship between perception and conception. This section does 
not, therefore, follow the chronological development of James' 
thought, but instead discusses his development in terms of the 
specific problems he had with perception and conception. Finally, 
it will be necessary to return to perception and conception in 
Chap. 9 to assess James' last attempts to resolve his problems from 
the perspective of his developed epistemology and metaphysic. 
In setting up the characteristics of the stream of consciousness, 
James claimed that feelings were cognitive--that they dealt, by 
definition, with objects independent of themselves (see James, 1890, 
1, p. 225). But this definition had to be refined when James came 
to consider the objects of thought and their correlates in the 
various and varying worlds of reality. Thoughts of physical objects 
had different functional implications for the individual than 
thoughts of metaphysical objects for example. The conditions of the 
arousal of thoughts in consciousness also varied as a function of 
the typology of their objects. Thus, the definition that thought 
is cognitive came to mean that the thought had an object, or more 
specifically, was an object, and that the determination of the status 
of that object might be given in the thought itself or it might be 
necessary for the individual to take further steps to determine 
what category the object belonged to. 'Cognitive' in the broad 
sense of the Principles refers to the conception of thought as broad-
ly intentional in that the thought means something specific to the 
individual--for example, that 'Columbus discovered America'. Thus, 
when James came to write The meaning of truth, he used the term 
cognitive in a more restricted sense: 
But let us keep closer to the path of common usage, 
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and reserve the name knowledge for the cognition of 
'realities', meaning by realities things that exist 
independently of the feeling through which their cognition 
occurs. If the content of the feeling occur nowhere in 
the universe outside the feeling itself, and perish with 
the feeling, common usage refuses to call it a reality, 
and brands it as subjective feature of the feeling's 
constitution,or at most as the feeling's dream (James, 
1909, pp. 5-6). 
In The meaning of truth James makes a clear distinction between 
those feelings which are cognitive and those which are not: "The 
feeling of q knows whatever reality it resembles, and either directly  
or indirectly operates on. If it resembles without operating, it 
is a dream; if it operate without resembling, it is an error" (James, 
1909, p. 28). At the same time, "All feeling is for the sake of 
action, all feeling results in action" (James, 1909, p. 22). James 
reconciles these two statements by stating that only percepts, and 
not concepts, need mirror and operate upon external reality (see 
James, 1909, p. 30). However, the relationship between perception 
and conception is such that conception must eventually be brought 
back to the level of perception for verification, so that the demand 
for verification applies indirectly to conception as well (see James, 
1909, pp. 32-33). It is necessary for James to assert that con-
cepts must ultimately lead back to percepts because he believes 
that knowledge is a product of the interaction between consciousness 
and the world. To this end, he says, "Knowledge of sensible reali-
ties thus comes to life inside the tissue of experience. It is made; 
and made by the relations that unroll themselves in time" (James, 
1909, p. 106). Percepts and concepts are therefore distinguished 
as follows: 
A percept knows whatever reality it directly or indirectly  
operates on and resembles; a conceptual feeling, or thought  
knows a reality, whenever it actually or potentially  
terminates in a percept that operates on, or resembles  
that reality, or -is otherwise connected with it or with its  
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context. The latter percept may be either sensation or 
sensorial idea; and when I say the thought must terminate  
in such a percept, I mean that it must ultimately be 
capable of leading thereto,--by the way of practical 
experience, if the terminal feeling be a suggestion; by 
the way of logical or habitual suggestion, if it be only 
an image in the mind (James, 1909, pp. 32-33). 
Perception is defined as the "consciousness of particular 
material things" (James, 1890, 2, p. 77); as such, perceptions are 
'representative', exist over time, and are selected from the visual 
array. They have these particular qualities because they represent 
the world of experience as it is 'got' by the senses: 
No matter how small a tract of it be taken, it is always 
a much-at-once, and contains innumerable aspects and 
characters which conception can pick out, isolate, and 
thereafter always intend. It shows duration, intensity, 
complexity or simplicity, interestingness, excitingness, 
pleasantness or their opposites. Data from all our senses 
enter into it, merged in a general extensiveness of which 
each occupies a big or little share. Yet all these parts 
leave its unity unbroken. Its boundaries are no more 
distinct than are those of the field of vision. Boundaries 
are things that intervene; but here nothing intervenes 
save parts of the perceptual flux itself, and these are 
overflowed by what they separate, so that whatever we 
distinguish and isolate conceptually is found perceptually 
to telescope and compenetrate and diffuse into its 
neighbours. The cuts we make are purely ideal (James, 1911, 
pp. 49-50). 
Because the world of pure experience at first appears as a monistic 
totality, "Every perception is an acquired perception" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 78). We learn to regard certain objects, and particular 
qualities of the chosen objects as important, relevant, or interest-
ing and therefore as the 'essentials' or 'essence' of the object; 
thus, "in our perception of shape and position it is really diffi-
cult to decide how much of our sense of the object is due to repro-
ductions of past experience, and how much to the immediate sensations 
of the eye" (James, 1890, 2, p. 79). While the world that per- 
cepts reflect is fleeting and unstable, percepts themselves are in 
part 'fixed'. We find the object we have learned to expect to find. 
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Perception keeps us 'in touch' with the real world, and if we look 
for its 'fixed propensities' as we have come to recognize them, we 
are also able to perceive changes or differences as the objects of 
perception change. 
Concepts, on the other hand, are rigid, static, immutable, and 
they include awareness of objects when the physical objects are not 
present to the senses. Perceptions are fleeting because they are 
only experienced in the presence of the physical object itself, 
which changes phenomenally on each presentation, so that the same 
perception is never experienced exactly the same way twice. Concepts 
are 'fixed' mental structures--"we say what each part of the sens-
ible continuum is and all these whats are concepts" (James, 1911, 
p. 50). 
But cognition cannot be divided quite so neatly as these defini-
tions may imply. Experientially concepts and percepts become so 
intermingled that it . is difficult at times to distinguish between 
them: 
'Things' are known to us by our senses, and are called 
'presentations' by some authors, to distinguish them from 
the ideas or 'representations' which we may have when 
our senses are closed. I myself have grown accustomed to 
the words 'percept' and 'concept' in treating of the con-
trast, but concepts flow out of percepts and into them 
again, they are so interlaced, and our life rests on them 
so interchangeably and undiscriminatingly, that it is often 
difficult to impart quickly to beginners a clear notion 
of the difference meant (James, 1911, p. 47). 
Conception and perception are mutually dependent cognitive faculties. 
Initially, cognition is dominated by perception; as the individual 
develops: 
The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his 
substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order 
in which his experience originally comes. ...Trains of 
concepts unmixed with percepts grow frequent in the adult 
mind; and parts of these conceptual trains arrest our 
attention just as parts of the perceptual flow did, giving 
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rise to concepts of a higher order of abstractness 
(James, 1911, p. 51). 
Without concepts, we would merely be able to 'experience' the world; 
we would not be able to 'change' the world, nor differentially di-
vert our activities towards cognitively defined ends. Conception 
forms a congruent correlated mental reality which implicitly, if 
not always explicitly, is contrasted with the physical reality. 
Conception aids our 'understanding' of reality: "The whole system of 
relations, spatial, temporal, and logical, of our facts, gets plot-
ted out" (James, 1911, p. 65). Moreover, new relations between con-
cepts may be discovered. But: 
Nothing happens in the worlds of logic, mathematics or 
moral and aesthetic preference. The static nature of 
the relations in these worlds is what gives to the pro-
'positions that express them their 'eternal' character: 
the binomial theorem, e.g., expresses the value of any 
power of any sum of two terms, to the end of time (James, 
1911, p. 68). 
James sums up the function of concepts as follows: 
Concepts thus play three distinct parts in human life. 
1. They steer us practicaTly every day, and provide an 
immense map of relations among the elements of things, 
which, though not now, yet on some possible future occasion, 
may help to steer us practically; 
2. They bring new values into perceptual life, they 
reanimate our wills, and make our action turn upon new 
points of emphasis; 
3. The map which the mind frames out of them is an object 
which possesses, when once it has been framed, an independent 
existence. It suffices all by itself for purposes of study. 
The 'eternal' truths it contains would have to be acknowledged 
even were the world of sense annihilated. 
We thus see clearly what is gained and what is lost when 
percepts are translated into concepts. Perception is solely 
of the here and now; conception is of the like and unlike, 
of the future, of the past, and of the far away. But this 
map of what surrounds the present, like all maps, is only a 
surface; its features are but abstract signs and symbols of 
things that in themselves are concrete bits of sensible 
experience. We have but to weigh extent against content, 
thickness against spread, and we see that for some purposes 
the one, for other purposes the other, has the higher.  
value. Who can decide offhand which is absolutely better to 
live or to understand life? We must do both alternately, 
and a man can no more limit himself to either than a pair 
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of scissors can cut with a single one of its blades 
(James, 1911, pp. 73-74). 
If our potential for knowledge is to be developed as highly as 
possible, concepts and percepts must play interacting roles. The 
static 'universal' abstract concepts allow the formulation of scienti-
fic, metaphysical, and ethical theories. But concepts always mean  
the same thing; therefore they are also "forever inadequate to the 
fullness of the reality to be known" (James, 1911, p. 78). Thus, 
the 'static' nature of concepts has both positive and negative value, 
depending upon the type of knowledge desired. The perceptual world 
is, on the other hand, rich, mutable, and real, but without concep-
tion, unstable and discontinuous, so that its rich relations are 
unavailable for 'appreciation'--they can only be experienced, or 
recognized as recurring events. Therefore: 
The two mental functions thus play into each other's 
hands. Perception prompts our thought, and thought in 
turn enriches our perception. The more we see, the more 
we think; while the more we think, the more we see in our 
immediate experiences, and the greater grows the detail 
and the more significant the articulateness of our 
perception (James, 1911, pp. 108-109). 
Both concepts and percepts are feelings and both have different, 
and yet interpenetrating and dependent functions in assisting our 
relationship with reality. Both provide material and structure 
for the cognitive reorganization and understanding of reality, and 
both contribute to the construction of moral and metaphysical systems. 
But if James concludes that "Percepts and concepts interpenetrate 
and melt together, impregnate and fertilize each other. Neither, 
taken alone, knows reality in its completeness. We need them both, 
as we need both our legs to walk with" (James, 1911, pp. 52-53). 
his epistemology, as it is expressed in pragmatism, places a higher 
value on knowledge gained through perception than in the cognitive 
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juggling of concepts. In defence of percepts, he says: 
They end discussion; they destroy the false conceit of 
knowledge; and without them we are all at sea with each 
other's meaning. If two men act alike on a percept, they 
believe themselves to feel alike about it; if not, they 
may suspect they know it in differing ways. We can 
never be sure we understand each other till we are able 
to bring the matter to this test. This is why metaphysical 
discussions are so much like fighting with the air; they 
have no practical issue of a sensational kind. 'Scientific' 
theories, on the other hand, always terminate in definite 
percepts. You can deduce a possible sensation from your 
theory and, taking me into your laboratory, prove that 
your theory is true of my world by giving me the sensation 
then and there (James, 1909, pp. 39-40). 
The function of cognition lies in the construction of concrete, 
public knowledge about the external world as it exists, and James' 
'glorification' of perceptual verification is perfectly consistent 
with his evolutionary interests. 
The Relationship Between Percepts and Concepts  
James' theory of knowledge is based on the assumption that con-
ception must ultimately be validated in perception. This means that 
the relationship between percepts and concepts is dependent on verifi-
cation so that the application of concepts to describe the physical 
world cannot be done on an a priori basis. James gives precedence 
to perceptual knowledge, for concepts must lead, at least potentially, 
to percepts. Ayer, discussing The meaning of truth, writes: 
James addresses these essays to the analysis of knowledge, 
but it will be seen that so far as his arguments go, he 
might equally well have been speaking of belief. In all 
of them, his principal aim is to eliminate what he calls the 
'epistemological gulf' which might be thought to exist 
between states of cognition and their objects by showing 
that the processes in which knowledge consists entirely 
'fall inside the continuities of concrete experience' (Ayer, 
1968, p. 292; internal quotations from James, 1909, p. 
Just as James tells us that all feeling exists for the sake of action, 
all conception would appear to exist for the sake of perception 
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(see James, 1909, p. 103). 
In deriving all potential for knowledge from feeling, James be-
lieved a feeling to be cognitive if, and only if, it resembled 
something in the external world. If there is no resemblance, it is . 
either an error or a dream (see James, 1909, p. 28). In this way 
we come to know what exists and what does not. But the question 
becomes more complex when we take this idea of resemblance in the 
wider context of James' theory of knowledge. It is in this wider 
context that Ayer's comment that James might 'well have been speak-
ing of belief' is particularly apt. In "The tigers in India" (James, 
1895/1909, p. 43), James tells us that we know immediately and 
intuitively, or conceptually and representatively. We know immed-
iately or intuitively when we experience a particular percept of 
an object: in this case the mental content and the object are indis-
tinguishable. I see, and cognitively identify the piece of paper 
upon which I am writing as a piece of white paper with particular 
characteristics so that "The thought-stuff and the thing-stuff are 
here indistinguishably the same in nature" (James, 1909, p. 47). 
But the case of conceptual, or representative knowledge is somewhat 
more complex. James claims that in these cases we 'know' an object 
by our mental pointing towards that object. He demonstrates this 
idea with the famous example of our knowledge of 'the tigers of 
India': 
The pointing of our thought to the tigers is known simply 
and solely as a procession of mental associates and motor 
consequences that follow on the thought, and that would 
lead harmoniously, if followed out, into some ideal or real 
context, or even into the immediate presence, of the tigers. 
It is known as our rejection of a jaguar, if that beast 
were shown to us as a tiger; as our genuine assent to a 
genuine tiger if so shown. It is our ability to utter all 
sorts of propositions which don't contradict other proposi-
tions that are true of real tigers. It is even known, if 
we take the tigers very seriously, as actions of ours which 
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may terminate in directly intuited tigers, as they would 
if we took a voyage to India for the purpose of tiger-
hunting and brought back a lot of skins of the striped 
rascals which we had laid low (James, 1895/1909, p. 43). 
The two types of knowledge are thereby equated, for in the first 
case we are actually in contact with the object of our conception 
and in the second, we are potentially able to reach it. In both 
cases, the thought has already ended, or is potentially capable of 
ending, in perception. Therefore, James says, we 'know' the object 
in both cases, because there is a direct correspondence between 
knowledge and object (see James, 1909, pp. 44-45). Our conceptions 
of objects appear to be determined by external factors: 
I hope you may agree with me now that in representative 
knowledge there is no special inner mystery, but only an 
outer chain of physical or mental intermediaries connecting 
thought and thing. To know an object is here to lead to it  
through a context which the world supplies (James, 1895/1909, 
p. 46). 
The world therefore supplies the context for our conceptual knowledge 
about the tigers--what we might think about tigers is at least in 
part restricted to what we might perceive if we actually encountered 
a tiger. James is implying that those conceptions that count as 
knowledge so count by virtue of resembling the world. Knowledge, 
according to James, consists of the experienceable relations, supplied 
by the world, between the knower and the known. And here, of course, 
he runs into difficulties: all thought processes that lead to verifi-
able conclusions do not necessarily 'resemble' the world. The 
degree of necessary resemblance between concepts and percepts is 
a point that causes James tremendous difficulties and he vacillates 
accordingly. As Ayer shows, James attempts once again to 
rectify his position regarding the required degree of resemblance 
between percepts and concepts in an essay called "The relation 
between knower and known" (James, 1904/1909, pp. 102-120): 
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In the essay on 'The Function of Cognition' which was 
written twenty years earlier, James had attempted to deal 
with examples of this kind by taking the cognitive thought 
to be what he called the feeling of a quality and then 
laying it down that 'the feeling of knows whatever reality 
it resembles, and either directly or indirectly operates on'. 
He took the factor of resemblance to be primary and brought 
in the causal factor mainly as a means of determining 
which of the several realities that the feeling of a might 
resemble was the one that it knew. He now sees, however, 
that for a thought to be cognitive of an absent object, it 
is neither necessary nor sufficient that there should be 
any qualitative resemblance between them. It is not neces-
sary because the object may be thought of only by name or 
description, without the accompaniment of any image; and 
even if there is an image, it does not have to be clear or 
accurate in order to fulfil its cognitive function. It is 
not sufficient because, as we have repeatedly seen, the mere 
fact that two things are similar or even identical in quality 
in no way entails that they stand in any relation of reference. 
So even if one does take the cognitive thought to be an 
image 'certain extrinsic phenomena, special experiences 
of conjunction, are what impart to the image, be it what 
it may, its knowing office'. 
In the example chosen, James remarks that if he could not 
describe the Hall that he was thinking of, or direct someone 
to it, or recognize it when he came upon it, then even though 
his thought consisted in an image which in some degree re- 
sembled it, the resemblance would be no more than a coinci-
dence. ...In short, what makes the thought cognitive of the 
object is that one leads to the other by an experiential 
path which feels 'right' at every stage. As James puts it, 
'there is experience from point to point of one direction 
followed, and finally of one process fulfilled (Ayer, 1968, 
pp. 293-294; internal quotation from James, 1909, p. 105). 
In "The relation between knower and known", James returns to 
the position he took earlier in the Principles. To •be cognitive, 
the thought simply has to 'mean' the particular object but it does 
not have to resemble it in a definable sense. James took issue with 
J.S. Mill's theory of a representative form of conception in the 
Principles (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 470-471; see also J.S. Mill, 
1872, p. 393), stating that instead, only sensations may resemble 
their objects (see James, 1890, 1, p. 147)--a highly debatable point 
in itself. He insists that the fringe gives the concept its speci- 
fic meaning each time the concept appears in the stream of conscious-, 
ness (see James, 1890, 1, p. 472). At the same time James defines 
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the meaning of the concept in terms of its ability to: 
lead to a remoter state of mind which either acts upon the 
reality or resembles it. ...The stuff of which.. .thoughts 
are composed is symbolic, and .a thought attests its pertin-
ency to a topic by simply terminating, sooner or later, in 
a sensation which resembles the latter (James, 1890, 1, 
p. 471). 
This perhaps makes James' position more lucid, even if we are 
not entirely clear on how to categorize conceptualization. James 
comes very close to stating that conceptualization can be imageless; 
he does state that often, concepts are merely denotative--that is, 
their 'objects' are pointed out or referred to rather than expressed 
(see James, 1890, 1, p. 463). We can conceive of objects which as 
yet have no representational status (for example, a perpetual motion 
machine (see James, 1890, 1, p. 463), but James makes it clear that: 
Most of the objects of our thought, however, are to some 
degree represented, as well as merely pointed out. Either 
they are things and events perceived or imagined, or they 
are qualities apprehended in a positive way. Even when 
we have no intuitive acquaintance with the nature of a 
thing, if we know any of the relations of it at all, anything 
about it, that is enough to individualize and distinguish 
it fromall the other things which we might mean (James, 
1890, 1, p. 463). 
Psychologically speaking, the object is specified in the particular 
conceptual thought itself; the concept is 'illuminated' by the fringe 
so that the thought 'means' this and not that, about the tigers in 
India, or about Memorial Hall. 
But there are still difficulties: the means through which the 
concept 'leads' to a percept must still be described in terms of 
internal mental processes, and 'external' experience. In the Prin-
ciples, James essentially says that a concept is true--in the sense 
that the topic of the thought is pertinent--if a sensation resembl-
ing the thought is achieved (see James, 1890, 1, p. 471). In "The 
tigers in India", James' definition of conception becomes 
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more overtly 'representational' as the concept is described as 
'resembling the object' (see James, 1895/1909, pp. 45-48). By now 
he had gone back to the view of the Principles, insisting that a 
concept need not be an image per se, but need resemble the object 
only to that degree which is necessary to bring us to a perception 
of the object. There is a double-sided difficulty with this posi-
tion: in the first place, it is difficult to make any clear psycho-
logical statement about the way in which the concept can be said to 
resemble the object at all. The subject-object problem is a major 
source of difficulty throughout James' psychology, for it was expli-
citly shown above that thoughts in the stream of consciousness bear 
little resemblance to physical objects, and James is ratifying this 
conclusion in his psychology and in his 1904 paper. Verification, 
in this case is essential to bring the thought itself to a satis-
factory conclusion. Verification confirms the 'meaning' of the 
thought which instigated the verification process through the intent-
ional nature of the meaning. That is, subject-object relations are 
satisfied only when verification is made a part of the psychological 
process. The second aspect of the problem is that James seems still 
to be restricted to the notion that a given conception must eventu-
ally lead to a perception if it is to be verified and hence judged 
to be cognitively true of reality. To quote Ayer again at some 
length: 
It is, I think, a fault of both examples that James does 
not sufficiently distinguish between a set of e4eriences 
which would constitute what Peirce called the 'development' 
of the thought of an object and a set of experiences which 
would lead to the actual perception of the object. It is, 
indeed, possible that the two should coincide; talking 
•of the Memorial Hall might immediately lead one to take one's 
friend to see it; thinking of the tigers might set up an 
immediate disposition to book a passage to India. But even 
in these cases what fixes the reference is not just that 
the train of experiences leads to the perception of the 
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object, but rather that the perception is, or would be, 
taken as the fulfilment of the thought. This applies also 
to the experiences which come between the thought and the 
perception. In the example of the Memorial Hall, James 
makes much of the fact that these intervening experiences 
themselves correspond to previous images, but this is clear-
ly not necessary except in so far as the correspondence sat-
isfies the criteria which one must have for locating the 
object; if one did go to hunt for tigers, one might have 
very little idea of what one would encounter on the way. 
The intervening experiences only come into the picture to 
the extent that they also develop the thought, and this 
they may do without having any tendency to lead to the 
perception of the object. 
To see that this must be so, one has only to consider 
that in a great many cases, there is no possibility of our 
ever getting to perceive the objects to which our thoughts 
refer. Sometimes the impossibility is only practical, as 
when we think of things or events which are located in the 
distant future or very far away in space, but very often it 
is logical. Even if we leave abstract objects and fictitious 
objects out of account, and confine our attention to what 
is perceptible, not everything that is in its own nature 
perceptible is capable, even in theory, of being perceived 
by everyone who may chance to think of it. There is a sense 
in which we cannot perceive the thoughts and feelings of 
others, and what is more important in the present context, 
we cannot now perceive events which are located in the past. 
This does not mean, however, that we cannot think about them 
(Ayer, 1968, pp. 295-296). 
Ayer is making two important points here. The distinction must be 
made between the 'intervening experiences' which lead to the fUlfil-
ment of the concept, and the verification of the concept in perception 
per se. In a case where the concept of the object includes the means 
of relocating it, then the intervening experiences serve as partial 
verifications of the concept, and the process whereby the concept is 
'translated' into a percept is describable. But when one seeks a new 
object, the intervening experiences are not part of the original con-
ception and can only aid in the development of the thought in a purely 
secondary way. 
Furthermore, while James has concentrated upon the necessity for 
concepts to be 'translatable' into percepts, he recognizes that con-
cepts are often substituted for percepts in our mental experiences 
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of the world: 
Most thought-paths, it is true, are substitutes for nothing 
actual; they end outside the real world altogether, in wayward 
fancies, utopias, fictions, or mistakes. But where they do 
re-enter reality and terminate therein, we substitute them 
always; and with these substitutes we pass the greater number 
of our hours (James, 1904/1909, p. 113). 
In this case, the 'intervening experiences' could serve to bring the 
thought to a satisfactory conclusion within the conceptual system 
itself. But Ayer is asking whether or not perception is the necessary 
fulfilment of thought, and he provides examples to show that some types 
of thinking are logically incapable of leading to perception. And 
by the time James came to write Some problems of philosophy, he had 
come to believe that the independence of the conceptual system had 
to be ensured and he no longer placed the same emphasis on the need 
to verify concepts in percepts: 
• The map which the mind frames out of them [the concepts] 
is an object which possesses, when once it has been framed, 
an independent existence. It suffices all by itself for 
purposes of study. The 'eternal' truths it contains would 
have to be acknowledged even were the world of sense anni-
hilated (James, 1911, p. 74). 
Conceptual systems exist in their own right. Conception is a 
potentially two-directional process; it may have as its end the veri-
fication of an idea in the external world, and it may equally welt 
follow the goal of extending itself--thoughts may quite validly lead 
to 'resting places' or 'verifications' within the conceptual schema 
itself, independent of any possibility of perceptual verification. 
Some problems of philosophy is James' final statement on the status 
of percepts and concepts. And what is most interesting about this 
final statement is the correspondence between it and James' ideas on 
the necessary truths as he developed them in the Principles. As James 
so adamantly states: 
None of these eternal verities has anything to say about 
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facts, about what is or is not the world. ...All that these 
sciences make us sure of is, that if these things are any-
where to be found, the eternal verities will obtain of them 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 663). 14 
Further, the direct application of the eternal verities or necessary 
truths to the external world is impossible. In speaking of the appli-
cation of arithmetic to nature, James says: 
The same real things are countable in numberless ways, 
and pass from one numerical form, not only to its equivalent 
...but to its other, as the sport of physical accidents or 
of our mode of attending may decide. How could our notion 
that one and one are eternally and necessarily two ever 
maintain itself in a world where every time we add one drop 
of water to another we get not two but one again?--in a 
world where every time we add a drop to a crumb of quicklime 
we get a dozen or more?--had it no better warrant than such 
experience? At most we could then say that one and one are 
Usually two (James, 1890, 2, p. 655). 
Given that a fair amount of our conceptual material cannot be 
applied directly to nature, James' stress (in the pragmatic writings) 
on the need to verify conception in perception is at first puzzling. 
James is struggling with several related problems throughout his psycho-
logy and philosophy. If consciousness is to be efficacious, then 
thoughts must be intrinsically meaningful; that is, they must facili-
tate particular actions, or point to other, related conceptions. The 
fact that, according to James, a concept has discoverable relations 
with the external world, and equally discoverable relations with other 
thoughts, gives conception the necessary functional plasticity to 
support his view that consciousness is efficacious. But this very 
plasticity of conception creates difficulties in accounting for our 
cognitive capacities. The subject-object distinction now becomes a 
14. There are problems with the resolution that James comes to, 
regarding the relationship between percepts and concepts in Some 
problems in philosophy. Briefly, his solution incorporates elements 
of the rationalism he was trying to overcome. This problems is 
discussed in •Chap. 9. 
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serious problem: if concepts are not always representational and if 
some conceptual systems contradict the experienceable relations in 
the natural world, how can we ever be truly cognitive of anything? 
The answer is of course that we can only be sure that our conceptions 
are true when they are translated into perceptions. This translation 
eliminates: 
'the epistemological gulf' so that the whole truth-relation 
falls inside of the continuities of concrete experience, 
and is constituted of particular processes, varying with 
every object and subject, and susceptible of being described 
in detail (James, 1909, p. 41). 
To 'ensure that the epistemological gulf, between subject and 
object, in fact, between percepts and concepts, really can be elimin-
ated, James sought, through the methodology of pragmatism, to show 
that true concepts are always potentially capable of terminating in 
percepts. As Ayer writes: 
He admits that we can have a 'notion of imperceptibles like 
atoms or ether', but maintains that such notions are empty 
unless they can be 'cashed' in terms of sense-perception. 
'Scientific theories,' he says, 'always terminate as definite 
percepts.' These percepts, or to speak more strictly, the 
sensations out of which they are elaborated, are 'the only 
realities that we ever directly know' and since the realities 
that we know indirectly must be reducible .to them, they are, 
in a sense, the only concrete realities that we can know at all 
(Ayer, 1968, p. 229). 
Verification becomes an integral part of the defined relationship of 
percepts and concepts. And this in turn means that the success of 
James' psychology may very well depend on the success of his pragmatic 
methodology. 
James also tries to eliminate the epistemological gulf between , 
subject and object in his radical empiricism. He tries to show "that 
thoughts and things are absolutely homogeneous as to their material 
and that their opposition is only one of relation and function" (James, 
1905/1967c, p. 137) and "thoughts in the concrete are made of the same 
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staff as things are" (Brennan, 1961, P. 23). When James gave thoughts 
and things the same ontological status, he extended this 'legislated 
equality' to his theory of knowledge. If all thoughts or concepts could 
be shown to have their real ends in perception and thought processes 
could be shown to intrinsically lead theindividual towards verification 
in the perceptual world, then James would have evidence for an identity 
theory between mental and physical objects. 
Basically, this would mean that the percept serves two major 
functions; it provides concrete knowledge about the external world and 
it also provides the building blocks of the conceptual system. The on-
ject in the mind and the object in the world exist in different sets of 
relations, and it is therefore the context of existence, rather than the 
strict mental/physical distinction which allows objects to be categor-
ized. Pragmatism and radical empiricism can therefore be studied as 
support systems for the new theory of consciousness outlined in the Prin-
ciples. The relationship between percepts and concepts is complex, and 
James' discussion of that relationship is not always consistent. The 
criteria of evidence for the 'realness' of an object differ according to 
the nature of the object so that James' hierarchical structure of real-
ity--described psychologically in terms of belief--determine the veri-
fication procedures. The psychological dynamics of belief must there-
fore be examined, so that concepts can be distinguished in terms of the 
realities they describe. This will provide a means of assessing the cri-
teria of evidence: if the atoms in the void are imperceptibles, what 
'sensations' or 'perceptions' can science provide to make us 'realize' 
their existence? And what in fact is the relation between the mathemat-
ical world where two plus two will always equal four, and the 'natural'
•world where two plus two is only sometimes equal to four? 
CHAPTER 4  
THE STRUCTURES OF REALITY:  
AN ANALYSIS OF BELIEF  
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Historical Antecedents  
James made cognition a necessary condition for thought--thought 
"always appears to deal with objects independent of itself" (James, 
1890, 1, p. 225)--so that by definition, thoughts are objective. But 
thoughts are also subjective because the thought is coloured or fring-
ed by the mental state of the thinker. In fact, the Selective predis-
positions of the thinker have a determinative influence over which 
'objects' or 'objective qualities' will be thought and which will be 
ignored. James insisted, moreover, that thoughts were indivisible 
unities in the experience of the thinker so that the object of the 
thought was not a copy of the object as it existed in the physical 
world, but the totality of the thought itself. The separation of 
thoughts into 'objective' and 'subjective' qualities is thus an arti-
ficial separation, undertaken by the psychologist or introspective 
thinker in an attempt to discover what is meant by cognition. James' 
definition of thought is based on a ratification of the subject-object 
distinction and the critical issue that arises from James' account 
of the structures of consciousness is the problem of what it is that 
thoughts actually know about the several worlds of reality. If 
thoughts are subjective-objective units, the nature of thought will in 
part depend upon the nature of the independent objects or external ref-
errents of thought and in part on the nature of the thinker. This 
chapter will therefore explore the correspondence between thought 
objects and objects themselves. 
If James was determined to construct a unified conception of 
consciousness, he was also determined to construct a realist epis-
temology. He therefore makes the distinction between imagination, 
and belief in the independent reality of an object, the primary 
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criterion of cognition. "Belief" he says, "is thus the mental state 
or function of cognizing reality. As used in the following pages, 
'Belief' will mean every degree of assurance, including the highest 
possible certainty and conviction" (James, 1890, 2, p. 283). 
Wild points out that James follows Brentano in making the distinc-
tion between belief and thought: while belief cannot 'happen' with- 
out thought, "the mere thought of the object may exist as something 
quite distinct from belief in its reality" (James, 1890, 2, p. 286). 
Wild therefore says: 
We cannot believe in any object without first thinking of 
it in some way. But the two operations are quite distinct. 
As Brentano says, "it is then twice present in consciousness, 
as thought of, and as held for real or denied". James 
agrees with this distinction and emphasizes it in his own 
thought (Wild, 1969, p. 142, internal quote from Brentano 
appears in James, 1890, 2, p. 286). 
Brentano believed that the psychic act which answers as to whether 
the object is real or not was best called judgement. James states 
that he prefers to call the psychic act 'belief' (see James, 1890, 
2, p. 287), and Wild writes that James wished to move away from the 
'intellectual operations' implied by making acceptance of the object 
dependent on judgement. Instead, he writes, James was most concerned 
with grounding the acceptance of an object in the impact it makes 
upon the sensory organs, so that belief is grounded in perception 
•and awareness of self (see Wild, 1969, p. 142). This is entirely 
reasonable; at the same time, James had a philosophical warrant for 
his selection of 'belief' over 'judgement' in the British empiricist 
tradition. 
James bases cognition on belief for several reasons. The mind-
body dualism that he adopted at the outset of the Principles demand-
ed a distinction between subjective and objective phenomena: while 
the mind is cognitive of reality, it is not cognitive in the sense 
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of 'copying' the objects of the external world. By making belief 
the warrant for reality, James follows the empiricist tradition 
wherein the world was known by means of sensations received by the 
individual. While he rejected the passive sensationism which char-
acterized nineteenth century empiricism, notably in the works of the 
Mills, James remained true to the spirit of empiricism. Knowledge 
of 'real' objects consists of received sensations, 'conceptualized' 
according to the rules that describe the operations of the mind. 
The individual believes that these sensations are accurate representa-
tions of an external world, but his knowledge of that world is in 
fact mediated through his sensory organs. J.S. Mill .writes that the 
senses: 
tell us our sensations. The objects awaken in us, certain 
states of feeling. A part, at least, of what we know of 
the objects, is the feelings to which they give rise. What 
we term the properties of an object, are the powers it 
exerts of producing sensations in our consciousness (Mill, 
1872, p. 7). 
Mill goes on to say "that an object is to us nothing else than that 
which affects our senses in a certain manner; that we are incapable 
of attaching to the word object, any other meaning" (Mill, 1872, 
p. 8). James concurs with Bain's criticism that Mill neglects the 
emotional and volitional elements of belief and regards his own 
account as "more complete" (James, 1890, 2, p. 322), but he accepts 
Mill's general dictum that it is the states of feeling, aroused in us 
by objects, that we know. As Brett writes, James "does not discuss 
• reality, but the sense of reality" (Brett, 1942, p. 88). 
James is quick to point out that he is indebted to his pre-
decessors for the major assumptions of his theory of belief. ' 
1. (See James, 1890, 2, p. 322). James' theory of belief owes 
more to the philosophical tradition than any of his other psycho-
logical constructions. 
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Hume's postulate that cause and effect relations were effects pro-
duced in the mind, and did not 'exist' between the objects themselves 
(see Hume, 1739/1962, III, vii, pp. 44-45), provides the 'skeptical' 
background for James' theory of reality, but James' most important 
inspiration came from Bain who insisted that belief was correlated 
with preparedness to act (see Bain, 1875/1888, p. 505). Bain covered 
the whole range of 'believable' ideas in this scheme, including the 
intellectual, or theoretical postulates that are held in conscious-
ness but seldom acted upon (see Bain, 1875/1888, p. 507). Belief 
is therefore opposed to doubt and inquiry rather than to disbelief; 
belief and disbelief are psychologically the same state, for in 
either state, the "mind is in a condition of certainty" (Bain, 1875/ 
1888, p. 509). James affirmed Bain's statement 2 and incorporated 
Bain's distinction into his psychology. 
Taking belief as the means of cognitive affirmation means that 
James is able to ignore ontological distinctions between the cate-
gories of objects as they 'really' are, and the same objects in the 
consciousness of the thinker. That is, some objects are not 'absolute-
ly' known to exist in a given context, while others are merely 
believed to have independent referrents. Ontological distinctions 
are made between the mind and the physical world and between the var-
ious sub-worlds of reality. The mind varies in the degree of assent 
that is given to any 'belief' statement--to the extent that it is 
absolutely convinced of the independent reality of some objects and 
events, and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, struggles to 
maintain the sense that a given idea is 'true'. The mind also varies 
2. (See James, 1890, 2, pp. 284, 322). James does not specifically 
acknowledge Bain's influence here, but he does so in the literature 
review at the end of the chapter. 
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in the means through which assent is given to the reality of the 
object in question, and in this, too, James follows the empiricist 
tradition. Unity of mind is preserved in the sense that mental fiats 
must be given to any and all 'believable' objects. 
The Hierarchy of Selection  
James divides the set of cognizable objects into seven categories 
• in order to analyze the types of belief that are inspired by objects. 
The objects of cognition are grouped into seven possible worlds of 
reality and these are: 1) the world of sense, 2) the world of 
science, 3) the world of ideal relations, 4) " 'idols of the tribe', 
illusions or prejudices common to the race", 5) the supernatural 
worlds, 6) the worlds of individual opinion and 7) the worlds of 
madness and vaguery (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 292-3). And, James says, 
"Every object we think of gets referred to one world or another of  
this or of some similar list" (James, 1890, 2, p. 293). The 'rank-
ing' of the categories varies from individual to individual so that 
each thinker chooses one reality to be the ultimate reality and 
"From this world's objects he does not appeal" (James, 1890, 2, p. 
293). The rest of the sub-worlds are 'believed in' according to the 
degree of 'reality' the individual invests in them but the primary•
reality is believed in with absolute certainty (see James, 1890, 2, 
p. 294). James logically goes beyond individual idiosyncracy in the 
selection of the ultimate reality, for he asserts that the world of 
sense is given the primary fiat of having an absolute status against 
which the claims of all other realities are measured (see James, 1890, 
2, p. 294). James also ranks the sub-worlds in terms of the freedom 
of the individual to select those objects, relations, propositions, 
etc. to 'be' the most real for himself. Within the world of sense, 
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most of our fiats are involuntary; if we attend to the object at all, 
we attend to it with an implicit belief in its independent reality. 
James made selectivity one of the essential characteristics of 
the stream of consciousness and the selectivity of the stream of 
consciousness is described according to a hierarchical model.
3 
Ethics is given the rank of greatest autonomy, followed by aesthetics, 
empirical reasoning, and selection in the sensible world; finally, 
physiological selections form the base of the structure (see James, 
1890, 1, pp. 284-287). The given levels are ranked in accordance with 
the degree to which they are independent of objects and relations as 
they are found in the world of sensory experience. Ethics attains 
top rank because choice is seen to be supreme and because it is 
neither governed nor coerced by objects and relations in the practical 
everyday world.
4 
Aesthetics follows, for the artist is freer to 
accept or to reject sensory elements in his work than is the empiri-
cal scientist. The rational connection of objects and relations, or 
reasoning, is given a still lower status for its postulates are most 
influenced by the physical world (see James, 1890, 1, p. 287). The 
selections from the physical world come next, and at bottom are 
found the physiological selections of the sense organs themselves: 
this last category admits no conscious intervention. Selections 
3. See Chap. 3, pp. 189-193, for a more comprehensive description 
of the hierarchy. No attempt has been made here to specifically 
relate the worlds of reality to the individual selective mechanisms. 
Some modes of selection seem more appropriate to some of the worlds 
of reality than others. There is an obvious correspondence between 
the world of sensory objects and the senses as selective mechanisms 
and seemingly little correspondence between ethical selections and 
the world of sense. As the argument develops however, it will become 
clear that the modes of selection interact in determining the objects 
in each sub-world, or at least in determining the individual's be-
haviour in regard to the objects of each sub-world. 
4. The validity of this position is debated in the next chapter. 
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are made •according to the physical structure of the organ (see James, 
1890, 1, pp. 284-285). It is clear, then, that the 'freedom' of 
consciousness to select objects is correlated with the degree to 
which the physical world imposes its own structures on consciousness, 
and the degree to which selection is constrained by the physical 
construction of the body. 
This raises the question as to whether there are any levels of 
reality which are not constrained by the physical world to some degree. 
For Knox, who attempts to establish James as an evolutionary psycho-
logist, ignoring any other philosophical commitments James may have 
had, the answer is no. Knox argues that James connects ethical 
and metaphysical acts to adaptive acts through the behaviour or con-
duct of the individual and the concept of selection. It matters, 
in a Darwinian, and therefore a psychological sense, whether or not 
an idea is 'true', or 'believable'; truth can be defined psychologi-
cally as that which facilitates the organism's survival, while error 
is that which does not (see Knox, 1914, p. 69): 
James's view may be summarily stated as the theory that 
what determines the survival of beliefs is an inter-play 
between conscious selection and natural selection. That is 
clearly what the view of experience as experimentation, 
taken in conjunction with the "paramount reality of sensa-
tions", necessarily entails. We make the environment to 
fit; but it is our obligation to cut our coat according 
to our cloth that gives us a chance of really using our 
brains (Knox, 1914, pp. 75-76). 
According to Knox, James establishes a hierarchy of needs for the 
organism; physical needs form the base of the pyramid, and there is 
a continuity between the basic physical needs and the higher spirit-
ual needs, expressible in the conduct or behaviour of the organism 
(see Knox, 1914, pp. 70-71). Through his selections, man creates 
his own world so that the 'adaptive' world is as much a product of 
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creation as is the metaphysical/ethical world (see Knox, 1914, pp. 
77-78). But whether or not Knox's appraisal of James' intentions 
holds up under analysis depends on whether or not James did intend 
his theory of ethics to have an exclusively evolutionary basis, related 
to adaptation in the physical world.
5 
Bixler and Stroh both make the point that James was committed 
to a 'realist' epistemology, and James' realism as they describe it, 
is compatible with Knox's description of James' Darwinism. Bixler 
writes: 
It must be remembered that belief is an active assertion 
as to what shall be real for us. Psychologically it is a 
similar activity to that attention which in making one 
possibility more real than others actually brings new reality 
into being. Experience in its active aspect is conscious 
experimentation. Believing is part of the whole selective 
process and it creates as it selects and holds. This is not 
true in all cases, of course, for the environment is not 
by any means entirely pliable, and the world cannot be molded 
to accord with all our desires. But within a restricted sphere, 
choice and creation do operate. And religious beliefs lie 
in this sphere. 
James always maintained that this position was compatible 
with the point of view of realism. The creation of reality 
through attention, for example, is not purely a subjective 
process. We do our part in the attending process (Bixler, 
1926, p. 96). 
Unlike Knox, however, Bixler devotes the rest of his book to 
the analysis of the problems of James' theory of truth, for he argues 
that James had to balance his commitment to realism against his even 
stronger commitment to the view that consciousness is efficacious. 
Stroh writes that for James: 
the human mind cannot be understood as cut off from the 
natural world, but rather must be understood dynamically as 
both affected by it and reacting to it. The mind is anything 
but self-enclosed. It is not a mere passive observer or 
knower, nor a purely theoretical instrument. It is primarily 
a practical instrument engaged in action (Stroh, 1968, p. 124). 
As the analysis of James' theory of reality progresses, Knox's 
5. This problem is discussed in Chap. 6, pp. 405-411, 423-460. 
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link-up of the sensory and ethical worlds through the mechanisms of 
selection and behaviour will be shown to be too superficial a view 
'of James' epistemology to be tenable. First, it will be shown that 
James was more committed to ensuring that consciousness was at least 
potentially efficacious than he was with connecting the worlds of 
reality through selection or behaviour. Secondly, it will be shown 
that the objects of the various worlds of reality are selected by 
qualitatively distinct means; each sub-world has "its own special 
style of existence" (James, 1890, 2, p. 291). The 'rules' for select-
ing objects of belief and the methods of verifying the reality of 
objects therefore vary as a function of the particular nature of 
each of the sub-worlds. 
The differential degrees of freedom to believe or to doubt that 
an object, relation, or postulate is real or true raises problems in 
relation to the efficaciousess of consciousness. Consciousness has 
been described as a structural unity so that the same interal dynamic 
processes are supposed to operate in determining the 'realness' of 
objects in any of the sub-worlds. But if consciousness is 'coerced' 
- into assenting that physical objects are real, that 'mythological 
objects' are real in their special world and that religious systems 
at the very least give guidance as to which moral postulates should 
be believed in, then the problem of how constrained consciousness 
is at all levels arises. The sub-worlds may also be interdependent; 
the assent given at one level of reality may influence whether or 
not affirmation is given to an object in another sub-world. This 
will be demonstrated in regard to the objects of science and the world 
of sense. If the worlds are interdependent then beliefs in ethical, 
aesthetic, or metaphysical postulates may be influenced by beliefs, 
more or less coerced, in other stratas of reality. The effect of 
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other beliefs on metaphysical hypotheses will be examined below. 
The possible interdependence of selections is important because 
James did not believe that mind Was efficacious in the sense of 
possessing any 'creative' power. All that consciousness could do 
was to select objects from the possibilities presented to it: 
The soul presents nothing herself; creates nothing; is at 
the mercy of the material forces for all  
but amongst these possibilities she selects; and by reinforc-
ing one and checking others, she figures not as an 'epi-
phenomenon', but as something from which the play gets 
moral support (James, 1890, 2, p. 584). 
and: 
The effects of interested attention and volition remain. 
These activities seem to hold fast on certain elements, and 
by emphasizing them and dwelling on them, to make their 
associates the only ones which are evoked. This is the 
point at which an anti-mechanistic psychology must, if 
anywhere, make its stand in dealing with association. Every- 
thing else is pretty certainly due to cerebral laws. ...But 
even though there be a mental spontaneity, it can certainly 
not create ideas or summon them ex abrupto. Its power is 
limited to selecting amongst thosewhich the associative 
machinery has already introduced or tends to introduce. If 
it can emphasize, reinforce, or protract for a second either 
one of these, it can do all that the most eager advocate 
of free will need demand; for it then decides the direction 
of the next associations by making them hinge upon the em-
phasized term and determining in this wise the course of 
the man's thinking, it also determines his acts (James, 
1890, 1, p. 594). 
The efficaciousness of consciousness will therefore depend upon the 
'freedom' of the selective functions of mind. 
But the question of how freely selectivity operates is further 
complicated by James' theory of psychogenesis; whether selectivity 
really operates according to the hierarchical structure outlined 
above will depend upon whether or not James has built a dualism be-
tween the functions of consciousness into his psychology in order to 
avoid the possibility that ethical assents may be coerced. 
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The Problem of Front and Back Door Experience  
In his theory of psychogenesis, James claimed that the mind 
is assailed in two ways and Brennan's description of the two modes 
of experience which act upon the brain is one of the most cogent 
in the literature: 
In The Principles of Psychology, James says that the 
word experience refers to two distinct ways in which 
the mind is "assailed", although the word's use is 
generally restricted to mean only one of those ways. 
The first type, the way of experence in the usual 
sense of the word, is the "front-door" way; here 
knowledge enters through the five senses, and the 
agents which affect the brain in this way immediately 
become the mind's objects. The second type of exper-
ience is the "back-door" way; here, knowledge ori-
ginates "inside" the person, and the agents produce 
perceptions which take cognizance of something other 
than the agents. 
In the case of front-door experiences, the agents 
are natural objects (like sunsets, etc.), which impress 
the brain "through the senses, and in the strict sense 
of the word give it experience, teaching it by habit 
and association what is the order of.. .(its) ways". 
But the agents of back-door experiences are in the 
brain itself or elsewhere in the body, being natural 
objects or processes "which equally modify the brain, 
but mould it to no cognition of themselves" (Brennan, 
1961, p. 122; see also James, MVO. 2, pp. 626-627). 
Front-door experience correlates with James' general description 
of our knowledge of physical objects and natural forces. Back- 
door experience accounts for metaphysical, aesthetic, ethical, and 
intellectual knowledge (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 638-639). And, as 
Brennan says, "the natural sciences seem to come from a combination 
of both types of experiences" (Brennan, 1961, p. 123). Furthermore, 
James explicitly separates our 'ideals' from the order of sensory 
experience: "There are then ideal and inward relations amongst the 
objects of our thought which can in no intelligible sense whatever 
be interpreted as reproductions of the order of outer experience" 
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(James, 1890, 2, P.  639). Although James is discussing the means 
by which the progression of sensations and perceptions of the physi-
cal world are organfzed into meaningful systems within consciousness, 
he makes it clear that the two modes of experience, while interact-
ive, are differentially developed. The problems that the dualistic 
psychogenetic model raises for a consistent hierarchical conception 
of belief can be more easily illustrated if we consider the effects 
of belief upon action. Belief is necessary for action to proceed. 
But James, in his discussion of volition basically divides actions 
into two functional categories (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 522-579). 
The first is ideo-motor action, largely (as shall be demonstrated 
below) a product of organized, selected, front-door input. The 
second category of action is comprised of our leffortfull volitions, 
stimulated by 'back-door' generated systems of ethics, aesthetics, 
and metaphysics. Behaviour, or the tendency to act in definable 
ways, is thus divided into two sets of conflicting action modes 
because conflicting patterns of action are demanded within the two 
frameworks of experience. Beliefs are the necessary precursors of 
any action, and beliefs will be shown to be categorized or grouped 
according to the same dualistic model. While consciousness may 
be structurally unified--back and front door tendencies are both 
experienced as feelings--the patterning of beliefs may in fact be 
divided into two 'opposed' sets of feelings. The function of front-
door feeling is to adapt the individual to the environment; he grants 
the objects and relations reality and conforms to their demands. 
At the same time the individual is under pressure to change the world 
according to the demands of the conceptual structures that event-
ually emerge from the inborn back-door tendencies. As Brennan 
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reminds us, "the significance of a belief lies in the kind of action 
which it leads to" (Brennan, 1968, p. 87; see also Knox, 1914, p. 
68, as Brennan bases his analysis on Knox's). Belief does not con- 
sist in the static possession of eternal truths (see Brennan, 1968, 
p. 87), and the combination of 'Darwinian' and 'Renouvian' constructs 
in James' theory of reality produces a tension between the functions 
of consciousness. Beliefs have real and immediate consequences in 
James' psychology, and the analysis of James' system of realities 
must take into account the types of action that result from the poss-
ession of particular beliefs. Therefore the relationships between 
the sub-worlds of reality must be carefully studied from a functional 
perspective. 
Huxley defined free will as the lack of restraint in carrying 
out predetermined desires: "For an agent is free when there is noth-
ing to prevent him from doing that which he desires to do." 6 This 
materialist concept of freedom is difficult to disprove, once the 
theorist has allowed any mechanistic explanation of impulses, feel-
ings, or thoughts and the mechanistic elements are fairly strong in 
James' account of the development of belief in the independent real-
ity of objects (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 168, on the illusion of free-
dom). James writes that "As far as a large part of our thinking 
goes, then, it can intelligibly be formulated as a mere lot of habits  
impressed upon us from without" (James, 1390, 2, p. 632). At the 
same time, the 'back-door' tendencies which account for ethical 
judgements are "born in the house" (James, 1890, 2, p. 627). The 
6. Huxley, 1874/1894, pp. 240, 244. Huxley believed that mental 
conditions were simply symbols of underlying physiological processes. 
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mind has no conscious awareness of these tendencies but the decision 
process is influenced by their existence (see James, 1890, 2, p. 
627). The back-door tendencies are 'fortuitous' in the sense that 
they have "no zoological utility" (James, 1890, 2, p. 627). Never-
theless, they definitely have a determinative influence of their 
own upon conscious selection. The existence of two opposing sets 
of tendencies means that the efficaciousness of consciousness 
depends on the tension produced in consciousness between the two sets 
of tendencies, and the effects of this tension on the mind's inter-
action with the several worlds of reality. 
The Development of Consciousness. 
In James' view, the infant's first impressions of the world are 
of unity, cohensiveness, and conjunction; out of this 'primal unity' 
the individual separates out particular objects and relations, 
which are then absolutely believed to exhibit independent reality. 
The child thus progresses from a monistic apprehension of reality 
towards a pluralistic awareness of the separateness or individuality 
of objects and events. John Wild gives a good description of this 
process: 
From the very beginning, this world is ordered around a hard 
core of external and internal sensations. These sensations 
of light, sound, pain, etc., are directed to isolated spatial 
centers, whose relations are not brought out. They come to us 
as bald facts which simply occur. We feel them to be real and 
independent of our desires. While we have them, they are simply 
there in a naked facticity that we can do nothing to alter. 
They are never experienced alone, but always as figures on a 
ground. The first such fact that the child can focus, whatever 
it may be, is centered on a field of fringes that vaguely 
encompasses the germs of all that he will ever come to feel 
and know. His living body is the center of this field, and 
the two are in constant flux. The living body never returns to 
a state it was in before, and no condition of the field ever 
exactly repeats itself. What we call experience is a history 
in which the desires of the child become purposes, and the 
230. 
field becomes more or less organized into a world of 
things(Wild, 1969, pp. 188-189). 
James' concept of selection is related to his proposition that 
the first impressions of the world are of unity and cohesiveness. 
Because pure experience is initially perceived as a 'oneness', the 
individual's task is to break up the 'unity' into the 'many'. He 
breaks up the 'one' by selecting some objects as more meaningful, 
interesting, and important than others. He simultaneously works at 
reconstructing the world and his reconstruction takes the form of 
allocating selected objects to the various sub-worlds of reality list-
ed above. The reconstruction of reality thus depends on the select-
ions that are made and the classification imposed on the selected ob-
jects. The eventual conceptions of reality depend upon the fortuitous 
interaction between the individual (in a particular physiological 
state) and the specific conditions of the experiential field at any 
given moment. The problem is to determine whether the individual has 
any real choice in making his selections. Because an experience is 
not initially 'understood' or 'cognized' does not mean that it is 
without a coercive structure. The belief thatobjects possess particu-
lar qualities comes long before conceptualization develops: 
The child's attention is outwardly directed towards the 
sources of sensations that appear in the spatial volumes 
that he hears, and sees, and tastes. They attract his desires, 
and he believes in their reality with a primitive belief 
(Urdoksa) that leads him to act and to explore them. This 
belief remains with him as long as he lives, and underlies 
everything he later thinks and does, including his most 
radical questioning of them, even of the belief itself 
(Wild, 1969, p. 189). 
• If the child does select his own world, he certainly makes many 
of the selections or separations of particulars before conception 
develops: his selections comprise his earliest conceptualizations; 
they are not the results of conceptualization. The first selections 
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are made through instinctive and reflexive reaction patterns which 
are cognitively 'blind'. The situation is quickly reversed as exper-
iences multiply; the individual rapidly forms his first 'conceptions' 
about the world, and his actions are thereafter elicited by his 
'ideas' or 'thoughts' about what the world is like. 
The assignment of an object to one sub-world or another is neither 
random nor arbitrary, nor is the selection of the 'realness' or 'con-
creteness' of one sub-world over another, for the world of sensory 
experiences is almost inevitably chosen as the sub-world whose inde-
pendent reality cannot be denied. Cognitively, the individual makes 
the discrimination between sensations which are received from other 
objects and those which he comes to recognize as dreams or fanciful 
ideas. The first cognitive separations are made between 'real' and 
'unreal' events. "It is only as objects become permanent and their 
relations fixed that discrepancies and contradictions are felt and 
must be settled in some stable way" (James, 1890, 2, pp. 299-300). 
But objects are not simply distinguished as 'real' or 'unreal'. Those 
objects that are selected as 'real' are also 'categorized' as having 
certain undeniable properties so that the child who is burnt by the 
candle-flame will invariably conceptualize the candle-flame as hot. 
Its colour may be of secondary importance. The child who simply ob-
serves the candle-flame from a distance may fail to realize that it 
is hot; his accredition of reality may therefore be given to the ob-
served colour and movement of the flame. The selection of qualities 
as 'real' depends on experience, and the early, pre-cognitive exper-
iences may influence later selection throughout the hierarchy of be-
lief. Early, or pre-cognitive experience must therefore be taken into 
account in assessing how 'free' selections are in any of the sub-
worlds. 
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The Problems  
The major problem is to determine how much freedom is given to 
consciousness in the selection of the objects, relations, or postu-
lates which are believed to be real. James writes that the 'popular' 
mind conceives of the sub-worlds more or less separately, while the 
'complete philosopher' seeks to find the proper place for each object 
of thought in the sub-worlds; at the same time, "he also seeks to 
determine the relation of each sub-world to the others in the total 
world which is" (James, 1890, 2, p. 291). The popular mind 'forgets' 
that the sub-worlds are interrelated when he experiences the objects 
of one of them; the philosopher does not (see James, 1890, 2, p. 291). 
James insists that the items of one world may be related to the ob-
jects of another. This is important for he is not always consistent 
in defining the relationship between the sub-worlds in terms of the 
potentially coercive effect objects from one sub-world may exert on 
the selection of objects in another. 
The problem of selection can be broken down into two major 
strands; it is first necessary to look at the internal structure of 
each sub-world and determine what the constraints on selection are. 
Each sub-world demands a distinct type of affirmation and the assent 
to the 'reality' of any object is given or withheld in terms of the 
logical structure of the world it potentially 'belongs' to. It is 
also necessary to look at the relationship between sub-worlds, to de- 
termine whether or not any one sub-world is indeed free of constraint 
• from the other worlds. The sub-world of science (as shall be demon-
strated below) is actually a product of the tension created by the 
different statuses of the 'realities' of the world of sense and the 
'realities' of the world of ideal relations. Its objects, therefore, 
are not independent. At the same time, James tries to maximize 
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selectivity in the worlds of metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics-- 
that is,, to show that they are free of the constraints that apply to 
the other sub-worlds. That this is an untenable hypothesis will be 
briefly shown below, and again in greater detail in the analysis of 
pragmatic metholology. 
The next problem concerns the feasibility of a hierarchical 
model of belief. The hierarchical structure of selectivity must be 
balanced against the functional dualism which separates those 'reali-
ties' which the individual is coerced into believing in, from those 
selections which are seemingly uncoerced. The tension between James' 
'Darwinianism' and his commitment to Renouvier is felt here in regard 
to the objects of sense, and the ethical/metaphysical objects. The 
consistency of the hierarchy is also 'disturbed' by the ambiguous 
status of the objects of science, as will be demonstrated below. 
The 'subjective' character of ideation presents yet another dif-
ficulty. While the mind gives assent to the presence of physical 
objects and relations, it does not mirror the physical world 'as it 
comes' but reorganizes it into meaningful conceptions so that any 
particular belief is a combination of objective and subjective factors. 
Furthermore, James makes it clear that front- and back-door tenden-
cies are not differentially experienced, for they 'appear' in the 
mind as feelings. But this makes it difficult, at the psychological 
level, to discover to what extent our beliefs are directly veri-
fiable, and to what extent they depend on processes which underlie 
conscious experience. The theory of belief must therefore be exam-
ined from the perspective of James' attempt to specify the psycho-
logical conditions that determine belief in objects as independent 
entities. 
James' theory of reality will be examined with reference to three 
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of the seven sub-worlds. The worlds of sense, of ideal relations, 
and of science have been selected because they contain explicit, 
'examinable' objects and relations. Furthermore, the problems of hier-
archy and the dual function of belief can be examined in terms of 
the interaction between these three sub-worlds. The four remaining 
realms--the idols of the tribe, the supernatural worlds, the worlds 
of individual opinion, and the worlds of madness and vaguery--will 
not be specifically discussed. Their objects are either too diverse 
as in the case of the idols of the tribe, wherein James includes 
religious systems, the 'secondary qualities', and cultural beliefs-- 
or they are too idiosyncratic for a cogent analysis.
7 
The Basic Premises of James' Theory of Reality  
In working out some means of assessing the independence of 'real' 
objects apart from our subjective thoughts about them, James begins 
with the assertion that "our own reality, that sense of our own life 
which we at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for 
our belief. 'As sure as I exist!'--this is our uttermost warrant for 
the being of all other things." 8 We cannot help believing in our 
own independent existence. We then ascribe an almost equal reality 
to those objects which fulfil our personal needs, and next to the ob-
jects which seem to belong to these objects. The sense of reality 
is given to •those objects and relations which are egocentrically 
connected with outselves. James draws a parallel betwen Descartes' 
7. For a cogent description of the parameters of these latter 
worlds, see Wild, 1969, pp. 149-151. 
8. James, 1890, 2, p. 297; see also James, 1890, 1, p. 289, where 
James states that each individual makes one fundamental separation 
between himself and the rest of the universe. 
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cogito, wherein Descartes derives the existence of the external world 
from his conviction of the 'reality' of his own sense of self, and 
his own contention that the ultimate assent to the reality of other 
things stems from the sense of one's own reality. 
There are important differences between James' and Descartes' 
assertion of the independent reality of other objects and relations. 
First, declares Descartes, I exist, and secondly I am aware of imper-
fections and lacks within myself. Descartes contends that awareness 
of his own imperfection comes from an implicit comparison with some-
thing perfect, of which he falls short. He continues his argument 
by inferring that the source of the standard must exist since he is 
cognizant of his own imperfection, and he identifies this standard 
with God. In addition, he perceives a world and if this world does 
not actually exist he is deceived. He concludes that he is not de-
ceived for deceiving is an imperfection, and God, the source of stand-
ards of perfection, can have no imperfections. God therefore does 
not deceive, and the world exists (see Descartes, 1637/1964, pt. IV, 
pp. 100-106). Descartes' aim is ontological; he is concerned with 
the status of objects independent of our relations with them. James 
is not: the separations he makes in terms of stimulus salience and 
causal efficacy have psychological and pragmatic implications alone-- 
that is, the separations affect our tendencies to believe and to act. 
Furthermore, Wild contrasts Descartes' derivation with James', em-
phasizing that James' concept of self: 
is no soul substance or thinking thing, enclosed within 
itself. By its cares and concerns, the self reaches out 
to other independent things and persons. It is intimately 
and really related to them in many ways. ...This is far 
from the Cartesian thinking substance. The human person 
• is stretched out into an external world of independent 
beings, and he knows them in the same manner, and with the 
same mode of certainty, with which he knows himself (Wild, 
1969, p.-154). 
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In contrast to Descartes therefore, James develops an 'empirical' 
notion of the self. The self, and the worlds of realities it knows 
and believes in cannot be defined in an a priori sense, as the physi-
cal world of Descartes was defined. The self and the worlds it 
knows, are the products of the growth of the individual consciousness 
as it interacts with the physical world. The process wherein an ob-
ject is accorded reality is an interactive and continuous process. 
Psychologically, the mind is constructed so that we are inclined 
to believe in as much as we can. "The primitive impulse is to af-
firm immediately the reality of all that is conceived" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 319). The primitive impulse of consciousness is towards belief 
and affirmation, but the object in question must conform to the de-
mands of the 'sub-world' in consciousness at any given time in order 
to retain credibility. Objects are categorized according to their 
particular qualities, and in the sensible world, these qualities re-
side in the objects themselves and are impressed upon the mind from 
without. More latitude is allowed in the worlds of imagination, so 
that the imaginary horse "may have wings to its heart's content, so 
long as it does not pretend to be the real world's horse--that horse 
is absolutely wingless" (James, 1890, 2, p. 294). The strictures 
imposed on man, and by man, as to the contents permitted each world, 
keep them separate in consciousness, so that the individual attends 
to one world, then another, without any confusion as to the proper 
objects of each. 
We cannot and do not doubt that objects exist externally to 
ourselves because of the compatibility between our internal sensations 
and the external objects'which present themselves, in space and time 
conjunctions with the sensations: 
The world of living realities as contrasted with 
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unrealities is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as 
an active and emotional term. This is the hook from which 
the rest dangles, the absolute support. And as from a 
painted hook it has been said that one can only hang a 
painted chain, so conversely from a real hook only a real 
chain can properly be hung. Whatever things have intimate  
and continuous connection with my life are things of whose  
reality I cannot doubt. Whatever things fail to establish 
this connection are things which are practically no better 
for me than if they existed not at all (James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 297-298). 
The objects which initially have this intimate and continuous con-
nection with our own lives are not selected by us as significant. 
They become significant because they are presented or appear in con-
junction with certain internal sensations we experience (see James, 
1890, 2, pp. 299-300, 305). They are thus 'selected' out of the mass 
of possible objects and relations confronting us because they are in 
some way compatible with our internal states. Some objects are 
therefore more interesting, exciting, or stirring than others. The 
case is simple enough when there is one dominant internal sensation 
or state of mind, and one external object is presented which satisifes 
or aggravates that feeling, or 'resembles' the feeling: 
Any relation to our mind at all, in the absence of a  
stronger relation, suffices to make an object real. 
The barest appeal to our attention is enough for that. 
...take the candle entering the vacant mind. The mind 
was waiting for just some such object to make its spring 
upon. It makes the spring and the candle is believed 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 299). 
The child has no reason to doubt the independent reality of the object. 
And it is important that the candle in James' example is an imagin- 
ary candle. James is emphasizing that in the early stages of cogni-
tive development, the possibility of doubt is non-existent; the mind 
is constructed so that any uncontradicted object simply coerces ac-
ceptance of its reality. Doubt, and affirmation of belief require 
developed conceptualization and volition. 
How then, do some objects come to be granted the status of 
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independent reality? James describes the construction of reality 
as a kind of 'sorting out' process; initially the mind makes no dis-
tinction between hallucinations, perceptions, dreams, and sensibly 
experienced objects (see James, 1890, 2, p. 299). But these objects 
contradict each other: they are not all experienced in the same way. 
The hallucinated candle and the real candle do not make the same im-
pact on consciousness and consciousness is 'coerced' into according 
the objects that appear before it differential modes of reality. The 
objects of sensation come to be judged as most real because they 
coerce the attention; they 'possess' consciousness. James outlines 
the qualities that an object must possess to maintain itself in con-
sciousness as follows: 
(1) Coerciveness over attention, or the mere power to 
possess consciousness: then follow-- 
(2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in 
the way of exciting pleasure or pain; 
(3) Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity 
to arouse active impluses, the more instinctive the better; 
(4) Emotional interest, as objects of love, dread, 
admiration, desire, etc.; 
(5) Congruity with certain favorite forms of contemplation-- 
unity, simplicity, permanence, and the like; 
(6) Independence of other causes, and its own causal 
importance 
(James, 1890, 2, pp. 299-200). 
These categories are not mutually exclusive: James says that 
"Coerciveness is the result of liveliness or emotional :interest" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 300). The objects which have the most coercive 
qualities, which most excite peasure and pain, which most stimulate 
the will, which hold our emotional interest, are congruent with con-
templation, and seem to manifest the most independent existence, are, 
in the end, the objects of sensatio.
9 
9. (See James, 1890, 2, p. 300). James does not really attempt 
to justify this particular hierarchy of qualities which describe 
the 'realness' an object has for the individual. He states that 
(contd.) 
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The World of Sense  
The sub-world which has the most persistent ability to coerce 
belief in its independent reality is the physical world that we know 
through our sensations. James calls it:• 
The World of sense, or of physical 'things' as we 
instinctively apprehend them, with such qualities as 
heat, color, and sound, and such 'forces' as life, 
chemical affinity, gravity, electricity, all existing 
as such within or on the surface of the things (James, 
1890, 2, p. 292). 
This does not mean that other orders of reality cannot dominate con-
sciousness so that the sensible world is excluded. Conceived objects 
may well be thought of as more real by particular individuals. The 
physicist may, give a greater degree of reality to molecular vibrations 
than to sensible objects, and a unique experience may so impress us 
that all habitual modes of thought are disorganized (see James, 1890, 
2, pp. 300-301). In the end, however, the mind returns to the sens-
ible world: "But no merefloating conception, no mere disconnected 
rarity, ever displaces permanent things from our belief" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 301). Given then, that the objects of sensation are 
accorded the highest status of reality, so that the surest warrant 
for belief in other sub-worlds is measured against belief in sensory 
objects (see James, 1890, 2, p. 294), it is necessary to examine 
exactly what James intends when he makes the world of sense the pri-
mary reality. Objects impress themselves on consciousness, but James 
contended that thoughts or feelings are never totally objective. 
9. (contd.) formal treatments of the problem have already suffic- 
iently occupied philosophers. His own hierarchy is intended to be 
'quasi-empirical': it organizes the criteria as he believes most 
people would do. Furthermore, the characteristics run into each other 
in experience--for example, lively and interesting objects stimulate 
the will. He therefore abandons the construction of a formal system 
at this point and begins his discussion of the sensory world and its 
coercive power over the mind. 
240. 
The sensation received from an object is compounded with the sub-
jective feelings about the object. At the same time it is necessary 
to look at James' concept of reality in terms of the 'determined' 
aspects of sensation or cognition. While objects do not produce 
'copies' of themselves in the mind, they can determine the nature of 
sensations or feelings or thoughts. 
James insists that "among the sensations themselves all are not 
deemed equally real" (James, 1890, 2, p. 305). Instead: 
The more practically important ones, the more permanent 
ones, and the more aesthetically apprehensible ones are 
selected from the mass, to be believed in most of all; 
the others are degraded to the position of mere signs 
and suggestions of these (James, 1890, 2, p. 305). 
James is actively opposing the passive sensationalism which character-
ized the older empiricism. The mind is not a passive recipient of 
impressions, which are then combined according to the laws of associ-
ation, and all objects do not have the same power to coerce fiats 
of belief. Those objects which do so embody particular qualities 
which appeal to the mind. Selection is initially constrained by the 
construction of the sensory organs so that to be perceived in the 
first place, the 'qualities' of the object must be compatible with 
the 'range of the sensory organs'. Objects do have qualities which 
cannot be perceived; we can perceive violet light rays; we cannot 
'see' ultra-violet rays (see James, 1890, 1, p. 284), so that what we 
will call 'real' depends in part upon the structure of our sensory 
apparatus. Then, out of the range of perceivable qualities, the 
mind selects those which seem "worthy of its notice and suppresses 
all the rest" (James, 1890, 1, p. 285). 
The selection process is not completely idiosyncratic nor is 
it completely dominated by vaguely defined interests. Our senses 
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reveal two categories of qualities according to James. Tactile, 
or muscular sensations reveal the-primary qualities of objects, 
while their secondary qualities are experienced through the senses 
of vision, hearing, and smell. The primary qualities are judged to 
be the most real because they are: "the least fluctuating. When we 
get them at all we get them the same. The other qualities fluctuate 
enormously as our relative position to the object changes"(James, 
1890, 2, p. 306). 
The primary qualities of the object of sensation include its 
pain and pleasure producing characteristics, and thus necessarily 
arise from the tactile relationship between object and organism. The 
object, as it finds its way into conceptualization, is never that 
object solely as it exists in the world of pure experience. Added 
to it are the subjective valuations of the individual as he exper-
iences the object, and the types of experience possible depend not 
only upon the particular properties of the object itself but upon 
the physiological structure of the experiencing organism. The dagger 
is only pain-producing when contact is made with an organism capable 
of experiencing pain (see James, 1890, 2, p. 306). In marking out 
the world of pure experience, the individual necessarily adds to the 
dimensions of that world. The mapping cannot take place without 
subjective additions to independent objects, and the 'realness' or 
'closeness' of any object will be judged in terms of its particular 
excitatory potential (see James, 1890, 2, p. 307), first according 
to its pleasure-pain provoking properties (as we are structured to 
be sensitive to them), and subsequently in terms of its ability to 
excite the other senses. 
These 'other' senses, which experience the secondary qualities, 
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select from the panoply of sensations so that "the real color of a 
thing is that one color-sensation which it gives us when most favor-
ably lighted for vision" (James, 1890, 2, p. 305). Our sensory 
apparatus is such that we come to believe "that we think we see the 
whole object, tangible, and visible alike, in one simple indivisible 
act" (James, 1890, 2, p. 77) . 10 Thus, perception is a felt combin-
ation of the primary tactile sensations and the secondary qualities 
we perceive through our other sensory organs. James writes: 
Sensational and reproductive brain-processes combined, 
then, are what give us the content of our perceptions. 
Every concrete particular material thing is a conflux 
of sensible qualities, with which we have become acquainted 
at various times. Some of these qualities, since they are 
more consonant, interesting, or practically important, we 
regard as essential constituents of the thing. In a general 
way, such are the tangible shape, size, mass, etc. Other 
properties, being more fluctuating, we regard as more or 
less accidental or inessential. We call the former qualities 
the reality, the latter its appearances. Thus, I hear a sound, 
and say 'a horse-car'; but the sound is not the horse-car, 
it is one of the horse-car's least important manifestations. 
The real horse-car is ,a feelable, or at most a feelable and 
visible thing which in my imagination the sound calls up. 
So when I get, as now, a brown eye-picture with lines not 
parallel, and with angles unalike, and call it my big 
solid rectangular walnut library-table, that picture is 
not the table. It is not even like the table as the table 
is for vision, when rightly seen. It is a distorted per- 
spective view of the sides of what Imentally perceive (more 
or less) in its totality and undistorted shape. The back 
of the table, its square corners, its size, its heaviness, 
are features of which I am conscious when I look, almost 
as I am conscious of its name. The suggestion of the name 
is of course due to mere custom. But no less is that of 
the back, the size, weight, squareness, etc. (James; 1890, 
2, p. 78). 
Secondary qualities come to act as signs of primary qualities. 
10. The shape of an object, as given in vision, is a secondary 
quality, for shapes are visually apprehended as patches of colour: 
moreover, shapes take on perspectival distortions when they are 
perceived visually. This goes against the original formulation of 
the doctrine, but James is making the primary and secondary qualities 
distinction into a psychological, rather than an ontological, 
distinction. 
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At the same time, primary qualities are instrumental in the selection 
of secondary qualities through inter-sensory corroboration: 
Reproduced sights and contacts tied together with the 
present sensation in the unity of a thing with a name, 
these are the complex objective stuff out of which my 
actually perceived table is made. Infants must go through 
a long education of the eye and ear before they can perceive 
the realities which adults perceive. Every perception is  
an acquired perception (James, 1890, 2, p. 78). 
Perceptions are learned: we call the table square when we see it 
because it feels square, and we thus select the visual sensation that 
best corresponds to the tactile sensation when we wish to describe 
the object.
11 
But the depiction of objects through the primary-
secondary qualities distinction is confounded by the functional dis-
tinctions employed by the perceiver in his apprehension of objects. 
The psychological use of the primary-secondary qualities distinction 
allows James to develop a schema for structuring the world of sense. 
Sensible objects which are, or can be, tangibly felt are accredited 
with independent existence and have the most coercive power over 
consciousness. Other properties--the 'sound of the horsecart'--are 
' integral in announcing the tangible presence of the feelable object, 
but are less important manifestations of its 'realness' than its 
tangible properties. The functional distinctions employed by the ° 
perceiver are grounded in the structural distinctions as the follow-
ing quotation shows. At the same time, the functional distinctions 
are less constrained than the structural selections. The essence of 
any object in conception depends on the use we have for the object 
at any given time: 
All ways of conceiving .a concrete fact, if they are 
11. The analysis of how we come to select 'squareness' as the 
correct visual description of the table is more complex than is 
intimated here. See pp. 246-254 for a discussion of the relationship 
between tactile and visual appearances. 
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true ways at all, are equally true ways. There is no  
property ABOLUTELY essential to any one thing. The same 
property which figures as the essence of a thing on one 
occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another. 
Now that I am writing, it is essential that I conceive 
my paper as a surface for inscription. If I failed to do 
that, I should have to stop my work. But if I wished to 
light a fire, and no other materials were near by, the 
essential way of conceiving the paper would be as combust-
ible material; and I need then have no thought of any of 
its other destinations. It is really all that it is: a 
combustible, a writing surface, a thin thing, a hydrocarbon-
aceous thing, a thing eight inches one way and ten another, 
a thing just one furlong east of a certain stone in my 
neighbour's field, an American thing, etc., etc., ad infinitum. 
Whichever one of these aspects of its being I temporarily 
class it under, makes me unjust to the other aspects. But 
as I always am classing it under one aspect or another, 
I am always unjust, always partial, always exclusive. My 
excuse is necessity--the necessity which my finite and 
practical nature lays upon me. My thinking is first and 
last and always for the sake of my doing, and I can only do 
one thing at a time (James, 1890, 2, p. 333). 
Whether I wish to write on the paper, or to start a fire with 
it, I must first of all believe that the paper exists independently 
of my idea of it. Furthermore, the properties which make it an 
appropriate material for writing on or for starting a fire coincide 
to some degree: its 'thinness'--part of its shape--helps to make it 
appropriate for both purposes, although thinness is not a necessary 
property of either writing materials or combustible materials. The 
primary and secondary qualities indicate that the object is there  
and that it feels, looks, sounds, tastes or smells in certain ways 
(all of these senses are not necessary to 'guarantee' the presence 
of any given object at any given time for the observer of course). 
It is difficult to determine, therefore, how the primary and secondary 
qualities act to determine the thinker's intentions towards the 
object. The relationship between our needs and the properties ob-
jects display is based on the selective abilities of the mind, and 
the ability of the mind to translate perceptual data into modes of 
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conceiving reality. All thin white surfaces (sheets of plastic, 
cloth, painted metal) are not appropriate writing material. Thus, 
cognition is partially dependent upon a knowledge of the primary 
and secondary qualities--as indicators of the presence of objects 
with certain qualities--and upon triodes of conceptually combining 
these properties into 'nameable' objects. The primary and secondary 
qualities do not tell us that the object is a piece of paper until 
we have learned to correlate certain appearances with certain con-
ceptions or 'names' of objects. This explains why James stresses 
that all perceptions are acquired perceptions. The primary and second-
ary qualities are impressed on the child's mind from without, and 
these impressions consist of repeated combinations of the qualities 
--for example, thin white objects which he will later perceive as 
'sheets of paper'. The mind imposes its own classifications on the 
combinations of the qualities so that 'named' or 'conceptual' objects 
emerge, and in the process of acquiring names, objects acquire 
functions which are given in terms of the thinker's needs. In time, 
actual thoughts of an object may bear little resemblance to any real 
particulars of the object and the piece of paper is conceived of 
as 'a surface for inscription'. But this does not mean that primary 
and secondary qualities cease to play an active role in cognition 
once modes of conceiving objects are developed. Primary and second-
ary qualities continue to provide the essential information about 
the presence or absence of objects. 
The potential of objects to excite fiats of belief depends upon 
the impact their primary qualities make on the individual--first in 
terms of their pleasure-pain proclivities, and secondly in terms of 
other tactile stimuli which are received by the tactile and 
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'muscular' apparatus. The secondary qualities excite assent as to 
their reality, first, in terms of their correspondence with primary 
qualities, and then according to the present needs of the individual. 
The latitude for belief varies according to these constraints; assent 
is forced in the cases where the object excites the pain-pleasure 
feelings--we cannot deny the reality of the dagger that stabs us. 
And while we may not be able to deny conceptually that paper may equal-
ly well be used to start a fire, we can ignore the property of flama-
bility when we wish to write on the paper (see James, 1890, 2, p. 
333). The object retains its properties indifferently; our 'appre-
ciation' of the object varies with our interaction with the object. 
At most, then, the individual can select from the range of restricted 
possibilities, those properties which he shall call 'real' indicators 
of the object's presence, and those which he will ignore, or simply 
take as signs of the object, signs in this sense signifying the pre-
sence of other properties that concern him. 
The relationship between primary, secondary, and 'essential' 
characteristics is complex for the 'essential' properties may take 
their form from primary or secondary qualities. Which properties an 
individual is compelled to attend to in any given situation depends 
on the specific nature of the situation. If the individual initially 
begins to construct his cognitive system by allowing reality to 
those properties which he cannot ignore--the primary, tactile pain 
and pleasure provoking qualities of objects--he is eventually free to 
treat these properties indifferently in his manipulations of the 
physical world (as far as circumstances permit). He may ignore the 
primary tactile properties of the dagger if there is no danger of his 
being stabbed by it. The primary and secondary qualities provide 
the initial foundations for the structures of cognition and continue 
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to provide a supportive base for all future cognitions. The quali-
ties that will be attended to in any given situation depend on the 
active interaction of the individual with real physical objects and 
events. Thus he can base his interactions with the physical world on 
primary and secondary qualities indifferently as long as the world 
cooperates. He may think of the dagger before him in terms of any 
of its uses, attributes, or appearances until someone picks up the 
dagger to stab him. Then he is immediately coerced back into attend-
ing to the primary characteristics of the object. 
James tries to make the distinction between those properties 
which we can ignore and those which are forced upon the mind by means 
of a psychological use of the primary and secondary qualities distinct-
ion. He does not attempt to use the distinction in the Gal jean sense 
of distinguishing between what is really 'there' in the world, and 
what exists only when the object interacts with consciousness. Instead, 
he uses it to distinguish between the degrees of coercion exhibited 
by objects interacting with mind. But there are elements of the 'older' 
or 'traditional' usage in James' theory. 
Locke makes the distinction between primary and secondary quali-
ties on the basis of those qualities which are inherent in the object 
itself, and those which "are nothing in the objects themselves but 
powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities" 
(Locke, 1690/1964, Bk. 2, VIII, 9, p. 112). The primary qualities 
are solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; these produce sensations 
of solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number in the 
observer. The secondary qualities include colours, tastes, sounds, etc,
12 
12. (Locke, 1690/1964, Bk. 2, VIII, 9, p. 112). James cites Locke's 
dictum that pains and pleasures are our primary warrant for ascrib-
ing reality to objects. Locke makes it quite clear that these are 
sensations produced in us. They are secondary effects of the primary 
(contd.) 
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The empiricist tradition followed Locke's description, and according 
to Smith, developed a theory of the 'muscle sense' which was separated 
from the visual sense in terms of the type of information that could 
be provided about the physical world. Berkeley thus stated that "we 
learn the spatial properties of distance, size and form by touching 
and moving between objects" (Smith, 1970, p. 137). He was followed 
by Hartley, who asserted that we gained knowledge about the spatial 
properties of the physical world through the association of sensations 
received from muscular contractions and pressures(see Smith, 1970, p. 
139). Brown went further, and "distinguished the sense of pressure 
from the sense of bodies (i.e., the primary qualities) which were of 
two kinds, resisting and extended" (Smith, 1970, p. 143). James Mill 
concurred. He believed that our ideas of extension and resistance 
had their genesis in muscular contractions (see Smith, 1970, p. 147). 
The psychological elements in this viewpoint are obvious, as Smith 
shows (see Smith, 1970, p. 137). The individual is structured psycho-
logically so that he perceives the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities when he examines his own means of knowing the 
world. 
James was well-versed in the traditional notion that the resist-
ance encountered by the muscles was the only means through which the 
physical world was really known (see James, 1880/1920, p. 213). And 
he criticized the theory because it implied that free will was only 
a viable concept if the law of conservation was an 'approximate' des-
cription of the 'resistance' between bodies. If the law of conserva-
tion was not taken as 'approximate', free will would have to be 
12. (contd.) qualities (see Locke, 1690/1964, Bk. 2, VIII, 17, p. 
115; see also James 1890, 2, p. 306). Locke is concerned with dis-
tinguishing real, or primary qualities in the Galilean sense, James, 
with distinguishing them in a psychological sense. 
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dropped in favour of the supposition that: "the ego, in willing... 
[is] merely cognitively conscious, in the midst of the universal force-
stream, of certain current with which it was mysteriously fated to 
identify itself" (James, 1880/1920, p. 216). James was unwilling to 
settle for 'mysterious' indentifications between the will and a uni-
versal force and argued: 
To my mind all such discussions rest on an anthropomorphi-
zation of outward force, which is to the last degree absurd. 
Outward forces, so far as they are anything, are masses in 
certain positions, or in certain movements, and nought besides. 
The muscular "force-sense" reveals to us nothing but hardness 
and pressure, which are subjective sensations, like warmth 
or pain (James, 1880/1920, p. 216). 
James implies that all senses are equally important in providing 
'primary knowledge' about the world (see James, 1880/1920, p. 213), 
but his argument lacks consistency, for at times he states that tactile 
sensations provide the permanent basis for the conceptualization of 
the properties of objects (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 305-306). At other 
times he argues that the selection of visual images as to the 'shape' 
of an object are not random, nor do they depend on the 'experience' 
of primary qualities: 
We have native and fixed optical space-sensations; but  
experience leadsus to select certain ones from among them  
to be the exclusive bearers of reality: the rest become  
mere signs and suggesters of these. The factor of selection, 
on which we have already laid so much stress, here as else-
where is the solving word of the enigma (James,.1890, 2, 
p. 237). 
Selection of the 'true' shape of an object is determined by our per-
ception of the object when it and our eyes are: 
in what may be called the normal position. In this position 
our head is upright and our optic axes either parallel or 
symmetrically convergent; the plane of the object is perpen-
dicular to the visual plane; and if the object is one contain-
ing many lines it is turned so as to make them, as far as 
possible, either parallel or perpendicular to the visual plane. 
In this situation it is that we compare all shapes with each 
other; here every exact measurement and decision is made 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 239). 
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When we perceive objects in this spatial relationship to our-
selves, "we believe we see the object as it is" (James, 1890, 2, p. 
237). As Perry shows, James found a warrant in the writings of 
Stumpf and Hodgson for his conclusion that "all three dimensions of 
space are directly sensed, and not constructed or inferred" (Perry, 
1935/1974, 2, p. 80). The secondary senses eventually provide inform-
ation that is as •'true' as the primary or tactile senses provide, and 
James goes against the empiricist tradition in making the perception 
independent of tactile experience. At the same time, it is difficult to 
decide whether James believed that the determination of the 'true' 
shape of an object was •dependent on the interaction--in space--between 
object and perceiver alone. From a developmental point of view, he 
stresses that the child's eyes and ears must be 'educated' before he 
"can perceive the realities which adults perceive" (James, 1890, 2, 
p. 78). 
In 1887 Hodgson wrote to James: 
I have read, and also re-read, your four articles on space, 
in Mind. I cannot say I am quite convinced that sight alone, 
without the aid of touch, would ever arrive at discriminating  
what we call depth from superficial extension. Of course, I 
understand, and have long thought, that we see extension, 
indiscriminated into the three dimensions, which are our 
reasoning way of understanding what we see. We see super-
ficial extension at least, but not defined against or con-
trasted with the third dimension. In order to discriminate 
the latter, in order to see things solid, I think we require 
the aid of touch. However, I am quite open to conviction, 
and have no philosophical reasons for not welcoming your 
psychological  view of the immediateness of our perception of 
solids or depth (Hodgson, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 81). 
James finally, according to Perry, decided that the notion of 
space "is given dimly and then developed and articulated by exper-
ience" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 83). But he conceded that tactile 
sensations had a role to play: spatial relationships developed so that 
the individual made immediate judgements in terms of them. In 1888 
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he wrote to Croome Robertson: 
Lastly, as to your last half-page,--thanks for the concession 
to the eye! I also concede that in the concrete individual 
all these experiences come abreast and are inextricably 
entwined. In a sense the tactile ones are "basal", i.e., 
we choose them as the reals; but if you have ever seen a 
blind man (as I have) -17,75-g to tell with his fingers which 
of two angles cut out of paste board is the larger.. .and 
compared his slowness and inaccuracy with the instantaneous 
certainty of the eye dealing with the same objects, I don't 
see how you can doubt the entire independence of our eye- 
space-measurements of those of touch (James, quoted in Perry, 
1935/1974, 2, p. 86). 
The selection of 'secondary' effects is constrained by the 'pri-
mary' effects of objects, and by 'learned modes of perceiving', so 
that James has partly given in to the arguments of traditional empiri-
cism. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that James really 
believed (at this point in his career) that secondary qualities were 
effects produced in the mind by the primary qualities (see James, 
1890, 2, p. 671). But James deviates dramatically from the empiricist 
tradition when he includes the pain and pleasure producing properties 
of objects as primary qualities. He writes: 
Then, more decisive still, the tactile properties are those 
most intimately connected with our weal or woe. A dagger 
hurts us only when in contact with our skin, a poison only 
when we take it into our mouths, and we can only use an 
object for our advantage when we have it in our muscular 
control. It is as tangibles, then, that things concern us 
most; and the other senses, so far, as their practical use 
goes, do but warn us of what tangible things to expect. 
They are but organs of anticipatory touch, as Berkeley has 
with perfect clearness explained (James, 1890, 2, p. 306; 
see also James, 1880/1920, p. 216). 
Pleasure and pain are subjective categories of experience. If objects 
are capable of producing these effects in organisms, they must, in 
terms of the original primary and secondary qualities distinction, 
produce the effects in the same way that they produce the secondary 
qualities. So why, then, does James deviate from the established 
tradition, and discuss the pleasure-pain effects of objects under the 
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heading of primary qualities? He gives the answer in "The feeling 
of effort" when he states that 'hardness' and 'pressure' are subject-
ively experienced as are pleasure and pain (see James, 1880/1920, p. 
216). It is impossible, given James' construction of 'thoughts' as 
unitary, single events that primary qualities could be 'known' or 
'experienced' in any totally objective sense. 
James was concerned with the establishment of an evolutionary 
psychology. That is, he was concerned with cognition as an 'adaptive' 
function of the mind. Therefore, he is concerned with the impact 
physical objects make on the organism. The fact that the dagger pro-
duces pain--that we are constructed so that we cannot help feeling 
pain, and that this pain is experienced through the tactile senses-- 
qualifies the pain-pleasure effects of objects as primary qualities 
in James' epistemology. He is concerned with making the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities on the basis of how objects 
feel to us. Thus, vision, hearing, and smell are senses which mediate 
information about what the object would feel like should we come into 
contact with it. 
James is making the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities on the basis of the consequences that accrue to the indi-
vidual in his interaction with the physical world. Human experience 
is at the centre of James' epistemology. He is not concerned with 
determining the physical characteristics of objects in an absolute, 
philosophical sense. Rather, he is concerned with deriving parameters 
for determining whether or not physical reality possesses any defin-
able characteristics which can make an impact on the individual. If 
the individual is to survive, he must know the difference between 
physical objects and thoughts about objects--and this difference, 
according to James, is learned through experience. And it is learned 
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through the separation of those feelings which include sensations 
of pleasure or pain (or less dramatically, other tactile sensations) 
and those which do not. The visual sense is initially unreliable-- 
the child makes no distinction between the reality of the candle he 
hallucinates and the candle he 'sees'. Were the individual to be 
totally isolated from physical reality so that he simply watched the 
parade of objects passing before him, but never came into physical 
contact with them, he would presumably remain uncertain of the dis-
tinction between those things that had an independent physical reality 
of their ,own, and those which were the products of his imagination. 
In the end, then, there is no way of distinguishing between 'real' 
and 'unreal' objects, apart from the 'felt' sensations that the first 
category provides, and the second does not.
13 
We give independent 
reality to those things we can feel, or potentially feel, and deny 
it to those we cannot. The senses of sight, hearing, and smell give 
Information that serves as 'signs' of the presence of real objects. 
As cognition develops, the individual comes to recognize visual and 
tactile representations as equivalent means of knowledge (see James, 
1890, 2, p. 78). 'Seeing' the table is sufficient for the subject 
to infer that the table will yield certain predictable tactile sensa-
tions should he come into physical contact with it. 
This analysis leads to two conclusions--1) that there is a world 
of physical objects, independent of ourselves, and 2) that we are 
structured so that we cannot avoid 'feeling' or 'experiencing' at 
least some of these objects. There is, at some level, a determinative 
13. Even this distinction is not universal or infallible. Altered 
states of consciousness can provoke distortions of the 'ordinary' 
distinctions between mental and physical objects. See for example, 
James' account of hypnotic states (James, 1890, 2, pp. 593-616). 
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relationship between the self and the physical world. This determin-
ative relationship between the self and the physical world can best 
be expressed by the psychological version of the primary and second-
ary qualities distinction: primary qualities are those with the 
greatest sensible coerciveness and hence, in the evolutionary history 
of the race, those most relevant to the organism's adaptation and 
survival. Any quality--primary or secondary--may be selected by the 
individual as essential for his particular purpose, providing that 
the specific situation warrants such wide selectivity. That is, the 
individual can only regard the primary, tactile, pain-producing 
potential of the dagger as a non-essential characteristic when he is 
in no danger of being stabbed with the dagger. James can go no 
farther in deriving a realist basis for his epistemology. Given 
that the mind is coerced into believing in the independence of the 
physical world, then, can consciousness truly be said to be effica-
cious in regard to the selective process that is responsible for 
conceptions of the physical world? This is probably the most diffi-
cult question to answer in any analysis of James' epistemology. 
Certainly he intended that the question be given a positive answer 
--the problem is whether or not his construction of mind and its 
relationships with the physical world supports this conclusion. 
In the examination of James' theory of interests it was con-
cluded that the interest hypothesis did not guarantee an efficacious 
consciousness. Given that the organism has a positive interest or 
instinct that predisposes it to struggle to survive, it is logical 
to conclude that the organism cannot help behaving in such a way 
so as to maximize its survival. In this sense, Huxley's automaton 
model 'explains' survival as well as James' insistence that 
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consciousness is efficacious. James' insistence that the primary 
qualities of objects are the pleasure-pain producing effects accords 
better with .a deterministic acccount of adaptation, than with the 
view that survival depends on the possession of an efficacious con-
sciousness. 
James makes it clear that the selection process is not entirely 
free of external constraints: the distinction between what can be 
willed and what must be believed is a physiological, not a psycho-
logical question (see Kuklick, 1977, pp. 166-168): 
Nature cannot change the past to suit our thinking. She 
cannot change the stars or the winds; but she does change 
our bodies to suit our thinking, and through their intru-
mentality change much besides; so the great practical 
distinction between objects which we may will or unwill, 
and objects which we can merely believe or disbelieve, 
grows up, and is of course one of the most important 
distinctions in the world. Its roots, however, do not 
lie in psychology, but in physiology; as the chapter on 
Volition will abundantly make plain. Will and Belief, in  
short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the  
Self, are two names for one and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL 
phenomenon. All the questions which arise concerning one 
are questions which arise concerning the other. The causes 
and conditions of the peculiar relation must be the same 
in both. The free-will question arises as regards belief. 
If our wills are indeterminate, so must our beliefs be, 
etc. (James, 1890, 2, p. 321). 
The problem is further compounded when James asserts that we 
may feel that an act, or selection has been freely made but the feel- 
ing of freedom may be illusory: 
But, on the other hand, there is the certainty that all his 
effortless volitions are resultants of interests and associ-
ations whose strength and sequence are mechanically determined 
by the structure of that physical mass, his brain; and the 
general continuity of things and the monistic conception of 
the world may lead one irresistibly to postulate that a 
little fact like effort can form no real exception to the 
overwhelming reign of deterministic law. Even in effortless 
volition we have the consciousness of the alternative being 
also possible. This is surely a delusion here; why is it not 
a delusion everywhere?(James, 1890, 2, p. 572). 
James appears to be incorporating a double-sided view of 
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consciousness into his theory of belief and action. Consciousness 
is efficacious to the extent that we can say 'let this be a reality'. 
At the same time the fiat of reality is coerced in relation to cer-
tain objects and their effects on the mind. Mind would seem to have 
two distinct functions; it must accept the coercive nature of certain 
qualities, so that conceptualization is in part determined. It is 
also free to accept or reject others, and at all times it 'experiences' 
objects according to the particular 'content' of the stream of con-
sciousness at any given moment, so that conception is in part the 
creation of the individual. Those qualities which must be accepted 
are those which come, or can come potentially into direct contact 
with the body so that the mind-body dualism is substantiated by the 
primary and secondary qualities distinction. Physiological structures 
force the individual to grant'reality to objects in terms of certain 
of their properties. It is the 'sharpness' of the dagger that gives 
it its pain-producing characteristics, and 'sharpness' describes the 
primary qualities of the object in the traditional sense--it is sharp 
because it is shaped in a certain way and has a determinable degree 
of hardness. Its particular colour is irrelevant in demanding assent 
to its independent reality, but colour provides information about 
the nature of the object's primary qualities--it serves as a real 
indicator of them. The point is that we can separate the world of 
concrete realities into two categories in terms of James' particular 
use of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Those 
sensations which are 'felt' in a tactile sense indicate the presence 
of an independent object. Those sensations which are at some remove 
from the body, or cannot come into contact with the body, may, or 
may not, indicate the presence of a real object. These sensations 
are sorted into signs of real objects, so that the individual soon 
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recognizes the presence of objects when he sees or hears them and 
the secondary sensations come to serve the function of primary indi-
cators of objects. 
The 'secondary' sensations give a more fleeting, changing, 
'chaotic' picture of reality James describes at length how these 
sensations are sorted out by the mind, so that the individual selects 
one shade to 'stand for' the colour of the object. Thus he comes to 
think that the object really is that colour--that sensations are re-
peating themselves, whereas in fact he has merely learned to select, 
from an always subtly different range of phenomenal presentations, 
those which seem to be most permanent, most unchanging (see James, 
1890, 1, p, 231). 
It is within the possibilities for selection given in the second-
ary sensations that consciousness may be least constrained. In the 
world of physical reality the secondary selections are constrained 
by the primary selections. But this constraint is not all-pervasive. 
The selections we make from the world of sensation are chosen in 
accordance with postulates, schematas, or conceptions which belong 
to other sub-worlds of reality (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 286-287). 
The 'parameters' or qualities of the physical world exert an 
influence over what it is possible for the individual to 'believe' 
about the contents of the other sub-worlds of reality. These quali-
ties are not, however, always the same qualities that coerced belief 
at the sensory level. Nor do they place the same kind of restraints 
on what can be accepted as true in the other sub-worlds. The other 
sub-worlds of reality exist on an 'extra-physical' plane--that is, 
they depend on mind for their realization. Certainly, in Jamesian 
terms, the physical world requires consciousness if it is to be 
known. It does not, however, appear to require consciousness to 
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exist. In allowing that objects have the power to coerce conscious-
ness into an assertion of their independence, James goes as far as 
it is possible to go in asserting the independent existence of the 
physical world. Beyond this, he takes care to show that the natural 
order of reality has little in common with human conceptions of order 
(see James, 1890, 2, pp. 634-635). Although the other sub-worlds 
depend on the existence of the physical world to a greater or lesser 
extent, depending on their position in the hierarchy of belief, it 
will be shown that their postulates are derived from the structure 
of consciousness itself. 
The World of Ideal Relations  
While sensible objects impress the mind from without, so that 
their realness is affirmed through the means of the senses, James 
claims that there is another order of reality which impresses its 
truths from within. The ideal relations are generated by the 
back-door processes: the mind is structured so that it organizes 
experience into various logical, mathematical, aesthetic, meta-
physical, scientific, and ethical systems. Out of this organi-
zation emerges: "The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths 
believed or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathemati-
cal, metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic propositions (James, 1890, 
2, p. 292). 
James finds little in the world of sensory experience to corre-
late with our abilities for comparison as it exhibits itself in classi-
fication, logic, and mathematics--the 'pure sciences'.
14 
 These are 
14. See James, 1890, 2, pp. 641-642, where he sharply limits the 
amount of sensational experience necessary for the generation of 
the ideal relations. 
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separated from the natural sciences because their truths are self-
contained, and they do not rely on congruency with the external 
world to maintain our belief in the consistency of their relations. 
They are 'self-validating'propositions, and they are related to the 
sensible world as follows: 
[The world of ideal relations] is a very peculiar world, 
and plays right into logic's hands. Some of the things, 
at least, which it contains are of the same kind as other 
things; some of them remain always of the kind of which 
they once were; and some of the properties of them cohere 
indissolubly and are always found together. Which things 
these latter things are we learn by experience in the strict 
sense of the word, and the results of the experience are 
embodied in 'empirical propositions'. Whenever such a thing 
is met with by us now, our sagacity notes it to be of a 
certain kind; our learning immediately recalls that kind's 
kind, and then that kind's kind, and so on, so that a 
moment's thinking may make us aware that the thing is of a 
kind so remote that we could never have directly perceived 
the connection. The flight to this last kind over the heads  
of intermediaries is the essential feature of the intellectual 
operation here. Evidently it is a pure outcome of our sense 
for apprehending serial increase; and, unlike the several 
propositions themselves which make up the series (and which 
may all be empirical), it has nothing to do with the time- 
and space-order in which the things have been experiences 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 652). 
The external world correlates, or is congruent, with some of the 
basic comparisons, and experience thus shows us that the comparison 
of these systems with sensible objects is possible, but unnecessary 
to sustain the systems. The main impetus for ordering experience into 
logical, classificatory and mathematical terms stems from our own 
unique, brain-born mental predisposition: "Classification, logic, 
and mathematics all result, then, from the mere play of the mind com-
paring its conceptions" (James, 1890, 2, p. 659). The result of 
this is that: 
the mind is filled with necessary and eternal relations which 
it finds between certain of its conceptions, and which form 
a determinate system, independent of the order of frequency 
in which experience may have associated the conception's ori-
ginals in time and space (James, 1890, 2, p. 661). 
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Although James shows quite clearly that these eternal verities have 
nothing to say about what we can find in the world--about facts 
per se--they do relate in specific ways to the 'real' structure of 
the physical world. If we find the particular objects in the world, 
the eternal truths must and will obtain of them (see James, 1890, 
2, p. 663). The eternal verities have a secondary relationship to 
the real world as they are derived and as they are applied. 
But even though this secondary relationship obtains, it is not 
immediately relevant to their primary status as ideal constructs: 
The eternal verities which the very structure of our mind 
lays hold of do not necessarily themselves lay hold on 
extra-mental beings, nor have they, as Kant pretended later, 
a legislating character even for all possible experience. 
They are primarily interesting only as subjective facts. 
They stand waiting in the mind, forming a beautiful ideal 
network; and the most we can say is that we hope to discover 
realit!es over which the network may be flung so that ideal 
and real may coincide (James, 1890, 2, pp. 664-665). 
The conceptual map is sufficient for purposes of study; its eternal 
truths need to be acknowledged whether the world of sense exists or 
not (see James, 1911, p. 74). As conceptualization develops, the 
links between mind and world become more and more tenuous until a 
distinct 'dualism' of the contents of both results. We 'believe' in 
the ideal relations because their inner consistency as conceptual 
systems compels belief. In this way, systems of ideal relations, 
taken without reference to external objects, compel our assent to 
their objects in the same way as we are compelled to believe in the 
objects of our senses. We now have two worlds of irrefutable objects: 
one sensible, and one ideal. 
James includes logical and mathematical systems in the same 
sub-world with metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical postulates be-
cause both 'categories' have the same psychogenetic origin and none 
of these postulates rely on 'front-door' experience for their 
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internal verifiability. The postulates of these systems can only 
be contradicted by other postulates within the same systems; their 
truth or falsity has nothing to do with the physical world. But they 
do have implications for human cognition of, and interaction with, 
the physical world. This is not due to their psychogenetic origin, 
or their internal consistencies as systems, but rather to the place 
James accords scientific objects in his analysis of the worlds of 
reality. Therefore logical and mathematical theories must be consid-
ered in relation to the objects of science, which constitute the 
second sub-world of reality, while aesthetic, metaphysical, and ethi-
cal postulates must be reconsidered below in regard to James' famous 
'will to believe'. The functions of the necessary truths, if not 
their evolution, vary according to James' notion of what we can and 
cannot help believing about the physical world. 
The World of Science and the 'Common Assumptions' of the  
late Nineteenth Century  
James describes the world of scientific objects and relations 
as follows: 
The world of science, or of physical things as the learned 
conceive them, with secondary qualities and 'forces' (in 
the popular sense) excluded, and nothing real but solids 
and fluids and their 'laws' (i.e., customs) of motion. ... 
I define the scientific universe here in the radical 
mechanical way. Practically, it is oftener thought of in 
a mongrel way and resembles in more points the popular 
physical world (James, 1890, 2, p. 292). 
James distinguishes conceptions of science from conceptions 
about physical objects as they are 'instinctively apprehended'. 
Scientific objects must be distinguished from sensible objects be-
cause scientific descriptions of the physical world are as foreign 
to the immediate apprehension of objects as are the logical, mathe- 
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matical, metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic propositions, grouped 
together in the third category of 'ideal relations or abstract truths 
believed or believable by all'. There is nothing in sensible exper-
ience to coerce a 'scientific' perspective of the world: 
The most persistent outer relations which science believes 
in are never matters of experience at all, but have to be 
disengaged from under experience by a process of eliminating, 
that is, by ignoring conditions which are always present.• 
The elementary laws of mechanics, physics, and chemistry 
are all of this sort. The principle of uniformity in nature 
is of this sort; it has to be sought under and in spite of 
the most rebellious appearances; and our conviction of its 
truth is far more like a religious faith than like assent to 
a demonstration (James, 1890, 2, pp. 636-637). 
Science is distinguished from the category of ideal relations 
because scientific theories are commonly conceived of as describing 
the physical world as it really is, while those occupations--mathe-
matics, logic, ethics, metaphysics and aesthetics--included in the 
category of ideal relations 'exist' as independent conceptual worlds 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 663). The development of scientific laws, 
however, occurs under the same conditions as those which elicit the 
ideal relations: "Every scientific conception" writes James, "is 
in the first instance a 'spontaneous variation' in some one's brain" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 636). But science must also coincide with the 
'empirical truths' gleaned from experience--"that heat melts ice, 
that salt preserves meat" (James, 1890, 2, p. 637). At the same time, 
the scientific truths: 
arise in the mind in no such passive associative wayas that 
in which the simpler truths arise. Even those experiences 
which are used to prove a scientific truth are for the most 
part artificial experiences of the laboratory gained after 
the truth itself has been conjectured. Instead of experiences 
engendering the 'inner relations', the inner relations are 
what engender the experiences here (James, 1890, 2, p. 638). 
The relationship between science and the world would appear to 
demand that the 'front-door' truths would have an immediate influence 
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on the genesis of scientific theories. But scientific theories do 
not replicate the space- and time-relationships perceived immediate-
ly between objects (see James, 1890, 2, p. 632); they need only be 
"congruent with the time- and space-relations which our impressions 
affect" (James, 1890, 2, p. 640). This congruency is precisely 
what is achieved in 'succ'essful' scientific theories. James does not 
reject front-door experience as providing the material for scientific 
theories; instead he argues that it does not provide an adequate 
time- and space-sequence for the construction of scientific theories: 
What happens ir the brain after experience has done its 
utmost is what happens in every material mass which has 
been fashioned by an outward force,--in every pudding or 
mortar, for example, which I may make with my hands. The 
fashioning from without brings the elements into collo-
cations which set new internal forces free to exert their 
effects in turn. And the random irradiations and resettle-
ments of our ideas, which supervene upon experience, and 
constitute our free mental play, are due entirely to these 
secondary internal processes, which vary enormously from 
brain to brain, even though the brains be exposed to exactly 
the same 'outer relations'. The higher thought-processes 
owe their being to causes which correspond far more to the 
sourings and fermentations of dough, the setting of - mortar, 
or the subsidence of sediments in mixtures, than to the 
manipulations by which these physical aggregates came to 
be compounded (James, 1890, 2, p. 638). 
Scientific theories are 'brain-born'--they result from the mind 
playing with, and selecting from, the data which constitutes its 
conceptions of reality. James claims that secondary brain processes 
impose a unique order upon the time-space relations gleaned from 
experience. Thus 'belief' in scientific objects must be studied 
from two perspectives: in the first instance, we 'believe' in the 
movements and relations between objects in the same way as we 'be-
lieve' in the physical objects themselves--we believe that objects 
fall down, that heat melts ice, etc., in the same way that we be-
lieve in the objects and the ice (see James, 1890, 2, p. 637). But 
our belief in the scientific principles that correlate with these 
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events--the laws of gravity and thermodynamics--is another matter 
entirely: as James shows, they 'conceptualize' our experience but 
are not of our experience (see James, 1890, 2, p. 638, quoted above, 
p. 262). The fact that scientific postulates of this sort harmonize 
with experience gives them more power to excite belief than if such 
harmony were non-existent. The particular structure of the mind 
impels the reorganization of experience into patterns and laws con- 
gruent not only with the experience itself, but with particular mental 
predispositions. 
This conception of science is dependent on an 'in-built' plasti-
city in a consciousness which interacts with a plastic environment. 
The external world must be capable of receiving the mould into which 
human conception casts it, if the criteria of empirical verification 
are to be met(see James, 1890, 2, p. 652). James' dictum that we 
believe as much as we possibly can believe is consistent with his 
theory that the thinker continually attempts to verify conception in 
perception. Conceptions must be verified by perceptions if we are 
to discover whether the new 'scientific' ordering of experience is 
congruent with sensible experience (see James, 1890, 2, p. 652). If 
such congruency obtains, we 'believe' in the scientific theory. 
This, then, is basically the relationship between sensory experience and 
the ideal relations when both become embedded in scientific theories. 
But James' construction of the relationship is problematic when it 
is considered in conjunction with his construction of the stream of 
consciousness. 
James' isolation of a 'scientific' world of primary qualities 
and the laws of motion is the most interesting aspect of his theory 
of belief. The discussion of James' construction of consciousness 
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focused on James' reaction against the traditional empiricist 
theories of mind, and his attempt to create a new concept of con-
sciousness based on evolutionary principles. James gave the primary 
and secondary qualities distinction a new evolutionary focus when 
he converted it, from an ontological into a psychological distinction. 
But his psychological revision retained the basic division of the 
older form of the distinction--primary qualities, or tactile sensa-
tions, were the qualities that showed the least fluctuation--they 
were the most undeniably real. James' definition of scientific 
objects confirms his ratification of the primary and secondary quali-
ties distinction. It was stated (see Chap. 1, p. 102), that James 
developed a new evolutionary concept of mind and that these mental 
structures were eventually applied to the reconstruction of the physi-
cal world in his later philosophy. The physical world, however, re-
tained its pre-evolutionary structure in the Principles. James .' 
construction of the world of science is perhaps the best evidence that 
the Principles is both radical and conservative--that 'parts' of the 
old Newtonian world-view are ratified, while the basis for a new 
empiricism is built into the restructuring of consciousness. 
James really believed in the efficacy of the mathematical/mech-
anical structure that had been derived for the physical world with-
in the context of Newtonian science. The dualism between mind and 
body logically extends into a mind-matter dualism, and this dualism 
is intensified in James' writings by the qualitatively different 
structures given to mind and body or matter. In the older empir-
icism, mind and matter were structured along parallel lines--the 
structure of matter was reflected in the elementaristic 'ideas', and 
physical laws were 'translated' into the laws of association. Mind 
and physical reality were constructed so that mind 'knew' the world. 
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James' mind is not so constructed, and the exact nature of scientif-
ic knowledge therefore becomes problematic. 
James' definition of what is included in the sub-world of science 
is not problematic--he simply follows traditional Newtonian concep-
tions of the world. But the problem of how these 'scientific objects' 
are known, and moreover, believed to be 'real', believed to coerce 
consciousness in regard to their 'realness',is problematic. Wild 
writes that the secondary qualities: 
are dismissed as the effects of scientific causes and, 
therefore as appearances. In this way, they are "reduced 
to relative unreality when their causes come to view", 
though these same appearances are "the things on which 
our knowledge of the causes rests". But how, can a delusion 
conduct us to the truth? James' comment on this paradoxical 
situation is interesting, and shows how deeply he felt the 
need for a more adequate phenomenology which would do 
justice to diverse perspectives (Wild, 1969; internal 
quotation from James, 1890, 2, p. 301). 
Wild is referring to James' comment that "the appearance needs the 
reality in order to exist, but the reality needs the appearance in 
order to be known" (James, 1890, 2, p. 301). The statement may 
appear paradoxical in modern philosophical terms, and it may be 
true that James later came to feel the need of a phenomenological 
framework for his epistemology because of th -4 apparent paradox 
(James' relationship with phenomenology is discussed in Chap. 8). 
But a less paradoxical and more satisfactory explanation of James' 
position in the Principles can perhaps be given in terms of James' 
acceptance of some of the late nineteenth century common assumptions 
about the nature of the physical world--in particular, the mathe-
matical and mechanical assumptions, and the distinction between pri-
mary and secondary qualities. 
The mathematical and logical systems which conceptually deter-
mine the progress of scientific discovery belong to the world of 
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ideal relations. Their believability is not an empirical affair; 
the fiat for their reality comes from their logical consistency 
with one another--to the mind that 'knows' them, they are true, and 
their objects and relations are real. But they are not real in any 
physical sense. Therefore the function of science is to bring to-
gether the ideal and the physical worlds. Science grows out of the 
tension between the two indisputably real sub-worlds of reality. It 
describes physical events, but it does so in terms of abstract or 
ideal systems. Scientific objects are therefore both subjective 
(in the sense that they owe part of their form to the rational system 
of ideal relations), and objective, So far, the psychological 
dynamics are simple enough. If the mind can locate the object it 
thinks about in the physical world, the mind will be satisfied that 
the object exists. But scientific objects, according to James' 
definition, are not that easily located. Thus the criteria James 
uses to come to the conclusion that they are 'believed or believable 
by everyone' must be examined. 
White remarks that "It is clear that James thought that the 
discovery that Newtonian particles exist in outer reality is an em-
pirical affair" (White, 1973, p, 178). White is discussing the 
following statement by James: 
Science thinks she has discovered the objective realities 
in question. Atoms and ether, with no properties but masses 
and velocities expressible by numbers, and paths expressible 
by analytic formulas, these at last are things over which 
the mathematico-logical network may be flung. ...Sensible 
phenomena are pure delusions for the mechanical philosophy. 
The 'things' and qualities we instinctively believe in do 
not exist. The only realities are swarming solids in ever-
lasting motion, undulatory or continued, whose expression-
less and meaningless changes of position form the history 
of the world, and are deducible from initial collocations 
and habits of movement hyhothetically assumed (James, 1890, 
2, p. 665), 
This statement certainly indicates that James really believed that 
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the outer world was made up of Newtonian particles. But how had 
James arrived at this belief? If the statement is taken at face 
value we have grounds for claiming that James accepted the standard 
Newtonian view of science as it applied to the construction of the 
physical world and that his construction of consciousness and his 
construction of the physical world were radically different. Unfort-
unately the situation is far more complex than this,and the answer 
depends on the status of the concept of 'atoms' in James' theory. 
If James believed in Newtonian particles, he also indicated that 
knowledge of the atoms and their movements was hypothetically deduced 
so that the notion that matter is composed of atoms must therefore 
be taken as a fundamental theoretical construct within the broad 
mechanical/mathematical paradigm of Newtonian theory. That para-
digm, like all scientific paradigms, according to James, had its 
genesis in the sub-world of ideal relations and necessary truths, 
which provides both the hypothetical constructs and their particular 
organization into scientific theories, and in the empirical rela-
tions that are observed between events of the order of heat melts 
ice, that salt preserves meat etc. (see James, 1890, 2, p. 637). 
The cohesions that are observed in the sensible world are only "pro-
ximate laws of nature" (James, 1890, 2, p. 637), and as such do 
not constitute a scientific view of the sensible world. The laws 
derived within science must not contradict the proximate laws of 
nature, but scientific laws are not simple abstract formulations 
of the proximate laws of nature. Instead, they constitute a set 
of rules which describe, or attempt to describe, the relations be-
tween selected observed cohesions in the sensible world, Further-
more, scientific laws are generated in spite of the contradictory 
appearances of sensible phenomena, so that James likens belief in 
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the truth of mechanical laws to religious faith (see James, 1890. 2, 
pp. 636-637, quoted above, p. 262). 
What would it mean, then, to say that the discovery that Newton-
ian•particles exist in outer reality is really an empirical affair? 
In James' terms, the verification of an idea consists in finding a 
sensible object that corresponds to the idea. Thus, the verification 
of any idea depends on making a search in the sensible world for a 
corresponding object. But then we have to ask what properties the 
object must have, or how it must be presented to the observer in 
order to qualify as a verification of the idea in the mind of the ob-
server. And this remained a troublesome epistemological problem 
for James (see Chap. 3, pp. 193-196, and Chap. 7, pp. 496-507). 
The search for Newtonian particles is initiated according to James, 
under the rebellious appearances of objects in the perceptual dis-
play (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 636-637, quoted above, p. 262). 
The confirmation that the outer world is made up of Newtonian 
particles can, in James' terms, go no farther than the congruity of 
appearances with the whole corpus of Newtonian theory. The atomic 
theorist looks for confirmation of his theory in the observable 
behaviour of objects--that is, out of the perceptual array he sel-
ects those events which indicate that objects exhibit the properties 
they do because they are composed of Newtonian particles. The dis-
covery that Newtonian particles exist in outer reality is only an 
empirical affair in the sense that the sensible world is searched 
for phenomenal manifestations that indicate that objects would only 
behave in this way or that if they were composed of Newtonian part-
icles. If enough phenomenal evidence of this sort is amassed, the 
theorist believes that his theory is true,
15 
 And the products of 
15. The problem of underlying causes is taken up again in Chap. 9. 
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this correspondence between sensible phenomena and the propositions 
generated within the framework of necessary truth and ideal re-
lations--that is, the scientific object--has a fairly strong coercive 
power over the mind. The scientific object is the product that is 
generated when postulates and experiences from the two sub-worlds 
whose 'reality' cannot be denied by the mind are used together to 
generate a third type of object,. The objects of science are not 
directly locatable in either sub-world so that their power to coerce 
belief is somewhat less than that of objects of the sensible or ideal 
worlds. But their coercive powers are still fairly strong. Thus, 
James' belief that the discovery of Newtonian particles was an em-
pirical affair is subject to the conditions restricting verification 
outlined above, 
On the other hand, James believed that sufficient empirical 
evidence of this sort had been amassed to substantiate the theory, 
that objects were composed of Newtonian particles. He had a progres-
sive view of science: he believed that the universe was growing more 
orderly, more rational, to the human mind (see James, 1890, 2, p. 
669): 
The modern mechanico-physical philosophy of which we are 
all so proud, because it includes the nebular cosmogony, 
the conservation of energy, the kinetic theory of heat and 
gases, etc., etc., begins by saying that the only facts 
are collocations and motions of primordial solids, and the 
only laws the changes of motion which changes in collo-
cation bring (James, 1890, 2, p. 667). 
and, further on: 
So we seek, and seek; and in the molecular systems we 
find a sort of inward belonging in the notion of identity 
of matter with change of collocation. Perhaps by still 
seeking we may find other sorts of inward belonging, even 
between the molecules and those 'secondary qualities', etc., 
which they produce upon our minds. 
It cannot be too often repeated that the triumphant 
application of any one of our ideal systems of rational 
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relations to the real world justifies our hope that other 
systems may be found also applicable. Metaphysics should 
take heart from the example of physics, simply confessing 
that hers is the longer task (James, 1890, 2, p. 671). 
James, like Huxley and Tyndall before him, cannot resist charting 
the progress of science. He seems certain that progress will continue 
in an unbroken sequence, so that metaphysical axioms will eventually 
find substantive objects in the physical world. This concept of pro-
gress, as much as any other consideration, is what allows Jame to 
group metaphysical axioms along with mathematical and mechanical 
postulates. At the time he wrote the Principles, it seems clear that 
James really believed that the nineteenth - century common assumptions 
about the nature of the physical world were true: the physical world 
could be mathematically and mechanically described, it was composed 
of atoms, it exhibited the primary and secondary qualities, and the 
relationships between atoms could be described by 'laws' of motion. 
This is important, given that James disputed the validity of the 
analogous common assumptions in regard to the structure of the mind. 
James' statement that the objects of science are believed or 
believable must still be examined more comprehensively to determine 
what it is about scientific objects that makes them real. Certainly 
they are not believed to be 'real' in the same way that the objects 
of sensation are, because the apprehension of their qualities is 
initially inspired by the ideal relations generated by the mind and 
James takes care to make this clear. Thus, the nature of the ideal 
relations is instrumental in determining the nature of the qualities 
which will be sought in the physical world, and which, if found, 
will be 'realized' as scientific objects. 
White states that James usually claims that "some principles are 
necessary and immutable" (White, 1973, p. 177), while insisting 
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at other times that "there is no such thing as a principle of natural  
science of this kind" (White, 1973, p. 177). And in some places in the 
Principles he comes close to combining the two positions and arguing 
that "the wave-theory of light and theories of pure mathematics are 
alike not only in being 'spontaneous variations' but also in being 
'rational propositions'" (White, 1973, p. 177, see also James, 1890, 
2, p. 669). 
James' commitment to evolutionary theory and his even stronger 
commitment to an efficacious model of consciousness resulted in his 
theory that the ideal relations and necessary truths originally had 
their genesis as spontaneous variations in the mind. At the same time, 
the large body of logical propositions generated within the frame-
work of the necessary truths--and the logical irrefutability of the 
necessary truths themselves--seemed to have a 'truth value' which 
somehow transcended their spontaneous or fortuitous origins. In 
other words, James at times inclined towards rationalism in his pre-
sentation of the necessary truths, and in his presentation of the 
logical propositions and scientific theories that were generated 
from them. Several problems emerge from James' confusion here: 
granting that the necessary truths gradually evolved as the mind 
evolved, through the fortuitous process of spontaneous variation
•(see James, 1890, 2, pp, 618, 627-628, 631, 636, 641), the necessary 
truths and ideal relations have since achieved a 'truth' status 
(for James) that supervenes their natural, fortuitous origins. The 
truth of the rational propositions must be conceded by any individual 
who attends to them, They are rational propositions in the sense 
that their truth can only be questioned from inside the rational 
system (rational propositions can only be nullified by other 
273. 
rational propositions), they are not subject to empirical verifi-
cation, and their truth values are consistently immutable. The 
truth of the propositions, 2 + 2 = 4, is self-verifying within the 
mathematical system: it is not contingent upon outside circumstances. 
The proposition that the necessary truths transcend their origins so 
that a static, immutable, system of self-verifying propositions is 
generated is problematic, given James' commitment to the premise 
that the necessary truths arose in the first place as spontaneous 
variations in the mind. If the necessary truths originated as spon-
taneous variations in the mind, it is logical to assume that these 
truths could potentially be modified or replaced by other spontaneous 
variations through the continued evolution of the mind interacting 
with the physical world. Thus, James' rationalistic approach to the 
status of the necessary truths and the ideal relations conflicts 
with his commitment to evolution.
16 
While necessary truths are self-verifying within their systems, 
we have established that according to James, scientific truths are 
contingent upon the discovery of confirmatory appearances in the 
sensible world. And when James emphasizes the 'fallibility' of 
scientific theories, he also emphasizes their spontaneous origins: 
Every scientific conception is in the first instance a 
'spontaneous variation' in some one's brain. For one 
that proves useful and applicable there are a thousand 
that perish through'their worthlessness. ...the 'scientific' 
conceptions must prove their worth by being 'verified'. 
This test., .is the cause of their preservation, not that of 
their production (James, 1890, 2, p. 636). 
In this mode, the necessary truths act as permanent constructs in the 
mind--the mind is structured so that it compares, classifies, andmakes 
16. This problem is taken up in more detail in Chaps. 7 and 9. 
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logical inferences and mathematical judgements (see James, 1890, 
pp. 644-665).. The necessary truths and ideal relations emerge 
from these propensities of mind and form self-verifying systems. 
The nature of the self-verifying systems seemingly results from the 
structure of mind as it has evolved over time. But the ideal rela-
tions and necessary truths facilitate the generation of propositions 
which purport to rationalize sensible experience--in this case, 
scientific hypotheses. A spontaneous variation, in this sense, is 
a proposition which depends upon the body of necessary truth for its 
terms, but which is not a necessary outcome of the mind's facility 
for comparing concepts. The problem here is whether scientific 
hypotheses are treated as spontaneous outcomes of the play between 
ideas in the mind and the desire to rationalize sensible experience 
(see James, 1899, 2, p. 636), so that they require verification in 
the sensible world (because they are fallible), or whether scientific 
theories are logical extensions of the necessary truths and stand 
as rational propositions in their own right. 
James at times inclines towards rationalism in the sense that 
he confounds the propositions of scientific theory with the necessary 
truths. This means that he sometimes took the position that scienti-
fic propositions could be self-verifying (see White, 1973, pp. 176-
179), The limitations on what constitutes a necessary truth (as 
opposed to a scientific proposition) are not always clear. As White 
asks, did James believe that Newton's gravitational law F - G— 
d 2 
was a rational proposition in the sense of being; "one that we can 
establish merely by comparing concepts"?(White, 1973, p. 179). White 
argues that Newton's law is not a rational proposition in this sense; 
it is a physical law: 
meaning that each particle of matter is attracted by 
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every other particle with a force, F, which is directly 
proportional to the product of their masses, m i and m 2 , 
and inversely proportional to the square of the 
distance, d, between them (White, 1973, p. 178). 
But White also argues convincingly that James was inclined to ele-
vate the proposition beyond its hypothetical verifiability in the 
sensible world and to turn the hypothetical formula into a self-
verifying proposition when he states that natural science: 
strives after,. .a mathematical world-formula, by which, 
if all the collocations and motions at a given moment 
were known, it would be possible to reckon those of any 
wished-for future moment, by simply considering the 
necessary geometrical, arithmetical and logical impli-
cations. Once we have the world in this bare shape, 
we can fling our net of a priori relations over all its 
terms and pass from one of its phases to another by 
inward thought-necessity (James, 1890, 2, pp. 666-667; 
see also James, 1890, 2, p. 669; and White, 1973, pp. 
179, 336). 
It must be concluded that James is taking up a rationalist position 
here because he strongly implies that once the mathematical formula 
is derived, the properties of the physical world can be derived 
solely within the mind's ability to compare its concepts. He is 
confounding the derivation of logical propositions with the deri-
vation of empirically testable hypotheses. 
James' inclination towards rationalism--that is, his confounding 
of necessary and contingent propositions--is largely a result of the 
status of Newtonian theory in his age. Newtonian theory had been 
notoriously successful in 'unravelling' the mysteries of the cosmos, 
and scientific optimism was running high. Theorists really believed 
that ,Newton's laws, and the scientific discoveries that followed 
their acceptance, had eventuated in a unified view of nature. Their 
task was simply to put the finishing touches on the whole edifice 
of scientific theory (see Chap. 1, p. 7). James did not realize 
that Newtonian science was already in trouble for he was unaware of 
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the significance of the changes that were taking place in the physi-
cal sciences. He can hardly be blamed for this; the rumblings in 
physics only become significant from the perspective of historical 
hindsight. Instead, James ratified the progressive view of history, 
holding that the empirical confirmation of scientific theory was 
only necessary to verify the correspondence between phenomenal appear-
ances and scientific hypotheses. He believed that the eternal veri-
ties or necessary truths could not provide the thinker with the 
means of locating their sensible correlates. But if the sensible 
correlates were once discovered, then the thinker could be confident 
"that the eternal verities will obtain of them" (James, 1890, 2, 
p. 663; see also p. 634). Itwas not altogether illogical for James 
to conclude that once the eternal verities, and the mathematical/ 
logical theory derived from them had received confirmation through 
the location of correlated sensible objects and appearances, that 
the mathematical/logical theory would itself be self-verifying when 
its parameters were extended. 
James concludes his discussion of the rationalization of the 
physical world through science as follows: 
Take any other mathematico-mechanical theory and it is the 
same. They are all translations of sensible experiences into 
other forms, substitution of items between which ideal 
relations of kind, lumber, form, equality, etc., obtain, 
for items between which no such relations obtain; coupled 
with declarations that the experienced form is false and 
the ideal form true, declarations which are justified 
by the appearance of new sensible experiences at just 
those times and places at which we logically infer that 
their ideal correlates ought to be. Wave-hypotheses thus 
make us predict rings of darkness and color, distortions, 
dispersions, changes of pitch in sonorous bodies moving 
from us, etc.; molecule-hypotheses lead to predictions of 
vapor-density, freezing point, etc.,--all which predictions 
fall true. 
Thus the world grows more orderly and rational to the 
mind, which passes from one feature of it to another by 
deductive necessity, as soon as it conceives it as made up 
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of so few and so simple phenomena as bodies with no 
properties but number and movement to and fro (James, 1890, 
2, p. 669). 
The objects of science appear to have the ability to compel 
belief because they appear when scientific theories predict they 
will. Finally, they appear as parts of rational, potentially self-
verifying systems in those sections of the Principles where James 
lapses into a rationalist account of science. But James' lapse into 
rationalism must be balanced by the empirical position he advances 
in regard to what makes scientific objects believable. 
Primary Qualities and the Objects of Science  
In constructing his theory of reality, James explicitly states 
that scientific objects are believed in because they can be discov-
ered in the,sensible world. Therefore, the intersection between 
the worlds of sense and science must be examined in order to set up 
criteria of believability for the objects of science. James writes 
that "What science means by 'verification' is no more than this, 
that no object of conception shall be believed which sooner or later 
has not some permanent or vivid object of sensation for its term" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 301). It is the appearance of 'permanent and 
vivid objects of sensation', when and where the scientist predicts 
them that confirm scientific hypotheses. Thisverifiability criter-
ion can be broken down, psychologically, into two major sets of 
realities. On the one hand, the truths of science are regarded as 
logical structures (when James leans towards rationalism). On the 
other, the objects of science are 'real' because they exhibit pri-
mary qualities, or they are 'real' because they appear in the 
secondary qualities as they are understood to be effects of 
primary qualities (see James, 1890, 2, p. 669). 
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James writes that "The molecules and ether-waves of the scienti-
fic world,...simply kick the object's warmth and color out, they 
refuse to have any relations with them" (James, 1890, 2, P. 293). 
The secondary qualities have no place in science. "The objects of 
this scientific world are not related by patterns of human meaning 
and values, but rather by relations of quantitative variables or, 
as James says, by 'laws" (Wild, 1969, p. 148). James' insistence 
that scientific claims are 'believable' because they can be veri-
fied in the 'world of sense' does not appear surprising at first, 
given his breakdown of sensory phenomena into primary and secondary 
qualities, and his assertion that the primary qualities--in both 
the physical and psychological sense--are responsible for particular 
selections from physical reality. There is a correlation between 
the 'realness' of sensory experience and the 'realness' of the'ob-
jects of science. But James is well aware that the sensible world 
is not constructed so as to admit an intuitive verification of scient-
ific postulates. While James stresses that the primary qualities 
of sensible objects are experienced as the 'more' permanent qualities, 
he also stresses that the secondary qualities are perceived as 'real' 
properties of the object. Furthermore, the secondary qualities of the 
sensible world exert a more immediate demand on attention than the 
scientific realities of molecules and vibrations: 
Witness the obduracy with which the popular world of 
colors, sounds, and smells holds it own against that of 
molecules and vibrations. Let the physicist himself but nod, 
like Homer, and the world of sense becomes his absolute 
reality again (James, 1890, 2, p. 302). 
The theories of physics do not describe reality as it is given 
to us through the senses, or, more correctly, they do not describe 
reality as it is immediately experienced. But the objects of physics 
do, according to James, correlate with certain properties of the 
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sensible world, so that our intuitive notions of causation and the 
'sophisticated' physical theories of causation are correlated: 
Sensible objects are thus either our realities or the  
tests of our realities. Conceived objects must show  
sensible effects or else be disbelieved. And the effects, 
even though reduced to relative unreality when their causes 
come to view (as heat, which molecular vibrations make 
unreal), are yet the things on which our knowledge of 
the causes rests. Strange mutual dependence this, in which 
the appearance needs the reality in order to exist, but 
the reality needs the appearance in order to be known! 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 301). 
Sensible appearances and scientific objects would appear to 
come together in James' psychology through his use of the primary 
and secondary qualities distinction. The primary or tactile proper-
ties of the sensible world were shown to provide the most basic data 
for the premise that the reality of the physical world could not be 
doubted while the more fluctuating secondary qualities act as signs 
that real, tactile objects are present. But there is a problem here. 
When James discusses scientific objects in terms of primary and 
secondary qualities, he reverts to the traditional Galilean defin-
ition of primary and secondary qualities. 
Scientific objects, unlike sensible objects, are composed of 
the primary qualities alone so that James is ratifying the ontologi-
cal distinction between the two sets of qualities. He is using the 
distinction in the traditional sense to distinguish between those 
properties which really inhere in the object itself, and those which 
are excited in the mind when the object interacts with a sentient 
observer. He has abandoned the psychological usage of primary and 
secondary qualities, wherein primary qualities were judged irrefut-
ably real because they were capable of producing tactile sensations 
(pain jnd pleasure) in the observer. But there still appears to 
be some correspondence between the two usages of the doctrine in 
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the sub-worlds of sensory and scientific objects. The primary 
qualities which really inhere in objects produce sensations that 
are experienced in particular ways by the observer--that is, the 
primary qualities of objects produce tactile feelings, and the tac-
tile feelings are distinguished from sensations mediated through 
other organs (vision ; smell, hearing, and taste) insofar as they 
are less fluctuating, more immediate. But the psychological use of 
the doctrine is not based on an ontological distinction between the 
two types of qualities: instead, tactile sensations form the base 
of a sensational hierarchy, and are judged most real. James also 
allows that secondary qualities are productive of pleasure and pain, 
and that the adult observer uses secondary qualities as guarantors 
of the presence ofobjects. Primary qualities in James' psychological , 
doctrine are merely more real, or less fluctuating than secondary 
qualities. In his usage of the doctrine to describe the objects 
of science, primary qualities alone are real; secondary qualities 
are the products of the interaction between the primary qualities 
of objects and sentient human observers. 
Sensory objects and scientific objects appear to be related 
through the shared possession of primary qualities at least. The 
observer experiences the primary qualities of objects through the 
senses, and thus experiences them in terms of their pleasure and 
pain producing proclivities, but it might be argued that the quali-
ties that are 'known' in both sub-worlds remain constant, so that 
scientific hypotheses could be verified through the senes. However, 
the case is not quite that simple. James typically defines scienti-
fic objects as collocations of atoms or molecules in motion. But 
in another section of the Principles, scientific objects are alluded 
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to as "nothing real but solids and fluids and their 'laws'.. .of 
motion" (James, 1890, 2, p. 292). The fit between an atomistic or 
reductionist theory of matter and the Galilean form of the distinct-
ion between primary and secondary qualities has always been diffi-
cult, simply because the primary (real) qualities are identified 
with certain qualities of objects as perceived, while the qualities 
of atoms, as such, are not perceivable. If scientific objects are 
defined as atoms in motion, then the primary qualities of the 
psychological distinction and the primary qualities of the scientific 
distinction (as it was popularized by Galileo) are not identical. 
The primary qualities of molecules in motion manifest themselves 
to the observer in primary and secondary qualities indifferently. 
In the example cited above (see p. 279), James writes that molecular 
vibrations produce the effect of heat for the observer. Thus, apply-
ing the primary and secondary qualities distinction, we find that 
the primary quality of movement produces the secondary quality of 
heat for the observer. In the psychological distinction, however, 
the tactile sensation of heat would have to be adjudged the primary 
quality, while the molecular motion, would be secondary. In general, 
motion (which was a primary quality for Galileo and thus for subse-
quent thinkers), could only occasionally be accounted primary on 
James' psychological distinction--that is, only when the motion is 
of bodies large enough to be felt as wholes. 
When James defines scientific objects as solids and fluids and 
their laws of motion, the 'Galilean' form of the doctrine can be 
• applied to perceivable objects, and we could conceivably expect to 
find a correspondence between primary qualities in the psychological 
sense and primary qualities in the ontological sense. The Galilean 
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primary qualities of figure (shape), number and motion, would all 
be tactually perceivable. Thus, scientific hypotheses could be 
verified through sensory experience. If scientific objects are 
defined as atoms in motion, however, the sensory verification of 
scientific hypotheses is more difficult, or less direct. Atoms in 
motion are not experienceable through ordinary sensory means. The 
existence of atoms is inferred by the discovery of regular patterns 
of events in the sensible world. Furthermore, the notion of an 
atomic theory of matter has its genesis in the world of ideal rela- 
tions and necessary truths, and not in the world of sensible objects. 
The relationship between scientific and sensible objects is 
problematic because James most consistently defined scientific ob-
jects as atoms in motion. 17 This means, essentially, that he is 
accepting the notion that primary qualities belong to atoms in motion, 
and that these underlying primary qualities produce the sensed, or 
psychological primary and secondary qualities of the sensible objects. 
And it follows from this that sensible primary and secondary quali-
ties are used indifferently to infer the presence and activity of 
atoms in motion: 
Wave-hypotheses thus make us predict rings of colour 
distortions, dispersions, changes of pitch in sonorous 
bodies moving from us, etc.; molecule-hypotheses lead to 
predictions of vapor-density, freezing point, etc.,-- 
all which predictions fall true (James, 1890, 2, p. 669), 
James is not concerned with demonstrating that some experienced 
properties of objects are real, while others appear only when the 
primary qualities of objects interact with sentient observers. 
Instead, he is concerned with demonstrating the means whereby 
17. The only place where James defines scientific objects as solids 
and fluids and their motions is James, 1890, 2, p. 292. , Throughout 
the rest of the Principles he consistently describes scientific 
objects as atoms in motion. 
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sensible objects can be used to substantiate hypotheses based on 
the definition of scientific objects as atoms in motion (see James, 
1890, 2, pp. 668-671). The hypothesis that James intended to link 
the sensible world and the scientific world through the primary and 
secondary qualities doctrine--that is, through an identity of pri-
mary qualities--must be discarded. Scientific theorizing and veri-
fication proceed according to the following pattern: the mind, with 
its abstract capacities--described in the operations of the ideal 
relations and necessary truths--is motivated to rationalize sensible 
experience. The generation of any scientific theory is therefore 
determined by the particular abstract capacities of the mind and 
the build-up of sensible experience. Atomic theories are therefore 
generated to 'explain' selected appearances (see James, 1890, 2, 
p. 667). The scientific theory begins as an abstract, ideal propo-
sition--for example, that the mathematical sum (called the total 
energy of the molecules considered), containing the mutual distances 
between objects, is constant throughout their movements (see James, 
1890, 2, p< 668). The scientist then returns to the world of sens-
ory experience to determine whether or not sensible objects appear 
to behave in the ways predicted by this mathematical/mechanical 
formula. In attempting to verify his hypothesis, the scientist 
searches for sensible phenomena such as rings of colour, distortions, 
changes in pitch, vapor density, etc. (see James, 1890, 2, p. 669, 
quoted above, p, 282). Sensible appearances serve as confirmations 
of scientific theories because "the things of Nature turn out to 
act as if they were of the kind assumed. They behave as such mere 
drawing and driving atoms would behave" (James, 1890, 2, p. 668). 
The psychological form of the primary and secondary qualities 
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distinction does not aid the scientist directly in his attempt to 
disengage scientific objects from beneath their sensible manifesta-
tions. It is instrumental only insofar as it provides a formal 
•description of the properties which sensible objects possess, and 
which coerce our unquestioning belief in their independent reality. 
The belief in the reality of sensible objects is critical to scienti-
fic theorizing because it provides the only possible insurance that 
scientific objects exert real effects--that is, that the primary 
• qualities inhere in them, so that the psychologically apprehended 
primary and secondary qualities have their genesis in underlying 
causes. To this end, James writes: 
The conceived system, to pass for true, must at least  
include the reality of the sensible objects in it, by  
explaining them as effects on us, if nothing more. The  
system which includes the most of them, and definitely  
explains or pretends to explain the most of them, will  
ceteris paribus, prevail (James, 1890, 2, p. 312). 
The existence of scientific objects can therefore only be in-
directly verified, but these indirect verifications are accepted 
because the scientific objects conform to some (although not all) 
of the demands of the sensible world and the world of ideal relations. 
. We have made the distinction between ideal relations that are self-
verifying, and those which require verification in the sensible 
world. Scientific theories display logical relationships between 
their parts, and even if they are not self-verifying, they are 'satis-
fying' in a logical sense. The correlation between appearances and 
theoretical postulates adds to the believability of scientific 
theories: the realness of sensible appearances cannot be doubted. 
And when sensible appearances seem to confirm that objects behave 
in the ways that they would if scientific hypotheses were true, the 
credibility of the hypothesis is ensured. The motivation to believe 
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in the objects of science is largely given through James' belief 
that the mind is constituted to rationalize the world--the thinker 
wants to believe that cause and effect are lawfully determined, and 
any evidence that supports this conception is treated seriously. 
The believability of scientific objects depends upon the corre-
lation of abstract hypotheses and sensible experience, and therefore 
scientific objects occupy a more precarious place in the hierarchy 
of belief than either of the two sub-worlds responsible for their 
generation. That is to say, the objects of science are discarded as 
believable objects when new theories are generated which take account•
of a wider range of sensible phenomena. James did not anticipate 
the collapse of Newtonian science; he believedthat the Newtonian 
science of the late nineteenth century had the rationalization of 
the physical world well in hand, dnd he believed that progress to-
wards this end would be cumulative. The point is that he left room 
in his theory for a major paradigm shift in regard to the nature of 
scientific objects, and he allowed for change and development within 
the broad Newtonian paradigm. This is quite a different matter from 
the claim that he believed that the physical world could really be 
described by the mathematical/mechanical theory of Newtonian science. 
If he believed in the reality of Newtonian atoms, he was on the verge 
of developing a relativistic conception of scientific progress. 
That he did not actually manage to do so will be shown to be largely 
the result of his faith in the science of his day,
18 
18. This issue is discussed in Chaps. 7 and 9. 
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The Metaphysical, Aesthetic, and Ethical Axioms of the  
World of Ideal Relations  
Of the metaphysical axioms James says: "But alongside of these 
ideal relations between terms which the world verifies, there are 
other ideal relations not as yet so verified" (James, 1890, 2, P. 
669). James places the metaphysical axioms in the world of ideal 
relations because he believes that metaphysical axioms do not make 
a particularly close 'fit' with many of the events in the natural 
world: 
But all around these incipient successes (as all around 
the molecular world, so soon as we add to it as its 
'effects' those illusory 'things' of common-sense which 
we had to butcher for its sake), there still spreads a 
vast field of irrationalized fact whose items _simply are 
together, and from one to another of which we can pass by 
no ideally 'rational' way (James, 1890, 2, p. 670). 
The purpose of these axioms lies elsewhere: they provide the 
'framework' for the rationalization of the world of sense (see James, 
1890, 2, pp. 670-671, quoted below). Verification of the metaphy-
sical axioms is therefore extremely problematic: for every case 
where the axioms 'fit' with particular natural events, we are likely 
to find contrary, or 'irrelevant' cases in nature. Thus James jus-
tifies the role of the metaphysical axioms in the rationalization 
of reality as follows: 
It is not that these more metaphysical postulates of 
rationality are absolutely barren--though barren enough 
they were when used, as the scholastics used them, as 
immediate propositions of fact. They have a fertility as 
ideals, and keep us uneasy and striving always to recast 
the world of sense until its lines become more congruent 
with theirs. Take for example the principle that 'nothing 
can happen without a cause'. We have no definite idea of 
what we mean by cause, or what causality consists in. But 
the principle expresses a demand for some deeper sort of 
inward connection between phenomena than their merely 
habitual time-sequence seems to us to be. The word 'cause' 
is, in short, an alter to an unknown god; an empty pedestal 
still marking the place of a hoped-for statue. Any real 
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inward belonging-together of the sequent terms, if 
discovered, would be accepted as what the word cause 
was meant to stand for. So we seek, and seek; and in 
the molecular systems we find a sort of inward belonging 
in the notion of identity of matter with change of collo-
cation. Perhaps by still seeking we may find other sorts 
of inward belonging, even between the molecules and those 
'secondary qualities', etc., which they produce upon our 
minds. 
It cannot be too often repeated that the triumphant 
application of any one of our ideal systems of rational 
relations to the real world justifies our hope that other 
systems may be found also applicable. Metaphysics should 
take heart from the example of physics, simply confessing 
that hers is the longer task. Nature may be remodelled, nay, 
certainly will be remodelled, far beyond the point at present 
reached. Just how far?--is a question which only the whole 
future history of Science and Philosophy can answer. Our 
task being Psychology, we cannot even cross the threshold 
of that larger problem (James, 1890, 2, pp. 670-671). 
The fertility of the metaphysical ideals lies in the fact that 
they are not immediately verifiable. They require, therefore, an 
extra fiat of belief to keep them in consciousness and to keep us 
actively engaged in realizing their potential in the world. Beliefs 
of this kind satisfy the emotional and active needs, whereas beliefs 
in scientific, mathematical, and logical postulates satisfy intel-
lectual needs (see James, 1890, 2, p. 317). Belief, in this emotional 
sense, becomes the active faculty most often associated with James' 
famous 'will to belicve'. The function of the metaphysical axioms 
is to act as the instigations for change in the natural world. There 
is little or nothing in the natural world to coerce the individual 
into believing in any particular metaphysical axiom. In James' view, 
perceptual evidence confirms our scientific belief in the molecular 
'substructure' of the physical world, but he insists that no amount 
of perceptual evidence can be satisfactorily offered for the prin-
ciple 'nothing can happen without a cause'. The rationale for be-
lieving in such a principle is that having faith in its veracity 
may eventually, facilitate the rationalization of the world in such 
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a way that the proposition becomes true. This same rationale pro-
vides the basis for James' pragmatic methodology.  
Metaphysical axioms would appear to occupy a position somewhere 
between the self-verifying propositions of mathematics and logic, 
and scientific theories in the world of ideal relations and neces-
sary truths. Ideal relations of the highest order--for example, 
mathematical relations of the type 2+ 2= 4--are self-verifying; they 
can be neither verified nor falsified by any appeal to the physical 
world. Scientific objects, on the other hand, must be discovered 
in the sensible world if they are to retain their believability. 
Metaphysical axioms take up a position half-way between these two 
types of ideal objects because they do persist when challenged. They 
can , only be challenged by other metaphysical axioms, or at best by 
partial evidence in the physical world. But while they are believable 
as logical propositions, they are not self-verifying. The truth of 
a proposition such as 'nothing happens without a cause' is not co-
ercive in the same sense that the truth of the proposition 2 + 2 = 4 
is On the other hand, the compilation of events with seemingly de- 
finable causes does not constitute 'proof' for the postulate either, 
for the survey of events is never exhaustive, and causes are only 
deducible from effects, so that causes are only potentially 'discover-
able' beneath phenomenal appearances. 
Metaphysical axioms induce the type of belief that James advo-
cates in The will to believe He contrasts science, morality, and 
religion so that: 
Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions 
whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral 
question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of 
what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can 
tell us what exists; but to compare the worths, both of what 
exists and of what does not exist, we must consult not 
science, but what Pascal calls our heart. Science herself 
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consults her heart when she lays it down that the infinite 
ascertainment of fact and correction of false belief are the 
supreme goods for man. Challenge the statement, and science 
can only repeat it oracularly, or else prove it by showing 
that such ascertainment and correction bring man all sorts 
of other goods which man's heart in turn declares. The 
question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them 
is decided by our will, Are our moral preferences true or 
false, or are they only odd biological phenomena, making 
things good or bad for us, but in themselves indifferent? 
How can your pure intellect decide? If your heart does not 
want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never 
in.51-6- you believe in one (James, 1896/1911, pp. 22-23). 
While the mind may be 'coerced' into believing in scientific 
objects, belief in metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical postulates 
cannot be coerced. Belief in these postulates requires an effort of 
will; this is James' famous will to believe, and it comes into play 
when no evidence exists for making the choice between accepting or 
rejecting the unverifiable option. Selection is 'free', for there 
are no 'empirical facts' to persuade the individual into accepting or 
rejecting a given axiom. Nor can the individual be coerced into be-
lieving in the axiom because it is self-verifying. 
The concept of belief, in the active sense of believing in yet 
unverifiable options, was James' major legacy from Renouvier and 
it lies at the heart of his philosophy. Perry describes Renouvier's 
system as follows: 
Belief is nothing, if not sure; reason cannot ensure it; 
therefore, the consummation of belief can take place only 
through an act of will--a premature and hazardous self-
commitment. The only sort of justification which such an 
excess of assurance over evidence can possess is a moral 
justification. So we are brought back to the subjective  
basis of belief. This does not mean that belief is subject- 
ively extemporized, or created out of whole cloth; but that 
belief is completed--clinched, adopted, fixated--by a 
subjective act impelled by subjective motives. And once 
the legitimacy of these motives is granted they are entitled 
to a sphere of their own. Broadly speaking, we may say that 
where experience and logic are not decisive, and where 
there is at the same time a practical need of belief, there  
belief may and should be dictated by moral and religious , 
considerations. As a matter of fact, says Renouvier, 
followed by James, all of the great philosophical systems 
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are expressions of the temperaments and inclinations of 
their authors, however much they may profess to submit 
only the irresistible proof (Perry, 1935/1974, 1, p. 657). 
The function of this special kind of belief is to provide assent 
and affirmation to ideas which cannot be verified through experience, 
or through logical deduction. When the mind is compelled by actual 
objects or consistent relations within conceptual systems, belief 
is merely a kind of passive assent to what is already 'known'. Pur-
posively speaking, the function of the will to believe is to propel 
action in accordance with ideas which are not already substantiated 
in experience, and may not be substantiated through the ordinary 
means of scientific procedure: 
But is it psychologically possible that will should induce 
belief? Renouvier's answer is that this is the one and only 
thing that will can induce. The will cannot act directly 
on the body, but applies itself, in the form of attention, 
to ideas; and when an idea is thus dwelt upon and survives 
to the exclusion of others, it straightway expresses itself 
in appropriate action. This is the doctrine of will which 
James said he owed to Renouvier (Perry, 1935/1974, 1, pp. 657- 
658). 
This is clear enough. But the selection of 'objects' or 
'options' where such effort of the will is necessary is more proble-
matic. Are metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical beliefs uncon- 
strained? In "The will to believe", James insists that the decision 
to believe or not believe in any option (for example, to believe in 
Christianity or agnosticism, in Mohammedanism or theosophy), is de-
termined by whether or not the option is 'living' or 'dead', 'forced' 
or 'avoidable', and 'momentous' or 'trivial' (see James, 1896/1911, 
p.3). Living options are those "in which both hypotheses are live 
ones" (James, 1896/1911, p. 3); forced options are those decisions 
where "there is no standing place outside of the alternative" 
(James, 1896/1911, p.3); while 'momentous' options are unusual or 
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unique opportunities. The refusal to choose between living, forced, 
and momentous options loses the chance of 'greatness' as surely as 
trying and failing (see James, 1896/1911, p.4). What is it then, 
• which makes one option living, forced, or momentous, and makes another 
dead, unforced, or trivial? James' only comment is that our willing 
nature has previously selected another option which is antagonistic 
to the 'dead' option (see James, 1896/1911, pp. 8-9). He then des-
cribes the 'live' options for 'nineteenth century New England' (see 
James, 1896/1911, p, 9; and Kuklick, 1977, p. 172), adding only 
that "we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use" 
- (James, 1896/1911, p. 10). Thus Clifford and Huxley find no 'use' 
for traditional Christianity whilst Newman does (see James, 1896/ 
1911, p. 10). Furthermore, metaphysics and ethics present a wide 
and often conflicting panoply of possible options (see James, 1896/ 
1911, p. 16). Writers such as Knox (see Knox, 1914, p.77), view 
the range of options as evidence of James' insistence on individual-
ism and freedom and are content to leave the analysis there. Kuklick 
is not satisfied and rightly claims that James failed to develop a 
social theory of ethics, seeking refuge in the psychological dyna-
mics of belief (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 177). 
James' failure to go beyond examples in terms of what makes an 
option living or dead, makes it difficult to determine how free of 
constraint ethical and metaphysical selections are. For example, 
Huxley adopted an agnostic position in regard to religious truths 
when he became a Darwinian. Agnosticism was compatible with Huxley's 
belief in the .'rightness' of evolutionary theory, and his ethical 
decision to disbelieve in the argument from design was compatible 
with his strong desire to affirm the uniformity of nature as defined 
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within the mathematical/mechanical model of nature (see Goudge, 
1967, P.  102). Huxley therefore made an ethical decision to 'be-
lieve' in evolutionary theory and to take an agnostic position with 
regard to religion. But his ethical decision, in Jamesian terms, 
cannot be considered an absolutely free decision because James 
claims that "Science can tell us what exists" (James, 1896/1911, 
p. 22). Huxley was caught between two momentous, live, and forced 
options regarding evolution and religion. The question is whether 
or not scientific evidence was necessarily determinative in setting 
up the dilemma in the first place and whether its existence necessi-
tated the rejection of one option if the other was accepted. 
Carpenter was caught in the same dilemma, agreed that the evidence 
for evolution was coercive, and accepted the theory. But he was un-
willing to make a concomitant rejection of religion, believing 
instead that religion and evolutionary theory would ultimately prove 
compatible. Thus Huxley need not have affirmed the 'truth' of evo-
lutionary postulates at the expense of Christian arguments on the 
basis of scientific evidence per se. The evidence for evolutionary 
theory necessitated reworkings in both scientific and religious 
paradigms, and to the extent that it necessitated such reworkings, 
it was coerceive. It was not, however, determinative in the selection 
of the metaphysical options (for example, the uniformity of nature 
versus Christianity). 
• The adoption of particular metaphysical and ethical postulates 
is not determined by the objects of other sub-worlds of reality but 
it is constrained by them, and this is important, if James' notion 
of 'live' options is to be taken seriously. In the examples above, 
metaphysical beliefs are constrained by factors other than other 
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possible metaphysical axioms. James at times seems to have been 
blinded by his own conception of what a 'perfect' metaphysical belief 
would consist in and what its 'truth' would do for the understand- 
ing of the world. In the Principles he says: 
The perfect object of belief would be a God or 'Soul of  
the World', represented both optimistically and moralisti-
cally (if such a combination could be), and withal so  
definitely conceived as to show us why our phenomenal  
experiences should be sent to us by Him in just the very  
way in which they come. All Science and History would thus 
be accounted for in the deepest and simplest fashion. ... 
It is safe to say that, if ever such a system is satisfactorily 
excogitated, mankind will drop all other systems and cling 
to that one alone as real. Meanwhile the other systems 
coexist with the attempts at that one, and, all being alike 
fragmentary, each has its little audience and day (James, 
1890, 2, p. 317). 
Such perfect objects of belief as these may not be constrained 
by definable objects in the other sub-worlds of reality, and may in 
fact arise more directly out of the back-door tendencies. But there 
is no guarantee of this, and James' evaluation of metaphysical and 
ethical postulates as areas of free selection may in fact be a major 
weakness in his theory of belief and in his pragmatic methodology. 
Conclusions  
The discussion of the three major sub-worlds of reality has 
emphasized the conditions which are necessary for the mind to assent 
to the reality of any event or object that is experienced. The con-
straints on 'free selectivity' are fairly tight--the mind is coerced 
by internal or external constructs to grant reality to objects in 
the sub-worlds of sense and ideal relations. The mind selects; it 
does not create, and this means that whether or not the mind is effi-
cacious depends on the degree of constraint on free selectivity 
operative in each sub-world of reality. It is important, too, that 
the mind is not unstructured, that the mind 'interprets' any piece 
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of experience according to congenital and developed constructs. 
Perry treats the 'inborn' tendencies in the context of describing 
James' nativism': by nativism he means James' "general tendency 
to emphasize what is original rather than what is acquired" (Perry, 
1935/1974, 2, p. 80), and he goes on to say that: 
This took two forms. In the first place, influenced by 
Darwin, he credited the human mind with a liberal share of 
inborn traits and aptitudes. This appears in his long list 
of human instincts, and his apparent readiness to add to 
the list, as well as in his recognition of innate categories 
which predetermine the human modes of thinking and even of 
experience, In the second place, he believed in the diversity 
and fecundity of first experiences (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
p. 80 
While James believed that the physical world influenced the 
mind by 'stamping copies' of space and time relationships upon con-
sciousness, so that "the mind is passive and tributary, a servile 
copy, fatally and unresistingly fashioned from without" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 632), he insisted that the scientific ordering of the world 
resulted from the verification of internally generated theories so 
that: "Instead of experiences engendering the 'inner relations', 
the inner relations are what engendered the experiences here" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 638). The mind is so constructed that it automatically 
compares and classifies information it receives (see James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 643-646), This means that even the space-time relations, passive-
ly received, can be, and have been, translated into mathematical/ 
mechanical/logical systems. The tendencies of the mind to compare 
and classify information therefore result in the great conceptual 
systems (see James, 1890, 2, p. 659). 
But the fact that the mind is active, selective, and that it is 
structured to compare and classify does not guarantee that it is 
efficacious, As Kuklick says: 
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The contents of consciousness...were empirical, and 
•the function of mind was selective attention: it accentuated 
and emphasized certain items and did the reverse with others. 
This was the contrast between the empirical (empirical 
contents of the mind) and a priori (the selective attention 
definitive of mind) (Kuklick, 1977, p. 169). 
The nature of selective attention is determined in part by the 
mental tendencies and traits and the subsequent 'build-up' of con-
ceptions about the nature of reality. Furthermore, as Kuklick em-
phasizes, James insisted that the mind itself could not make changes 
in the physical constitution of the universe (see Kuklick, 1977, pp. 
173-174), and he makes the distinction between what the mind might 
'like' to be real and what the will can effect in the way of change 
in the physical world (see Kuklick, 1977, pp. 167-168). 
James made two separate attempts to demonstrate that conscious-
ness is efficacious. His first attempt at a teleological definition 
of mind (see Chap.2), did not provide a 'scientific' construct for 
psychology, and as Kuklick points out, James had given up the notion 
of a specific fiat of belief or assent by the time he came to con-
struct the stream of consciousness (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 178). The 
'fiat' of the interest theory was transferred to the ability of 
consciousness to differentially attend to ideas (see Kuklick, 1977, 
p. 178). James' second option was to make the mind an organ of 
selection; this is the viewpoint of the Principles, and James attempts 
to define the mind's relationship to the various sub-worlds of 
reality in such a way that there is room for 'free' choice within 
the interaction between inner and outer constructs. The structure 
of the sub-worlds of reality is crucial in this context because the 
nature of the object determines, in part, how the object will be 
experienced by consciousness. At the same time, James struggles to 
stay within the confines of psychology so that the nature of objects 
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can only be discussed within the context of human experience. This 
means that the question of free will cannot be decided within the 
confines of psychological investigation--and James is well aware of 
this. Thus, the problem of whether or not the mind is efficacious 
cannot be resolved within the confines of psychology: all that James 
can do is to construct the relationship between the mind and its 
objects in a form that is most conducive to an interpretation of 
mind as efficacious. He therefore tries to define the operations 
of the mind and its interaction with the sub-worlds of reality so 
that mind is sometimes coerced, and sometimes 'free'. He does this 
by attempting to create a structural 'hierarchy' of belief; that is, 
the mind is both 'passive' and 'active' in its beliefs, and in cer-
tain circumstances, can choose to attend to this object rather than 
that. This position is somewhat dangerous because it appears to 
lead to a functional dualism which could potentially impair the 
structural unity of the mind. The principles of selectivity and the 
'hierarchy' of realities are combined in the Principles and James' 
hope is to thereby establish a framework in which the first option--
that is, a teleological definition of mind--could be considered, 
But the difficulties of establishing a selective 'hierarchy' are 
compounded by James' own indecision regarding idealism and scientific 
materialism. 
James was caught, according to Kuklick, between the demands of 
scientific materialism and Royce's idealism (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 
183), and this dilemma was reflected in his writings on the nature 
of science and metaphysics. Kuklick writes that James: 
half-heartedly defended a scientific psychology and a 
metaphysical idealism, neither of which satisfied him; and 
he half-heartedly defended a distinction between the two 
which he did not believe. ..,There was a similar synthesis 
in the development of the functionalist or pragmatic view 
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of mind; it too followed from James' unsatisfactory view 
of the scientific and real worlds (Kuklick, 1977, pp. 184- 
' 185). 
Kuklick presents a cogent analysis of James' difficulties, He states 
that James' belief in Renouvier's skepticism regarding the absolute 
status of truth was shattered by Royce's argument that ideas were 
transcendent in the sense that they were true or fase because they 
'intended' an absolute idea (Kuklick, 1977, p. 177). Thus, according 
to Kuklick, James wavered between scientific materialism and Royce's 
idealism, breaking his psychology into two distinct strands to 
accommodate both streams of philosophy. This hypothesis enlarges 
White's criticism that James wavered between rationalism and the 
'spontaneous variation' of scientific theories, and both of these 
criticisms lend weight to the hypothesis that, whatever his intent-
ions were regarding the construction of a hierarchical conception 
of selectivity, James' theory of belief must be analyzed in terms 
of the dualisms it incorporates. 
That James intended to construct a hierarchical model of belief 
is confirmed by the hierarchy of selection he established. The 
hierarchy is organized in terms of the constraints imposed on the 
selection of possible 'objects'. The organs of sensation are 
physiologically constructed so that certain types of objects, effects, 
or relations can be experienced. Others cannot, so that the found-
ations of experienced sensations are totally constrained. Next, 
the world of sense provides a large range of options for selective 
attention, but its objects cannot be disbelieved if they are attend-
ed to at all: the physical properties of the objects themselves, 
and their subsequent effects on the individual, force him to assent 
to their independent reality. Moreover, selection is constrained 
by the nature of the physical world: the individual is forced by 
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the 'nature of things' •to attend to certain objects, while others 
have a lesser means of forcing attention. This world has a hier-
archical construction; the tactile properties of objects demand 
unhesitating assent to their independent reality and the qualities 
themselves are not 'selected' by the mind. The properties which 
appeal to the other senses demand assent, but there is more room for 
variation in selecting particular aspects of the property. The 
appearances of the secondary qualities shift through time and space; 
what is assented to as comprising their 'real' appearances is based 
on selective experience (see James, 1890, 2, pp, 77-78) and it is 
also influenced by the primary qualities that 'produce' the effect 
on the mind. Selection is less constrained when the individual 
selects the object according to its 'essence', for the individual 
selects one 'property' of the object as 'essential' according to his 
needs, and he is free (within specifiable limits) to ignore the other 
'essential' qualities of the object. 
Selection is freer still in the world of ideal relations--not 
because the mind does not compare its objects in determinable and 
determined ways, but because it need not compare them at all. James 
says that "It need not compare its materials but if once roused to 
do so, it can compare them with but one result, and this is a fixed 
consequence of the materials themselves" (James, 1890, 2, p. 643). 
The mind is constructed so that it attempts to make a 'fit' between 
its own logical constructs and the physical world (see James, 1890, 
2, p. 667), but it is compelled no further. Furthermore, the mind 
is compelled to grant assent to the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4, if 
it attends to the proposition, but it is not compelled to attend to 
this truth as it is compelled to attend to the sensation of pain 
that accompanies being stabbed by a dagger. The realities of the 
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ideal world correspond to the realities of the world of sense be-
cause they are 'universally recognizable' objects, and as such, 
command assent to their reality. But the parallel can be taken no 
farther. The 'believability' of the ideal relations is based on the 
structure of the mind; the ideal relations are 'believed' because 
the basic development of conceptualization is predetermined--prede-
termined because the mind receives time and space relations from 
the world of pure experience, and predetermined because the mind 
compares and classifies the objects of experience according to the 
'inclinations' of the back-door processes_ 
In addition to the self-verifying propositions of logic and 
mathematics,James' world of ideal relations is also a repository 
for those axioms which are empirically verified, and those which are 
only potentially verifiable, and thus require an extra fiat of be-
lief to maintain their place in consciousness. The systems which 
can be verified--in this case, scientific theories--are more immed-
iately believable than those which cannot--that is, the metaphysical, 
aesthetic, and ethical systems. This is an artificial division 
based on James' conception of the progress of science: none of these 
systems are 'absolutely' coercive in gaining conscious assent for 
their believability because they partially rely on verification in 
the world of sense. When corresponding physical objects and rela-
tions are discovered, the 'objects' and the theory are believed to 
be real expressions of the physical world. So far, according to 
James, the only sensible objects that have been discovered to cor-
respond with the logical deductions from the necessary truths are 
those which correspond to mathematical/mechanical/logical systems 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 665). These are the objects of science, 
and James says that they are believable by all (see James, 1890, 2, 
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p. 292). 
The objects of science pose the greatest problem because their 
genesis and qualitative status as objects of belief cannot be 'fixed' 
within the hierarchy. They mediate between two distinct sub-worlds 
of reality but the characteristics which give them this function 
are not clearly defined. Had James taken a strong position regard-
ing the genesis of scientific theories--had he concluded that they 
were logical deductions from the necessary truths themselves--that 
they resulted from the mind comparing its conceptions, thus taking a 
'rationalist' or 'idealist' (see White, 1973; Kuklick, 1977) stance, 
he would have had grounds for assuming that the 'objects' of science 
were believable because they conformed to the dictates of the neces-
sary truths. He also had the option of developing the notion that 
scientific theories were 'spontaneous variations', and linking their 
objects more closely with experience. In order to do this, however, 
he would have had to take a more 'Spencerian' line regarding the 
genesis of conception--that is, he would have had to take the position 
that the evolution of the back-door processes was determined or 
'shaped' by the physical environment, He was reluctant to do this, 
and went to some trouble in the Principles to refute Spencer's 
theory of the genesis of the necessary truths (see James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 620-632). Had he accepted Spencer's formula, scientific objects 
would necessarily have been believable because they would correspond 
with pre-determined mental constructs, which in turn, would be deter-
mined by experience in the physical world, 
James wavered between both of these alternatives. He wanted to 
ensure that the mind functioned independently of any absolute postu-
lates. To his way of thinking, pinning mind to the Rationalist 
absolute was as much a detriment to freedom as including it in the 
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mechanical model of the automatists or determinists (see Kuklick, 
1977, P.  174), But James was careful to insist that the structures 
of mind are not dependent on the structures of the physical world: 
This world might be a world in which all things differed, 
and in which what properties there were were ultimate 
and had no farther predicates. In such a world there would 
be as many kinds as there were separate things. ...But 
our world is no such world. It is a very peculiar world, 
and plays right into logic's hands (James, 1890, 2, pp. 651- 
652). 
We learn, through experience, which things are of the same kind, 
which things remain in the same state, and which things come together 
(see James, 1890, 2, p, 652). This experience is correlated with 
the structural operations of the mind, so that inferences can be made 
about the world which go beyond sensory experience. The world and 
the mind interact, but logical, mathematical, and classificatory 
systems are developed 'independently' of the structure of the physi-
cal world itself. Given that the physical world did not manifest 
any'classifiable' characteristics "lOgical relations would obtain, 
and be known (doubtless) as they are now, but they would form a 
merely theoretiç scheme and be of no use for the conduct of life" 
(James, 1890, 2, p, 652). 
James appears to be taking the position that the 'fit' between 
the systems generated by the structures of the mind, and the physi-
cal world, is purely a fortuitous fit. And this casts doubt on the 
'universal believability' of scientific objects. If the fit between 
conception and the physical world is made fortuitous on an a priori  
basis, then the objects that science discovers may in fact really 
exist in the world, but they may form only a small and singular sub-
set of potential objects. Moreover, the appearances which indicate 
the presence of atoms in motion (in James' theory) may in fact be 
due to underlying effects so far 'undiscovered'. James was able 
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to make the fit 'believable' because he was unable to foresee that 
the mathematical/mechanical/logical interpretation of the physical 
world could give way. He was a Newtonian in his beliefs about the 
construction of the physical world because he could not be anything 
else. 
James' insistence (in the Principles) that scientific objects 
were believed or believable by all to be real, and his assertion in 
"The will to believe" that the mind was coerced into believing in 
the objects of science, clashes with his insistence that the meta-
physical, aesthetic, and ethical axioms were ultimately free of con-
straints from the physical world. He claimed that no definite veri-
fications of these postulates could yet be made; they stand as 
guiding principles rather than as descriptions of what the world is 
like. Their function is to "keep us uneasy and striving always to 
recast the world of sense until its lines become more congruent with 
theirs" (James, 1890, 2, p. 671). These are the principles which 
require will to believe in their truth or 'realness'. It is the 
coercive nature of scientific principles opposed to the uncoercive 
status of the ethical and metaphysical axioms which creates the 
functional dichotomy in James' theory of reality and this problew 
must now be discussed. 
Belief serves two distinct functions in James' psychology. In 
the world of sense and the world of ideal relations, belief in the 
'realness' or 'truth' of the object often appears to coincide with 
what the mind cannot help knowing. The mind passively assents to 
the reality of the object in its particular context. Believing in 
the 'reality' of the object in this sense also ensures that the indi-
vidual is prepared to act appropriately in response to the object 
when it appears. Belief, like cognition, facilitates purposive 
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behaviour so that the 'thought that the teakettle is full' is equi-
valent to the 'belief that the teakettle is full' (see above, pp. 
187-189; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 321; and Wild, 1969, p. 142). 
Beliefs about the 'reality' of sensible objects are therefore intent-
ional. In this sense, the equivalence between belief and thought 
applies only to a possible 'set' of thoughts about 'real' objects 
and our intentions regarding them. 
The psychological dynamics of belief in regard to the objects 
of science are more complex than the dynamics of beliefs about sens-
ible objects. Because the content of any system derived from the 
eternal verities is at such a remove from the actual physical world, 
belief is uncoerced by the physical world. There is simply nothing 
in the physical order of experience to coerce from us the ideas we 
have of atoms, ether, and underlying mechanical laws. In fact, the 
'truths' of science often conflict with sensory experience: 
Science thinks she has discovered the objective realities 
in question. Atoms and ether, with no properties but masses 
and velocities expressible by numbers and paths expressible 
by analytic formulas, these at last are things over which 
the mathematico-logical network may be flung, and by suppos-
ing which instead of sensible phenomena science becomes 
yearly more able to manufacture for herself a world about 
which rational propositions may be framed. Sensible phenomh , 
ena are pure delusions for the mechanical philosophy. The 
'things' and qualities we instinctively believe in do not 
exist. The only realities are swarming solids in everlast-
ing motion, undulatory or continued, whose expressionless 
and meaningless changes of position form the history of the 
world, and are deducible from initial collocations and habits 
of movement hypothetically assumed (James, 1890, 2, p. 665). 
The rational o-derly universe of science exerts a strong appeal to 
the mind. Its appeal is so great that: 
The sentimental facts and relations are butchered at a blow. 
But the rationality yielded is so superbly complete in form 
that to many minds this atones for the loss, and reconci1e 7s 
the thinker to the notion of a purposeless universe, in which 
all the things and qualities men love dulcissima mundi nomia, 
are but illusions of our fancy attached to accidental clouds 
of dust which the eternal cosmic weather will dissipate as 
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carelessly as it has formed them (James, 1890, 2, P.  667). 
And this is where the psychological differences between believing 
in the 'realness' of sensible objects, and believing in the 'realness' 
of scientific objects becomes clear: 
The popular notion that 'science' is forced on the mind 
ab extra, and that our interests have nothing to do with 
its constructions, is utterly absurd. The craving to believe 
that the things of the world belong to kinds which are re- 
lated by inward rationality together is the parent of science 
as well as of sentimental philosophy; and the original investi-
gator always preserves a healthy sense of how plastic the 
materials are in his hands (James, 1890, 2, p. 667). 
The function of belief must not be understated here. The desire 
to relate mental concepts and real objects would account, psycho-
logically, for attempts to directly apply scientific conceptions to 
the external world. And this is what science means for James: 
scientific theories are generated on the assumption that there is 
order underlying the apparent chaos of the sensible world and scienti-
fic research consists of attempts to verify this conception in per-
ception. Belief in this sense is an active faculty as it provides 
the impetus for the concretization of conception in perception. Thus 
James can quite consistently say that "Will and Belief, in short, 
meaning a certain relation between objects and the Self, are two 
names for one and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL phenomenon" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 321). Belief now comes with a real fiat for specific acticn. 
It is linked with will rather than with cognition and it ensures 
that the individual will look for validation of his 'plastic' con-
ceptualization in the plastic world of things. Without this attempt 
to 'fit' the products of conceptualization to the external world, 
we have metaphysics, not science. This accounts for James' emphas- 
is on verification in the external world, and his rule that concep-
tion, to be properly useful, must end in perception. 
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While James' model of belief allows us to select the scientific 
theory most compatible with our aesthetic, emotional, and active 
needs, to the exclusion of other theories which may satisfy our 
intellectual interests just as well, James' use of the pragmatic 
method of truth as it applies to science limits the implications we 
can draw for conceptualization from our verifications.
19 
Belief, 
in this active sense, impels us towards further verification, not 
towards the creation of further metaphysical assumptions. James 
develops a positivistic empirical conception of science and a 
Romantic view of morals, ethics, and aesthetics (see Williams, 1942, 
pp. 103, 106; see also Kuklick, 1977, p, 166). In consequence, 
intellectual beliefs become dependent for their continued existence 
upon perceptual verification. Belief cannot and will not be sus-
tained in the face of contradictory perceptual evidence. Belief, 
in the case of the scientific theories derived from the necessary 
truths of mathematics, logic, and classification, acts firstly as 
a causative agent in 'realizing' the relationship between intellect 
and object, and secondly, gains impetus, or is coerced, by the dis-
covery that sensible objects behave in ways that are compatible 
with the theory: "the things of Nature turn out to act a'..; if they 
were of the kind assumed. They behave as such mere drawing and 
driving atoms would behave" (James, 1890, 2, p, 668). 
The 'final' scientific beliefs about the world of experience 
19. See Chap, 7. pp. 482-484. James developed his pragmatic 
methodology to act as a means of bringing conception and perception 
together. He continually stresses the need to verify conception in 
perception so that the 'ideal' worlds and the world of pure exper-
ience have their meeting point in perception. Both 'worlds' have an 
independent existence. Human experience therefore occupies the 
central position in James' cosmology, and progress--material and 
metaphysical--is dependent on human experience. 
306. 
involve a 'translation' of the elements of reality into a kind of 
ideal system. The world grows more orderly to the mind as mental 
constructs are verified by the appearance of specific physical 
phenomena. These phenomena are selected because they 'fit' with 
the theory. Order and systematization come about through the pro-
cess of active selection impelled by belief. Validation of hypo-
theses come about as follows: 
Take any other mathematico-mechanical theory and it is the 
same. They are all translations of sensible experiences 
into other forms, substitutions of items between which ideal 
relations of kind, number, form, &quality, etc., obtain, 
for items between which no such relations obtain; coupled 
with declarations that the experienced form is false and 
the ideal form true, declarations which are justified by 
the appearance of new sensible experiences at just those 
times and places at which we logically infer that their 
ideal correlations ought to be (James, 1890, 2, p. 669). 
The world of science which develops is an amalgamation of the 
sensible and the ideal. The verification of scientific hypotheses, 
through selection of sensory phenomena, unites the two worlds. The 
combination of the natural and pure sciences is responsible for the 
practical application of ideal relations to the physical world. 
Dynamically, one might assume, the 'passive' belief in the world of 
sensory objects, and the corresponding 'passive'
20 
belief in the 
ideal relations creates a psychological tension which impels the 
individual to bring the two together. The result brings the ideal 
relations into direct relationship with the physical world and trans-
forms the physical world into a kind of ideal system: the colour 
and complexity and turbulence of objects and relations is changed 
into "bodies with no - properties but number and movement to and fro" 
20. Belief is characterized as 'passive' because the objects that 
are believed in coerce the mind to grant its fiat to their reality. 
Selection is still operative within defined limits, however. 
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(James, 1890, 2, p. 669). The world of science hangs between the 
physical and metaphysical worlds because of the pull 'downward' 
of the ideal relations,and the elevation of 'mutated' physical objects. 
It is believable, but must rely on continued verification to sus- 
tain belief. And this is where James' assertion that scientific 
objects coerce belief becomes problematic. He ignores the need for 
the continuous verification of scientific theories, and lapses into 
an implicitly rationalist account of scientific progress. At the 
same time, he restricts the will to believe to metaphysical, aesth-
etic, and ethical problems, so that the active role for belief is 
confined to the limited set of axioms which do not yet have empirical 
correlates. 
Belief is given an active function when it is used in the con-
text of those postulates which do not have definable expectations in 
the ordinary sense. Metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical beliefs 
are axioms which provide the impetus for actions wherein the outcome 
is uncertain, where the task is unusually difficult and perhaps 
dangerous, and where the action that is required is contrary to the 
ordinary demands for comfort or survival in the physical world. 
These beliefs require an extra effort of the will to hold the thought 
in consciousness. It is this functional dualism (between beliefs 
in objects with sensible correlates, and beliefs in objects without 
sensible correlates) that finally makes a hierarchical model of 
belief untenable. 
Metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical beliefs are not coerced 
by any particular object, according to James (see James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 669-670), although he believes that the world will be remodelled 
because of them (see James, 1890, 2, p. 671). Sensible objects 
will be discovered, in the cases of metaphysical and aesthetic 
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axioms, and 'made' in the case of ethical postulates.
21 
The function 
of believing in metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical axioms is to 
facilitate the remodelling of the world. The first signs of James' 
pragmatic concept of progress--described by Marcell as "individual-
stic, purposive, relativistic, contingent.. ,both object and process, 
both end and means" (Marcell, 1974, p, 191)--are found in the Prin- 
ciples. Thus James states that before science began to achieve 
such success in defining the physical world: 
The most promising of these ideal systems at first were of 
course the richer ones, the sentimental ones. _The craving 
to believe that the things of the world belong to kinds 
which are related by inward rationality together, is the 
parent of Science as well as sentimental philosophy; and 
the original investigator always preserves a healthy 
sense of how plastic the materials are in his hands (James, 
1890, 2, pp. 665-667). 
The 'objects' of science were not discovered without a struggle 
and the metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical postulates will require 
a similar struggle. And James implies that the outcome was, in the 
case of science, and is, for other ideal relations, unpredictable. 
But the older view of progress is also to be found in the 
Principles: James never suggests that the Newtonian model of ae 
universe could give way to a new interpretation--it could only be 
extended (see James,: 1890, 2, p. 671). He suggests, throughout 
the Principles, that once a sensible object is discovered for a 
'scientific object' the scientific object will be accepted as be-
lievable or 'real'. Theories succeed or fail according to the 
ability of the theorist to discover their physical correlates (see 
James, 1890, 2, p. 301). This implies that once objects are dis- 
covered for metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic axioms, the 
21. This is certenly a 'romantic' or 'idealistic' view of 
ethics, and the problems with it for James' psychology are dis-
cussed below. 
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believability of those objects would be coerced and the objects 
themselves would be stable. Belief is then correlated with cognition 
instead of the will. The 'discoverability' of metaphysical, aesthe-
tic, and ethical objects rests on which view of progress James 
ultimately adopts, and Kuklick describes the problems that James' 
tendency to adopt a progressive view of history were to cause in his 
pragmatism: 
This doctrine gave James a reputation for philosophic 
tolerance, but he also defined the limits within which 
acceptable beliefs would fall. In this enterprise he 
revealed something less than tolerance. What he assumed 
to deserve human aesthetic preference were the beliefs 
congenial to the articulate public of nineteenth-century 
New England: an optimistic theism was inherently suited to 
the human animal. The restricted nature of this outlook 
was plainest when James discussed the beliefs he thought 
were universalizable if not universal: "Here in this room, 
we all of us believe in molecules and the conservation of 
energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant 
Christianity and the duty of fighting for the doctrine of 
the immortal Monroe, all for no reasons worthy of the name." 
And James tried to show that because of man's practical 
nature and desire for moral action, a theistic God was the 
only rational and possible object for us to conceive as 
lying at the root of the universe (Kuklick, 1977, p. 172; 
internal quotation from James, 1896/1911, p. 9). 
To conclude then, we have shown that James uses the primary 
and secondary qualities distinction in diverse, and incompatible 
ways to describe the properties of sensible and scientific objects. 
The primary qualities of sensible objects do not correspond to the 
primary qualities of scientific objects. This means that the con-
firmation of scientific theories through the search for sensible 
correlates does not correspond to the accredition of reality that 
is given to sensible objects. This has implications for the broad 
rationalization of the physical world in ethical and metaphysical 
terms--if the discoverable objects of science do not correspond to 
the objects of the sensible world, there is no guarantee that 
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sensible objects will be discovered that correspond to ethical or 
metaphysical postulates. That is, like scientific objects, meta-
physical and ethical correlates could be expected to appear only as 
manifestations of underlying structures (analogous to the atoms of 
science). James' firm commitment to Newtonian progress blinds him 
to these distinctions, and prevents him from developing the 'relati-
vistic' implications of his theory. 
James' tendency to lapse into rationalism in regard to the status 
of scientific theories poses a further problem. Scientific objects, 
in the context of James' rationalism, are verified within the system 
of ideal relations--they are regarded as true and consistent formu-
lations because they are derived from the self-verifying necessary 
truths and ideal relations. The confusion here in regard to the 'truth' 
of scientific theories again arises from James' commitment to the 
nineteenth century progressive view of history. The massive mathe-
matical/mechanical system had been notoriously successful in generat-
ing postulates which appeared to lawfully describe the behaviour of 
sensible objects, so that James' tendency to assume that further 
verification would eventually become unnecessary was a reasonable, 
if unwarranted assumption. The status of scientific objects is cru-
cial in unravelling the implications of James' theory of reality bE-
cause James initially' appears to be constructing a theory wherein 
sensible correlates of the same order as the objects which make up 
the sensible sub-world of reality are discoverable for other sub-
worlds of reality as well. This analysis has concentrated on showing 
that in fact, the sensible correlates of the other sub-worlds of 
reality are not equivalent with the objects of the primary world of 
sensory experience. 
Belief, therefore, has two distinct psychological functions. It 
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is synonomous with cognition in the case of those objects whose 
reality cannot be disputed. So far, the only objects which have this 
absolute coercive power are the objects of sense and the objects of 
the world of ideal relations and necessary truths (as those objects 
have been defined above). All other objects depend on their relations 
with the sub-world of sensible reality and the sub-world of ideal 
relations--in varying proportions--for their coercive power over the 
mind. Cognitively, the mind is coerced by two types of objects: it 
grants reality automatically to sensible objects and to the ideal 
relations and necessary truths. To know, objects from either of these 
worlds is to believe in their existence. Belief in this sense means 
psychologically that the individual does not doubt that the object 
he 'knows' is real. 
But belief has a second function: when belief is aligned with 
will rather than with cognition, it functions as the impetus to sus-
tain the active search for objects which will correspond with ideas 
in the mind. James distinguished this second function from the first 
when he described the will to believe, Belief functions in this way 
when sensible correlates have not yet been discovered for ideas in 
the mind. The will to believe comes into play as a force to sus-
tain metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical ideas in consciousness 
so that the iniividual will strive to discover sensible objects which 
will verify the 'truth' of the axioms. James believed that sensible 
correlates had been discovered for scientific theories, so that the 
will to believe in scientific theories was no longer necessary. Thus, 
the function of the will to believe is to instigate a search for 
objects which will turn the belief into a cognitive propositions of 
the first type. The problem is whether or not ideas which require the 
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will to believe to sustain themselves in consciousness can be trans- 
formed into beliefs of the first types. James intended to construct 
a hierarchical model of reality, wherein the will to believe could be 
used to facilitate the rationalization of the world. Scientific know-
ledge was used as the measure of the success of this transforming acti-
vity so that the two functions of belief could theoretically be viewed 
as the beginning and the end of a single psychological process. 
But James did not succeed in this aim. Scientific objects do 
not become synonomous with sensible objects, as James himself some-
times recognizes. The tension remains between the derivations from 
the world of ideal relations and the world of sensible objects, and 
this tension is describable psychologically, in the two disparate 
functions of belief that have been outlined above. This tension is 
further increased when the two types of belief are analyzed from a 
motivational perspective: when belief is passive, as in the case of 
sensible objects, it acts to facilitate adjustment in the mundane 
physical world. If the individual is to act appropriately and thus 
to survive, he must grant reality to the sensible world. Further-
more, once he has mapped the parameters of the physical world, he 
is at liberty to select objects for his own use by concentrating on 
some of their properties to the exclusion of others, Belief in this 
passive, cognitive sense, allows •the individual to adapt to the exi-
gencies of his environment and to further his own survival ends in 
that environment. 
But belief is put to a different purpose when the individual 
attempts to impose ideas onto the physical world--ideas which arise 
from his unique propensities to generate metaphysical, aesthetic, 
and ethical postulates. The sensible correlates for these postulates 
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are not immediately obvious in the perceptual array--they do not 
impose themselves on the mind, but must be sought for beneath the 
appearances of physical objects or in the rearrangements of sensible 
experience (like the objects of science). Belief in the truth or 
efficacy of the postulate can only come from an active assertion of 
the will, and belief thus becomes an active faculty for imposing 
changes on the physical world. It is therefore necessary to examine 
the structures of action which correlate with the structures of belief, 
in order to see More clearly how the individual interacts with the 
various sub-worlds of reality. The structures of action are broken 
down by James into 'adaptive' features, which account for the indi-
vidual's tendencies to 'adjust' to his environment, and into tenden-
cies to struggle against the environment as it is given. The con- 
cept of 'struggle' is not related to the 'struggle for survival'-- 
that is, an effort towards satisfactory adjustment, but instead, it 
is transformed along Renouvian lines into the will to change  reality, 
to believe in unverifiable options in the hope and faith that they 
may, through human effort, become true. 
CHAPTER 5  
314. 
THE STRUCTURES OF VOLITION  
315. 
Introduction  
In his essay "What makes a life significant?" James comes to 
the conclusion that the real significance of life consists in possess-
ing novel ideals and having the will or endurance to pursue them and 
make them 'true' in the world. Either intellectual idealism, or the 
habit of endurance, may bring the individual successfully through the 
ordinary crises the world inflicts, but neither one on its own can 
bring the real and fundamental changes to the world which count as 
'progress' in James' view (see James, 1899/1949, pp. 306-307). The 
last two chapters have shown how James aimed at restructuring consci-
ousness so that thought was an active, selective, unified process 
with the result that the individual's relationships with reality were 
such as to promote the 'rationalization' of the physical world. The 
epistemological constraints on the will to believe were also briefly 
analyzed. James believed that the function of thought is to mediate 
action, and it is therefore necessary to continue •the discussion of 
James' psychology with an analysis of the structures of action, and 
in doing so, to determine how the will 'works' to make the novel 
ideals or conceptions 'true' in the physical world. 
James' whole philosophy is devoted to the stated end of ensuring 
that novel ideals can be made true through the effort of the will and 
no discussion of his psychology of action is complete if it does not 
take into account James' views on the ultimate significance of life. 
James' theory of volition is biased towards his metaphysical conclu-
sions that free will is at least a possibility and the possibility 
that the will is truly free is maximized by believing in the efficacy 
of the will. The fervour of James' beliefs in this regard must not 
be underestimated, for his whole psychological theory of volition is 
constructed with the aim of maximizing the 'chance' that free will 
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is a real possibility. His biases show in his attempt to refute 
the notion of innervation, in his selection of historical and contem-
poraneous sources for his theory, and in the detailed construction of 
the theory of volition itself. 
Is James really a voluntarist then? The term has been defined 
as applying: 
to any philosophical theory according to which the will is 
prior to or superior to the intellect or reason. More 
generally, voluntaristic theories interpret various aspects 
of experience and nature in the light of the concept of the 
will, or as it is called in certain older philosophies, 
passion, appetite, desire, or conatus. Such theories may 
be psychological, ethical, theological, or metaphysical 
(Taylor, 1967, p. 270). 
James is a voluntarist in the sense that it is through voluntary 
actions that meaning, truth, verification, change, and the reconstruc-
tion of reality come into being. Moreover, his voluntarism has an 
evolutionary flavour, not only because of the optimism he expresses 
regarding the eventual moral evolution of man, but because James' 
whole psychology stresses the active development of organisms, from 
the basic reflexive movements to voluntary ideomotor acts, and fin-
ally to volition with effort, performed in conjunction with ethical 
and metaphysical ideals. It is the connection between the first 
reflexive movements the organism makes in response to the environment, 
and the eventual development of a voluntary morality that makes James' 
voluntarism an evolutionary voluntarism and best distinguishes him 
from the pre-evolutionary German voluntarists such as Fichte, 
Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. 
But James is not a voluntarist in the 'traditional' sense of 
these philosophers. In James' psychology, the nature of the voluntary 
act depends on the status of the idea, thought, or feeling that insti- 
gates the action, so that James' theory of action relies on his theory 
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of cognition. Therefore, the structures of action run parallel to 
the empirical contents of consciousness. Whether or not an idea will 
be enacted, or more specifically, how it will be enacted, depends on 
the believable status of its object and the actual structure of the 
thought in consciousness. This would imply that the structures of 
action can be hierarchically conceived; it also implies that the same 
functional dualism which 'broke up' the hierarchical system of real-
ities may apply to the structures of action, and this hypothesis will 
be examined below. 
James' theory of volition contrasts markedly with his theory of 
reality in terms of his selection and acceptance of historical and 
contemporary theories of reality and action. He regards his theory 
of reality as a fuller and more complete account of traditional theoriz-
ing: he states that his account is to be taken as an extension and 
elaboration of hypotheses advanced in the empiricist tradition, and he 
acknowledges the importance of the foundations laid by Locke, Hume, 
Berkeley, J.S. Mill, and Bain (see James, 1890, 2, p. 322). But the 
pattern changes when James begins to construct his theory of volition: 
he sets out to show that the broad empiricist tradition has erred in 
its treatment of voluntary activity, much as it erred in the construc-
tion of consciousness James speaks largely as a mainstream nine- 
teenth century psychologist when he writes about the perception of 
reality; the philosophical assumptions that intrude in his discussion 
and create problems of consistenty (in regard to his radically recon-
structed consciousness), can be seen as problems or assumptions 
common to the late nineteenth century scientific community in general. 
The problems with the theory of volition are different; James has a 
difficult struggle to stay within the boundaries of psychological 
discussion and his metaphysical commitments continually intrude--in 
the construction of the theory itself and in his assessment of past 
and contemporary theorizing on the subject. He discusses theories of 
volition in terms of their compatibility with his notion of free will 
so that his assessment of any theory is subjectively biased by his 
metaphysical views. At the same time, James was committed to the effi-
cacy of the scientific method. The same enthusiasm for nineteenth century 
scientific progress which led him to ratify the mathematical/mechani-
cal/atomistic construction of the physical world was also responsible 
for his acceptance of reflexology as the biological or physical basis 
of volition. His theory of volition can therefore be regarded as an 
attempt to find a place for free will within the constraints imposed 
by the reflex model of action. The tension between these two commit-
ments runs throughout the theory of volition, and James attempted to 
resolve the problem by rejecting the theory of innervation and replac-
ing it with an afferent model of perception which provided a cognitive 
basis for action. 
It is relevant that James already had the backbone of his theory 
of volition figured out by 1880 when he published "The feeling of 
effort".
1 
But by the time he was systematically putting the Principles  
together, James had worked out his contruction of consciousness; and 
the theory of volition as it appears in the Principles is more compre-
hensive--given the preceding stream of consciousness theory--than it 
could be in 1880 without it. The dependence of the theory of volition 
on the theory of consciousness will emerge throughout this analysis; 
the most immediate implications are found in James' refutation of the 
1. Most of James' work on the construction of the stream of 
consciousness did not really get under way until 1884, although the 
genesis of James' eventual conception is to be found in the 1879 
paper "Are we automata?" (see McDermott, 1967, pp. 818, 819, 821, 
827). 
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theory of innervation. 
In 1880, James published his famous paper "The feeling of 
effort". As Kuklick writes: "The aim of this article was to identify 
the mysterious sentiment of power, the will or fiat" (Kuklick, 1977, 
p. 166). But James also wished to make his explanation both physio-
logical and psychological: "I propose in the following pages to offer 
a schema of the physiology and psychology of volition, more completely 
worked out and satisfactory than any I have yet met with" (James, 
1880/1920, p. 151). An ambitious statement. He goes on to state 
that the feeling . of effort is a universal experience and cites Bain's 
distinction between the sensational elements of the feeling, and the 
active mental experience of effort (see James, 1880/1920, p. 152). 
Traditionally, according to James, these sensational elements of feel-
ing (afferent sensations), and the active mental experiences of effort 
(efferent sensations), have been treated as completely opposed (see 
James, 1880/1920, p. 152). He proposes to retain Bain's psychological 
distinction at the experiential level, but begins a drastic revision 
of the nature of the muscular and mental feelings of effort (see 
James, 1880/1920, pp. 152, 194-195). 
The groundwork for James' theory of volition is set in the argu-
ments he advances against the theory of innervation. The theory of 
innervation, first put forward, according to James, by Mueller
2 
and 
elaborated by Bain, states that the feeling of muscular exertion is 
a result of the sensations which accompany the outgoing stream of 
nervous energy from the central nervous system (see James, 1880/1920, 
p. 153; see also Bain, 1868, p. 77). It does not: 
2. See James, 1880/1920, p. 152; James refers to Mueller's 
Physiologie, 1840, Bd. ii, p. 500. 
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result from any influence passing inwards, by incarrying 
or sensitive nerves. ...It does not follow that the 
characteristic feeling of exerted force should arise by 
an inward transmission through the sensitive filaments; 
on the contrary, we are bound to presume that this is the 
concomitant of the outgoing current by which the muscles 
are stimulated to act (Bain, 1868, p. 77). 
James notes that Bastian, Ferrier, and Lotze have protested 
against this view, but he feels that their arguments have not been 
systematically worked out, and therefore have not provided an effect-
ive counter against the theory (see James, 1880/1920, pp. 153-154). 
James then decrees that: 
the feeling of muscular energy put forth is a complex afferent  
sensation coming from the tense muscles, the strained ligaments, 
...etc. That there is over and above this another feeling 
of effort involved, I do not deny; but this latter is purely 
moral and has nothing to do with the motor discharge (James, 
1880/1920, p. 154). 
He argues that sensory and motor cells are different in appearance 
and that the motor apparatus is known to be: "absolutely insentient 
in an afferent direction, although we know that the fibres of the 
anterior root will propagate a disturbance in that direction as well 
as in the other" (James, 1880/1920, p. 155). 
These physiological data, combined with the psychological dictum 
"that consciousness seems to desert all processes where it can no 
longer be of any use" (James, 1880/1920, p. 155) lead James to con-
clude that: "Our idea, notion, thought, of a movement, what we 
mean whenever we speak of the movement, is this sensible perception 
which we get of it when it is taking place, or has completely occurred" 
(James, 1880/1920, p. 159). The 'sensible perception', introspect- 
ively defined, is "an aggregate of afferent feelings, coming primarily 
from the contraction of the muscles" (see James, 1880/1920, p. 159). 
Physiological and psychological 'data; are thus combined in support 
of James' decree that innervation is not a valid concept.3 
3. James discusses a wide range of experimental evidence in 
(contd.) 
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James' introspective and physiological investigations lead him 
to the conclusion (supported by Ferrier--see James, 1890, 2, p. 504), 
that there is no introspective evidence for the existence of feelings 
of innervation and in fact, experimental evidence disproves the exis-
tence of such feelings (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 514-517). Instead he 
concludes that: 
It is not the thought of the innervation which the movement 
requires. It is the anticipation of the movement's sensible 
effects, resident or remote, and sometimes very remote indeed. 
Such anticipations, ...determine what our movements shall be 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 521). 
And this leads directly to the concept of ideo-motor action. 
James acknowledges his debt to Carpenter and Bain (see James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 522, 525), but concentrates on Lotze's analysis (see James, 1890, 
2, pp. 523-525). Lotze's influence is important. According to Perry, 
James discovered the doctrine of ideo-motor action in Lotze's work 
before 1870 and soon after that rediscovered it in Renouvier's works 
(see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 88). Lotze's distrust of innervation as 
a valid theory 3nd his doctrine of ideo-motor action gave James grounds 
for systematically attacking the theory of innervation and 'encour-
aged' James to construct his own theory of volition. Perry states 
that regarding the feelings of effort: "James reversed a judgment 
which he himself formerly held, that the feeling of effort accompanies 
the efferent (outgoing) current which innervates the muscle" (Perry, 
1935/1974, 2, p. 88). Had he held to this position, 4 his theory of 
3. (contd) support of his position (see James, 1880/1920, pp. 159-180; 
see also James, 1890, 2, pp. 495-522). This 'evidence' is not speci-
fically discussed here for reasons of space and because the studies 
themselves are not particularly relevant to the discussion that follows. 
What is important is that James believed that the question of inner-
vation could be resolved through direct appeal to the physiological 
and psychological evidence. 
4. Perry shows that James' systematic rebuttal of innervation 
was made in conscious opposition to the leading authority of Wundt 
and Bain, while Ward stated that the problem of whether the feeling 
(contd.) 
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consciousness could not have been made compatible with his theory of 
volition as will be shown below in the discussion of ideo-motor 
action. Thus, James' refutation of the theory of innervation deter-
mined the scope of his theory of action and enabled him to make the 
structures of consciousness and the structures of action interdepend-
ent. 
The structures of volition will now be examined with special 
reference to pre-voluntary movements and reflex actions, instinctive 
impulses, emotional expressions, and ideo-motor actions. Volition 
with effort will be examined in a separate chapter. While James based 
his theory of volition (including volition with effort) on the reflex 
action paradigm, the analysis of volition with effort involves excur- 
sions into James' moral philosophy while the 'lower' volitional struct-
ures can be examined in a purely psychological context. The methodo-
logical differences between the two types of analysis therefore make 
it appropriate to treat volition in two separate chapters. 
The Influence of Pre-volitional Structures on Voluntary Behaviour  
Voluntary behaviour can be separated into two basic categories-- 
ideo-motor .action and volition with effort. Ideo-motor action is 
the simpler, more common type of voluntary activity. It does not re-
quire any special mental effort because the fiat for action consists 
in the presence of an uninhibited idea in consciousness. Volition 
with effort is more complex because it requires the presence of an 
idea or concept in consciousness, and a special effort of attention 
to sustain the idea against competing ideas or impluses. James makes 
4. (contd.) was afferent or efferent was immaterial (see Perry, 
1935/1974, 2, p. 88). 
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the distinction between this psychological or mental type of effort 
(or lack thereof) and the feelings of muscular effort exerted when 
any action is performed (see James, 1880/1920, pp. 154, 195-196). 
The dividing line between the refutation of the theory of innerva-
tion and the beginning of a theory of volition is found in James' 
attempt to isolate the types of feelings which are stimulated and eli-
cited by the physical performance of any action. The source of these 
feelings of effort (as they are experienced in consciousness) •has im-
portant consequences for James' psychological theory of effort be-
cause the theory of volition rests on two major premises. Whether or 
not a voluntary action can be performed at all depends first on the 
physiological possibilities of the organism, and second on the ways 
in which ideas of voluntary actions are developed in the organism 
(see James, 1890, 2, pp. 486-487, 560-561). Voluntary behaviour is 
learned behaviour and the genesis of such behaviour must be found in 
the pre-voluntary reflexes, movements, instincts, and emotional expres-
sions of the organism. Since the theory of volition is based on the 
refutation of the theory of innervation, the volitional structures• 
are largely determined by pre-volitional experience. It is therefore 
necessarS, to examine the pre-volitional behaviour of the organism 
before continuing the discussion of James' refutation of the theory 
of innervation, and the theory of volition he developed as a result. 
Movement  
Bain was the first influential theorist to state that organisms 
are essentially active, therefore providing psychology with one of 
its most important conceptions of the a priori relationship between 
the organism and the environment (see Bain, 1868, p. 59; see also 
Young, 1970, pp. 114-116). After Bain, all psychologies begin with 
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the basic premise that the organism is structured towards activity 
as well as reactivity, and James' psychology is no exception. Bain 
believed "that movement precedes sensation, and is at the outset inde-
pendent of any stimulus from without" (Bain, 1868, p. 59; see also 
Bain, 1868, p. 296). Volition develops through the 'education' of 
the individual; that is, spontaneous movements are associated with 
their consequences (pleasures and pains), the movements eventually 
become purposive and voluntary 'reflexes' are developed (see Young, 
1970, p. 115; Bain, 1868, pp. 296-306). 
At times James appears to follow this paradigm 5 and will, as 
Kuklick writes: "referred primarily to actions" (Kuklick, 1977, p. 
169). Fearing also notes that "James though difficult to classify 
seems to regard reflex action as the prototype of all action" (see 
Fearing 1930/1964, p. 297; see also James, 1890, 1, p. 23). But both 
Kuklick and Fearing recognize that James was somewhat inconsistent 
on this point. Kuklick states that James sometimes identified the 
will with action; at other times he 'more correctly' identified it 
with the 'fiat' for action (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 169). As Fearing 
points out, this distinction is all-important. At times, says Fear-
ing, James makes the distinction between reflex, semi-reflex, and 
volitional acts (see Fearing, 1930/1964, p. 297), and Fearing finally 
classifies James as a member of that group of theorists "who assign 
specific characteristics to reflexes, but emphasize continuity of 
the series from the reflex to the will action. ...there is no sharply 
drawn line of demarcation between reflex and other varieties of 
5. In his article, "Reflex action and theism", James states 
that "All action is thus re-action upon the outer world" (James, 
1831/1911, p. 114; see also James, 1881/1911, pp. 113-117, 
142; and Kuklick, 1977, pp. 168-169. 
neuro-muscular action" (Fearing, 1930/1964, p. 289). 
James was committed to a naturalistic, physiologically oriented 
theory of action and attempted to develop a hierarchical conception 
of the structures of action according to the reflex model. But the 
function of action was a different matter entirely--as Kuklick states, 
James is a reflexologist when he defines will as action; he is not 
when he defines will as the fiat for action (see Kuklick, 1977, pp. 
168-169). Whether or not James fits into Fearing's 'mechanical' group , 
(see Fearing, 1930/1964, p. 297), or into his 'genetic' group (see 
Fearing, 1930/1964, p. 289), depends on whether or not the focus is 
on James' description of the structures of action or on the functions 
of volition. The inconsistency noted by both Fearing and Kuklick can 
be resolved by treating the structural and functional aspects of James' 
theory of volition independently, and then examining the theory of 
volition to determine whether or not the hierarchical structure is 
plastic enough to allow for the duality of function that James appears 
to insist upon, 
James first concentrates on defining the physiological basis 
of voluntary behaviour so that: "the whole neural organism, 
physiologically considered, but a machine for converting stimuli into 
actions; and the intellectual part of our life is knit up with but 
the middle or 'central' portion of the machine's operations" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 372). This statement represents the reflex strand of the 
theory of volition described by Fearing (see Fearing, 1930/1964, p, 
297), and it corresponds to Kuklick's statement that the will is some-
times identified with action. Stimuli are received through the affer-
ent paths, and are felt, or experienced by the organism. During the 
pre-volitional stage, the organism reacts reflexively or instinctively; 
the mind merely registers the reaction, and the kinaesthetic patterns 
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are stored in the memory. Later on, the mind reacts to the stimulus 
with an 'idea' or 'impulse' (corresponding to the initial reflex move-
ment), which stimulates physical movement. This is an oversimplifi-
cation of James' view of the development of the volitional structures 
out of reflex structures, and so far, it parallels Bath's theory. 
But James' reaction against the theory of innervation now asserts 
itself in positive form. He insisted that it was the afferent feel-
ings that were received by the mind when an action was performed; the 
mind 'felt' the movements of the muscles, the straining of the liga-
ments, the increase in heart-rate (see James, 1880/1920, p. 154). 
Some of these movements could be performed at will (the movement of 
muscles), and some retained their automatic status (increases and 
decreases of heart-rate). James' insistence that it is the afferent 
sensations that are received when an act is performed, and that the 
mind concentrates on these afferent sensations when desiring that an 
action take place, marks the dividing line between James' theory of 
reflex action and Bain's. 
The relationship between the physical and mental structures is 
interactive; movement is the result of feeling, and the intellectual 
life is 'secondary' to this basic process (see James, 1890, 2, p. 487): 
"we might say that every possible f4ling produces a movement and that the 
movement is a movement of the entire organism, and of each and all its 
parts" (James, 1890, 2, p. 372). Many of the so-called psychological 
reactions are reducible to simple changes in the physical systems 
(see James, 1890, 2, p, 373), and James expanded this postulate into 
the theory of emotion. But the postulate has wider implications for 
the theory of volition; it is a long way, psychologically speaking, 
from an accelerated heart beat in response to a sudden shock, to the 
'effortful' decision to believe in free will. What joins these 
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'feelings', or places them on the same psychological continuum is 
their ability to excite the same physical feelings whether the organ-
ism is acting or reacting. The stimulus may be an outer object which 
produces afferent effects in the individual and the 'reflex' response 
is 'felt' by consciousness as the afferent effects which are stimu-
lated by the automatic movements. Similarly, any idea or impulse 
which takes command of consciousness, whether it be an instinctive 
impulse or a successful effort to hold an idea in consciousness against 
competing ideas, is eventually felt by consciousness as the afferent 
effects of the movements performed, for all dominant impulses must 
eventually be released into some sort of physical action according to 
James. 
The organism is constructed so that certain stimuli incite auto-
matic responses; many of these reflex reactions persist throughout 
the life of the individual in their original reflex form. These same 
reflex responses also develop into emotional expressions, in the sense 
that they are elicited by the cognitive meaning that is attached to 
the stimuli. The reflex movements also provide the foundations for 
the repertoire of voluntary responses that the organism learns to make 
in the presence of the stimulus, or learns to make in the presence of 
new stimuli which do not automatically elicit reflex responses. The 
reflexive movements serve two functions in James' theory; they pro-
vide the foundations for the repertoire of actions that can be willed 
and they also provide much of the 'vocabulary' of consciousness, for 
consciousness knows the world in part through the felt impact of the 
bodily movements upon the physical world. 
Although James rejected the innervation theory in Bain's concept 
of volition, he used Bain's law of diffusion to express the relation-
ship between feeling and the movements of the body. Movements are 
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consequences of 'cerebro-motor' changes, and all movements, whether 
they are reflexive, voluntary, instinctive, or emotional, can be 
physiologically related under the general dictum of Bain's law of 
diffusion which states that: "According as an impression is accompanied 
with Feeling, the aroused currents diffuse themselves over the brain, 
leading to a general agitation of the moving organs, as well as affect-
ing the viscera" (Bain, quoted in James, 1890, 2, p. 372). James 
expresses Bain's law so that: "A process set up anywhere in the centres  
reverberates everywhere, and in some way or other affects the organ-
ism throughout, making its activities either greater or less" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 381). The physiological concomitants of volition are 
constant; psychological distinctions (which describe the nature of 
the external or internal stimuli and the eventual response), account 
for variations in the nature of physiological arousal--that is, 
whether the heart-beat accelerates or decreases in response to the 
perception of the stimulus (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 373-374). These 
movements are not purposive or volitional--we do not run to produce 
an accelerated heart-rate. The physiological changes serve instead 
as signs or sensations which can eventually direct the organism 
towards purposive acts. 
But some of the physiological movements provide the foundations 
for voluntary activities. James writes that: 
voluntary movements must be secondary, not primary functions  
of our organisms. ...Reflex, instinctive, and emotional 
movements are 'all primary performances. ...When a particular 
movement, having once occurred in a random, reflex, or invol-
untary way, has left an image of itself in the memory, then 
the movement can be desired again, proposed as an end, and 
deliberately willed. But it is impossible to see how it 
could be willed before (James, 1890, 2, p. 487). 
This is an important statement for it limits volition in two ways. 
Movements are categorized according to whether or not they can be 
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willed and whether or not they can be willed is a physiological, 
not a psychological question: 
Now notice in all this, whether the act do follow or not 
upon the representation is a matter quite immaterial so far 
as the willing of the act represented goes. I will to write, 
and the act follows. I will to sneeze, and it does not. I 
will that the distant table slide over the floor towards me; 
it also does not. My willing representation can no more 
instigate my sneezing centre, than it can instigate the table, 
to activity. But in both cases, it is as true and good willing 
as it was when I willed to write. In a word, volition is a 
psychic or moral fact pure and simple, and is absolutely com-
pleted when the intention or consent is there. The supervention 
of motion upon its completion is a supernumerary phenomena 
belonging to the department of physiology exclusively, and 
depending on the organic structure and condition of executive 
ganglia whose functioning is quite unconscious (James, 1880/ 
1920, pp. 190-191; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 560). 
The fact that movements must first occur in a random involuntary 
way means that there are physiological -Omits on the possibilities for 
volitional acts requiring effort; James insists, in the context of his 
pragmatic theory of truth, that belief in metaphysical and ethical 
postulates has real, concrete consequences in the physical world (see 
Chap. 7). This means that ethical ideas actually have physical conse-
quences; they are productive of particular movements, so that ethical 
possibilities are therefore restricted by physiological structures. 
The Instincts  
Instinct is obviously further removed from purely physical 
life than is simple reflex action. While simple reflex 
action is common to the internal visceral processes and to 
the processes of externai adjustment, Instinct is not. There 
are no instincts displayed by the kidneys, the lungs, the 
liver: they occur only among the actions of that nervo-
muscular apparatus which is the agent of psychical life 
(Spencer, 1870, 1, p. 434). 
The pre-volitional structures of action include movements and 
reflexes, instincts,and emotional expressions. The simple movements 
or reflexes are consequences of the organism's physiological structure; 
organs, muscles, etc., move and react in ways that are predicted by 
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the nature of the specific structures of the organs. The psychologi-
cal consequences of this activity or movement are the feelings or 
sensations experienced by the organism. Physiologically and psycho-
logically, these basic movements or reflexes constitute the base 
of the hierarchy of action. 
The second level of the action pyramid is composed of the in-
stincts. James defines instinct "as the faculty to produce certain  
ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education  
in the performance" (James, 1890, 2, p. 383). The instincts are there-
fore the "functional correlatives of structure. With the presence of 
a certain organ goes, ...almost always a native aptitude for its use" 
(James, 1890. 2, p. 384). The instincts are species-specific patterns 
of movement, individuated and determined by the physical structure 
of the individual and its 'ends' in the environment. Thus James says: 
"The actions we call instinctive all conform to the general reflex 
type; they are called forth by determinate stimuli in contact with 
the animal's body, or at a distance in his enviroment" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 384). And, he adds, "Every instinct is an impulse. Whether 
we shall call such impulses as blushing, sneezing, coughing, smiling, 
or dodging, or keeping time to music, instincts or not, is a mere 
matter of terminology. The process is the same throughout" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 385). 
In treating instincts as reflex-type actions, James appears to 
be building his theory on Spencer's: 
Instinct may be described as,. .compound reflex action. ...no 
clear line of demarcation can be drawn between it and simple 
reflex action. ...the dingo-motor processes which reflex 
actions show us, pass by degrees from the simple to the complex; 
...recipio-motor processes do the like. Nevertheless we may 
conveniently distinguish, as a higher mode of these automatic 
nervous adjustments, those in which complex stimuli produce 
complex movements (Spencer, 1870, 1, p. 432). 
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James echoes this conception when he agrees with Spencer that instincts 
are complex actions, awakening several impulses towards action (see 
James, 1890, 2, p. 385). But this is the extent of his debt to 
Spencer. While James accepted Spencer's psychological reflex paradigm 
he emphasized the importance of the empirical findings of Darwin and 
Romanes in his work on instinct (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 394, 397, 420, 
431, 432, 438). Romanes, as Young points out (see Young, 1970, p. 177), 
specifically supported Darwin's view of instinct over Spencer's and 
James was familiar with Romanes' arguments. The fundamental differ-
ence between Spencer's and Darwin's concepts of instinct was that 
Spencer tried to define instincts structurally as elaborations on re-
flexes, while Darwin defined them functionally as species-specific 
behaviours that should require learning but do not. James does not 
discuss the differences between Spencer's and Darwin's views in his 
chapter on instinct in the Principles, but he makes it clear in the 
last chapter of the Principles that he is a Darwinian regarding 
instincts: 
there is no good evidence for the belief that our instinctive 
reactions are fruits of our ancestor's education in the midst 
of the same environment, transmitted to us at birth. ...the 
features of our organic mental structure cannot be explained 
at all by our conscious intercourse with the outer environment, 
but must rather be understood as congenital variations, 
'accidental' in the first instance, but then transmitted as 
fixed features of the race. ...'Accidental' in the Darwinian 
sense (James, 1890, 2, p. 618; see also James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 678-688). 
James believed that Darwin had sound empirical evidence for his 
view that instincts are the result of "natural selection of accident-
ally produced tendencies to action" (James, 1890, 2, p. 638; see also 
Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 236). Darwin asserted that it would in fact "be 
the most serious error to suppose that the greater number of instincts 
have been acquired by habit in one generation, and then transmitted 
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by inheritance to succeeding generations" (Darwin, 1859/1977, P. 235; 
also quoted in James, 1890, 2, p. 683). Darwin had a 'plastic' view 
of the genesis of instincts. He had discovered that instincts were 
not universal even within the same species and he hypothesized that 
instincts evolved as the organism 'discovered' more 'successful' modes 
of coping with the environment (see Darwin, 1859/1977, pp. 241-242). 
Darwin was not implying that the process of discovery was a conscious 
process; instead, it appeared that members of the same species have 
several tendencies to act, and these tendencies may conflict. The 
cuckoo thus had the tendency to hatch her own eggs and the tendency to 
lay her eggs in the nests of other birds. The American cuckoo typi-
cally hatches her own eggs, and only occasionally lays them in the 
nests of other birds. The secood tendency proved most beneficial to 
the European cuckoo and it 'hardened' into an instinct (see Darwin, 
1859/1977, p. 242). Darwin argues that the empirical evidence suggests 
that many instincts are only imperfectly developed and uses this as 
evidence for his theory of natural selection. Through the process of 
natural selection, tendencies are solidified into instincts so that 
the behaviour of the organism becomes more recognizably instinctive 
(see Darwin, 1859/1977, pp. 242-243). (Darwin also argued that instinc-
tive behaviour is modifiable by will or reason, although instinctive 
acts may be performed in opposition to the will (see Darwin, 1859/1977, 
p, 235). Although he claimed that social feelings were instinctive 
in animals, and therefore like Spencer, claimed that evolutionary 
theory was compatible with moral behaviour in man (see Young, 1970, 
pp. 177-178), he does not dismiss the possibility of a conflict between 
will and instinct: "How unconsciously many habitual actions are 
performed, indeed not rarely in direct opposition to our conscious 
will! yet they may be modified by the will or reason" (Darwin, 1859/1977, 
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p. 235). Darwin also advances the argument that instincts could not be 
totally determined by inheritance for various species of insects 
have sterile, anatomically distinctive members which perform specific 
tasks in an instinctive way. Since direct inheritance of instincts 
is therefore impossible, the appearance of instinct in sterile insects 
must be controlled by natural selection (see Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 
262). 
Darwin's observations armed James with biological arguments 
against Spencer's evolutionary associationism, and he was therefore 
able to construct a psychological theory of instinct compatible with 
his insistence that consciousness is efficacious because it is sel-
ective. His debt to Spencer in particular, and to association psycho-
logy in general, was confined to the adoption of a reflex model: 
"The actions we call instinctive all conform to the general reflex 
type: they are called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact 
with the animal's body, or at a distance in his environment" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 384). 
Furthermore, he conceded that 'complex' instincts awaken the 
several impulses necessary to perform the action (see James, 1890, 2, 
p. 385). James therefore used the basic psychological reflex model 
to describe the means whereby mental impulses are translated into 
actions. But he transformed Spencer's mechanical reflex model into 
a structural model of action where the emphasis is on the means where-
by a particular impulse is aroused in consciousness. Once the idea, 
thought, feeling, or impulse has gained ascendency in consciousness, 
action takes place by means describable by the mechanical theory of 
reflex action. Darwin's insistence that more than one tendency to 
respond in a given situation may exist in the organism's congenital 
repertoire meant, psychologically, that the response could not 
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necessarily be predicted from the stimulus. Darwin's legacy to James 
was a two-fold gift: first of all, a stimulus could arouse two con-
flicting tendencies to act, and second, Darwin tended to regard 
instincts as the eventual products of inherited "occasional and aber-
rant" habits (Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 242). James extended this notion 
into the conscious life of the organism so that the function of 
instincts was to promote habit formation. 
Instincts as conflicting tendencies. 
James takes exception to the view that man is distinguished from 
other animals by his lack of instincts and argues that man has more  
instincts than any other organism (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 389-390). 
As a species rises on the evolutionary scale, the number of impulses•
to action increases (see James, 1890, 2, p. 392). An instinctive re-
action is therefore elicited through the interaction of the internal 
conditions of the organism and the complex conditions of the environ- 
ment_ The individual initially reacts to any new stimulus on an instinc-
tive level. The particular instinct that is evoked is dependent upon 
a number of factors--the developmental 'phase' of the individual, his 
particular physiological condition at the time, and his previous accu-
mulation of experience. The second time that the stimulus appears, 
however, the response is tempered by the memory of the previous exper-
ience with the stimulus. The individual reacts in terms of expecta-
tions about consequences or ends. If his past experience informs him 
that his first action led to desirable consequences he may repeat 
that response. If negative consequences have ensured--the child has 
previously grabbed the fatal candle and burned himself--his plastic 
capacity for different responses will ensure a new response: "every 
instinctive act in an animal with memory must cease to be 'blind' 
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after being once repeated" (James, 1890, 2, p. 390). 
The function of instinct is to provide the organism with an in-
built set of impulses towards activity in the multiple world of exper-
ience; the possession of instincts ensures interaction and activity-- 
it also limits beforehand some of the possible dangers facing the un-
initiated organism. By and large, instinctive impulses reduce the 
risks the individual faces in the external world (see James, 1890, 
2, p. 392). James states that man must begin life as an amalgam of 
conflicting tendencies because his potential interactions with the 
world are so large and various. That plasticity of response inborn in 
man is his protection: 
There are moreworms unattached to hooks than impaled upon 
them; therefore, on-the whole, says Nature to her fishy 
children, bite at every worm and take your chances. But as 
her children get higher, and their lives more precious, she 
reduces the risks., Since what seems to be the same object may 
be now a genuine food and now a bait; since in gregarious 
species each individual may prove to be either the friend or 
the rival, according to the circumstances, of another; since 
any entirely unknown object may be fraught with weal or woe, 
Nature implants contrary impulses to act on many classes of  
things, and leaves it to slight alterations in the conditions 
of the individual case to decide which impulse shall carry 
the day. Thus, greediness and suspicion, curiosity and 
timidity, coyness and desire, bashfulness and vanity, 
sociability and pugnacity, seem to shoot over into each other 
as quickly, and to remain in as unstable equilibrium, in the 
higher birds and mammals as in man. They are all impulses, 
congenital, blind at first, and productive of motor reactions 
of a rigorously determinate sort. Each of them, then, is an  
instinct, as instincts are commonly defined. But they contra- 
dict each other--'experience' in each particular opportunity 
of application usually deciding the issue. The animal that  
exhibits them loses the 'instinctive' demeanor and appears 
to lead a life of hesitation and choice, an intellectual life; 
not, however, because he has no instincts—rather because he  
has so many that they block each other's path (James, 1890, 
2, pp. 392-393). 
James' psychological rationale for equipping the organism with 
contrary tendencies towards action is to ensure that the possession 
of instinctive tendencies per se does not automatically produce a 
stereotyped response pattern. The organism which possesses the most 
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instincts exhibits the greatest hesitancy in responding, and this 
inbuilt hesitancy provides the foundation for 'reasoned' assessments 
of what should best be done in any given situation. Reason and 
instinct are compatible: 
In other words, there is no material antagonism between 
instinct and reason. Reason, per se, can inhibit no impulses; 
the only thing that can neutralize an impluse is an impulse 
the other way. Reason may, however, make an inference which  
will excite the imagination so as to set loose the impulse 
the other way; and thus, though the animal richest in reason 
might be also the animal richest in instinctive impulses too, 
he would never seem the fatal automaton which a merely  
instinctive animal would be (James, 1890, 2, P.  393). 
Habit formation and the instincts. 6 
Instincts have another function: most instincts are 'transient' 
structures "implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 402) Instincts are inhibited as habits develop, and 
James' law of inhibition is as follows: "When objects of a certain•
class elicit from an animal a certain sort of reaction, it often hap-
pens that the animal becomes  partial to the first specimen of the  
class on which it has reacted, and will not afterward react on any 
other specimen" (James, 1890, 2, p. 394). The initial selection of 
any object inhibits the selection of other 'possible' objects of the 
same class so that the range of instinctive tendencies is restricted 
by habit formation to the extent that the organism may now appear to 
have never possessed the instinct at all (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 
394-395). 
6. The psychological relationship between instinctive impulses 
and habit formation appears to originate with James. He does not 
credit any other theorist with deriving the particular principles 
of habit formation as they are based on instinct and he claims that 
his formulation provides an orderly explanation for behaviour that 
Romanes and Spalding regard as deviant (see James, 1890, 2, p. 394). 
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Instincts are also 'arrested' by habits when: "the same class 
of objects awakens contrary instinctive impulses. Here the impulse 
first followed toward a given individual of the class is apt to keep 
him from ever awakening the opposite impulse in us" (James, 1890, 2, 
p, 395). James cites Spalding's observations on 'imprinting' behaviour 
in chicks to illustrate his point. Newly hatched chicks will, in 
the absence of a hen, follow any moving object including man, without 
fear. But if the man appears for the first time a few days later 
when the fear impulse is dominant, the chicks will flee: 
The two opposite instincts relative to the same object ripen 
in succession. If the first one engenders a habit, that 
habit will inhibit the application of the second instinct 
to that object, All animals are tame during the earliest 
phase of their infancy, Habits formed then limit the effects 
of whatever instincts of wildness may later be evolved (James, 
1890, 2, p. 397; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 396). 
This pattern of development is related to what James calls the 
law oftransitoriness which states that: "Many instincts ripen at a 
certain age and then fade away" (James, 1890, 2, p. 398). The pattern 
of habit formation is therefore determined by whether or not the 
organism encounters an appropriate 'object' at the time when the 
particular instinct can be aroused. If such an object is encountered, 
a habit is formed, which persists after the original instinctive impulse 
has faded away. If an appropriate object is not encountered, the 
habit will not be formed "and, later on in life when the animal meets 
the objects, he will altogether fail to react, as at the earlier epoch 
he would instinctively have done" (James, 1890, 2, p. 398), 
Habit formation is a complex process; it depends upon the elici-
tation of instinctive responses by specific stimuli, and the corres-
ponding appearance of an appropriate object at a time when the 
instinctive impulse is 'arousable' in the normal course of the animal's 
development (see Darwin, 1859/1977, pp. 236-237, 239-240). Spencer's 
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and Darwin's theories are combined in James' psychology to produce 
an interactive model of the developmental tendencies of the organism 
in relation to a plastic environment (see above, pp. 330-334). 
James' theory of instinct is therefore plastic in contrast to his 
rigid view of habit formation--this 'rigidity' is perhaps best exempli-
fied in James' rather polemical statement on the importance of habit 
formation to the efficient maintenance of human society. He writes: 
Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most 
precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all 
within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of 
fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone 
prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from 
being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps 
the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it 
holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman 
to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months 
of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the 
desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the 
battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early 
choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees 
because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is 
too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata 
from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you see the 
professional mannerisms settling down on the young commercial 
traveller, on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the 
young counsellor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage 
running through the character, the tricks of thought, the 
prejudices, the ways of the 'shop', in a word, from which the 
man can by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeves can 
suddenly fall into a new set of folds. On the whole, it is 
best he should not escape. It is well for the world that in 
most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like 
plaster, and will never soften again (James, 1890, 1, p. 121). 
A rather strong statement for the mercurial James! But he ratifies 
it in his distinction between those skills which are acquired during 
the 'plastic' phase of instinctive curiosity and the attempts to 
learn new skills after the period has passed: 
Out:side oftheir own business, the ideas gained by men before 
they are twenty-five are practically the only ideas they 
shall have in their lives. They cannot get anything new. 
Disinterested curiosity is past, the mental grooves and channels 
set, the power of assimilation gone. If by chance we ever do 
learn anything about some entirely new topic we are afflicted 
by a strange sense of insecurity, and we fear to advance a 
resolute opinion. But, with things learned in the plastic 
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days of instinctive curiosity we never lose entirely our 
sense of being at home. There remains a kinship, a sentiment 
of intimate acquaintance, which, even when we know we have 
failed to keep abreast of the subject, flatters us with a 
sense of power over it, and makes us feel not altogether out 
of the pale (James, 1890, 2, p. 402). 
The 'evanescent' or 'transient' nature of instinctive proclivi-
ties and the rapid rigidification of the tendencies into habits would 
appear to have a potentially stultifying effect on development. Wild 
takes a more positive view of habit formation, crediting James with 
a phenomenological approach to human instinct, and stating that origi-
nal interests or impulses are developed through the application of 
habitual patterns of behaviour (see Wild, 1969, p. 249). Appropriate 
study habits facilitate intellectual development according to Wild 
because "habit takes over the original interest, which is maintained, 
but in ever-developing forms. The action becomes purposive, its 
objects ordered, and its operations enormously enriched and refined" 
(Wild, 1969, p. 249). Wild's argument is valid enough when habit 
formation is considered from the perspective of facilitating intellect-
ual exploration. The growth of habits facilitates the continued pur-
suit of the original impulse, and activities are purposively directed 
towards the redefined goal. The problem is that James does not inter-
pret habit information in this light as is shown above (see James, 
1890, 1, p, 121, and James, 1890, 2, p. 402, quoted on p. 338). 
Furthermore, Wild does not give a discussion of what he describes as 
James' phenomenological approach' apart from his statement that James 
regarded certain reflex impulses as purely accidental, as having no 
survival value, and only rarely becoming autoncmous structures.
7 
From this we can assume that Wild means the theory of instinct is 
7. See Wild, 1969, p, 294. Wild is referring to James, 1890, 
2, p. 402. 
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'phenomenological' because the child 'appears' to be ready to acquire 
distinctive intellectual skills at various stages in his development. 
This readiness to learn has its roots, according to James, in the 
child's instinctive curiosity about the world, and this 'curiosity' 
manifests itself in definite, perceivable ways (see James, 1890, 2, 
p. 402). Wild takes the child's readiness to learn as evidence for a 
phenomenological account because habit formation is the result of the 
attachment of purposive ideation and corresponding action to impulses 
which were originally non-purposive or fortuitously acquired. 
The notion that not all instinctive impulses have survival value 
is important in James' theory, as Wild emphasizes (see Wild, 1969, 
p. 249). If James' psychology is to be conceived of as a structural 
unity, all impulses towards activity must be derivable from natural-
istic sources. Some of the instinctive impulses appear to manifest 
themselves in ways which have no survival in 'modern society' but 
can be traced back through time to a point where they were of adapt-
ive significance (see James, 1890, 2, p. 414, for James' examples 
with regard to remnants of the hunting instinct). Others--some of 
the 'fear reactions--appear to have no practical utility at all and 
in fact may be detrimental to the individual: 
High places cause fear of a peculiarly sickening sort, 
though here, again, individuals differ enormously. The 
utterly blind instinctive character of the motor impulses 
here is shown by the fact that they are almost always 
unreasonable, but that reason is powerless to suppress them. 
That they are a mere incidental peculiarity of the nervous 
system, like liability to sea-sickness, or love of music, 
with no teleological significance, seems more than 
probable. 8 
Still other instincts, such as sympathy, have practical implications 
8. James, 1890, 2, pp. 418-419; see also James, 1890, 2, pp. 
626-627, where James appears to place the accidental impulses into 
the back-door category, which separates them from those impulses 
which have teleological significance. 
341. 
for the survival of the race although the individual following them 
may endanger his own safety (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 410-411). James 
allows that sympathy must be considered as an instinct (see James, 
1890, 2, pp. 410-411), and his inclusion of sympathy as a natural or 
instinctive impulse potentially provides a naturalistic basis for 
the structuring of an evolutionary concept of morality. 
Instinctive tendencies would now appear to derive from both the 
front and back-door processes of evolution and not all impulses seem 
to exist for the purpose of facilitating habit formation and adjust-
ment to the internal and external demands. Whether these are true 
instincts is difficult to determine. It will be demonstrated in the 
next chapter that James did not use instinctive impulses as the found-
ation for his theory of ethics. Instead, he made a clear distinction 
between those impulses which were instinctive and those which arose 
fortuitously--and which were 'contrary' to the instinctive history 
of the race (see James, 1890, 2, p. 536). Front and back door tend-
encies appear to manifest themselves in two ways: most front door 
tendencies work to facilitate the efficient adjustment of the indivi-
dual to the environment, while most back door tendencies are elicited 
by empirical events but do not have their true ends in efficient habit 
formation (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 626-627). Some front-door tend-
encies may be productive of 'moral' behaviour but their primary status 
is not moral. They are adaptive structures which have moral impli-
cations when they are contradicted by other impulses or when they 
arise in situations of extraordinary stress. "True" moral impulses 
are back-door tendencies, while many back door tendencies seem to be 
without adaptive or moral utility at all, James calls this last cate-
gory of impulses instinctive because they are elicited in the same 
way that the 'productive' instincts are elicited. 
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But as the following pages will show, these impulses may, in 
some cases, be more properly treated as emotional expressions or 
reactions. Other impulses, such as the tendency towards sea-sickness, 
seem to have more in common with simple reflex reactions; their 
appearance in one individual and not in another is fortuitous and 
merely indicates that individual differences must be taken into ac-
count, The stategem of clarifying the status of the 'accidental' im-
pulses has two advantages. It allows further clarification of the 
'cognitive' nature of emotional expressions, and it allows James' 
earlier definition of the instincts to retain its meaning. James 
stated that instinct is "the faculty to produce certain ends, without  
foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the perform-
ance" (James, 1890, 2, p. 383). Being sea-sick, on the one hand, or 
paralyzed with fear, on the other, can hardly constitute 'ends' as 
the term is used in this definition. These 'impulses' may lead to 
habits of avoiding the events that trigger them, but these so-called 
habits have little in common with the productive or purposive chains 
of behaviour that emerge from the 'true' instincts. 
The conflicts between instinctive tendencies have important 
implications for James' theory of volition with effort as will be 
shown in the next chapter. It is therefore necessary to select the 
most 'developed' definition of instinct so that correspondingly clear 
definitions pf the other categories of impulses can be given. That 
the mind contains non-instinctive, but naturally determined impulses 
in addition to the instincts will be shown in the discussion that 
follows. 
Emotional Expression  
James' theory of emotion aroused a storm of critical comment 
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when he first published it in 1884 (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 92; 
see also James, 1894/1920, p. 346), and he appears to have had doubts 
about its credibility: 
We can define the pure psychic emotions far better by starting 
from such an hypothesis and modifying it in the way of 
restriction and subtraction, than by having no definite 
hypothesis at all. Thus will the publication of my article 
have been justified, even though the theory it advocates, 
rigorously taken, be erroneous. The best thing I can say 
for it is, that in writing it, I have almost persuaded 
myself it may be true (James, 1884/1920, p. 275). 
Two months after the publication of "What is an emotion?" he wrote: 
I find that of my friends, the only ones to whom it seems 
plausible are the physiologists, and that is not necessar-
ily a point in its favor. I must confess, however, that it 
grows rather more plausible to my own mind, the more I think 
it over (James, 1884, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 92). 
But James stuck by the theory, enlarged it, and included it in the 
Principles in 1890, and in 1894 he attempted to answer his critics in 
the paper "The physical basis of emotion". That the theory of emo- 
tion is one of James' most original contributions seems to be undis-
puted (see for example, Boring, 1950, p. 519; Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
p. 89); Lange's independent version of the theory first appeared-- 
in Danish--in 1885, and was translated into German in 1887 (see James 
& Lange, 1922, p. 6). This means that James could not have read 
Lange's version until 1887 so that his intellectual debts for the 
theory belong to other theorists, and as usual, these debts were sub-
stantial (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 89; see also Kraushaar, 1936, 
pp. 247-250). 
James' view of emotion was, psychologically speaking, the most 
radical of his time and it initially appears to contradict many of 
the psychological principles he had already developed and was later 
to systematize in the Principles. James' doubts about the viability 
of the theory are significant; nowhere else does he express such 
344. 
uncertainty about any of his psychological doctrines. His initial 
doubts are not unwarranted, for the theory of emotion is one of his 
most problematic statements, and whether he achieved his end of devel-
oping a view of emotion that is consistent with his other conceptions 
of consciousness, and whether the theory is in fact viable will be 
discussed below. More specifically, it will be shown that James sub-
stantially rejected a cognitive interpretation of the emotions, so 
that emotional reactions do not play any part in determining the indi-
vidual's actions. James thus comes close to an epiphenomenalist ac-
count of emotion, and the dangers of epiphenomenalism are enhanced 
by the elementarism that is introduced when he attempts to construct 
a causal account of emotional arousal. 
The theory of emotion must be discussed in the context of James' 
theory of action, because James insists that instincts (and therefore, 
presumably, other Impulses towards action) cannot be separated from 
emotional accompaniments: 
Objects of rage, love, fear, etc., not only promote a man 
to outward deeds, but provoke characteristic alterations in 
his attitude and visage, and affect his breathing, circulation, 
and other organic functions in specific ways. When the 
outward deeds are inhibited, these latter emotional expressions 
still remain, and we read the anger in the face, though the 
blow may not be struck, and the fear betrays itself in voice 
and color,.though one may suppress all other sign. Instinctive  
reactions and emotional expressions thus shade imperceptibly  
into each other. Every object that excites an instinct excites  
an emotion as well. Emotions, however, fall short of instincts, 
in that the emotional reaction usually terminates in the 
subject's own body, whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to 
go farther and enter into practical relations with the excit-
ing object. 9 
The critical difference between emotional and instinctive reactions 
lies in their potential for entering into relations with the external 
9. (James, 1890, 2, p. 442; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 471). 
James claimed that moral and intellectual cognitions were also 
accompanied by emotions. 
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world. Emotional reactions terminate in the body of the individual 
and it is necessary to determine what their role is, if any, in 
inciting particular responses. In the above definition their status 
appears to be restricted to acting as accompaniments of other thoughts 
or actions (like the fringes of thought in the stream of consciousness). 
Because James' theory of emotion proved so controversial, and 
because there appear to be major problems in integrating the theory 
with his psychological theory of the structures and functions of cons-
ciousness, it is necessary to recall that the theory is given in 
three versions. James' original statement is contained in his 1884 
paper "What is an emotion?" Most of the 1884 paper was included in 
the Principles, and a comparison of "What is an emotion?" with the 
chapter on emotion in the Principles reveals that all of the major 
points of the theory were carried over into the Principles. In fact, 
much of the 1884 paper was simply reprinted verbatim in 1890 (see 
James, 1884/1920, p, 244). The version of the theory contained in 
the Principles expands and enlarges greatly on the 1884 paper: argu- 
ments are more fully worked out, and the theory is supported with more 
'evidence'. Thus, the 1884 paper can be taken as a sketch of the 
theory, and for the sake of clarity we will concentrate on the version 
given in the Principles as the mature form of the theory, 
10 
But James' 
more sophisticated working out of the theory still did not satisfy 
his critics, and in 1894, James attempted a reply to his critics in 
a paper called "The physical basis of emotion". Several commentators 
believe that the expanded version of the theory of emotion given in 
the Principles is in fact a viable account of emotion, consistent with 
10. The Principles will therefore be taken as the primary reference. 
Overlap between the 1884 and 1890 versions of the theory will be 
indicated in the reference notes in the text. 
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James' overall construction of consciousness, and that their inter-
pretation is supported by the 1894 paper. This interpretation of 
the theory of emotion is discussed below. 
James' theory of emotional expression reverses the traditional 
paradigm whereby "the mental perception of some fact excites the mental 
affection called the emotion, and this latter state of mind gives rise 
to the bodily expression" (James, 1890, 2, p. 449; see also James, 
1884/1920, p. 247). Basically, James' theory of emotion states that 
bodily changes follow immediately upon the perception or cognition of 
any exciting object. Emotions are the feelings of these bodily changes 
as they occur (see James, 1890, 2, p. 450; see also James, 1884/1920, 
pp. 247-248). Emotions are excited along with instinctive reactions 
to objects, but emotional expressions terminate in the body of the 
individual, while instinctive reactions often enter into 'practical 
relations' with the exciting object (see James, 1890, 2, p. 442). The 
entire body serves as a sounding-board for emotional excitement, and 
the range of the physiological changes that the body undergoes are so 
numerous that "no shade of emotion, however slight, should be without 
a bodily reverberation as unique, when taken in its totality, as is 
the mental mood itself" (James, 1890, 2, p.' 450; see also James, 1884/ 
1920, pp. 251-252). Should the individual try to imagine the presence 
of a strong emotion without its bodily manifestations, he would find 
that he had nothing left to contemplate (see James, 1890, 2, p. 451; 
see also James, 1884/1920, p. 255). Thus, James states, "each emotion 
is the resultant of a sum of elements, and each element is caused by 
a physiological process of a sort already well known. The elements 
are all organic changes, and each of them is the reflex effect of the 
exciting object" (James, 1890, 2, p. 453; see also James, 1884/1920, 
p. 268). No special brain-centres exist which are specifically 
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responsible for the generation of emotional expressions--the afferent 
sensations are sufficient to account for the whole range of emotional 
expression (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 472-474; see also James, 1894/ 
1920, p. 370). 
The most explicit, if the most problematic, statement of the 
theory is given as follows: 
My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow  
directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our  
feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. 
Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep, 
we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by 
a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be 
defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that 
the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, 
that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, 
and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry 
because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we 
tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are 
sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the 
bodily states following on the perception, the latter would 
be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of 
emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it 
best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, 
but we should not actually feel  afraid or angry (James, 1890, 
2, p. 450; see also James, 1884/1920, p.p. 247-248). 
This statement essentially constitutes the 'strong' version of 
the theory of emotion and it is the statement which aroused so much 
critical furor; it describes what James calls the 'coarse' emotions 
"in which everyone recognizes a strong organic reverberation" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 449). His critics objected to this statement on the 
basis that "Common sense would be likely to say that it was because 
we object to being eaten [that we run away]; but according to Professor 
James the reason we dislike to be eaten is because we run away". 11 
The essential criticism made by both Irons and Worcester was 
that James was claiming that it was not the cognitive appreciation 
11. Worcester, 1892, quoted in James, 1894/1920, p. 349; see also 
Irons, 1894, dicussed in James, 1894/1920, p. 349. Irons makes 
substantially the same criticism as Worcester. 
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of the situation which engendered the emotional reaction; instead, 
James argued that the stimulus aroused reflex physiological changes 
in the individual which were then experienced as emotions. Moreover, 
Worcester pointed out that no particular stimulus excites one neces-
sary reaction in the observer; rather, the reaction to the stimulus 
is determined by the relation of the observer to the stimulus--that 
is, caged bears do not provoke the response of running away.
12 
James 
replied to the second criticism by stating that the misunderstanding 
was due to the "slapdash brevity of the language used" (James, 1894/ 
1920, p. 351), in 1884 and 1890, and that he meant 'run' to stand for 
"many other movements in us, of which invisible visceral ones seem 
by far the most essential; [these movements] discriminate also between 
the various grades of emotion which we designate by one name" (James, 
1894/1920, p. 351). 
But the first criticism was more difficult to dismiss, and it 
was by far the more important. In both 1884 and 1890, James made the 
distinction between the 'coarse' emotions and the 'subtle' emotions. 
The coarse emotions and their arousal are broadly described in James' 
'strong' statement of emotional expression quoted above (see James, 
1890, 2, p. 450, quoted on p. 347). These coarseemotions are later 
contrasted with the arousal of the subtler intellectual, moral,and 
aesthetic emotions "whose organic reverberation is less obvious and 
strong.
13 
In the case of the subtle emotions, bodily reverberations 
seemed to be entirely absent and the emotional reaction followed 
12. (See Irons, 1894, and Worcester, 1892, quoted in James, 1894/1920, 
p. 349). These criticisms have also been made by modern critics 
and will be taken up again below. 
13. (James, 1890, 2, p. 449; see also James, 1884/1920, pp. 267-269). 
The distinction between the coarse and the subtle emotions is less 
explicitly worked out in the 1884 version of the theory but the 
general distinction does not change between 1884 and 1890. 
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immediately on the perception of the object, so that the individual 
experienced "genuinely cerebral  forms of pleasure" (James, 1890, 2, 
p. 468). The experience of such immediate non-accompanied cerebral 
-pleasures would invalidate the theory of emotion as a whole. The 
absence of bodily reverberation preceding the subtle emotional states-- 
the immediate response to the object--would imply that the strong 
emotions were also directly aroused by the perception of the object 
instead of following upon the bodily reverberations (see James, 1890, 
2, p. 468). But James argued that introspection revealed that bodily 
reverberations preceded the most subtle of the emotions (see James, 
1890, 2, p. 471). And in 1894, he made it explicit that the subtle 
and the strong emotions were aroused in the same fashion; the distinc-
tion between the strong and subtle emotions was to be found in the 
intensity of arousal rather than in the mode of arousal (see James, 
1894/1920, p. 370). 
James claimed that both the coarse and the subtle emotions were 
essentially aroused by the afferent feelings excited by the presence 
of the object (see James, 1894/1920, pp. 358-360). 14 The 'pleasant-
ness' or 'unpleasantness' of the content of the perception is due to 
these afferent sensations (see James, 1894/1920, p. 358). The result-
ing emotion is therefore the summation of the afferent feelings arous-
ed in the individual for James claims that he can find nothing more 
in the experience of any particular emotion, subtle or strong, than 
its reduction to these physical sensations (see James, 1894/1920, pp. 
359-360). Thus James concludes his 1894 paper with the statement that: 
That part, if there be any, of emotional feeling which is 
14. James made this point implicitly in 1890 (see James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 468, 471), but it was not until 1894 that he specifically referred 
to the afferent feelings in relation to emotional expressions. 
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not of afferent origin should be admitted to be insignifi-
cant, and the name "emotion" should be suffered to connote 
organic excitement as the distinctive feature of the state 
(James, 1894/1920, P. 370). 
This statement is particularly important because it resolves the 
problem of accounting for James' motivation in constructing the theory 
of emotion along the lines he did. By making afferent sensations the 
basis of both the subtle and the coarse emotions, James was attempting 
to bring his theory of emotion into line with his basic theory of 
knowledge. The 1894 version of the theory therefore does not consti-
tute a major revision of the theory--James in fact ratifies his theory 
of emotion in this paper. Instead, the paper is important because 
James makes the epistemolo9ical rationale of the theory more explicit 
than he had in either 1884 or 1890. The theory of emotion cannot 
therefore be viewed as existing in three separate versions; the 1884 
paper sketches the broad outlines of the theory, while the Principles  
gives the theory in its most expanded and detailed version. Finally, 
the 1894 paper ratifies the theory and emphasizes the epistemological 
demands that the theory presumably met.
15 
So far, then, we have outlined the basic premises of the theory 
of emotion and indicated that the theory was not substantially changed 
between 1884 and 1894. We have yet to assess the theory and the pro-
blems it presents when taken in conjunction with James' broad theory 
of consciousness. Because the theory of emotion proved so problematic, 
it is logical to ask how he came to construct the theory in the first 
place; the answer lies in the influence of Lotze and Darwin. Their 
15. Because James presents the theory in its most detailed and 
expanded form in the Principles, the Principles will be used in the 
following discussion as the major statement of the theory and the 1884 
and 1894 papers will be referred to in cases where they shed light 
on James' intentions in constructing the theory. 
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combined effect on James' thought will therefore be briefly discussed 
in order to clarify James' philosophical position before we turn to 
the specific criticisms of the theory and its implications for James' 
psychology and philosophy. 
Lotze's influence and the influence of the British empiricists. 
According to Perry, James' theory "that emotions are fusions of 
organic sensations aroused by bodily expression" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
p. 89) was inspired by his reading of Lotze's Medicinische psychologie  
in 1867-1868. James made a note on his copy of Lotze's text that 
"Emotions due to bodily reverberation" (James, quoted in Perry, 1935/ 
1974, 2, p. 89; see also Wiener, 1965, p. 116). Perry states that in 
spite of this, Lotze was not the primary influence on James' theory; 
that credit he believes, belongs to Darwin and traditional British 
empiricism (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 89). Kraushaar disagrees, 
claiming that: 
Nowhere in James' psychology is Lotze's influence so manifest 
as in the account of the emotions. The substance of the James-
Lange theory, the emphasis on peripheral nerve action, the 
resonance theory of the relation of body and mind, and the 
denial of the existence of a separate cerebral center for 
emotions--all these typically Jamesian standpoints had already 
been achieved on a more or less speculative basis in Lotze's 
'Medicinische psychologie' of 1852. James differs only in 
presenting his theory more emphatically and in a much more 
radical form (Kraushaar, 1936, pp. 247-248). 
Kraushaar castigates James for his failure to acknowledge Lotze's pro-
found influence,
16 
and perhaps he is justified, for James does echo 
Lotze's theory as Kraushaar describes it (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 450- 
453, 472-474, in reference to Kraushaar's comment, 1936, pp. 247-248, 
quoted above), But James is primarily indebted to Lotze for the 
16. (See Kraushaar, 1936, p. 249; see also Titchener, 1914, p. 249). 
Titchener also criticizes James for failing to acknowledge Lotze's 
influence. 
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latter's rhetorical rejection of the theory of innervation and James 
does in fact acknowledge Lotze's work in his earlier paper, "The 
feeling of effort" (see James, 1880/1920, p. 154 for James' acknowledge-
ment). 
According to Kraushaar: 
James contended that the truly emotional elements of an 
emotion consist in the feeling of bodily responses to a given 
cognitive content. Any such content will "excite bodily 
changes.. .50 indefinitely numerous and subtle that the entire 
organism may be called a sounding board, which every change 
of consciousness however slight, may make reverberate." 
Awareness of this disturbance constitutes the emotion proper; 
incoming nerve currents are thus the true physiological 
basis of the emotion (Kraushaar, 1936, p. 248; internal 
quote from James, 1890, 2., p. 450). 
The feeling of any emotion relies upon the status of the afferent 
feelings; these are the feelings that constitute the emotion proper. 
These feelings are engendered upon the perception of the exciting ob-
ject and they correspond to the felt sensations of the muscles and 
organs, moving in response to the perception. The bear is perceived 
and this perception triggers two responses: a feeling or cognitive 
idea that 'it is best to run' dominates the stream of consciousness, 
and once running is commenced, the individual experiences the afferent 
sensations produced by his movements. The , perception simultaneously 
triggers the physiological reflexes of trembling, increase in heart-
rate, etc., and the individual experiences 'fear'. All are afferent 
sensations. The individual does not have any feelings of innervation--
that is, he has no awareness of the efferent currents responsible for 
the running, the trembling, or the increase in heart-rate. This is a 
fairly subtle point; the emotional expressions--that is, fear, anger, 
etc.--are not engendered by the object itself, but are products like 
the other feelings of movement, of the first effects of the stimulus 
on consciousness. The rejection of the theory of innervation is as 
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• basic to the theory of emotion as it is to the development of James' 
ideo-motor paradigm. 
Perry claims that James' theory of emotion owes more to the 
British empiricist tradition of philosophy than to Lotze because the 
British empiricist philosophers stressed "the receptive and cognitive 
aspect of mental content" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 89), so that James 
'naturally' inherited his position. Perry's point is valid when the 
discussion is confined to the orthodox British tradition of philosophy. 
The distinction must be made, however, between the philosophical and 
psychological traditions in British empiricism and their effects on 
James. James never discusses his rejection of the theory of innerva-
tion in relation to the philosophical tradition of British empiricism. 
But he explicitly rejected Bain's, Lewes', and Hughlings Jackson's 
account of innervation; if innervation was not compatible with British 
empiricist philosophy, it had been incorporated into British empiricist 
psychology in the work of Bain, Lewes, and Hughlings Jackson (see 
James, 1880/1920, pp. 151-155). The critical difference between Bri-
tish empiricist psychology and James' theory lies in James' rejection 
of innervation; the mind knows the afferent, not the efferent, sensa-
tions that are produced when an impulse, idea, or feeling is discharg-
ed into movement, or when an emotional reaction is engendered, and 
this is the point that Perry seems to miss. Perry does agree that the 
theory of emotion is consistent with the rejection of innervation (see 
Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp, 89-90). But in his efforts to link James 
with the so-called orthodox tradition of empiricism, he fails to note 
the fundamental incompatibilities between James' theory of emotion 
and the specific psychologies of empiricists. James gives a fairly 
long critique of the empiricist psychology in "The feeling of effort" 
(see James, 1880/1920, pp. 152-156, 206-219). If Perry believes that James 
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naturally inherited his particular notion of the role of afferent 
feelings, James certainly did not. 
DarwiWs influence. 
But Perry is less concerned with the influence of Lotze or Brit-
ish empiricism on the development of the theory of emotion than he 
is with Darwin's role. According to Perry (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
p. 89), and Wiener (see Wiener, 1965, p. 116), it was Darwin who ex-
erted the most profound influence on James' development of the theory. 
Darwin gave a detailed biological account (see Darwin, 1873; see also 
Wiener, 1965, p. 116) of the emotions which concretized James' emerg-
ing view that all emotions could be considered as 'organic disturb-
ances'. He was further influenced by Darwin's principle of natural , 
selection so that: "Some emotional expressions are accounted for by 
the principle of natural selection 'as weakened repetitions of move-
ments which formerly...were of utility to the subjectl." 17 •And James 
went further than Darwin in claiming that some emotional expressions 
had completely accidental origins, and therefore had no practical 
utility--such accidentally derived reactions formed the basis for man's 
aesthetic life for example (see James, 1890, 2, p. 484). The role 
of theorists such as Lotze and Henle (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 89; 
see also James, 1890, 2, pp. 461-462), was to provide firm physio-
logical foundations for a 'valid' evolutionary account of the emotions 
given in psychological terms. Darwin's account--insofar as it was 
psychological-was based on the associationism of Bain, Mueller, and 
Spencer (for examples, see Darwin, 1873, pp. 27, 29, 31), and James 
17. (Wiener, 1965, p. 117; internal quote from James, 1890, p. 478). 
It should be noted that James also acknowledges Spencer's influence 
here. 
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believed that Darwin's reliance upon association psychology consti-
tuted the only major weakness in the theory. 
Darwin was concerned with describing the ways in which the 
emotions manifested themselves as expressions; his account is largely 
a catalogue of the outward physiological changes that denote the appear-
ance of recognizable emotions. Thus, surprise is characterized by a 
raising of the eyebrows which wrinkles the brow and causes the eyes to 
open wide, etc. (see Darwin, 1873, p. 278). Darwin wished to discover 
whether the exp7essions were universal amongst the human races. He 
also did comparative studies to show that some of the expressions 
were exhibited by animals, his theory being that emotional expressions 
were a product of evolution, and his observations appeared to confirm 
his theory. It is suggested then, that Darwin's influence on James 
was not altogether positive: James seems to have been so overwhelmed 
by the detailed evidence that he concentrated his attention on the 
physiological expressions of emotion to the detriment of their cogni-
tive import. 
The physiological basis of emotion. 
James follows Darwin in calling the emotions expressions. An ob-
ject elicits 'an impulse or idea towards a specific action in the per-
ceiver. It also provokes physical changes in the body of the perceiv-
er, and the sum of these changes constitute the emotional expression. 
The impulse to act and the emotional expression are not experienced  
separately in consciousness (see James, 1890, 2, p. 442), so that the 
most logical explanation of emotional arousal is that the perception 
of the object immediately engenders a 'mental' emotion which gives 
rise to the physical sensations of emotion (see James, 1890, 2, p. 449). 
But James rejects this interpretation. Instead, he argues that the 
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perception is followed immediately by bodily changes and the feeling 
of these afferent effects is the emotion (see James, 1890, 2, p. 449). 
James argues that physiological theories support his conclusion that 
there are no separate emotional centres in the cortex,
18 
for if emo- 
tional centres are necessary, then: "we must deny the view that is cur-
rent and hold the cortex to be something more than the surface of 
'projection' for every sensitive spot and muscle in the body" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 473). James then argues that his interpretation of the 
emotions is compatible with the sensory-motor model but it should be 
noted that his version of the sensory-motor model is based on the 
changes he made in the functional status of the afferent and efferent 
tracts: 
An object falls on a sense-organ, affects a cortical part, 
and is perceived; or else the latter, excited inwardly, 
gives rise to an idea of the same object. Quick as a flash, 
the reflex currents pass down through their pre-ordained 
channels, alter the condition of muscle, skin and viscus; 
and these alterations, perceived, like the original objects, 
in many portions of the cortex, combine with it in conscious-
ness and transform it from an object-simply-apprehended 
into an object-emotionally-felt (James, 1890, 2, pp. 473-474). 
Emotional reactions are 'achieved' and experienced in the same way 
that the feelings of effort (in 'voluntary' actions) are 'achieved' 
and experienced. The organism is active and reactive and the body 
serves as a "sounding board" (James, 1890, 2, p. 450),  the cog- 
nitive and emotional states of consciousness; the afferent feelings 
provide the 'meaning' of the action and the reaction. But now the 
parallel between emotional expressions and ideas and the effects of 
their expression in movement breaks down. James distinguished 
18. Note Lotze's influence here (see Kraushaar, 1936, pp. 247-248, 
quoted above, p. 351). 
19. Note Lotze's influence here (see Kraushaar, 1936, pp. 247-248, 
quoted above, p. 351). 
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• emotions from instincts on the basis that instinctive impulses termin-
ated in direct interaction with the objects which arousEd them while 
emotional expressions terminated in the body (see James 1890, 2, p. 
442, quoted above, p. 344). Emotions are not outwardly purposive; 
in fact, James' discussion concentrates upon the physiological aspects 
of emotion and bars them from any explicit cognitive import. Wiener 
states that: "Just as the positivists argued that a physical object 
is the totality of its sensible effects, so James has shown that an 
emotion is the totality of its organic manifestations" (Wiener, 1965, 
p. 116; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 452). This makes it difficult 
to analyze the 'cognitive' aspect of emotional expression. •Peters 
notes that James "does not mean that the strictly emotional part of 
the emotion (its felt significance, its inwardness) is really physical 
or physiological" (Peters, 1962, p. 689). And James tries to make it 
clear that his sensationalist account of emotion does not diminish 
the worthiness, purity, or depth of the reaction so that the emotions 
"carry their own inner measure of worth with there (James, 1890, 2, 
p. 453). 
Reck, on the other hand, insists that "James's celebrated theory 
of the emotions exhibits most emphatically the physiological, behavior-
ist side of his psychology" (Reck, 1967, p. 25), and Watson admitted 
that the theory was adopted by most psychologists (see Watson, 1930/1961, 
p. 142). Watson deplored James' use of the introspective method to 
study emotion and claimed that by doing so, "James robbed psychology of 
perhaps its most beautiful and most interesting field of research" 
(Watson, 1930/1961, p. 142). Watson made this statement in 1930; ob-
viously his contemporaries, who were not utilizing the introspective 
method by this time anyway, found enough in the theory to see it as 
compatible with Behaviourism. It is reasonable to conclude that Reck's 
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interpretation of the meaning of the theory for modern psychology 
at least, is correct.
20 
In spite of James' assertion that the quality of emotional re-
actions is not 'touched' by the sensationalistic causal account he 
gives of the emotions, the 'cognitive' aspect of emotion is still dif-
ficult to define. Wild, however, believes that James' theory of 
emotion is both internally viable and consistent with his broad con-
struction of consciousness. Wild recognizes (in his discussion of 
the 1890 version of the theory) that James gives primacy to the bodily 
responses, thus appearing to eliminate cognitive meaning from emo-
tional expression, and that this is a potential problem with the 
theory (see Wild, 1969, p. 251). James states that certain stimuli 
immediately provoke physical sensations which are then experienced 
as emotional reactions (see James, 1890, 2, p. 450, quoted above, p. 
347). This overt position is dangerously close to the epiphenomenal-
ism that James had reacted so strongly against in his construction of 
consciousness. But Wild claims that James has already taken steps to 
ensure that his theory cannot be given an epiphenomenalist interpre-
tation. Wild argues that the interpretation placed upon the 'strong' 
version of the theqry is compatible with James' broad construction 
of consciousness. He notes that "James makes it clear that emotions 
are often excited by objects with which we have no practical dealings" 
(Wild, 1969, p. 251; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 442). These objects 
20. Psychologists basically accepted James' theory of emotion until 
1929 when Cannon successfully refuted it (see Robinson, 1972, p. 231). 
While James was not a Behaviourist, his theory of emotion was compatible 
with the •Behaviourist paradigm as it emerged in the early years of 
the twentieth century. It is worth noting that the theory of emotion 
was the only one of James' psychological theories that was explicitly 
adopted by the emerging Behaviourist movement, and it was adopted 
because it was heavily physiological, non-cognitive, and reductionist 
in construction. 
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would not, therefore, arouse emotion on a purely instinctive or 
reflexive level; they could arouse emotion only in the context of 
their 'meaning' •for the individual (see Wild, 1969, p. 251). Further-
more, Wild points out that the stimulus must be perceived before the 
individual reacts emotionally to it, and the fact that perception 
precedes emotional expression necessarily means that the object en-
genders the emotion because Qf its meaning for the individual (see 
Wild, 1969, p. 251; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 449). These measures 
are sufficient to protect James from the charge that his theory of 
emotion introduced epiphenomenalism into his broad account of cons-
ciousness. They are not sufficient, however, to constitute a cogni-
tive interpretation of emotion as will be shown below. 
Linschoten, like Wild, believes that James' revised formula 
takes the cognitive aspects of emotion sufficiently into account: 
The stimulus for bodily changes that is experienced 
as an emotion is not simply a thing or happening; it is 
a situation. The emotion is not the observation of the 
resonance to the meaning of things; that meaning depends 
on the situation in which they appear (Linschoten, 1968, 
283). 
Finally, both Wild and Linschoten believe that James' use of the term 
feeling as a generic name for all psychic states rescues the theory: 
"Emotion is that name for a special kind of feeling in which bodily 
changes are particularly evident" (Wild, 1969, P. 253; see also 
Linschoten, 1968, pp. 283-284). Wild believes that James gives a pri-
mary role to what he (Wild) calls the living body. Emotional re-
actions relate objects "to the bodily subject" (Wild, 1969, p. 253), 
and thus provide consciousness with cognitive knowledge about the 
world. 
The problem with this interpretation is that the fact that the 
individual has to be aware of the exciting stimulus at some level 
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before the physiological changes take place is not the issue here. 
The problem comes in determining the possible role that the physio-
logical changes, and hence the emotions, play in determining the re-
sponse that the individual makes to the exciting stimulus. James' 
broad paradigm implies that the response is determined on the cogni-
tive level--the perception of the bear excites the idea of running-- 
but the emotional reaction of fear accompanies the idea, rather than 
playing any part in the selection of the response. Fear of the bear 
is not part of the cognitive response to the percept of the bear; it 
accompanies the cognitive response. Emotions would appear to have 
their genesis in the immediate reverberations set up in the body when 
the stimulus is perceived. In this sense, the reverberations must 
constitute bodily 'actions' which are made in response to the idea  
in consciousness. These reverberations, in turn, are summed up into 
what is experienced as the particular emotional expression. Thus, 
Linschoten's argument that the meaning of the reaction depends on 
the situation in which the reverberations are excited is unsupported, 
nor does it allow the conclusion that James developed a cognitive 
theory of emotion. The emotional expression does not excite action-- 
it is the product of action. James was to repeat again and again 
that feelings exist for the sake of action, that feelings discharge 
themselves in action, and that actions are determined by the presence 
of particular feelings or ideas dominating the stream of conscious-
ness. The theory of emotion appears to reverse this paradigm because 
emotional feelings have no role in determining actions, but are by-
products of physiological arousal. It is because emotional expres-
sions appear to have this anomalous status as by-products of physio-
logical arousal that James comes very close to incorporating a 
rather dangerous epiphenomenalism into his theory of consciousness. 
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Emotions, as mental states, are nothing more than the collective 
offspring of afferent sensations. They are the means through which 
the mind 'knows' what is happening physiologically, but they are 
barred, by definition, from determining actions. 
Unlike Wild and Linschoten, Wilshire does not feel that the prob-
lems with the theory of emotion are easily resolved. He uses the 
theory of emotion as a demonstration that there are two opposing strands 
in the Principles and sets out to show that there is a conflict between 
James' tendency to "treat thought as a psychical existent specifiable 
in its own terms" (Wilshire, 1968, p. 211) correlatable to brain 
states, and his recognition that he must first specify the relation-
ship of the object of thought to the physical world (see Wilshire, 
1968, p. 211). James, according to Wilshire, is prevented from achiev-
ing a theory of emotion wherein the emotional reactions are cognitive-
ly related to the world, because he insists on advancing a causal 
theory of emotion (see Wilshire, 1968, p. 213; see also James, 1890, 
2, p. 453). And James' corresponding disregard for the classification 
of emotional states undermines both his attempt at describing the 
mental experience of emotion, and the relationship of emotional re-
actions to the objects that provoke them. Wilshire rightly remarks 
that: 
An emotion like fear refers beyond the body to what we are 
emotional about. We are not thinking about the palpitations 
of our heart, or the sickening lump in our stomach when we 
face a wild beast; we are thinking about the wild beast--we 
believe it to be there (Wilshire, 1968, p. 214). 
Wilshire's statement must not be confused with Linschoten's. 
Linschoten believes that the theory of emotion is valid as long as 
James allows the emotion to be determined by the meaning of the situ-
ation so that the emotion is the 'resonance' of the meaning in cons-
ciousness (see Linschoten, 1968, p. 283). This would mean that 
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emotions could be conceived of as comparable to the fringe states 
of ideas; the difference is that they are felt as physical sensa-
tions. Wilshire questions the validity of such an appraisal; the 
physical and mental expressicns must be, he believes,directed towards 
the object. He then extends his criticism to James' argument that 
the sensational nature of emotion does not negate the spiritual worth 
of the emotion. Wilshire correctly points out that James cannot vali-
date this claim unless he revises his definition to allow an emotion 
to be more than a "feeling of bodily disturbances" (Wilshire, 1968, 
p. 215). Wild and Wilshire agree that James' insistence on develop-
ing a causal theory of emotion works to the detriment of his concen-
trating on the meaning of emotion. But Wild feels that James' quali-
fications are successful while Wilshire does not. 
Wilshire is concerned with James' failure to construct a theory 
of emotion whereby the emotions are cognitively related to the objects 
which arouse them. This is an important omission in an evolutionary 
theory of emotion, for presumably the major function of the emotional 
reactions is to enhance the cognitive appreciation of reality. Thus, 
emotional reactions should be described in terms of the character-
istics of the stimulus which provokes the reaction, and they should 
also be describable in psychological, rather than in physiological 
terms. Wilshire claims that when we see the bear and are afraid, we 
are thinking about the bear; we are not thinking about the fact that 
our heart-rate has increased. Should we be asked to give a report on 
our state of mind by a bystander, we would most likely reply that we 
were afraid of the bear. Fear of the bear would be included in the 
thought of the bear. 
And it is precisely this aspect of the emotional reaction--that 
is, the cognitive experience of affect--that is completely disregarded 
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in James' account. James is no longer treating thought as a 'psychi-
cal existent' which correlates with physiological arousal. Instead, 
the emotions are characterized as the sums of felt physiological 
changes and the distinction James insisted on between mental exper-
ience and underlying physiological activity in his original construct-
ion of consciousness (see Chap. 3, pp. 142-148), has been abandoned. 
Afferent sensations--which are combined here as emotional expressions-- 
have no definable implications for action; actions are instigated by 
ideas or thoughts about performing specific actions, so that running 
away from the bear is mediated by the dominance of the thought of run-
ning in the stream of consciousness.
21 	
When emotions are given as the 
sums of physiological changes without any attempt to define a corres-
ponding cognitive structure or function for them, emotions cannot , 
logically have any role in determining the course of action the indi-
vidual will take in response to the stimulus. Wilshire is therefore 
correct in criticizing James for his refusal to relate emotional 
arousal to the exciting object and for his insistence on concentrating 
on the physiological mechanism of emotion. 
Were James' theory of emotion to be constructed so that it was an 
extension of his stream of consciousness theory, he would have had to 
claim that the fear that follows the initial perception of the excit-
ing object is a definable feeling--'fear' of the bear--rather than a 
collection of afferent sensations which are eventually summed together 
as fear, or anger, or ecstasy. Fear as a cognitive appreciation of 
the situation would then have implications for the action that followed. 
Similarly, the absence of fear would have implications for action. 
21. The mechanics of the translation of thoughts into movements 
is discussed below in the section dealing with ideo-motor action. 
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If we were to encounter the beast while alone in the woods and did 
not experience fear in response to the perception, the action that 
was subsequently taken would quite likely differ from the action that 
was taken when we were 'afraid', and James makes this quite clear in 
his discussion of fear as an instinct (see James, 1890, 2, p. 417). 
It is significant that in his analysis of fear as an instinct, he con-
centrates on the nature of the fear-arousing objects themselves, so 
that the instinctive reaction is 'explained' in terms of the organism's 
cognitive state and his relationship to the world (see James, 1890, 
2, pp. 415-422). It was hypothesized (see above, pp. 340-342 ), that 
the ambiguities of what James meant by instinct could be resolved if 
the non-adaptive fear-responses were to be treated as emotional re-
actions. This would have the advantage of ensuring the James had a 
consistent definition of instinct.
22 
It would also mean that emotional 
reactions could be defined as feelings
23 
which wereelicited by parti-
cular objects or events. The physiological accompaniments of emotion 
would then have the same relationship to the emotion in consciousness 
as the afferent tactile sensations aroused by sensible objects, have 
in relation to the thoughts about these objects that are aroused in 
consciousness.
24 
But James did not pursue this alternative; instead 
he set out to develop a causal theory of emotion (see Wilshire, 1968, 
p. 213; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 453). And in his attempt to , 
develop a causal theory of emotion, James blatantly based the theory 
on an elementaristic analysis of sensation. James writes: 
22. Instincts could be consistently defined as the ability to 
produce certain ends without foresight or education in the production 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 383). 
23. See Chap. 3, pp. 135-138 for James' definition of feelings or 
thoughts. 
24. See Chap. 4, pp. 239-258 on granting reality to sensory objects. 
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each emotion is the resultant of a sum of elements, and 
each element is caused by a physiological process of a 
sort already well known. The elements are all organic 
changes, and each of them is the reflex of an existing 
object (James, 1890, 2, p. 453). 
This is an astonishing statement considering James' vehement opposi-
tion to elementarism in earlier chapters of the Principles (see 
Chap. 3, pp. 138-141). James is attempting to relate emotional states 
directly to the body of the individual. 25 But he does so in such a 
way that emotions are reduced to bodily sensations which, in themselves, 
cannot have specific cognitive meanings. The flow of tears which fol-
low the entry of a particle of dirt in one's eye is produced automati-
cally or reflexively; the 'cause' is 'given' in the interaction be-
tween physiological structures and the environment (see James, 1890, 
1, pp. 12-13). But tears also flow on occasions of grief, or converse-
ly, on occasions of joy or aesthetic inspiration (see James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 444, 470). The exciting stimuli in these examples are qualitative-
ly distinct, and the flow of tears itself is 'meaningful' only when 
considered as part of the reaction to the exciting stimulus. Instead, 
James states that: "the genesis of an emotion is accounted for, as the 
arousal by an object of a lot of reflex acts which are forthwith 
felt" (James, 1890, 2, p. 454). This statement is consistent with 
James' definition of conscious thoughts only if he allows that it is 
the particular combination or patterning of the reflex acts that is 
significant, so that tears, again, can be part of qualitatively differ- 
ent emotions depending on what other reflexes are concurrently elicited. 
Even so, the combination must be granted properties of its own beyond 
those of its constituent elements; it is the unitary cognitive 'feeling' 
25. As both Wild and Wilshire point out (see Wild, 1969, p. 251; 
see also Wilshire, 1968, p. 213, where Wilshire writes: "James again 
regards the body in an 'atomized' way"). 
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of the emotional state that is important. We feel sad, joyful, 
afraid; we do not 'feel' or 'connate' the arousal of a lot of reflex 
arcs. 
James does intimate that such a 'fusion' of the reflex arousals 
takes place when he writes that: 
particular perceptions do produce wide-spread bodily effects 
by a sort of immediate physical influence, antecedent to the 
arousal of an emotion or emotional idea.. .If we abruptly see 
a dark moving form in the woods, our heart stops beating, 
and we catch our breath instantly and before any articulate 
idea of danger can arise (James, 1890, 2, p. 457). 
It appears that there are two parts to emotional expression; these are 
the immediate bodily changes which occur with the percept; and their 
'formalization' into a particular emotion concurrent with action. But 
James does not develop the latter aspect of the theory. Instead he 
concludes that: 
If our hypothesis is true, it makes us realize more deeply 
than ever how much our mental life is knit up with our 
corporeal frame, in the strictest sense of the term. Rapture, 
love, ambition, indignation, and pride, considered as feelings, 
are fruits of the same soil with the grossest bodily sensa-
tions of pleasure and of pain (James, 1890, 2, p. 467). 
and in regard to the 'subtler' emotions he writes: 
As far as these ingredients of the subtler emotions go, 
then, the latter form no exception to our account, but 
rather an additional illustration thereof. In all cases 
of intellectual or moral rapture we find that, unless there 
be coupled a bodily reverberation of some kind with the 
mere thought of the object and cognition of its quality; 
unless we actually laugh at the neatness of the demonstration 
or witticism; unless we thrill at the case of justice, 
or tingle at the act of magnanimity; our state of mind can 
hardly be called emotional at all. It is in fact a mere 
intellectual perception of how certain things are to be 
called--neat, right, witty, generous, and the like. Such 
a judicial state of mind as this is to be classed among 
awareness of truth; it is a cognitive act. As a matter of 
fact, however, the moral and intellectual cognitions hardly 
ever do exist thus unaccompanied (James, 1890, 2, pp. 470-471). 
This seems to be James' last word (in the Principles) on the subject 
of the relationship between emotion and cognition. We are therefore 
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forced to conclude that he meant to leave the emotional reactions as 
the physiological accompaniments of thought; this conclusion is sup-
ported by his summary statement in the 1894 paper: emotional feelings 
are afferent in origin and: 
That part, if any, of emotional feeling which is not of afferent 
origin should be admitted to be insignificant, and the name 
"emotion" should be suffered to connote organic excitement 
as the distinctive feature of the state (James, 1894/1920, 
p. 370). 
James hereby ratifies his causal elementarism and denies the emotions 
cognitive status in consciousness. 
Emotional reactions do not form a distinct level of James' 
structural hierachy of action. They are not, as James describes them, 
impulses towards specific movements (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 185), and 
their influence on ideation is not sufficiently well defined to allow 
them a describable psychological role in 'deciding' upon appropriate 
action. Emotional reactions are induced by perception and are strength-
ened or diminished depending upon the cognitive response that is ini-
tiated.
26 
Emotional expressions accompany ideas about the world 
and they accompany the actions initiated by impulses or thoughts about 
reality. They are found as 'accompaniments' on every level of the 
action hierarchy. Moreover, they terminate in the body of the indivi-
dual so that they are ' ,products' like movements, and are accordingly 
'experienced' in the same way that voluntary and involuntary movements 
are experienced in consciousness. 
26. (See James, 1890, 2, pp. 450, 463). James qualifies this 
view to some extent by stating that the repression of emotional 
reactions in certain personalities may lead to a general diminished 
responsiveness or to a more violent expression of the repressed 
passion when it is once again aroused by the stimulus (see James, 
1890, 2, p. 467). However, these examples are restricted to the 
manifestation of the emotional reactions themselves; the reactions 
are not linked with other cognitive approaches to reality. 
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The major implication that the theory of emotion has for the 
broad assessment of James' psychology is that James' theory of cons-
ciousness is based entirely on cognition. Thoughts or ideas in cons-
ciousness are accompanied by emotional expressions, but the affective 
feelings are barred from any efficacious role in determining the indi-
vidual's actions. This does not mean that James' attempt to create 
a unified theory of consciousness (as outlined above in Chap. 3) is 
nullified by the problems with the theory of emotion. Had James 
attempted to give the collection of afferent sensations which comprise 
the emotional expressions a role in determining what action the indi-
vidual will take, the unified theory of consciousness would be placed 
in jeopardy, for feelings or ideas in consciousness would be given two 
different and opposing structures. As it is, emotions are experienced 
simply as collections of afferent feelings and these feelings are 
oiven the same status as the other afferent feelings which are stimu-
lated by the presence of physical objects and events. As such, they 
provide information about the world that may eventually have effects 
on the production of ideas in the mind. More often, they are expres-
sed as the reflex movements that result (like instinctive or habitual 
reactions) when certain ideas dominate consciousness. They are not 
expressed as feelings or ideas in the mind. 
James' failure to provide a mental or cognitive definition of 
emotion in consciousness (as the parallel of the afferent feelings of 
emotion experienced in the body) presents problems in accounting for 
the motivational questions of why one particular course of action is 
selected over another. His theory of action is based on the principle 
that action immediately and automatically results when one idea gains 
control of consciousness over competing ideas in consciousness. The 
selection of one idea over another, the mechanisms which determine 
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how one idea gains precedence over another, are therefore vital 
issues in the construction of a cognitively based theory of action. 
These issues are particuarly important when we come to look at James' 
theory of volition with effort, where the selection between ideas 
competing in consciousness is critical in determining whether the re- 
sulting action is based on volition with effort, or whether it belongs 
to the habitual, or ideo-motor category of activity. Furthermore, the 
introduction of a causal elementarism into James' theory of mind has 
dangerous implications. It strengthens or supports the reflex inter-
pretation of actions which are performed without volitional effort, 
so that the foundations of James' theory of action incorporate many 
of the elements of the older psychology that he claimed he was oppos-
ing in his definition of feelings or thoughts and his construction 
of the stream of consciousness. James barely, manages to avoid intro-
ducing a dangerous epiphenomenalism into his theory of mind when he 
makes the emotions into sums of physiological elements. He avoids 
an epiphenomenalist account of emotion only because he insists that 
emotional expressions are elicited by cognitive perceptions and as 
such are the end products, akin to other bodily movements, of ideas 
in consciousness. 
Finally, in constructing his metaphysical theory of radical em-
piricism, James used the theory of emotion to support his contention 
that thoughts and things are made of the 'same stuff'. He argued that 
affections were not wholly mental phenomena but were experienced phy-
sically as well (see James, 1905/1967c, pp. 137-189). This in turn 
led him to suspect that a panpsychist account of the universe might 
be inevitable, and prevented him from making head-way in constructing 
a theory of the physical universe which was compatible with his ori-
ginal theory of the stream of consciousness. (This problem is taken up 
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in more detail in Chaps. 8 and 9). 
Ideo-motor Action  
Ideo-motor actions make up the next level of the structural hier-
archy of action, and James gives a precise definition of what an ideo-
motor act is: "Whenever movement follows unhesitatingly and immediate-
ly the notion of it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 522). The necessary and sufficient condition for an 
ideo-motor act is the uncontradicted presence of an idea in the mind 
of what that act is to be; no special fiat or exertion of the will is 
involved (see James, 1890, 2, p. 522). Ideo-motor actions are simple, 
common and uncomplicated because they do not require a special fiat 
for their implementation; nevertheless, they are voluntary actions 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 522). This is the major distinction between 
ideo-motor actions and reflex actions, instinctive impulses, and emo-
tional reactions; ideo-motor action involves foresight of ends (see 
James, 1890, 2, pp. 486-487), and is the end result of a complex 
developmental process: 
As we must wait for the sensations to be given us, so we 
must wait for the movements to be performed involuntarily, 
before we can frame ideas of what either of these things 
are. We learn all our possibilities by the way of exper-
ience. When a particular movement, having once occurred 
in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image 
of itself in the memory, then the movement can be desired 
again, proposed as an end, and deliberately willed. But 
it is impossible to see how it could be willed before 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 487). 
This means that "voluntary movements must be secondary, not primary  
functions of our organism" (James, 1890, 2, p. 487). Reflex and 
instinctive reactions leave 'ideas' of the particular movements in the 
memory, and these involuntary performances provide the basic struct-
ures for voluntary activity (see James, 1890, 2, p. 488). The 
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material for future voluntary actions is constituted out of sensory 
data gained during the period of involuntary experience. How an act 
looks, feels, sounds, when performed by someone else is stored in 
the memory, and when we come to perform the action ourselves, "another 
set of impressions, those, namely, which come up form the parts that 
are actually moved" (James, 1890, 2, p. 488) are stored in the mind 
as "kinaesthetic impressions" (James, 1890, 2, p. 488). James con-
cludes--on the basis of his studies of anaesthetic subjects (see James, 
1890, 2, pp. 489-492)--that: 
whether or no there be anything else in the mind at the 
moment when we consciously will a certain act, a mental 
conception made up of memory-images of these sensations, 
defining which act it is, must be there (James, 1890, 2, 
p. 492). 
James argues (specifically in opposition to the theory of innervation) 
that these "images of peripheral sensations" (James, 1890, 2, p. 494, 
see also James, 1890, 2, p. 501), are all that is required to elicit 
the movement. We are not conscious of the efferent machinery that 
translates the uncontested idea into movement. 
The nature of the ideas which 'provoke' movement is therefore the 
determinative aspect of movement and it is necessary to discover more 
precisely what kind of ideas thee are. Moore claims that there is 
no evidence for the notion that voluntary movements are 'caused' by 
kinaesthetic images. He also claims that only certain ideas can be 
shown to have demonstrable motor consequences (see Moore, 1924, p. 
330, quoted in Fearing, 1930/1964, p. 249). James does not deny this. 
He says that the ideo-motor paradigm is not a self-evident truth pre-
cisely because "we have so many ideas which do not result in action" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 525). But Moore's criticism is not altogether 
unwarranted when he says that kinaesthetic images per se cannot be 
shown to cause voluntary movements, for James' statement that 
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kinaesthetic images are sufficient elicitors of movements is not 
altogether consistent with his examples of ideo-motor actions. 
Kuklick states that the "mental conception...was both a "kinaes-
thetic idea and an inner entity, a mysterious intellectual phase" 
(Kuklick, 1977, p. 186). While James himself does not include a 
'mysterious intellectual phase' in his description of the parameters 
of the ideas which initiate ideo-motor acts, his examples are consist-
ent with Kuklick's statement. Three examples of ideo-motor actions 
have therefore been selected to show that there are at least three 
'types' of ideas which can initiate ideo-motor actions. These examples 
will be referred to as cases one, two and three in the discussion that 
follows. 'Case one' type actions are exemplified by this example: 
Whilst talking I become conscious of a pin on the floor, 
or some dust on my sleeve. Without interrupting the 
conversation I brush away the dust or pick up the pin. 
I make no express resolve, but the mere perception of the 
object and the fleeting notion of the act seem of themselves 
to bring the act about (James, 1890, 2, p. 522). 
This contrasts with the type of ideas which generate ideo-motor actions 
of the 'case two' variety:• 
But whenever a movement is difficult and precise, we become 
aware in advance of the amount and direction of energy which 
it is to involve. One has only to play tennis or billiards, 
or throw a ball, to catch his will in the act, as it were, 
of balancing tentatively its possible efforts, and ideally 
rehearsing various muscular contractions nearly correct, 
until it gets just the right one before it, when it says 
'Now go!' (James, 1890, 2, p. 493). 
Finally, the 'third case' of ideo-motor actions is exemplified by 
James' famous example of the struggle involved in getting out of bed 
on a cold morning. The 'problem' is resolved as follows: 
Now how do we ever get up under such circumstances? If I 
may generalize from my own experience, we more often than 
not get up without any struggle or decision at all. We 
suddenly find that we have got up. A fortunate lapse of 
consciousness occurs; we forget both the warmth and the cold; 
we fall into some revery connected with the day's life, in 
the course of which the idea flashes across us, "Hollo! 
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• I must lie here no longer"--an idea which at that lucky 
instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions, 
and consequently produces immediately its appropriate motor 
• effects. It was our acute consciousness of both the warmth 
• and the cold during the period of struggle, which paralyzed 
our activity then and kept our idea of rising in the condition 
of wish and not of will. The moment these inhibitory ideas 
ceased, the original idea exerted its effects (James, 1890, 
2, pp. 524-525). 
All three cases are examples of ideo-motor action because in each case 
there is no special fiat of the will which precedes the enactment of 
the idea. These are not simple reflex actions nor are they instinct-
ive reactions for their 'ends' are not blind; they are performed pur-
posively with a pre-determined goal in consciousness and these goals 
or ends are determined within the developmental process. Case two 
illustrates James' principle that the notion of specific kinaesthetic 
ideas is sufficient to ensure the performance of the action. But 
some kind of extra-ideation must be present as well--some purpose or 
intention of performing the action at all is necessary. In this case, 
the rationale for throwing the ball might serve as the 'fringe' which 
accompanies the kinaesthetic idea. 
Cases one and three are distinguished from case two because in 
these cases, the kinaesthetic ideas do not appear to dominate the 
idea of the action. The perception of the pin or the dust seems to 
call for the removal of the object, and whatever kinaesthetic ideas 
are involved do not seem to be part of 'conscious' thought. The 
kinaesthetic components may form the fringe of the idea, but the idea 
itself does not seem to be fully 'worked out' in consciousness so that 
working out its components can be done only at a very speculative 
level. The perception of the pin or the dust carries enough 'intent-
ionality' for the observer to remove them without disrupting the flow 
of conversation. In any event, there do not seem to be any rigorously 
374. 
formulated notions of kinaesthetic ideas in these instances. Case 
three, the example of getting out of bed on a cold morning, is pre-
sented without any reference to kinaesthetic ideas at all. The simple 
"I must lie here no longer" (James, 1890, 2, p. 524), is sufficient 
to prompt the act of getting up. Whatever kinaesthetic ideas are 
present are obviously 'fringe' accompaniments to the general idea in 
consciousness. An ideo-motor idea would seem to consist, in some 
cases, of kinaesthetic ideas; in other cases, of an uncontested per-
cept; and finally, in others, of a purposive idea alone. In each 
case, the 'idea' consists of more than a simple amalgam of kinaesthet-
ic ideas thus fulfilling Kuklick's criteria.
27 
Moore's criticism 
is also validated to the extent that JaMes' statement that kinaesth-
etic ideas are all that are necessary seems to be contradicted by 
James' own examples. It is of course possible that what James meant 
by a kinaesthetic idea was precisely the kind of intentionality des-
cribed above. Kuklick believes that the diverse theoretical commit-
ments James made were responsible for the dual image of ideo-motor 
ideas: 
Although this notion might not be consistent with his 
description of the physiological organism, the existence of 
this peculiar kind of image was, I think, a consequence of 
James's joint commitment to the dualism of the automaton 
theory and an ulterior idealism; it assumed that the motor 
theory of consciousness did not reduce mind to behavior 
(Kuklick, 1977, p. 186). 
The structure and function of ideo-motor actions must therefore be 
discussed in relation to the reflex basis for action, habit formation, 
and finally, James' ultimate rationale for disputing the validity 
of innervation 'if a clear picture of what James meant by ideo-motor 
27. Kuklick does not expand his statement on the nature of ideo-
motor ideation and the above is an attempt to analyze James' theory 
in terms consistent with Kuklick's statement. 
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action is to emerge. 
The Reflex Basis for Action  
The structural paradigm for all types of action is the reflex 
model. Thus James writes: 
Movement is the natural immediate effect of feeling, irre-
spective of what the quality of the feeling may be. It is  
so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it  
is so in the voluntary life. Ideo-motor action is thus no 
paradox, to be softened or explained away. It obeys the 
type of all conscious action, and from it one must start 
to explain action in which a special fiat is involved 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 527). 
The only phenomena that can inhibit the movements which immediately 
follow an idea's appearance in consciousness are conflicting ideas. 
The nervous system is a balance between currents; nervous impulses to 
move the muscles are sustained or inhibited by other nervous impulses 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 527), so that the nervous system is in a 
constant state of activity. The sustaining and'inhibiting nature 
of its activity is governed by consciousness because: 
A priori analysis of both brain-action and conscious action 
shows us that if the latter were efficacious it would by 
its selective emphasis, make amends for the indeterminateness 
of the former; whilst the study a posteriori of the distri-
bution of consciousness shows it to be exactly such as we 
might expect in an organ added for the sake of steering a 
nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself (James, 
1890, 1, p. 144). 
The relationship between mind and the nervous system is such that any 
uncontradicted idea therefore results in immediate movement.
28 
Mechan-
ically or physiologically speaking, there is no difference between 
voluntary and non-voluntary impulses so long as they are uncontradicted. 
Given James' rigid adherence to the reflex model,which provided the 
28. Note that this paradigm applies to the generation of emotional 
expressions as well as instinctive impulses and ideo-motor actions. 
It will also be shown to apply to volition with effort (see Chap. 6). 
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structural unity for his theory of volition, it is crucial that he 
ensure that ideas are the real determinants of action. 
It is also important to note that James does not make any attempt 
to explain how the actual machinery of the brain transforms the idea 
in consciousness into physical movement. James makes it clear that 
exactly how states of consciousness produce movement is not yet known, 
although he believes that there may someday be an empirical answer to 
the question (see James, 1890, 2, p. 495). This makes it clear that 
James has remained true to the mind-body dualism adopted earlier, 
and it is his insistence that the mind--or more specifically the exis-
tence of an idea in the mind--instigates action, which increases the 
possibility that consciousness really is efficacious. 
The Relationship Between Habit and Ideo-motor Action  
Ideo-motor actions have much in common with habits--in fact, 
many are habits, and all habits follow the ideo-motor rules for enact-
ment just as, Fearing states, "Habit, for James, is 'mechanically 
nothing but a reflex discharge'" (Fearing, 1930/1964, p. 247; internal 
quote from James, 1890, 2, pp. 107-108). James, taking his cue from 
Lotze, shows that ideo-motor and habit patterns are dynamically the 
same; both are performed in response to the perception of an object. 
Furthermore, ideo-motor actions do not require an express fiat: 
any more than.. .all those habitual goings and comings and 
rearrangements of ourselves which fill every hour of every 
day, and which incoming sensations instigate so immediately 
that it is often difficult to decide whether or not to call 
them reflex rather than voluntary acts. ...the intermediary 
terms of an habitual series of acts leading to an end are 
apt to be of this quasi-automatic sort. 29 
29, James, 1890, 2, p. 523; see also James' reference to Lotze's 
Medicinische psychologie in James, 1890, 2, p. 523. 
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Given that ideation, at least at the level of the presence of kinaes-
thetic ideas is a necessary precursor to action, why does James con-
centrate on the 'automatic' nature of ideo-motor action? His answer 
is clear: 
It is a general principle in Psychology that consciousness 
deserts all processes where it can no longer be of use. 
The tendency of consciousness to a minimum of complication 
is in fact a dominating law. ...We grow unconscious of 
every feeling which is useless as a sign to lead us to Cur 
ends, and where one sign will suffice others drop out, and 
that one remains, to work alone (James, 1890, 2, p. 496). 
Our activities gradually fall into a pattern where an original "idea 
of an end coupled with a series of guiding sensations" (James, 1890, 
2, pp. 519-520), is sufficient to generate and maintain a complex 
train of actions. 
And finally, the process having been repeated or practised suf-
ficiently, the idea of the end is sufficient in itself: 
The idea of the end, then tends more and more to make itself 
all-sufficient. Or, at any rate, if the kinaesthetic ideas 
are called up at all, they are so Swamped in the vivid kinaes- 
thetic feelings by which they are immediately overtaken that 
we have no time to be aware of their separate existence. ... 
This comes from the rapidity with which often-repeated move-
ments follow on their mental cue. An end consented to as 
soon as conceived innervates directly the centre of the first 
movement of the chain which leads to its accomplishment, and 
then the whole chain rattles off quasi-reflexively (James, 
1890, 2, p. 519). 
At this stage: "the determining condition of the unhesitating and 
resistless sequence of the act seems to be the absence of any conflict-
ing notion in the mind" (James, 1890, 2, p. 523). All that habitual 
actions require is the notion of the beginning of the act; the action 
is then carried out in a seemingly automatic fashion (James, 1890, 1, 
pp. 114-116). 
The rules of habit formation account for the differences in the 
three cases of ideo-motor actions given above. In the second case 
the skill required to get the ball on target may not have been fully 
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developed, thus requiring a concentrated attention on kinaesthetic 
ideas. As skill increases, attention to these ideas--their very pre-
sence in consciousness--would diminish if it did not disappear altoget-
her. It may also be the case that kinaesthetic ideas will continue 
to dominate in consciousness; whether or not the kinaesthetic ideas 
are ever completely dropped from conscious awareness depends on the 
nature of the task itself. In the first example, the 'habit patterns' 
of picking up the pin or bit of dust are so ingrained in the individual 
that the mere percept is sufficient to prompt the behaviour while the 
'greater part of consciousness' attends to the ongoing conversation. 
The action is 'quasi-automatic'. In the third instance, the habit of 
getting out of bed on awakening is delayed by conflicting ideas in 
consciousness; once the idea to get up gains ascendency for an instant, 
the act is performed so unhestitatingly that the individual is unaware 
of having gone through the motions at all. The three cases differ, 
finally, only in regard to the level of quasi-automatic action that 
has developed in each. The kinaesthetic cues have become 'supernumer-
ary' in cases one and three while they are still 'necessary' in case 
two. The appearance of automatic or reflexive behaviour simply demon-
strates the strength of habit formation. The responses are all volun-
tary, however automatic they may appear to the observer or feel to 
the actor, and they can be inhibited as easily as they are released. 
Finally the function of ideo-motor action is to facilitate an 
efficient adjustment to reality: 
The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our  
nervous system our ally instead of our enemy. It is to fund 
and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon the 
interest of the fund. For this we must make automatic and  
habitual, 4s many useful actions as we can, ...The more details 
of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody 
of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be 
set free for their own proper work (James, 1890, 1 , p. 122). 
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The Problem of Innervation  
At this point it appears that James' conception of ideo-motor 
action is that of a sophisticated reflex process. Volition is re-
quired at the onset of the development of an activity both to allow 
for the selection of the goal and the perseverance necessary to 
perfect the action. The action can then be performed in a reflex or 
habitual way, and has a quasi-automatic status in the behavioural 
repertoire of the individual. James' insistence that kinaesthetic 
ideas are sufficient to release movements correlates with the quasi-
automatic nature of habitual movements for he is stressing the sensa-
tional aspects of the idea-motor paradigm without a corresponding 
emphasis on the purposive elements of the action. 
But it is clear that James did not mean that the original voli-
tional nature of idea-motor action 'disappeared' once the action was 
integrated into the behavioural repertoire. He writes: 
The first point to start from in understanding voluntary 
action, and the possible occurrence of it with no fiat 
or express resolve, is the fact that consciousness is in its  
very nature impulsive. We do not have a sensation or a thought 
and then have to add something dynamic to it to get a move-
ment. Every pulse of feeling which we have is the correlate 
of some neural activity that is already on its way to insti- 
gate a movement. ..,The popular notion that mere consciousness 
as such is not essentially a forerunner of activity, that the 
latter must result from some superadded 'will-force', is a 
very natural inference from those special cases in which we 
think for an indefinite length of time without the action 
taking place. These cases, however, are not the norm; they 
are cases of inhibition by antagonistic thoughts. When the 
blocking is released we feel as if an inward spring was let 
loose, and this is the additional impulse or fiat upon which 
the act effectively succeeds (James, 1890, 2, pp. 526-527). 
The nature of the idea, and its relation to other ideas present 
in the stream of consciousness is critical in determining whether or 
not the act will immediately follow the idea of the act. Whether or 
not an action immediately follows upon the emergence of the idea in 
consciousness depends upon whether or not there are any 'inhibiting' 
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ideas present in consciousness at any given moment. And this is 
where James' strong opposition to the theory of innervation becomes 
most meaningful. He is attempting to build a theory of consciousness 
•wherein the contents of consciousness themselves are efficacious in 
determining whether or not an action is performed. Will, in James' 
sense is not a super-added structure or function, grafted onto a 
mechanical conception of mind (see Wild, 1969, p. 254). Instead, will 
or volition is the impulsive aspect of the idea itself. In some cases, 
the ordinary impulsive quality of the idea is insufficient to prompt 
action. This happens when the idea is 'blocked' by another idea, or 
when the idea consists of an unverifiable belief. Then an extra 
fiat, or mental effort, is necessary to hold the idea in consciousness 
so that it can eventually be released into movement. But in cases 
where the idea is uninhibited, and when the idea itself is of an 'un-
complicated' action, the idea is immediately released as movement. 
Restraint, or the lack of it, is a result of the given state of cons-
ciousness and nothing more is necessary. 
In the course of his diatribe against the hypothesis that feel-
ings of innervation are experienced, James writes: 
It is swallowing a camel and straining at a gnat for a man 
(all of whose muscles will on certain occasions contract at 
a sudden touch or sound) to suppose that on another occasion 
the idea of the feelings about to be produced by their con- 
traction is an insufficient mental signal for the latter, and 
to insist that an additional antecendent is needed in the 
shape of 'a feeling of the outgoing discharge' (James, 1890, 
2, p. 495). 
The theory of innervation, were it to be included in James' system, 
would disrupt the continuity of consciousness. He claims that there 
is no empirical or introspective evidence to support the existence 
of a feeling of innervation in the non-volutnary movements we make 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 494). Nor can he find any evidence for the 
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existence of feelings of innervation immediately prior to voluntarily 
executed actions (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 498-501). 
But James' adamant refusal to admit the existence of feelings 
of innervation is motivated by philosophical rather than empirical 
considerations. He had to preserve-the efficacious nature of conscious-
ness, and this could only be done epistemologically--that is, the 
'ideas' which incite actions must be conceived of as intentional or 
purposive, and cognitive of the conditions of the reality they act 
upon through the aegis of the body. The body is the means through 
which the mind knows the world and operates on the world. The afferent 
connection is a 'direct' connection of incoming sensation to mind-- 
the object in the world is 'known' by the mind through the feelings of 
afferent sensations as they enter the body.
30 
 James' intention, there-
fore, is to create a conception of ideo-motor action, wherein the 
thoughts which incite activity are generically identical to the 
thoughts which 'know' the external world. The mind thinks, not in 
terms of activating the neural machinery as the theory of innervation 
supposes (see James, 1890, 2, p. 493), but in terms of goals and ob-
jects: that is, it thinks in terms of the world as it 'knows' it. 
Efferent feelings of innervation could add nothing to this knowledge; 
afferent feelings can; for afferent feelings provide information on 
the success or failure of the undertaking, and it is through the 
afferent feelings that the individual knows whether or not he has 
attained his goal (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 493-494). 
We can conclude that the same genera of feelings which are in- 
volved in the cognition of an object are involved in our active dealings 
30. This is the rationale for the theory of emotion. What James 
fails to do is to show how these afferent feelings are transformed 
into emotional ideas. 
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with the object. While James stated that thoughts are cognitive 
(see James, 1890, 1, pp. 271-283), he also claimed according to 
Wiener, "That all thinking was ideo-motor in character" (Wiener, 1965, 
p. 109). Wild concurs with Wiener's statement, writing that: 
Underlying his whole conception of the will is his 
conception of the reflex arc, and the principles of ideo-
motor action. Every incoming current must eventually find 
a release in bodily movement of some kind. Hence every 
sensation, perception, or idea in the brain, must have a 
tendency to produce such action (Wild, 1969, p. 255; see 
also Wilshire, 1968, p. 178). 
Thoughts about the world can be directly productive of action in 
the world, as case one demonstrates. The perception of the offending 
pin or bit of dust is enough to prompt the action of removing the 
object. Thoughts are not merely cognitive--that is, the perceiver 
notes the existence of an object--but are active in the sense that 
the thought itself instigates a physically meaningful interaction with 
the object. Thoughts about the world and thoughts acting upon the 
world are equivalent, or to put it another way, cognition and action 
are two aspects of one idea in the mind. 
All ideas are not immediately productive of action. There are 
many thoughts which are cognitive and have no particular action pot-
ential, as James points out (see James, 1890, 2, p: 525). There are 
also cases wherein the thought has action potential but the action is 
not an obvious component of the thought itself. In these cases, the 
difficulty is to find the 'correct' conception of the situation so 
that appropriate action will result. These cases will be discussed 
in the two chapters which immediately follow. For now, it is suffi-
cient to point out that James' pragmatic methodology largely deals 
with the means of turning supposedly unverifiable, and therefore 
'inactive' ideas into postulates that can be tested in the sensible 
world, The ideo-mptor paradigm therefore provides the psychological 
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foundations for the pragmatic method of truth. Broadly speaking, 
cognition and action are the two 'ends' of the same psychological 
process: they merge in the particular idea in consciousness. But 
this subjective merging is only possible if cognitions and goals are 
conceived in a unified fashion--that is, through the afferent feel- 
ings. To put it still another way, the relationship between the cogni-
tive and active aspects of the thought can be described phenomeno-
logically as the 'intentionality' of the thought. 
The next level of the structural hierarchy of action is composed 
of those volitional acts where effort or 'will' is needed before the 
idea is released into action according to the rules of the ideo-motor 
paradigm. Volition with effort, as James termed it, is necessary 
when the individual finds himself in a situation which does not sug-
gest an 'automatic' or habitual response, or when he is faced with 
a dilemma which can only be resolved by a commitment to one unveri-
fiable postulate or another. Volition with effort may thus be taken 
as the 'highest' level in a hierarchical theory of action. There are 
also reasons to suspect that the will in fact has two functions and 
the introduction of effort indicates a 'break' between the adaptive 
and 'moral' functions. The topic is a large one and deserves a 
chapter of its own. 
CHAPTER' 6  
VOLITION WITH EFFORT:  
DOES THE WILL HAVE TWO FUNCTIONS?  
Nor are the moral judgments those most invariably 
and emphatically impressed on us by public opinion. 
The most characteristic and peculiarly moral judg-
ments that a man is ever called on to make are in 
unprecedented cases and lonely emergencies, where 
no popular rhetorical maxims can avail, and the 
hidden oracle alone can speak, and it speaks often 
in favor of conduct quite unusual, and suicidal as 
far as gaining popular approbation goes (James, 
1890, 2, p. 672). 
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The Five  Types of Decision  
Ideo-motor actions are the first real voluntary acts to appear 
in the action hierarchy. They are voluntary because they have their 
genesis in the plastic pool of instinctive tendencies, because they 
are the products of selective interaction with the sensible world, and 
because they can be inhibited by (or inhibit) competing ideas in the 
stream of consciousness. But if ideo-motor actions are voluntary 
actions (as opposed to reflex movements, emotional expressions, and 
instinctive reactions), they still do not require any special fiat of 
the will to discharge into movement. The mere presence of the uninhi-
bited idea in consciousness is sufficient to ensure its discharge, 
according to the rules of the reflex paradigm. Ideo-motor actions 
must therefore be contrasted with actions which require an extra fiat 
or burst of mental effort before they can discharge into muscular move-
ments. Actions which are preceded by mental effort do not, however, 
form the next level of the action hierarchy after ideo-motor action; 
instead, James constructs several intermediate levels which are des-
cribed as the four types of decision. The top level of the hierarchy 
is occupied by the fifth category of decision-making, where mental 
effort is required before the idea can be discharged. 
According to James, decisions are called for when deliberate 
action is required and when the mind contains ideas that are antagoni-
stic to one another. The idea that urges a specific action cannot 
discharge itself because it is blocked by contrary impulses, so that 
• experientially the individual is in a state of indecision (see James, 
1890, 2, p. 528). Finally, when one idea prevails and movement ensues, 
or, on the contrary, one idea is firmly squelched by the opposing idea, 
we are said to have 'decided' or to have uttered "our voluntary fiat 
386. 
in favour of one or the other course" (James, 1890, 2, P. 528). 
Decisions are divided into five categories by James ' but he does not 
describe the decision processes in a hierarchical order (that is, ac-
cording to their relationships with ideo-motor actions and the other 
structures of action). Therefore, to facilitate the analysis of the 
relationships between all of the structures of action, a hierarchical 
order has been imposed on the five decision processes. This hypothe-
tical ranking has been carried out by considering the range of possi-
bilities for mental selection that pertains to each of the five types, 
whether or not the full range of possibilities is utilized by the 
individual in making the decision, and the 'strength' or character of 
the mental fiat that is connected with each of the five types. The 
revised order should therefore be consistent with James' broad 
theories of consciousness and volition. 2 
In the first type of decision, the voluntary nature of the action 
is questionable for we find ourselves acting automatically "as if by 
a spontaneous discharge of our nerves, in the direction of one of the 
horns of the dilemma" (James, 1890, 2, p. 532). The outbreak of energy 
is unpremeditated so that we are less like voluntary agents than "like 
passive spectators cheering on the display of some extraneous force" 
(James, 1890, 2, P. 533). This type of decision follows a period of 
1. See James, 1890, 2, pp. 531-535; see also Wild, 1969, pp. 256- 
258 for a good description of the five types of decision. 
2. The changes made in James' order are not drastic: decisions of 
the second, fourth, and fifth types retain James' order in the revised 
schema. Decisions of the first and third types are reversed so that 
James' third type of decision is first in the new system, while his 
third type is given first place. The reasons for this reordering 
are implicit in the discussions of each category. It is relevant 
in terms of accepting or rejecting the new order that James does not 
indicate that he is ranking the categories--with the exception of 
category five which is distinguished from the other four because it 
requires mental effort. 
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inability to resolve the dilemma by discovering the 'right' concep-
tion 3 of the situation, so that after a period of psychic stress the 
individual suddenly finds himself swept away in an exciting act which 
releases the tension. 
The action is voluntary because: "so exciting is this sense of 
motion after our intolerable pent-up state, that we eagerly throw our-
selves into it" (James, 1890, 2, p. 532). But the fiat is given after  
movement begins so that this type of 'decision' is very close to re-
flex action, and James says that those who most often react in this 
fashion usually have a fatalistic mood of mind (see James, 1890, 2, 
p. 533). Decisions of the first type would seem to involve a more 
'primitive' type of process than ordinary ideo-motor actions, for 
James writes that the outcome is usually catastrophic (see James, 1890, 
2, p. 533). Dilemmas which are resolved this way could have two pos-
sible origins: they may be resolvable through a search for a 'correct' 
solution, or they might fall outside the norm of human experience so 
that they do not lend themselves to 'conceptual' solutions. James 
does not elaborate on this point. Whatever the origin of the dilemma 
however, the individual has two possible modes of reaction; he can 
allow himself to be swept away by the reflex discharge or he can exert 
an extra fiat of the will to overcome the tendency to act and perhaps 
solve the problem more 'rationally'. In Jamesian terms, the individ-
ual who gives his fiat to the reflex discharge is acting fatalistical-
ly because he fails to use his will and his intellect to come up with 
a new solution to the problem (if the dilemma concerns issues outside 
the norm of experience), or because he fails to endure the situation 
3. See the discussion of the third type of decision for James' 
definition of how the 'right' or 'correct' conception of a situation 
is discovered. 
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until a conceptual solution presents itself. In our hypothetical 
re-ordering of the categories, decisions of the first type come dir-
ectly after ideo-motor actions. These 'decisions' are actually some-
what more primitive than ordinary ideo-motor actions because the fiat 
is only given after the action has begun while in ideo-motor action, 
the fiat comes with the idea which instigates the act. But category 
one decisions are ranked above ideo-motor actions in the hierarchy 
because they only arise when the range of selectable options extends 
beyond the boundaries of the ideo-motor set of options, and when the 
outcome is important to the individual. 
Next, come decisions which are made passively--the individual 
feels no real commitment to the solution of the dilemma, and decides 
that he may as well follow this alternative instead of the other. He 
makes a selection, often on the basis of external pressures, and acts. 
In this second type of decision, the search for conception is minimal. 
This means that the situation is most likely conducive to a reasoned 
search for the correct 'answer', but the individual is unconcerned 
with discovering it. We drift into action determined from without 
"with the conviction that, after all, we might as well stand by this 
course of action as by the other" (James, 1890, 2, p. 532). Again, 
there is no real effort of the will, but this time the fiat is ration-
ally given in response to external pressures and not to a reflex dis-
charge (see James, 1890, 2, p. 532). 
Decisions which involve a search for the correct conception of 
the situation make up the third category. These are reasonable deci-
sions and represent the thinker using his rational powers in harmony 
with his empirical knowledge. The decision is important to the indi-
vidual and he brings his full powers of reason to bear on the problem. 
However, these decisions do not require mental effort and thus do not 
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rank as high as category five decisions because the individual acts 
on the basis of his previously acquired knowledge of the world. His 
range of selectable options is not increased. 
The feeling of mental effort is minimal and the dynamics of the 
decision process correspond to certain characteristics of ideo-motor 
action, When the correct conception is discovered, the decision is 
made, and the thinker immediately acts out his decision in muscular 
terms. The period of indecision which precedes action distinguishes 
category three decisions from ordinary ideo-motor acts and this per-
iod is spent in "conceiving the doing or not doing of the act in point. 
The moment we hit upon a conception which lets us apply some stable 
part of our Ego, our state of doubt is at an end" (James, 1890, 2, 
p. 531).. 
James maintains that in category three decisions, reasoning and 
willing are parallel phenomena: both consist of a search for the right 
conception of the problem: "A 'reasonable' character is one who has 
a store of stable and worthy ends, and who does not decide about an 
action till he has calmly ascertained whether it be ministerial or 
detrimental to any one of these" (James, 1890, 2, p. 532). The quest 
revolves around ends and conceptions previously determined and the 
relation to habit is obvious: "The conclusive reason for the decision 
in these cases usually is the discovery that we can refer the case to 
a class upon which we are accustomed to act unhesitatingly in a cer-
tain stereotyped way" (James, 1890, 2, p. 531). The fiat for action 
occurs in the recognition of a conception of action appropriate to 
the situation, so that the individual seems almost passive: the 
reasons for the decision appear "to flow in from the nature of things 
and owe nothing to our will" (James, 1890, 2, p. 531). The act is 
voluntary because the individual must choose between alternatives, 
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but real mental effort and striving to maintain a conception are not 
included in the process. This type of decision is a 'step up' from 
the type two decision because the resolution of the dilemma is not 
determined by outside agents; active, rather than passive assent is 
involved. 
Decisions which come about as a result of cataclysmic events make 
up the fourth level of the hierarchy. The individual is 'passive' 
in the sense that his flow of thought is interrupted by outside events. 
which cannot be ignored but the decisions that result from these inter-
ruptions of the flow of thought often have momentous effects on his 
life-style. Psychologically, the 'consequences' of the crisis are 
often an increase in the 'selectable' alternatives that the individual 
has. Options which were formerly lifeless or unimportant may now be 
seen as live and momentous. In decisions of the fourth type, delib- 
eration ends as a result of changes in external circumstances, and 
we pass instantly from the "easy and careless to the sober and stren-
uous mood, or possibly the other way" (James, 1890, 2, p. 533). Grief 
and fear are the most common instigators of this change of mood; the 
"consequence is an instant abandonment of the more trivial projects 
with which he had been dallying, and an instant practical acceptance 
of the more grim and earnest alternative which till then could not 
exhort out mind's consent" (James, 1890, 2, p. 533). The first part 
of the process does not allow true decision making; the change in 
deliberative mood gets no express fiat from consciousness; the change 
is imposed from without. But the results can be profound; once the 
mind is forced to grant the reality of the unpleasant and hitherto 
rejected idea, there is the potential for "All those 'changes of 
heart', 'awakenings of conscience', etc., which make new men of so 
many of us" (James, 1890, 2, p. 533). Determining the new course 
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•of action may then require a decision of the fifth type. 
At the top of the decision hierarchy, and therefore at the top 
of the whole hierarchy of action, are those decisions which require 
mental effort. Decisions of this type 'cannot be made by simply bring-
ing the full power of the intellect to bear on the dilemma. They 
require an extra effort of the will to hold attention on the idea 
which is finally selected out of two or more competing alternatives. 
James made it clear that there is a certain category of dilemma which 
cannot be resolved through appeal to the instinctive impulses, habit 
structures, or the accumulated empirical beliefs and conceptions 
about the nature of the sensible world. These are the dilemmas which 
require mental effort for no single ideal seems to make an unambig-
uous 'fit' with the problem. 
It is only in decisions of the fifth type that real mental ef-
fort is exerted. Mental effort is to be utilized when we are not 
caught up in a sheer release of energy (or can resist it), when we 
are not indifferent to the outcome, when a calm search for the correct 
conception is insufficient, and when nothing 'cataclysmic' intervenes to 
halt the ongoing deliberation. The fifth type of decision is made 
when non-instinctive motives are made to prevail, and they "prevail 
when they ever do prevail, with effort; and the normal...sphere of  
effort is thus to be found wherever non-instinctive motives to behav-
ior are to rule the day" (James, 1890, 2, p. 536). When there is no 
pre-determined means of discovering a course of action which is in 
fact implicit in the situation, we feel that our choices, our efforts, 
-do matter: 
In the fifth and final type of decision, the feeling that 
the evidence is all in, and that reason has balanced the 
books, may be either present or absent. But in either case 
we feel, in deciding, as if we ourselves by our own wilful 
act inclined the beam; in the former case by adding our 
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living effort to the weight of the logical reason which 
taken alone, seems powerless to make the act discharge; 
•in the latter by a kind of creative contribution of some-
thing instead of a reason which does a reason's work. The 
slow dead heave of the will that is felt in these instances 
makes all of them a class altogether different subjectively 
from all the three preceding classes (James, 1890, 2, p. 534). 
Psychologically, it is the feeling of effort, the feeling of the 
'slow dead heave of the will' that isolates this type of decision. 
Epistemologically, decisions of the fifth type involve ideas from the 
sub-world of morals, metaphysics, and aesthetics and are therefore 
distinguished from, all of the other action structures. Category five 
decisions are therefore distinguishable from the other four categories 
because they do not ordinarily pertain to the common world of experi-
ience; instead they pertain to the realm in which only metaphysical 
and moral postulates can decide the issue.
4 
Any discussion of deci-
sions involving mental effort is necessarily epistemological because 
whether effort is required depends upon what is known, verifiable, 
and available to percept, and what must be 'realized' within the con-
text of man's unique moral possibilities. 
Effort is necessary in those cases where the decision is moment-
ous and at the same time involves 'unverifiable' ideas (see James, 
1890, 2, p. 535), or when it is momentous and involves a choice be-
tween two alternatives "with no strictly objective or imperative 
choice between them" (James, 1890, 2, p. 534). James emphasizes the 
4. Note that it was stated in regard to category one decisions 
that these decisions might best be made with the application of mental 
effort to the problem. James does not make it clear as to whether or 
not decisions of the first type can pertain to ethical issues or 
whether a search for the correct conception would suffice. Decisions 
in category one were therefore placed at the lowest level of the 
decision-hierarchy because actions were generated on a reflex basis, 
rather than through a mental fiat. Individuals whose decision-making 
falls into category one may also be suffering from some pathological 
condition of the will. Pathological (as opposed to normal) modes 
of decision-making are discussed below. 
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heavy agonizing nature of making such decisions: he speaks of "murder-
ing the vanquished possibility" (James, 1890, 2, p. 534), and this 
not only describes the experience of decision-making, but has impli-
cations for understanding the selection processes of consciousness 
in relation to the world. In situations which demand the 'right con-
ception' there need be no sense of murdering alternatives--other 
alternatives are simply less 'right' or 'efficient'. By contrast, 
the questions resolved by volition with effort are "Questions as mom-
entous as that of the very existence of spiritual causality, as vast 
as that of the very existence of universal predestination or free-
will" (James, 1890, 2, p. 535). 
James places stringent restrictions on the legitimate scope of 
mental effort in the decision processes: 
The immense majority of human decisions are decisions 
without effort. In comparatively few of them, in most 
people, does effort accompany the final act. We are, 
I think, misled into supposing that effort is more fre-
quent than it is, by the fact that during deliberation  
we so often have a feeling of how great an effort it 
would take to make a decision now. Later, after the 
decision has 'Jade itself with ease, we recollect this 
and erroneously suppose the effort also to have been made 
then (James, 1890, 2, pp. 534-535). 
It would seem to follow from this that if a decision can be made in 
the context of one of the other four forms, such will be the case, 
and the 'remembered' feeling of effort will be an illusion. Whether 
or not James' theory of volition with effort is consistent in re-
gard to these restrictions on the legitimate scope for the use of 
mental effort will be discussed below.
5 
The top level of the action hierarchy is not restricted to that 
5. Note that decisions which require mental effort appear to 
correspond to options which require the will to believe (see James, 
1896/1911, pp. 2-4). 
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category of decisions which require effort; it also includes all of 
the unverifiable beliefs which require effort if they are eventually 
to be discharged in action. Metaphysical and ethical options may 
thus make up the two poles of a dilemma which requires effort for its 
resolution or they may be opposed to instinctive or ideo-motor ideas, 
or to empirical conceptions about the world, and thus require effort 
to prevent their inhibition in consciousness. The top level of the 
hierarchy includes the whole range of metaphysical, aesthetic, and 
ethical axioms, which make up the pool of non-instinctive ideas, or 
ideas which are 'foreign to the instinctive history of the race', 
and therefore require mental effort to sustain themselves in conscious-
ness, The genesis of these ideas is discussed below. 
This completes the description of the action hierarchy. The 
base of the hierarchy is composed of reflex actions. Next, come the 
instinctive reactions and emotional expressions. Ideo-motor actions 
occupy the next level. The first four types of decisions appear 
next, arranged in hierarchical order. Finally, the top level of the 
hierarchy is composed of those actions which require mental effort 
before the idea can stabilize in consciousness and thus be discharged 
according to the 'rules' of the reflex paradigm. 
Problems and Hypotheses  
James made a categorical distinction between those decisions 
which require effort for their resolution and those which 'logically' 
follow from the conceptual relationship of the mind to the world. In 
the discussion of the sub-worlds of reality, we showed that James 
constructed his epistemology so that belief has two functions: it is 
the mental faculty of granting assent to those events which coerce 
consciousness with their reality or 'truth', so that it describes the 
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'intentionality' of the thought in consciousness. It is also the 
faculty which enables us to 'believe' in postulates which are present-
ly unverifiable, in the hope that our actions may help them to 'be-
come' true. James makes it clear that belief and volion are "one 
and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL phenomenon" (James, 1890, 2, p. 321), in 
that they mean "a certain relation between objects and the Self" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 321). It is therefore reasonable to predict that James' 
theory of volition will exhibit the same basic dualism of function 
that characterizes the theory of reality. 
'Voluntary' in the sense of ideo-motor action, simply means that 
the idea is uncontradicted in consciousness; it is synonomous with 
'passive' belief, or intentionality because the fiat for action is 
contained in the idea itself. 'Voluntary', in the sense of volition 
with effort, means that the idea can only stabilize in the stream 
of thought when it is accompanied by mental effort. The following 
discussion will show that'mental effort is not correlated with the 
intentionality of any given idea; each idea has a certain impulsive 
power of its own, and whether or not it is accompanied by effort de-
pends on several factors. One of the major problems in the analysis 
of James' theory of volition is to determine whether mental effort can 
potentially arise in conjunction with any idea in consciousness, or 
whether its appearance is limited to a restricted set of ideas. If 
effort can be aroused indifferently, then it would , follow that the 
adventitious appearance of effort could be used to provide a function-
al unity for the theory. The fortuitous appearance of effort would 
be related to the interaction between the mind and the sensible world 
and the foundations for James' theory of ethics would be contained 
within this interaction and the fortuitous arousal of effort. It will 
be shown, however, that James did not use effort to link impulsive 
396. 
and nonimpulsive ideas, but made an a priori separation between those 
ideas which required effort and those ideas which did not. 
This leads into the major problem in James' theory of volition; 
that problem concerns the status of the ideas which make up the stream 
of consciousness. At times'James intimates that there are two dis-
tinguishable categories of ideas so that the mass of ideas in conscious-
ness can be divided into those which are instinctive and those which 
are 'foreign to the instinctive history of the race'. By definition, 
instinctive ideas do not require mental effort to be discharged into 
movements, while non-instinctive ideas do. Instinctive ideas are 
therefore impulsive; non-instinctive ideas are non-impulsive (see 
James, 1890, 2, p. 536). This implies that there is an a priori  
tension in consciousness between the instinctive and non-instinctive 
ideas. But James also implies at other times that a non-impulsive 
idea is any idea which the person is reluctant to attend to, and if 
this is the case, the distinction between impulsive and non-impulsive 
ideas would have to be made on empirical grounds. Both of these con-
ceptions will be evaluated in some detail below, and a resolution of 
the disparity between them will be attempted. 
When the question is posed as to whether or not the will has 
two functions, the immediate conclusion is that it obviously has: 
'voluntary' in the ideo-motor sense means that the idea comes with 
a sufficient fiat for immediate discharge into physical movement. 
This fiat has been described as the intentionality of the thought. 
Furthermore, the impulsive or intentional character of ideo-motor, 
ideas allows them to inhibit other ideas in consciousness; it also 
means that they can be inhibited by 'stronger' ideo-motor ideas. They 
have their origins in the plastic pool of instincts and result from 
the selective interaction between consciousness and the sensible 
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world. 'Voluntary' in the case of ideas which require effort, has 
another meaning: in this case the intentionality of the idea is insuf-
ficent to lead to its immediate discharge. The reasons for this 
insufficiency are discussed in detail below, but briefly, 'non-impul-
sive' means that the impulsive or intentional force of the idea is not 
strong enough to inhibit the quasi-automatic idea-motor ideas which 
are competing with it. The idea might not have any immediate implica-
tions for action, while the competing ideo-motor ideas do, or it might 
have consequences which are unpredictable (in terms of the afferent 
sensations that would result from its being acted upon), or it might 
have consequences that are dangerous or uncomfortable for the indivi-
dual. Mental effort is therefore necessary to hold the idea in con-
sciousness so that it can be transformed (if necessary) into an idea 
which has explicit directions for movement. Effort may then be necess-
ary to maintain the transformed idea in consciousness so that it can be 
discharged against competing ideo-motor ideas which have predictable 
afferent effects. Effort may also be necessary when two unverifiable 
beliefs compete for ratification in consciousness. The decision can-
not be made in terms of empirical conceptions about the nature of 
reality; it can only be made when mental effort is used to affirm 
the yalidity of one idea over the other. Once the decision is made, 
the selected idea may require further translation before it can be 
acted out; furthermore, it might again be impossible to predict the 
afferent sensations which would result from acting out the idea. Or, 
once again, the predictable consequences (given in afferent terms) 
might be dangerous or uncomfortable, so that the idea is in danger 
of being inhibited by competing ideo-motor responses. The will thus 
has two explicit functions because it acts to ensure the smooth enact-
ment of ideo-motor ideas, and it functions to give non-impulsive 
398. 
ideas a hearing in consciousness. 
The problem is to determine whether or not these functions are 
dualistically opposed to each other or whether the two functions 
work in conjunction to promote the adjustment and development of the 
individual in relation to the several worlds of reality. So far, the 
definition of decisions which require effort points to the existence 
of a distinguishable category of ideas which cannot be acted out ac-
cording to the ideo-motor paradigm. This indicates that there are 
two a priori  classes of ideas which are opposed to each other in the 
demands they make upon the individual, and in their 'readiness' to 
discharge into movements. If it can be shown that there are two con-
flicting sets of ideas in consciousness, and that these are distin-
guishable on an a priori, and not on an a posteriori basis, then we 
will be able to show that the two functions of volition are dual-
istically opposed to one another, and that James has constructed a 
'two-man' theory of consciousness. If, on the other hand, it can be 
shown that the impulsive/non-impulsive distinction is made on a situ-
tional or empirical basis, so that any idea in consciousness (inde-
pendent of its psychogenetic origins), can take on a non-impulsive 
status and thus require effort to hold it in consciousness, then 
we will have shown that the will has two functions in the 'explicit' 
or 'obvious' sense, but that the functions of volition do not contra-
dict one another and that consciousness exhibits a functional, as 
well as a structural unity. We will demonstrate that the dualistic 
interpretation of the statement that the will has two functions, is 
the correct one, and that James has built a functional dualism into 
his theory of volition. 
So far, we have been restricting our attention to James' psycho-
logical model of volition. But James' theory of volition, more than 
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any other of his psychological theories, was influenced by his 
philosophical position. We have already seen that the will to believe 
is to be utilized in those crisis situations where the decision is 
momentous and forced, and the option is live (see Chap. 4, pp. 287- 
290). In his writings on moral philosophy, moreover, James often 
made personal value judgements regarding the 'correct' choices between 
options--he argued, for example, that itwas better to believe in free 
will than in determinism and better to accept theism over atheism.
6 
It will be shown therefore, that while the will to believe is not 
synonomous with volition with effort, James' psychological conclus-
ions regarding the appropriate or inappropriate use of effort are 
at times heavily confounded with the logical and personal conclusions 
he reached in his moral philosophy. It will also be demonstrated 
that James' concept of mental effort was generated to conform with 
his philosophical principles and his own ethical decisions. 
James' philosophical commitments led him to correlate the sub-
worlds of reality with two distinguishable modes of action. On the 
one hand, man is constituted so that he struggles to achieve comfort-
able adjustment in the mundane world of sensible reality; on the 
other, he strives to make his unverifiable beliefs 'true' so that 
in time, the sensible world will take on a new (and more ethical) 
character. The demands that the 'worlds of freedom' and the 'worlds 
of mundane reality' exert on the individual are discussed below, as 
is James' romantic notion that the real significance of life lies in 
the struggle to make unverifiable beliefs into empirical beliefs. 
His emphasis on the worth of the struggle is discussed as support 
6. The relationship between James' personal conclusions 
and his philosophical constructions is also discussed in 
chap. 7. 
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for the hypothesis that James essentially equipped man with a funct-
ionally divided consciousness. 
The problem of determining whether or not the will actually 
has two distinguishable and opposing functions cannot be resolved 
by an analysis of James' psychological writings alone for James at-
tempted (perhaps unsuccessfully) to stay within the limits of a 
scientific account when discussing volition with effort. James 
was reluctant to adopt Spencer's and Darwin's conclusion that moral-
ity has an instinctive or naturalistic basis. Had he done so, moral 
issues would have found a natural place in his psychology; moral 
actions would have had their genesis in instinctive impulses, and 
would therefore constitute special patterns of interaction between 
the individual and the sensible world. But James made a sharp sep-
aration between science and morals largely because he believed that 
science was deterministic and that its objects coerced the mind's 
assent to their reality. He therefore argued that scientific material-
ism and its implications for an Absolute conception of the universe 
could only be opposed by believing that the universe was truly inde-
terminate and that opportunities for the exertion of free will could 
legitimately arise (see James, 1884/1911; see also James, 1896/1911). 
This separation between science and ethics makes it imperative to 
go to James' moral philosophy to determine when he considered the 
application of mental effort to be legitimate, and when he did not. 
The psychological and philosophical theories of volition there-
fore interact, and reinforce one another. If James' philosophical 
commitments determined the construction of the psychological model, 
the psychological postulates in turn form the empirical support 
system for James' later philosophical theories. The following analysis 
therefore has a four-fold purpose: first,.it will give a clearer 
401. 
picture of the psychological functions of volition, and second, it 
will also determine whether or not volition has two dualistically 
opposed functions. Third, Ole analysis will provide a rationale 
for the development of the psychological theory itself, explaining 
James' desire to refute the theory of innervation, and his insistence 
that volitional effort is purely a mental phenomenon--that it is 
radically distinguishable from the feelings of muscular effort which 
accompany any action, and that 'feedback' from any type of action 
is given in the afferent sensations which follow the release of the 
idea into muscular movements. Finally, the analysis will serve as 
an introduction to the foundations of the pragmatic method and to 
the problems that occupied James when he left psychology for philosophy. 
The Psychological Model of Volition with Effort  
James' psychological model of volition with effort is based on 
the distinction he made between mental and muscular effort, his 
definition of mental effort in relation to attention, and the reflex 
action paradigm. In refuting the theory of innervation, James pro-
posed that two categories of effort could be distinguished. Muscular 
feelings were substituted for feelings of innervation; the function 
of these afferent muscular feelings was to convey feedback concern-
ing the physical results of discharging the idea back to the mind. 
By way of contrast, the feeling of effort that is aroused in decis-
ions of the fifth type or in options requiring the will to believe, 
is a feeling of mental effort, sharply distinguishable from any feel- 
ings of muscular effort which are produced when an action is perform-
ed. Mental effort therefore precedes muscular effort, which then 
follows automatically once the idea is stabilized (through mental 
effort), in consciousness: "If on this purely mental plane his 
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effort succeeds, the outward consequences will take care of them-
selves, for the representation will work unaided its motor effects" 
(James, 1880/1920, p. 199; see also James, 1880/1920, pp. 194-198). 
Mental effort is defined by James as the effort of attention 
that is required to hold an idea in consciousness: 
attention with effort is all that any case of volition 
implies. The essential achievement of the will, in short, 
when it is most 'voluntary', is to ATTEND to a difficult  
object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing 
ii- the fiat; and it is a mere physiological incident that 
when the object is thus attended to, immediate motor 
consequences should ensue (James, 1890, 2, p. 561). 
The will, at its most voluntary, is thus reduced, psychologically, 
to the mental effort of attention. 
Ideo-motor action and volition with effort are distinguished 
by the feeling of mental effort experienced in the latter category 
and completely absent in the first. 'Difficult' ideas or ideas 
with strong co-existing competition in the stream of consciousness 
must be maintained through effort so that they can be automatically 
releasEd into the desired behaviour. This is volition with effort. 
"To sustain a representation, to think, is in short, the only moral 
act" (James, 1890, 2, p. 566), for it is the idea held foremost in 
consciousness that will find its release in action. Its release 
into action is "a mere physiological accident" (James, 1890, 2, p. 
561); thus, the reflex model is used to unite idEo-motor action and 
volition with effort in terms of their muscular effects. The 
7. In defining will as an effort of attention or the sustaining 
of an idea in consciousness, James had historical precedents in 
the works of Carpenter (see Carpenter, 1855, pp. 621-629), and more 
unambiguously, in Renouvier's writings (see Perry, 1935/1974, 1, p. 
323). Although he makes no citations in the Principles, James refers 
to Renouvier's theory of volition in his earlier paper, "The feeling 
of effort" as "the firmest, and in my opinion, the truest connected 
treatment yet given to the subject by any author with whom I am 
acquainted" (James, 1880/1920, p.194). Renouvier therefore provided 
James with what he believed to be an acceptable account of volition. 
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distinction is made in terms of whether or not mental effort is neces-
sary for the idea's eventual release so that moral action (or any 
other type of action) is defined by the nature of the idea in con-
sciousness, and not in the muscular completion of the action: 
To sum it all up in , a word, the terminus of the psycho-
logical process in volition, the point to which the will  
is directly applied, is always an idea. There are at all 
times some ideas from which we shy away like frightened 
horses the moment we get a glimpse of their forbidding 
profile upon the threshold of our thought. The only  
resistance which our will can possibly experience is the  
resistance which such an idea offers to being attended to  
at all. To attend to it is the volitional act, and the 
only inward volitional act which we ever perform (James, 
1890, 2, p. 567; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 560). 
Gilbert's description of James' theory of volition is a propos  
here: "willing" he says, "is reduced to other elementary psychologi-
cal processes. ...willing was reduced to ideas of movements which 
one wishes to perform, followed by the movement" (Gilbert, 1970, p. 
791). Volition with effort is therefore describable psychologically 
as the effort of attention that holds the idea in consciousness until 
it can be released into movement. This paradigm provides the dynamic 
foundation for James' moral philosophy--we determined earlier that 
James was not a voluntarist in the traditional sense, because he 
concentrated on the ideational or cognitive aspects of volition. 
Nevertheless, as Stroh points out, the volitional element--the expend-
ing of mental effort--is in fact the deciding factor in whether or 
not ethical ideas will be realized in the sensible world: 
The first thing to grasp in moral philosophy is the 
volitional rather than the purely intellectual character 
of the whole enterprise. Whether we can and ought to 
have a moral outlook at all cannot be decided by pure 
reason or any mere disinterested analysis of the facts. 
No moral skeptic can be refuted by logic or by appeal to 
the facts if he has already decided against any moral 
viewpoint. A moral outlook can orily exist if it is 
desired by someone. Morality stands on an initial faith 
in its possibility, and has pragmatic meaning only if 
this faith is made concrete and actively related to 
future, practical consequences. An abstract possibility 
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is not enough for James, since this would be merely 
static and verbal, whereas morality, if it is demanded 
at all, must be related to action (Stroh, 1968, P. 136). 
Psychologically, what stands behind the 'desire' for, or 'faith' 
, moral possibilities, is the mental effort which is expended on 
ideas. And Stroh emphasizes the critical concept in James' psycho-
logical theory of volition, his moral philosophy and his pragmatism: 
that concept is that ideas must eventually be released into muscular 
movements. To believe in an idea or postulate means that the indivi-
dual must act to concretize the meaning of the idea or postulate in 
the sensible world. Corresponding sensible objects must be discover-
ed which verify the 'truth' of theoretical postulates so that the 
rationalization of the metaphysical and ethical worlds can proceed. 
Similarly, ethical ideas often have action consequences in the 
sensible world so that the nature of the sensible world is radically 
changed. The effort of attention expended on any idea, and the re-
flex consequences of holding any idea in consciousness describe the 
psychological dynamics of how metaphysical and ethical ideas are 
'made' true in the sensible world. The theory of volition therefore 
has important implications for the understanding of James' broad 
philosophical position. Ideas have real consequences. 
And this brings us to the s nature of the ideas which require 
effort before they can be released into action. While the psycho-
logical dynamics of how an idea eventually results in muscular move-
ment seem fairly straightforward at this point, the problem of why 
some ideas require effort before they can be released is more compli-
cated. It is therefore necessary to examine the distinction between 
instinctive and non-instinctive motives and the respective strengths 
of their impulsive powers in the stream of consciousness so that 
the relationship between ideation and effort can then be analysed 
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in more detail. 
Impulsive versus Non-impulsive Ideas  
James divides the reservoir of ideas in consciousness into 
impulsive and non-impulsive categories as follows: 
There is a certain normal ratio in the impulsive power  
of different sorts of motive, which characterizes what  
may be called ordinary healthiness of will, and which is 
is departed from only at exceptional times or by exceptional 
individuals. The states of mind which normally possess 
the most impulsive quality are either those which represent 
objects of passion, appetite, or emotion--objects of instinct-
ive reaction, in short; or they are feelings or ideas of 
pleasure or of pain; or ideas which for any reason we have 
grown accustomed to obey so that the habit of reacting 
on them is ingrained; or finally, in comparison with ideas 
of remoter objects, they are ideas of objects present or 
near in space and time. Compared with these various objects, 
all far-off considerations, all highly abstract conceptions, 
unaccustomed reasons, and motives foreign to the instinctive 
history of the race, have little or not impulsive power. 
They prevail, when they ever do prevail, with effort; 
and the normal, as 'distinguished from the pathological, 
sphere of effort is thus found whever non-instinctive motives  
to behavior are to rule the day (James, 1890, 2, p. 536). 
James is following the pre-evolutionary precedent of the Mills 
and Bain who argued that moral ideas were 'acquired' during the 
course of life,
8 
and thereby rejecting Darwin's and Spencer's argu-
ment for an instinctive foundation for moral ideas. The influence 
of Darwin's evolutionary thesis on James' theory of morals is complex 
and will be discussed in more detail below but it is relevant in 
the present context that Darwin contended that habit and will were 
often opposed (see Darwin ., 1859/1977, p. 235). Darwin goes no 
further than this, and did not intend to provide a rationale for 
8. (See Young, 1970, p. 177; Young refers to Darwin's Descent  
of man, 1874, p. 98). This does not mean that James rejected a 
'naturalistic' genesis for moral impulses, but that he did not 
link them with the instincts,and the psychogenetic basis of moral 
impulses as discussed below. It does mean, though, that James con-
sidered morals or ethics to be the 'highest' form of human develop-
ment. The mind that grapples with the problem of free will is the 
sophisticated mind. 
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rejecting an instinctive foundation for moral development. James, 
however, makes the distinction between the instinctive impulses 
and "motives foreign to the instinctive history of the race" (James, 
1890, 2. P. 536), into the foundation for his psychological theory 
of volition with effort. The major distinction between the two 
categories of ideas consists in their ability (or lack thereof) to 
maintain themselves in consciousness without effort. The distinction 
is an important one for it supposes that there are two qualitatively 
distinct categories of ideas. This means that James' theory of 
volition is not consistently based on evolutionary premises as 
Spencer, and later Darwin, outlined them (see Young, 1970, p. 177). 
Instead, the theory of volition relies on James' selection and trans-
lation of biological evolutionary concepts into Renouvian terms. It 
may be relevant, in this context, that Renouvier did not support 
evolutionary theory, and James' theory of volition owes more to 
Renouvier's "Psychologie rationelle", in the Essais de critique  
generale (1875),than to any other source (see James, 1880/1920, p. 
194). The tension (and possible functional dualism) that is exhibited 
in the broad theory of volition can therefore be related to James' 
commitment to the conflicting theories of Darwin and Renouvier and 
his efforts to reconcile the two positions. 
That some impulses are 'instinctive' while others are not is 
not problematic; James' extensive catalogue of instincts and his 
categorization of conceptions belonging to the various sub-worlds of 
reality have already been discussed. What is problematic is his 
notion that abstract ideas and motives foreign to the instinctive 
history of the race have little or no impulsive power, so that they 
prevail only with effort. The division of ideas into non-impulsive 
and impulsive categories appears to contradict his earlier statement 
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that "the first point to start from in understanding voluntary 
action.. .is the fact that consciousness is in its very nature impul-
sive"(James, 1890, 2, p. 526). The existence of a definable cate-
gory of ideas with little or no impulsive power of their own would 
appear to endanger the structural unity of consciousness so that 
exactly what James means by a non-impulsive idea is important. 
James did not mean that non-impulsive ideas were not 'intent-
ional' in the sense defined in Chap. 3. 	All ideas are intentional 
in expressing their objects, and the non-impulsive ideas are no ex-
ception. But natal] ideas have specific implications for muscular-
movement--a large number of perceptions and conceptions are non-
impulsive in this sense; many of them are not even potentially impul-
sive (see Chap. 4, regarding the necessary truths for example. Im-
pulsive ideas, as the term is used in James' theory of volition, 
include that class of ideas which have immediate implications for 
action; these ideas are then opposed to a particular set of non-im-
pulsive ideas which do not have immediate implications for action. 
Non-impulsive (again, in the context of James' theory of volition) 
also refers to a particular set of ideas which are easily inhibited 
by impulsive or idea-motor ideas even when they do have immediate 
discharge potential. Within the theory of volition, the impulsive 
or non-impulsive status of any idea is determined by its psycho-
genetic origins and its relationship to other ideas in consciousness. 
If the feeling of mental effort is attached to a certain defin-
able class of ideas, rather than arising in any random, difficult, 
and fortuitous situation, then effort could not retain its status as 
an independent force. Instead, mental effort would simply appear 
as the means of describing the impulsive force of a non-impulsive 
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idea, when such an idea did result in movement. Effort would be 
equated with James' proviso that consciousness is impulsive, and this 
was not his intention. It is therefore necessary to re-examine James' 
definition of mental effort and its relation to ideation. 
So far, mental effort has been defined as the 'mental energy' 
which the individual exerts to hold an 'anti-impulsive, idea in the 
forefront of consciousness so that it can be discharged into muscular 
movement. James states that it is necessary to exert such effort when 
the idea carries little or no impulsive power itself so that effort 
is added to the idea but it is not part of the idea itself (see James, 
1890, 2, p. 536, quoted above, p. 405). Brett reveals the problems 
with this conception Khen he writes: 
From here in the Psychology, in spite of the genesis of the 
will from reflex action, we find registered a type of decision 
which is characterised by that mysterious process described 
as "adding our living effort to the weight of the logical 
reason", "a creative contribution of something in -Stead of a 
reason which does a reason's work". Careful search for 
further light on this subject, will, I think, prove fruitless. 
James paraphrases it more than once, but vainly. If cross-
examined, James, I imagine, would have said that it was largely 
a question of controlling interest or directing attention. 
Perhaps he would have frankly declined to explain it and 
asserted that it was elementary, indefinable, an immediate 
experience. That there is such a phenomenon of consciousness 
I should not wish to deny. All that is to be learned from 
the description given isthat James did believe in some such 
form of decision, that it was a pure affirmation relied upon 
to resolve a deadlock (Brett, 1942, pp. 92-93; internal 
quotations fromJames, 1890, 2, p. 534). 
These are strong words, but Brett's difficulties are well-founded. 
James was concerned with refuting the older associationist concept of 
the mechanical means by which ideas asserted themselves: 
9. This is a somewhat subtle point: there would be no way of 
determining whether effort was adventitiously aroused because its 
attachment to a particular set of ideas would merely indicate that 
sometimes the ideas seemed to be impulsive--that is, they stabilized 
in consciousness--while at other times they appeared to be non-
impulsive, or easily inhibited by other ideas. 
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The ideas themselves and their conflict have been held to 
constitute the total history of the mind, with no unaccounted- 
for phenomenon left over. Long before mutual inhibition by 
nerve processes had been discovered, the inhibitions and 
furtherance of one idea by another, had by Herbart been 
erected into a completely elaborated system of psychic states 
and dynamics. The English associationist school, without 
using the word inhibition, and in a much less outwardly 
systematic, though by no means less successful way, had also 
represented choice and decision as nothing but the resultant 
of different ideas failing to neutralize each other exactly 
(James, 1880/1920, pp. 208-209). 
James retained this paradigm for ideo-motor action; the impulsive 
(or intentional) power of the idea itself is sufficient to enable it 
to inhibit competing ideas in consciousness. But he did not find 
this paradigm sufficient to describe the means by which non-impulsive 
ideas gain a hearing in consciousness because it was based on the 
mechanical notion of force. James writes that in the older paradigm, 
mental effort was connected with muscular effort. Muscular effort 
revealed the resistance of physical objects, defined as their force. 
Hence will came to be equated with muscular effort because will over-
came a 'real' outer force. The notion of free-will was incompatible 
with this construction because the 'energy' necessitated by a 'free' 
action could not be accounted for by the laws of conservation. It 
was an 'extra' expenditure of energy, and upset the mathematical/ 
mechanical balance of nature (see James, 1880/1920, pp. 215-216). 
James believed that "all such discussions rest on an anthropomorphi-
zation of outward force, which is to the last degree absurd" (James, 
1880/1920, p. 216). He felt compelled--if his psychology was to be 
compatible with his philosophical commitment to free-will--to assert 
that the special mental effort was not simply the impulsive aspect of 
the idea itself. Furthermore, effort itself had to be defined as a 
totally mental phenomenon so that it could not be quantified (in 
measurable amounts) within James' ownrechanical reflex psychology .  
410. 
The result of James' unwillingness to quantify mental effort was to 
maintain it as an 'undefinable' or 'mysterious' property of the mind. 
As Brett indicates, the 'experience' of the phenomenon is all that is 
given. 
James firmly believed that 'sensual' ideas had more impulsive 
power than 'ideal' motives: 
But the sluggard, the drunkard, the coward, never talk of 
their conduct in that way or say they resist their energy, 
overcome their sobriety, conquer their courage, and so forth. 
If in general we class all springs of action as propensities 
on the one hand and ideals on the other, the sensualist 
never says of his behavior that it results from a victory 
over his ideals, but the moralist always speaks of his as a 
victory over his propensities. The sensualist uses terms of 
inactivity, says he forgets his ideals, is deaf to duty, and 
so forth; which terms seem to imply that the ideal motives 
per se can be annulled without energy or effort, and that the 
strongest mere traction lies in the line of the propensities. 
The ideal impulse appears, in comparison with this, a still 
small voice which must be artificially reinforced to prevail. 
Effort is what reinforces it, making things seem as if, while 
the force of propensity were essentially a fixed quantity, 
the ideal force might be of various amount. But what determines 
the amount of effort when, by its aid, an ideal motive becomes 
victorious over a great sensual resistance? The very greatness 
of the resistance itself. If the sensual propensity is small, 
the effort is small. The latter is made great by the presence 
of a great antagonist to overcome (Juries, 1890, 2, pp. 548- 
549. See also James, 1880/1920, pp. 210-211). 
'Effort' is necessary to ensure that non-sensual motives can 
potentially triumph. But the notion that effort was proportional to 
the resistance encountered was not a satisfactory resolution of James' 
difficulties. If effort is proportional to resistance, then effort 
can be seen as a mental force simply superadded onto non-impulsive 
ideas which gives them an equal or superior impulsive power compared 
to the impulsive ideas. Thus we would arrive back at the association-
ist paradigm--granted, by a circuitous route. Instead, James con-
cludes that effort does not constitute a necessary part of moral ideas 
per se. "It appears adventitious and indeterminate in advance", 10 
10. James 1880/1920, p. 212; see also James, 1890, 2, (contd.) 
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James does not claim that effort really is indeterminate or adventi-
tious. The question as to whether it is adventitious or whether it 
is determined in advance, is for him, the question of whether or not 
the will is free (see James, 1880/1920, p. 218). Psychologically 
then, James can claim only that introspective experience points to 
the existence of such a feeling of effort. Brett's difficulties with 
the concept of effort are justified. James' rationale for disputing 
the associationist paradigm may be legitimate enough but the concept 
of effort he replaced it with is ,a philosophical concept which itself 
is unverifiable in either logical or empirical terms (see James, 1880/ 
1920, p. 212; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 549). 
If the exact nature of mental effort cannot be defined, its oper-
ations can be. Although there is no guarantee that mental effort will 
be aroused in conjunction with any given idea, when mental effort 
'works' to hold an idea in consciousness, it can operate in two ways.. 
It can hold a particular idea in the forefront of consciousness when 
the idea is of performing an action that the individual is 'reluctant' 
to undertake, so that his ideo-motor inhibitions are overcome and the 
action is performed. But it must also be able to hold abstract ideas 
before the mind so that they can be translated into ideas which have 
direct action potential. The discussion that follows will show that 
this interpretation of the dynamic functions of mental effort makes 
it possible to analyze James' concept of non-impulsive ideas in a 
way that maintains the structural unity of consciousness. But it 
will also be demonstrated that this interpretation of the non-impulsive 
ideas supports the conclusion that James' theory of volition is based 
on a functional dualism. 
10. (contd.) pp. 549, 572, where James states that by definition, 
mental effort could not be measured. 
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Volition with Effort and the Mundane World  
In order to determine whether James has made an a priori dis-
tinction between those ideas which require mental effort to sustain 
them in consciousness and those which do not, or whether the use of•
mental effort is adventitiously determined by situational factors, 
it is necessary to look more closely at the situations where mental 
effort seems to be required in the psychological theory of volition. 
James states that "the normal...sphere of effort is thus to be found  
wherever non-instinctive motives to behavior are to rule the day" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 536), indicating that an a priori distinction 
can be made between the two categories of ideas. But he also has to 
show that effort is not invariably attached to any distinguishable 
set of ideas in consciousness if he is to preserve mental effort as 
an adventitious force or quality. The most logical means of ensuring 
that mental effort operates without constraint (in the context of 
his psychological model), is to show that effort can be aroused in 
conjunction with ideas which are not 'foreign to the instinctive 
history of the race', and we will demonstrate that this is precisely 
what James does. In other words, James shows how an ordinarily 
'impulsive' idea can take on a non-impulsive status so that it can 
only be enacted with mental effort. But it will also be shown that 
the circumstances which accompany thetransformation of an ordinarily 
impulsive idea into a non-impulsive idea are considered by James 
to be indicative of mental (or pathological) disturbances. Two other 
examples are also discussed wherein instinctive impulses appear to 
require effort for their discharge. The moral 'worth' of these 
examples will be shown to be mitigated by their 'front-door' percept-
ual origins and the fact that they have become ingrained in the 
individual's habitual repertoire so that they have more in common 
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with ideo-motor action than with 'true' ethical action. It will 
therefore be demonstrated that James did not use these 'anomalies' 
as the basis for a naturalistic, instinctive foundation for his 
theory of ethics. Finally, we will show that the use of the term 
'moral' (in the psychological paradigm) to describe an act that re-
quires mental effort is not equivalent to the meaning of 'moral' 
in the ethical sense of the moral philosophy. It will also be shown 
that James makes use of the philosophical meaning of 'moral' in his 
psychology when he discusses the relationship between impulsive and 
non-impulsive ideas in the so-called 'normal' individual, so that 
the apparent inconsistencies in the theory of volition can be resolv-
ed by unravelling the two intended meanings of 'moral'. 
The most disturbing example James gives of the moral use of 
mental effort in the psychological paradigm concerns the drunkard's 
struggles to give up drink. He writes that "The craving for drink 
in real dipsomaniacs...is of a strength of which normal persons can 
form no conception" (James, 1890, 2, p. 543), and he argues that to 
the drunkard, the correct conception that drink in such quantities 
is harmful, is non-impulsive (see James, 1890, 2, p. 565). If the 
drunkard can transform this 'abstract' idea into the concrete idea 
that drinking this particular glass of brandy makes him a drunkard 
and can then keep this conception before his mind -, James believes 
that he will soon cease to be a drunkard. Thus, he concludes, "The 
effort by which he succeeds in keeping the right name unwaveringly 
present to his mind proves to be his saving moral act" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 565). This statement presents several problems: first of 
all, in spite of James' division of ideas into impulsive and non-
impulsive categories on the basis of their instinctive/habitual 
status versus their 'extraordinary' status (see James, 1890, 2, 
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p. 536), he now seems to be implying that a non-impulsive idea is 
any idea that the individual is reluctant to attend to (the non-
impulsive idea of the drunkard is the impulsive idea of the tee-
totaller, and vice versa). Furthermore, the drunkard's dilemma 
appears to be resolved by discovering the correct conception of the 
situation, and James has already made it clear that decisions which 
can be made through a search for the correct conception of the situ-
ation do not require mental effort even though the individual feels  
that he has exerted effort (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 534-535). Fin-
ally, James appears to be equating morality with effort; the moral 
status of a decision is dependent upon whether or not the individual 
has expended mental effort in making it, and not in terms of the 
value of the action itself. Psychologically, morality is made synono-
mous with mental effort. 
The same problems appear in the next example: James writes: 
The exhausted sailor on a wreck has a will which is 
obstructed. One of his ideas is that of his sore hands, 
of the nameless exhaustion of his whole frame which the 
act of farther pumping involves, and of the deliciousness 
of sinking into sleep. The other is that of the hungry sea 
ingulfing him. "Rather the aching toil!" he says; and it 
becomes reality then, in spite of the inhibiting influence 
of the relatively luxurious sensations which he gets from 
lying still (James, 1890, 2, p. 566). 
James concludes his discussion of the sailor's predicament with the 
following statement: 
The trouble is to keep the mind upon a train of objects 
naturally so insipid. To sustain a representation, to think, 
is, in short, the only moral act, for the impulsive and the 
obstructed, for sane and lunatics alike (James, 1890, 2, p. 566). 
This statement makes it difficult not to conclude that non-impulsive 
ideas are simply ideas that meet with resistance when they appear 
in the mind and that effort and morality are psychologically equated. 
But the examples appear in a somewhat different light when they are 
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put back into the context of James' discussion. 
In making the distinction between instinctive and non-instinctive 
motives, James says that there is a normal ratio in the impulsive 
force of different motives which characterizes the health will (see 
James 1890, 2, p. 536, quoted above, p. 405). He goes on to write that 
the normal will can be distinguished from the pathological will because 
individuals with healthy wills need only apply effort when the idea is 
by  definition non-instinctive (see James, 1890, 2, p. 536)_ Individ-
uals suffering from pathological conditions of the will do not exhibit 
the normal ratio of impulsivity in regard to their motives, and James 
divides the pathological conditions of the will into two categories: 
these are the explosive will, and the obstructed will. He emphasizes 
that normal individuals may also be characterized as 'explosive' or 
'obstructed' on the basis of whether they readily engage in 'heroic' or 
'anti-impulsive' actions or whether they are inclined to be more hesi-
tant than is customary in being aroused to action. But he maintains 
that the relation between impulsive and non-impulsive ideas is normal 
in these individuals and that their behaviour merely describes the op-
posite poles of a normal continuum (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 538, 547). 
He also makes it clear that the perception of reality is not disturbed 
in many victims of pathological conditions of the will: instead, the 
lives of the 'drunkards', 'sentimentalists', 'dead-beats', 'schemers', 
and 'failures' are "one long contradiction between knowledge and action, 
and who, with full command of theory, never get to holding their limp 
characters erect" (James, 1890, 2, p. 547). In the pathological condi-
tions of the will, the normal relation between the impulsivity of ideas 
is disturbed so that ideas which would not normally require effort to 
hold them before consciousness in fact do require it. 
James insists that the drunkard suffers from a pathologically 
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explosive will. Thus, in the drunkard's case, "The paths of natural 
(or it may be unnatural) impulse are so pervious.. .that the slightest 
rise in the level of innervation produces an overflow. It is the 
condition recognized in pathology as 'irritable weakness'" (James 
1890, 2, p. 541). He then gives a clinical description of the explo-
sive will which is summed up as follows: "Works on insanity are full 
of examples of these morbid insistent ideas, in obstinately struggl-
ing against which the unfortunate victim's soul often sweats with 
agony, ere at last it gets swept away" (James, 1890, 2, p. 542). 11 
Victims of the obstructed will present the opposite pattern: 
the impulsive process is insufficient or it is so excessively inhibit-
ed, that ideas in consciousness are not readily discharged. The sailor, 
interestingly enough, is placed in this category. for the impulse to 
save himself--which should automatically dominate consciousness--is 
inhibited by the impulse to sleep. James insists that the healthy, 
will requires that the perception of the situation is right and "that 
action should obey its lead. But in the morbid condition in question 
the vision may be wholly unaffected, and the intellect clear, and yet 
the act either fails to follow or follows in some other way" (James, 
1890, 2, p. 546), so that: 
The moral tragedy of human life comes almost wholly from 
the fact that the link is ruptured which normally should 
hold between the vision of the truth and action, and that 
this pungent sense of effective reality will not attach 
to certain ideas (James, 1890, 2, p. 547). 
The normal relationship between the perception of reality and the 
immediate actions that such perceptions generate is broken in cases 
11. The works of Calmeil, Ribot, Maudsley, Winslow, Cowles, Burr, 
Mussey, and Clouston--all prominent psychiatric practitioners of 
the time--are cited by James in support of this conclusion. 
417. 
of the obstructed 'will, and the victim can only act when he summons 
up mental effort in conjunction with the idea (see James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 546-547). 
What implications do these examples have for James' broad theory 
of volition then? James' description of the will--particularly in 
regard to the role of effort in making ideas impulsive--concentrates 
heavily on pathological issues, and this emphasis is significant from 
a historical perspective. Late nineteenth century treatises on mental 
pathology focused on the 'healthiness' or 'unhealthiness' of the will, 
and James' discussion follows this practice. The aberrant behaviour 
of the psychotic or neurotic individual was often attributed to a 
failure of the will. Similarly, psychiatric treatments were divided 
into 'medical' cures--drugs, baths, bleeding etc.--and 'moral' cures 
--work, recreation, study, contemplation, music, crafts, discussion, 
etc.--specifically designed to correct faults in the will 12 
James isolates two pathological conditions of the will--the explo-
sive will and the obstructed will--contending that disorders of the 
will reflect an imbalance in either direction between the strength 
of the impulse or idea in the mind and its discharge into action. In 
the 'explosive' individual, ideas or impulses are too readily dis-
charged, so that the normal inhibition process is mitigated. In the 
'obstructed' individual, ideas or impulses are not discharged readily 
enough and the individual is 'over-inhibited', The drunkard and the 
12. The emphasis on some type of failure of the will as an explan-
ation for aberrant behaviour and the division of psychiatric treat-
ments into medical and moral cures can be found in just about every 
psychiatric treatise of the period. The categorization and description 
of the various types of 'failure of the will' varies from text to text. 
There was also considerable controversy over whether such 'failures' 
were best cured by moral or medical means. See James, 1890, 2, pp. 
541-546 for some examples of typical treatises; see also Esquirol, 
1845; Von Feuchtersleben 1845; Griesinger, 1854/1861; Maudsley, 1867; 
Spurzheim, 1817; and Sweetser, 1843. 
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sailor both need to use mental effort to correct the imbalance—the 
drunkard to hold the 'non-impulsive' notion that 'taking this particu-
lar drink makes him a drunkard' long enough so that he will refrain 
from drinking the liquor, and the sailor to overcome the obstructing 
idea of sleep by concentrating on the idea of pumping water out of 
the boat. It should be noted that in both of these situations, arriv-
ing at the correct conception of the situation should be sufficient 
to allow the correct idea to discharge automatically, according to 
James' decision-making model. Neither the sailor nor the drunkard 
are called upon to make decisions of the fifth type. Instead, effort 
is required to repair the pathological condition of the will so that 
the normal ratio between impulsive and non-impulsive ideas can be 
restored. 
Psychologically, all that moral action can mean (according to 
James), is that effort is applied to a non-impulsive idea. It is 
therefore submitted that James is defining 'morality' in the nine-
teenth century psychiatric sense--that is, 'moral' describes a method 
of correcting a pathological imbalance whereby the individual con-
centrates on the correct conception of his situation. The word 'moral' 
in this psychological or psychiatric sense is opposed to physical or 
medical methods, and has to be distinguished from the correlation 
James makes between moral and ethical actions in the moral philosophy. 
James is not using 'moral' to describe an ethical position which 
makes a value judgement as to the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of the 
idea. Furthermore, the medical use of 'moral' contrasts with the 
philosophical use of 'moral' in those passages in the Principles which 
correlate moral action with the will to believe (see James, 1890,2, 
p. 672). Psychological effort is necessary to hold any non-impulsive 
notion in the forefront of consciousness, but in the normal, as 
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opposed to the pathological, individual, such effort is only neces-
sary "wherever non-instinctive motives are to behavior are to rule the 
day" (James, 1890, 2, p. 536). 
Finally, it is significant that James places the sailor on the 
raft in the obstructed-will category. There is no reason to assume 
that the sailor ordinarily suffers from an obstructed will. What 
James seems to be implying is that the drastic situation engenders a 
disruption of the normal ratio between impulsive and non-impulsive 
ideas so that the sailor's condition is at least temporarily patho-
logical. His action is therefore moral in the psychological sense, 
but not in the ethical sense. The next two examples support this 
interpretation and add weight to the hypothesis that James did not 
intend to use the instincts or impulsive ideas as the foundation for 
his theory of ethics, and that his philosophical conclusions led him 
to isolate two conflicting sets of tendencies existing side by side 
in the same individual. 
James makes only one clear equation between instinctive behaviour 
and moral action in the ethical sense, and he makes it in regard to 
maternal behaviour : 13 
the passionate devotion of a mother--ill herself perhaps-- 
13. It is significant that James does not make use of this example 
in his chapter on the will; it appears in his discussion of instinct-
ive behaviour and he never refers to it again in the Principles. He 
obviously did not intend to use it as the foundation for a theory of 
ethics based on instinct. The sympathetic instinct is the only other 
instinct that is specifically linked with moral action. James' des-
cription of the sympathetic instinct is short; he refers to the 
maternal instinct to protect the child using this as 'evidence' that 
sympathy must, in some instances, havean instinctive basis (see James, 
1890, 2, p, 410). His other examples seem to involve a fortuitous 
arousal of •the sympathetic instinct--the action, for example, of the 
Good Samaritan--and he concludes that the sympathetic instinct "is 
peculiarly liable to inhibition from other instincts which its 
stimulus may call forth" (James, 1890, 2, p. 411). Habits, the 
instincts of love and hate, and the hunting and pugnacious instincts 
all inhibit the sympathetic instinct (see James, 1890, 2, p. 411), 
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to a sick or dying child is perhaps the most simple 
beautiful moral spectacle that human life affords. 
Contemning every danger, triumphing over every difficulty, 
outlasting all fatigue, woman's love is here invincibly 
superior to anything that man can show (James, 1890, 2, p. 440). 
• Here we have a conflict between two impulsive ideas so that the 
mother's dilemma superficially appears to parallel the sailor's: if she 
relaxes her vigilance the child may perish but if she does not rest, 
she herself might die. Her parental instinct and her impulse to rest 
are in conflict, and effort is necessary to maintain the one impulse 
over the other. There is no question of pathology here, however, for 
the mother's dilemma differs from the sailor's in one significant 
regard. The correct conception of the situation is not absolutely 
• pre-determined here. In a sense, the conflict is between the value 
of one life over another, for the mother puts her own life in danger 
by tending to the child. But the situation is not totally unambiguous; 
the mother's 'choice' to put the child before herself does not arise 
as an 'abstract conception, unaccustomed reason, or motive foreign 
to the instinctive history of the race' (see James, 1890, 2, p. 536). 
Instead, noble as her choice might be, her impulse to choose the child 
is determined within the instinctive-ideo-motor paradigm,
14 
and to 
desert the child, might very well, in James' view, be a non-impulsive 
notion which could only take command of consciousness through the 
exertion of mental effort. James had a rather sentimental view of 
female sacrifice, and depicts in lurid details the changes that are 
wrought in the woman's repertoire of impulsive, ideo-motor patterns 
when she becomes a mother (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 439-440). James 
makes it clear that he believed that the parental instinct is stronger 
14. See James, 1890, 2, p. 536, for a list of those motives, ideas, 
or considerations which have the most impulsive power in the mind. 
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in women than in men (see James, 1890, 2, p. 439), and his praise of 
the woman's 'moral instinct' is perhaps most significant as a piece 
of social mythology--that is, that women are more instinctively orient-
ed towards sacrificing themselves for their children than are men. 
And while he ennobles the woman he simultaneously makes her a victim 
of her instincts and habits, so that the ethical significance of her 
action (in the philosophical sense) is minimized. This tendency of 
James' becomes clearer in the next example: 
Humbler examples show perhaps still better what chronic 
effects duty's appeal may produce in chosen individuals. 
John Stuart Mill somewhere says that women excel men in 
the power of keeping up sustained moral excitement. Every 
case of illness nursed by wife or mother is proof of this; 
and where can one find greater examples of sustained 
endurance than in those thousands of poor homes, where the 
woman successfully holds the family together and keeps it 
going by taking all the thought and doing all the work-- 
nursing, teaching, cooking, washing, sewing, scrubbing, 
saving, helping neighbours, "choring" outside--where does 
the catalogue end? (James, 1907/1949. pp. 223-224), 15 
In this example, James intimates that the process of coping with 
mundane difficulties is more a matter of adaptation than of moral 
action in the ethical sense. The women have adapted to the harsh 
demands of their environments so that if their actions are moral, 
they are moral in a habitual, rather than in an extraordinary sense: 
The stimuli of those who successfully respond and undergo 
the transformation here, are duty, the example of others, 
the crowd-pressure and contagion. The transformation, 
moreover, is a chronic one: the new level of energy becomes 
permanent. The duties of the new offices of trust are 
constantly producing this effect on the human beings 
appointed to them. The physiologists call a stimulus 
"dynamogenic" when it increases the muscular contractions 
of men to whom it is applied: but appeals can be dynamogenic 
morally as well as muscularly (James, 1907/1949, p. 223; 
15. It is important to note that the effects of 'duty's appeal' 
are not restricted to women, in light of the remarks just made regard-
ing James' view of women and the maternal instinct. Immediately 
after the example given above, James turns his attention to situations 
where men act in similar 'heroic' ways in carrying out what they 
consider to be their 'duty' (see James, 1907/1949, pp, 225-229). 
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see also James, 1907/1949, p. 218). 
But are these 'true' moral actions in the ethical sense? James 
is insisting that the conditions which inspire them are anything but 
'foreign to the history of the race'.
16 
The actions are undertaken 
• in response to empirically generated conceptions of the situation. 
Moreover, the individual continues to behave in a so-called moral 
fashion because she/he has developed certain habitual ways of think-
ing about the world she/he inhabits. The ideas that inspire the 
behaviour are impulsive--they at least make some connection with the 
woman's maternal instincts--and the ideas (presumably the desire to 
rest) which must be inhibited are also impulsive or instinctive. 
The conflict is therefore between two sets of impulsive ideas, and 
the genesis and the resolution of the conflict can be accurately 
described by the ideo-motor paradigm. Ideo-motor action patterns are 
developed in response to instinctive impulses and stimuli from the 
sensible world. Furthermore, James makes it clear that the process 
of learning a new skill initially required concentration on the pro-
perties of the stimulus and the kinaesthetic cues that are 'recalled' 
when once the action has been attempted (see James, 1890, 2, p. 493). 
As skill increases, '"we become.. .acutely aware in advance of the 
amount and direction of energy which it [the task] is to involve" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 493). Finally, when we have mastered the skill, 
the bare idea of the action is sufficient to trigger the appropriate 
movements, the 'supernumerary consciousness' is dropped, and the action 
takes on a 'quasi-automatic' appearance (see James, 1890, 2, p. 
497). Attention, concentration, and muscular exertion are all 
16. Note the emphasis here on the example of others, crowd pressure 
and contagion in contrast to James' insistence that the most 
'peculiarly' moral judgements are made in 'lonely emergencies' and 
are not impressed on the individual through 'public opinion' (see 
James, 1890, 2, p. 672, quoted above, p. 384). 
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involved in developing ideo-motor skills, and these demands are all 
commensurate with the situation of the woman-of-all-work. That is, 
•the development of ideo-motor skills and their continued utilization 
often makes great demands on human energy resources. Ideo-motor actions 
do not, however, demand any special fiat of mental effort--either for 
their initial development or for their enactment when they have become 
integrated into the behavioural repertoire of the individual. 
James' designation of the activities of the woman-of-all-work 
as moral reflects a value judgement on his part as to the overall 
worth of the activities. Since this example appears in his popular 
moral philosophy,
17 
it is hardly surprising that he should emphasize 
the worth of the activity. But his conclusion that these activities 
have a moral value is somewhat inconsistent with his broad theory of 
volition and his philosophical theory of the will to believe as will 
be shown below. That he did not intend to equate the woman-of-all-
work with the man who affirms his own free will is evidenced by his 
insistence that she has gotten into the 'habit' of taking on extra 
duties. The nature of the energy manifested by the woman-of-all-work 
is best described in ideo-motor terms and not in terms of the mental 
effort that is necpssary to believe in unverified ideas. 
The Translation of Non-impulsive Ideas and their Genesis as  
Spontaneous Variations  
James makes a categorical distinction between those ideas which 
17. "The energies of men" was originally read before the American 
Philosophical Association in 1906. In 1907, James changed the title 
to "The powers of men", edited out •the technical discussion, and 
published the paper in the American Magazine. The shorter and less 
technical 1907 version of the paper was subsequently reprinted 
several times under the original 1906 title. 
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discharge themselves automatically into action, and those which 
require mental effort to keep them in consciousness long enough to 
stabilize. But he then seems to confuse this distinction between 
the impulsive/instinctive ideas and the non-impulsive/non-instinctive 
ideas when he shows that the mother, the sailor and the woman-of-all-
work all perform moral actions because they use mental effort to sus-
tain impulsive ideas in consciousness, and that the drunkard's assent 
to the non-impulsive notion that drinking the drink makes him a drunk-
ard is a moral action. Either James did not intend the distinction 
between instinctive and non-instinctive ideas to be definitive or he 
waived it by insisting that any idea can become a non-impulsive idea, 
depending on circumstances. But we have also shown that in each of 
these examples, James has intimated that the normal ratio between im-
pulsive and non-impulsive ideas no longer applies. Their actions are 
therefore moral in the psychological sense of the term but not in the 
ethical sense. The mother and •the woman-of-all-work are moral because 
they conform to societal ideals but their actual activities have more 
in common with the ideo-motor action paradigm than with 'true' or 
ethical morality which is correlated with the will to believe. 
It is reasonable to ask why James called all of these actions 
moral or why he bothered to refer to them at all. First of all, 
the use of pathological examples provides insurance for his insist-
ence that effort is free to vary and that it is not superadded to a 
determinable class of ideas. If healthy individuals only need to 
use mental effort in conjunction with non-instinctive ideas, then 
there is no guarantee that the appearance of effort is adventitious. 
If, on the other hand, he can show that disturbed individuals must 
use mental effort to make normally impulsive ideas discharge, then 
he has some guarantee that mental effort operates fortuitously. 
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Finally, these psychological anomalies provide a potential connection 
between volition with effort and volition without effort that was 
to become essential to his pragmatic theory of truth, The essential 
connection between impulsive and non-impulsive ideas lies in the 
need to 'translate' non-impulsive ideas into impulsive ideas. One 
of the defining characteristics of non-impulsive ideas is that they 
do not typically have immediate implications for action. A belief 
inone's own free will is not immediately associated with any definable 
set of kinaesthetic cues and so it does not discharge into physical 
movement.. 
James accounted for the quasi-automatic appearance of ideo-
motor actions with the proviso that consciousness tends to desert 
mental processes when it is no longer necessary. Thus, the perception 
of the pin was sufficient to prompt the individual to pick it up 
without interrupting his conversation. This is a defining character-
istic of ideo-motor-action--the more 'habitual' an ideo-motor pattern 
is, the less attention has to be paid to its execution. Non-impul-
sive ideas are therefore competing with ideo-motor patterns that are 
so well-established that they have taken on a quasi-automatic status 
and these ideo-motor ideas are not easily inhibited. If non-impul-
sive ideas are to prevail, the non-impulsive idea must be attended 
to in consciousness and it must then be translated into an idea that 
can be acted out. Until the idea has been sufficiently attended to 
and translated into an impulsive idea, it cannot be said to have 
stabilized in consciousness. But how non-impulsive ideas could be 
translated into impulsive ideas is not a question that admits of an 
immediate a priori solution, and James found the answer, not in his 
study of the 'normal' consciousness at work, but in the pathological 
condition of the drunkard's explosive will 
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Wiener gives the most interesting interpretation of what James 
meant when he argued that foregoing drink was a non-impulsive notion 
for the drunkard. Non-impulsive ideas, says Wiener, are often given 
in universals--that is, they consist of abstract statements of what 
would be 'good'. Impulsive ideas, on the other hand, are particular 
ideas of acts that can be immediately performed. Thus, in the case 
of the drunkard, the non-impulsive idea is that 'drinking is injurious' 
while the impulsive idea presents itself in the perception of the 
glass of brandy. What James means to emphasize therefore, is that 
the drunkard must think concretely; he must think in particulars 
rather than in universals so that the perception of the glass of 
brandy immediately gives rise to the inhibiting idea that 'drinking 
this specific glass of brandy makes me a drunkard', Wiener calls 
James' pragmatism 'nominalistic', meaning that James believed that 
impulsive ideas are ideas of particulars (see Wiener, 1965, pp. 121- 
122). Impulsive motives therefore, are ideas which suggest immedi-
ate and specifiable action; abstract ideas are non-impulsive motives' 
because they are unattached to any specifiable action patterns, And 
in this sense, the ideas which initiate the mother's and the woman-
of-all-work's activities are not non-impulsive. The instigating 
ideas may connect with universal notions of 'good' but they are 
neither abstract, nor do they require translation. They are ideo-
motor ideas which are in danger of being inhibited by other ideo-
motor ideas. 
The mechanics of the translation process will become clearer 
in the discussion of James' pragmatic theories of meaning and truth. 
For now, it is sufficient to conclude that the likelihood that the 
idea in consciousness will be released into movement depends on the 
exact construction of the idea in consciousness. Once the non- 
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impulsive idea is translated into •a 'particular' idea, it is immed-
iately expressible in action. James provides the basis for Wiener's 
interpretation when he says that ideas, or objects of thought are 
not necessarily simple. In fact, they may consist of an extremely 
complex set of propositions (see James, 1890, 2, p. 569). Making a 
decision means that the total object of thought is changed so that: 
"a new object is before our thought; and where effort exists, it 
is where the change from the first object to the second one is hard" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 570). Getting the structure of the new object 
right presents the difficulty. Once this is achieved, the new object 
must, by definition, be impulsive,
18 
Mental effort therefore serves 
two purposes; it must hold the non-impulsive idea before consciousness 
to allow the translation process to be effected, and once the trans-
lation process is completed, it must hold the idea in consciousness 
against competing ideas. The non-impulsive idea has become impulsive 
in a dynamic sense but it has not necessarily become impulsive in 
a categorical sense, and the tension between instinctive and non-
instinctive motives still holds. 
The distinction between impulsive and non-impulsive ideas is 
also made on psychogenetic grounds. While James rejected Darwin's 
instinctive foundation for moral action, the development of his 
theories of volition and ethics was influenced by Darwin from another, 
rather unexpected direction. Schneider writes that by 1869 James 
had begun to make the distinction between scientific and moral atti-
tudes (see Schneider, 1942, p. 132). In 1868 James reviewed Darwin's 
Variation of animals and plants under domestication and he was exposed 
18. Wiener refers to James' reference to Aristotle's doctrine of 
practical syllogism to support his interpretation of James' meaning 
here (see Wiener, 1965, pp, 121, 267; see also James, 1890, 2, 
p. 565). 
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to Darwin's discussion of spontaneous variation. Darwin could offer 
no biological reason for spontaneity; according to Schneider, 
Darwin "accepted novel forms as brute facts" (Schneider, 1942, p. 132). 
James was intrigued: 
From this time on the concepts of spontaneity and struggle 
became prominent themes in James' moral philosophy. ...He 
saw little value in the "survival of the fittest" formula, 
but he emphasized the fact of spontaneity in moral action 
and moral sense. His exposition of this theme culminated 
in the famous last chapter of his Psychology, in which he 
argued that what the Kantians regarded as a priori, necessary 
forms of the understanding, could be regarded in Darwinian 
analysis as spontaneous variations or postulates, not derived 
from experience, but tested in experience. It is significant 
that under the head of such spontaneous postulates he placed 
aesthetic and moral principles. He emphasized especially 
that moral principles arise, not from habit and convention, 
but from "lonely emergencies" (Schneider, 1942, pp. 132-133). 
Ethical ideas arise as spontaneous variations and, as Schneider 
reminds us, in the context of lonely emergencies, and not in habitual 
situations (see also James, 1890, 2, p, 672). Eventually, as Wiener 
points out, James was to extend the notion of spontaneous chance 
"to the whole of nature and its laws" (Wiener, 1965, p. 100; see 
also James, 1890,.2, p. 672). Thus, Darwin's intended biological 
conception was elevated to a metaphysical status in James' psycho-
logy and philosophy, and the genesis of James' metaphysic is to be 
found in his conception of moral and aesthetic tendencies as spontan-
eous variations.
19 
James' use of the biological concept of spontaneous variation 
to account for the genesis of ethical ideas serves as an introduction 
to the examination of the non-impulsive ideas which normally require 
mental effort to stabilize" in consciousness. Non-impulsive ideas--
described by James as "all far-off considerations, all highly abstract 
19. The philosophication of evolutionary postulates and the genesis 
of these postulates in the psychology will be discussed in Chaps. 
7, 8 and 9. 
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conceptions, unaccustomed reasons, and motives foreign to the 
instinctive history of the race" (James, 1890, 2, p. 536)--will be 
shown to compete with the impulsive ideas for a hearing in the 
stream of consciousness. The parameters of the conflict between 
the two sets of ideas is therefore the next major problem which con-
fronts us. But first, it is necessary to briefly examine the relat-
ionship between James' psychological model of volition and his philo-
sophical theory of the will to believe in order to show why psycho-
logy finally proved an inadequate vehicle for the expression of 
James' philosophical commitments and why the fundamental clash be-
tween the two sets of ideas had to be expressed in philosophy. 
The Problem of Free Will in Relation to the Psychology
20 
In James, the transition from psychology to the larger 
problems of philosophy appears to occur on the question 
of Free Will. His philosophy avows itself a free-will  
philosophy, just as his psychology is voluntaristic; 
and for the same reason--viz., that he is a true Darwinian, 
a champion of real novelty (Knox, 1914, p. 41). 
Although Knox seems to burden Darwin with a philosophical 
position that does not appear in any of his biological writings (and 
is contradicted in his private psychological writings--see Gruber, 
1974), he is correct in stating that James finally made the transition 
20. The following is not intended as a thorough examination of 
James' moral philosophy. Rather, some of James' ethical writings are 
briefly examined for the light they shed on the psychology. James' 
moral philosophy--particularly the will to believe--has been widely 
commented on. See, for example, Wild, 1963; Wild, 1969; Brennan, 1961; 
Wiener, 1965; Roth, 1969; Roberts, 1962; Stroh,1968; Bixler, 1926; 
Bixler, 1942; Beck, 1960; Doud, 1968; Kuklick, 1977; Knox, 1914; 
Williams, 1942; Brett, 1942; Schneider, 1942; Roth, 1967; and Perry, 
1935/1974. For the reactions of James' contemporaries to the will 
to believe, see Skrupskelis, 1977, pp. 11-12; Perry, 1935/1974; and 
Wiener, 1965. While writers such as Wild, Brennan, Perry, and Roth 
(for example) have a very positive regard for James' concept of the 
will to believe in particular and for his moral philosophy in 
general, writers such as Brett and Schneider are unconvinced. Brett 
(contd.) 
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from psychology to philosophy over the issue of the will and the 
limits of its operations. While the psychology of volition appears 
to have been constructed to provide a 'scientific' foundation for 
James' philosophical commitments, the transition from philosophical 
motives to psychological constructs was difficult: 
Since the free-will problem forms one of the nodal points 
wherein psychology and philosophy inosculate, James is, 
in his Principles, confronted with an awkward crux of 
method. How is he even to state the problem in psychological 
terms, when the solution thereof must take him far beyond 
the limits of psychology as a natural science--the limits 
within which alone psychology can lead an autonomous 
existence? (Knox, 1914, n. 42). 
James was aware that the problem of free will could not be 
resolved within the confines of a naturalistic, scientific psychology: 
The question of fact in the free-will controversy is thus  
extremely simple. It relates solely to the amount of effort 
which we can at any time put forth. ...Now, as I just said, 
it seems as if the effort were an independent variable, as 
if we might exert more or less of it in any given case. 
...But,on the other hand, there is the certainty that all his 
effortless volitions are resultants of interests and associa-
tions whose strength and sequence are mechanically determined 
by the structure of that physical mass, his brain; and the 
general continuity of things and the monistic conception of 
the world may lead one irresistibly to postulate that a little 
fact like effort can form no real exception to the overwhelm-
ing reign of deterministic law. Even in effortless volition 
we have the consciousness of the alternative being also 
possible. This is surely a delusion here; why is it not a 
delusion everywhere?(James-, 1890, 2, pp. 571-572). 
He concludes therefore "that the question of free-will is insoluable 
on strictly psychologic grounds" (James, 1890, 2, p. 572) and ends 
his discussion with an argument that believing in free will is a 
logical, as well as a personal choice (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 573- 
579). 
20. (contd.) refers to James' 'ill-fated will to believe" (Brett, 
1942, p, 92), while Schneider speaks of the "pathetic" will to 
believe (Schneider, 1942, p. 310). James came to regret using the 
- phrase 'will to believe', claiming that it "has been the source of, 
utter misunderstanding of my essay" (James in a letter to Baldwin, 
quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 245). 
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The problem of whether or not the will is free does not admit of 
a psychological answer (or even a determinative philosophical answer) 
and it would be unreasonable to expect James to provide one. But the 
positivistic restraints James imposed on the scope of the science of 
psychology and the demands of his personal philosophical creed combined 
to limit the scientific and philosophical scope of his theory of voli-
tion. Initially, as Kuklick states, James' conception of mind was 
based on the notion that the will was free and the mind itself created 
the world it came to know (see Kuklick, 1977, p, 171; see also James, 
1878/1920, p. 67). But by the 1880's James had sharply limited the 
category of ideas where belief was a necessary and legitimate precursor 
to the reality of the object in question. And, as Kuklick acutely 
points out, Janes "compromised the consistency of his thought and again 
allowed moral and scientific postulates to conflict"(Kuklick, 1977, 
p, 173; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 573). This conflict (the scienti-
fic side exemplified by the heavily mechanical reflex action paradigm 
that forms the foundation of James' theory of volition) made it impos-
sible for James to maintain the original 'looseness' of the teleologi-
cal paradigm he had adopted in 1878. 21 
The mind was coerced from without; it was also internally deter-
mined by the limitations of its structure, This 'deterministic' con-
struction was to be balanced by James' philosophical pluralism wherein 
he insisted that the 'parts' of the universe: 
have a certain amount of loose play on one another, so that the 
laying down of one of them does not necessarily determine 
what the others shall be. It admits that possibilities may 
be in excess of actualities, and that things not yet revealed 
21. The internal difficulties of the 1878 paradigm have already been 
discussed in Chap. 2. James' rejection of this earlier position 
is therefore not a weakness in his psychology. 
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to our knowledge may really in themselves be ambiguous. Of 
two alternative futures which we conceive, both may now 
- be really possible; and the one becomes impossible only at 
the very moment when the other excludes it by becoming real 
itself. Indeterminism thus denies the world to be one 
unbending unit of fact. It says there is a certain ultimate 
pluralism in it; and, so saying, it corroborates our ordin- 
ary unsophisticated view of things. To that view, actualities 
seem to float in a wider sea of possibilities from out of 
which they are chosen; and somewhere, indeterminism says 
such possibilities exist, and form a part of truth (James, 
1884/1911, pp. 150-151). 
The notion of 'a certain amount of loose play' in the physical world 
corresponds to James' notion that the expenditure of mental effort is 
"adventitious and indeterminate in advance" (James, 1880/1920, p. 212). 
But from a psychological perspective all that he can conclude is that 
"After a certain, amount of effort of attention has - been given to an 
idea, it is manifestly impossible to tell whether either more or less 
of it . might have been given or not" (James, 1890, p. 572). 
The amount of effort might be pre-determined or it might be free; 
all that the psychologist is free to conclude is that effort appeared 
to be present or absent in , a given case. As a psychologist, all that 
James could do was to try and construct a paradigm which would leave 
room for the adventitious appearance of mental effort To this end, 
he made the separation between the feelings of mental and muscular ef-
fort (see James, 1880/1920, pp. 215-217). By separating mental and 
muscular effort into two ontologically distinct categories, James made 
sure that mental effort could not be assimilated under the rubric of 
scientific measurement. He further stated that from a psychological 
perspective, free will would consist solely in the attention given to 
an idea which makes it 'real' for the possessor (see James, 1890, 2, 
pp. 569-573; see also James, 1880/1920, p. 218). On the one hand, James 
has placed mental effort beyond the scope of scientific quantifiability; 
on the other, he has made it clear that this does not mean that mental 
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effort necessarily arises on a purely fortuitous basis. He then con- , 
cludes that he is justified ethically and philosophically, if not 
scientifically, in asserting that free will is a genuine possibility 
and that "Freedom's first deed should be to affirm itself" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 573). This of course, is the most famous and far-reaching postu-
late generated out of James' will to believe, and it is important to 
remember that this is a philosophical and not a psychological conclu-
sion. He has constructed his psychological theory of volition to allow 
for the possibility that the will is really free, but he believed that 
he had remained true to the limitations of the psychological paradigm 
and the will to believe is not synonomous with volition with effort. 
The problem arises in terms of the definition of effort. While James 
insisted that mental effort might well be pre-determined in advance, he 
constructed his definition so that mental effort could not quantified 
scientifically. The inclusion of the 'mysterious' fiat of effort thus 
limits the scientific applicability of the theory of volition. 
The opposition that James maintained between science and morals in 
the Principles is also important.
22 
James conceded that within the 
context of psychology, he had to be a determinist (see Kuklick, 1977, 
p. 184), and he placed stringent psychological and philosophical restrict-
ions on the range of ideas which could be believed on the basis of faith 
alone. He also placed restrictions on the range of ideas which could 
result in physical movements: he told Peirce that he had cribbed his 
theory of the will to believe from Renouvier(see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
p. 209), but he went further than Renouvier in a naturalistic direction, 
claiming that will could only select within the field of reflex 
22. See James, 1890, 2, p. 573; James makes the same distinction 
in "The will to believe" (see James, 1896/1911, pp. 22-23). 
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possibilities (see Perry, 1935/1977, 2, P.  89). This simply means that 
James was insisting upon an automatic discharge of muscular movement 
when any idea dominated the field of consciousness. At the same time, 
the will can only effect movements already in the individual's reper-
toire and the concrete consequences of will actions are always given 
in terms of effected movements while willing itself is limited to the 
holding of an idea in consciousness (see James, 1890, 2, p. 560). 
The philosophical limitations on the scope for the will to believe 
correspond with James' theory of reality as it was outlined in chap. 4. 
The will to believe is only to be used in cases where the decision is 
live, momentous, and forced, and where the decision cannot be made on 
the basis of empirical evidence (see James, 1896/1911, pp. 2-3, 22-31). 
These restrictions are the philosophical concomitants of the psycho-
logical circumstances where effort is deemed necessary.
23 
Thus, the 
real function of mental effort appears to be to provide the mental 
' force necessary to sustain belief in options chosen according to the 
corollaries of the will to believe. James did not explicitly restrict 
the scope for effort in his psychology. In his philosophy, however, 
he was fervent in asserting that the only legitimate use of the will 
to believe was in cases where the evidence was insufficient and the 
decision imperative. Thus, in 1904 he wrote to Hobhouse: "My essay 
hedged the license to indulge in private over-beliefs with so many 
restrictions and signboards of danger that the outlet was narrow enough" 
(James, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 245). To Lutoslawski he 
wrote: "My general complaint is that you express the things as if there 
were so much freedom. I believe it to exist, but to have very narrow 
play" (James, 1900, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 215). More 
23. See James, 1890, 2, pp. 534-535; see also pp. 391-394 above, 
for a discussion of the circumstances which provoke decisions of the 
fifth type. 
435. 
specifically, James claims that "future human volitions are the only 
ambiguous things we are tempted to believe in" (James, 1884/1911, p. 
155), but he then limits the scope for these volitions because the 
alternatives for human action that present themselves "spring equally 
from the soil of the past" (James, 1884/1911, p. 157), He finally 
argues that no one is really "tempted to produce an absolute accident, 
something utterly irrelevant to the rest of the world" (James, 1884/ 
1911, p. 157). 
Perry gives a colourful assessment of James' view of the scope 
for free action: "He applauded Blood's remark that the universe was 
'game-favoured as a hawk's wing', but he did not want his game too 
high. He liked simplicity, purity, and wholesomeness, in life as well 
as in nature" (Perry, 1948, p. 217). 
The relationship between volition with effort and the will to 
believe can now be summed up: the justification for the will to believe 
cannot be derived from scientific postulates but James carefully con-
structs his psychology so that the reader is forced into a consider-
ation of its philosophical implications (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 534, 
569-579). It therefore seems reasonable to assume that he intended 
his philosophical conclusions to interrelate with his psychological 
constructions. This has important implications in considering what the 
precise function of mental effort is in James' psychology and in his 
philosophy. The scope of the will to believe is sharply restricted 
so that psychologically speaking, any belief, that requires the will to 
believe must also require mental effort, But mental effort is not 
restricted to beliefs requiring the will to believe in the psychology 
although James makes it clear that the use of effort for ordinarily 
impulsive ideas occurs only in limited and pathological situations. 
The problem is to decide what the psychological scope of the options 
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is for volition with effort in normal individuals. If we are entitled 
to use the will to believe in special cases only, is effort, properly 
speaking, to be restricted to such cases or did James really mean to 
allow it a wider scope within the normal range of motives and situ-
ations in the psychology? This question can only be answered after 
an examination of the function of volition with effort in relation to 
the 'normal' range of non-impulsive ideas. 
The following section therefore will examine the relationship 
between volition with effort and the non-impulsive ideas in order to 
determine finally whether or not James' psychological theory of voli-
tion is itself functionally dualistic. 
The Worlds of Freedom in James' Moral Philosophy  
Bixler writes that: 
The organism, it appears, has two aspects or two sets of 
functions; one, biological, acquisitive, competitive; the 
other, spiritual, reflective, appreciative. It lives, also, 
in at least two kinds of environment; one is physical, offer-  
ing food and shelter which must be fought for competitively; 
the other is the spiritual world of ideas, purposes, and 
causes which exist to be shared rather than divided and are 
not eliminated but enhanced by being possessed. This makes 
the notion of survival more ambiguous than ever, just as it 
makes that of adjustment to environment very unclear. As 
an animal or bodily organism man adjusts his physical environ-
ment to his needs. As a reflective human being he adjusts 
himself appreciatively to the needs of his fellows and to the 
world of ideas (Bixler, 1942, p. 64). 
This is a clear summary of the two sets of functions performed by the 
individual; it is also a clear summary of the problem before us. Are 
the two sets of functions compatible or has James developed a theory 
of volition wherein the two sets of functions are opposed to one another 
so that instinctive tendencies actually clash with 'ethical tendencies? 
The following discussion of James' moral philosophy will show that he 
has in fact constructed a two-man theory of volition so that there is 
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a built-in clash between instinctive and non-instinctive tendencies. 
While Bixler isolates two sets of functional tendencies (adaptive 
and spiritual) Wild provides an impressionistic summary of the charact-
eristics of the worlds which makes these competing demands on the indi-
vidual. The natural world and its demands are contrasted with the 
demands of the so-called worlds of freedom, and Wild's summary epito-
mizes the conflict between the two modes of reality: 
But whatever we may call it, his ethics are not based on 
logical or factual constraint, or natural necessities of 
any kind. James sharply distinguishes the worlds of freedom 
from the realm of nature, which is dominated by regular 
tendencies and laws. The moral world, on the other hand, 
satisfies no natural want or need. It may lead to the sacrifice 
of life. It does not bring us either happiness or pleasure, 
but rather hardship, suffering, and pain. It is a free 
creation of man that is brought forth by an unforced choice 
that wells up spontaneously from the depths of human existence. 
If we are to become moral, we must choose this by a real 
choice that persists and endures through the history it 
initiates. When this choice really takes place and stirs up 
others to embark on the strenuous path, it brings other aims 
and values in its train, Among these are serious engagements, 
the most intensive and highest energies of man including 
those of inner work, negative decisions, and "the breaking 
of rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case", 
hardship, loneliness, tragedy, and the courage to overcome 
these obstacles, transcending ideals, the passionate devotion 
that these inspire, and, finally, the real meanings which alone 
can support this devotion (Wild, 1969, pp. 282-283; internal 
quotation from James, 1891/1911, p. 209), 
This seems a somewhat surprising statement given James' commitment 
to evolutionary theory. Wild (unlike Bixler) implies that the mundane 
or natural world does not make any demands on the individual that can- 
not be overcome (because it is dominated by regular laws and tendencies), 
and that all struggle and sacrifice takes place in the ethical worlds 
of freedom. We have already seen that James admitted that mundane or 
natural circumstances could present tremendous difficulties for the 
individual--witness the sailor, the mother, the woman-of-all-work, and 
finally, the drunkard. But if James admitted that all of these indi-
viduals were up against difficult situations, we have also seen that 
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James constructed the ideo-motor paradigm in such a way that the indi-
vidual's relationship with the sensible world came to be conducted in 
a largely quasi-automatic way. Adjustment to the sensible world was 
based on instinctive tendencies which rapidly solidified into habits. 
The relationship between evolution and adjustment is described in 
the process wherein the numerous and often conflicting instincts are 
transformed into habitual patterns of behaviour. Choices exist for 
the individual but they are largely predicated on his past experiences 
in the sensible world; he has the 'data' before him. Thus, while 
Bixler is correct in emphasizing that the individual is equipped with 
a 'biological, acquisitive, and competitive' function which facili-
tates his adaptation in the physical world, James' theories of reality 
and volition are based on a comptaiblity between the structures that 
the individual is equipped with and the demands of the natural world. 
If the natural world is hazardous, the individual is innately equipped 
with the means of coping. James does not view the individual's strug-
gle for survival in the physical world as the primary problem. He 
is concerned with the ethical struggle the individual makes (or should 
make), to change the mundane world into a 'better' world. The bio-
logical concept of spontaneous variation is transformed so that it 
describes the adventitious appearance of ethical ideas. Similarly, 
the real struggle for existence is to take place in the ethical worlds 
of freedom and not in the biological arena. The biological postulates 
of evolutionary theory are thus transformed into the framework for 
the moral philosophy. 
Freedom in the mundane biological world of survival is largely 
illusory according to James: the individual feels free because his 
actions follow upon his desires or ideas. In reality, he feels free 
precisely because he has made such a successful adjustment to the 
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exigencies of the external world. By way of contrast, in the ethical 
worlds of freedom: 
every dilemma is in literal strictness a unique situation; 
and the exact combination of ideals realized and ideas 
disappointed which each decision creates is always a unique 
situation without a precedent, and for which no adequate 
previous rule exists (James, 1891/1911, p. 209). 
As Wild shows, James intended a radically different structure 
for the worlds of freedom as opposed to the sensible world of mundane 
events. Actions in the worlds of freedom satisfy no natural want or 
need; they are dominated by no determinate tendencies; they are free 
creations as opposed to conditioned responses; they are choices, rather 
than the end results of natural processes; serious engagement is re-
quired, and they, call forth intensive mental energy, hardship, and 
loneliness along the way. James believe that the potential for the 
strenuous life exists in all men (see James, 1891/1911, p. 211; see 
also Wild, 1969, p. 283). Thus man is as naturally predisposed towards 
moral action as he is towards ideo-motor action: 
The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down 
among our natural human possibilities that even if there 
were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing 
in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for 
living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its 
keenest possibilities of zest (James, 1891/1911, p.213). 
Within the 'sensible' or mundane. relationship between man and 
nature, the external world makes demands on the individual and forces 
a reaction; and the individual, in pursuit of his biological needs, 
makes demands on the environment. There is a pre-determined harmony 
built into the relationship so that the hazards fOr the individual are 
minimized (see Chap. 5, p. 334). But in the case of moral action, 
as both Reck (1967, pp. 31-32), and Wild (1969, pp. 282-283), point 
out, the demand exists solely in the individual. In his essay The 
moral philosopher and the moral life" James postulates that good only 
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exists when •sentient beings exist to demand it: 
In this essay James insisted that "the essence of the good 
is simply to satisfy demand", demand existing only in 
beings with sentience. Unless there are sentient beings 
who make demands which are satisfied, there is no good; 
and unless there are sentient beings who make demands on 
one another, there is no obligation. No matter how minute 
the demand or the sentient being who makes it, that demand 
has a role to play in the moral universe. Morality arises 
because demands conflict, and moral choice is required to 
decide among demands. The standard for moral choice is the 
principle which calls for the most inclusive satisfaction 
of demands. It holds as best that course of action or that 
situation in which all demands are satisfied. Of course this 
state of affairs is an ideal, never a reality. Still the 
moral imperative commands the election of acts which maximize 
satisfactions. On James' account the moral universe is 
inveterately democratic. Each demand has an equal claim 
with every other demand for satisfaction, This moral universe 
is, consequently, pluralistic. The good is rooted in the 
demands of singular sentient beings; the moral imperative 
develops from a concern to furnish the maximal satisfaction 
of these demands (Reck, 1967, pp. 80-81; internal •quotation 
from James, 1891/1911, p.201). 
James believed that sufficient conditions for ethical actions 
were guaranteed if the universe included sentient beings who made de-
mands and then had to work out a system to resolve demand conflicts 
(see James, 1891/1911, pp. 190-215), Writers such as Reck (1967, pp. 
80-81) and Brennan find this an important basis for James' pluralism, 
for as Brennan shows, James sometimes doubted the moral nature of the 
universe: 
Although James regarded the world thus as fundamentally 
moral, still a few texts can be found indicating that he 
seemed to view the universe as amoral or immoral: "To such 
a harlot [visible nature] we owe no allegiance; with her as 
a whole we can establish no moral communion; and we are free 
in our dealings with her several parts to obey or destroy, 
and follow no law but that of prudence in coming to terms 
with such of her particular features as will help us to our 
private ends." "Nature has no one distinguishable ultimate 
tendency with which it is possible to feel a sympathy," 
"If there be a divine Spirit of the universe, nature, such 
• as we know her, cannot possibly be its ultimate word to man. 
Either there is no Spirit revealed in nature, or else it is 
inadequately revealed there..." "Nature is all plasticity 
and indifference--a moral multiverse...and not a moral universe" 
(Brennan, 1961, p. 35; internal quotations from James 1895/1911, 
pp, 43, 44, 52; and James, 1902/1923, p. 492). 
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Morality belongs to man alone. Furthermore, true morality con-
'sists in action: "We can come to know moral truths only by doing them; 
such truths cannot, exist abstractly, that is, apart from some concrete 
• consciousness, and they can be known only when they are actualized 
in concrete human experience" (Brennan, 1961, p. 15). This means that 
the "philosopher must avoid the 'superstition' of believing in a 
system of moral relations which are true in themselves" (Brennan,1961, 
p. 16). Man cannot rely on any Absolute predetermined system; he 
is responsible for his own creations, and his rejection of ethical 
conduct leaves him equally responsible (see James, 1896/1911, pp. 4, 
30-31). 
The problem of how moral actions are to be decided upon is further 
compounded by the nature of the sensible world itself because moral 
actions take place in the world, James maintained that in the best 
of all possible worlds, all human demands would be met. Our world 
is not such a world however: 
But this world of ours is made on an entirely different 
pattern, and the casuistic question here is most tragically 
practical. •The actually possible in this world is vastly 
narrower than all that is demanded; and there is always a 
pinch between the ideal and the actual which can only be got 
through by leaving part of the ideal behind. There is hardly 
a good which we can imagine except as competing for the 
possession of the same bit of space and time with some other 
imagined good. Every end of desire that presents itself appears 
exclusively of some other end of desire. ...So that the• 
ethical philosopher's demand for the right scale of subordin-
ation in ideals is the fruit of an altogether practical need. 
Some part of the ideal must be butchered, and he needs to 
know which part. It is a tragic situation, and no mere 
speculative conundrum, with which he has to deal (James, 
1891/1911, pp. 202-203). 
The individual is continually called upon to make selections. 
In most cases, his conceptions about the world--gained through his 
interaction with sensible reality--will eventually suffice, and the 
decision will be made without effort. The ethical philosopher cannot, 
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however, rely upon his conceptions of the sensible world to guide him, 
because ethical decisions are by definition 'outside' mundane experi-
ence. James stressed that "The most characteristic and peculiarly 
moral judgments that a man is ever called on to make are in unpreced-
ented cases and lonely emergencies, where no popular maxims can avail" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 672). He never developed a social psychology 
and his failure to do so had important implications for his theory 
of ethics as the following quotation from Brennan's book illustrates: 
For James, the moral judgments which we are called upon 
to make on the basis of our own unique personal confront-
ation with moral problems are more characteristically and 
peculiarly moral judgments than those which are made for 
us by the community. This James believes even though he 
also admits the important contributions made by history and 
tradition.in forming our standards of behavior, While he 
takes cognizance of the "layers" of human perfection which, 
for example, separate us from the Africans who pursued 
Stanley with cries of "meat, meat!" still he feels that the 
really significant moral judgments are not those that are 
"most invariably and emphatically impressed on us by public 
opinion" (Brennan, 1961, p, 136; internal quotations from 
James, 1890/1911, p. 258; and James, 1890, 2, p. 672). 
The varieties of religious experience is perhaps the best source 
of James' views on what constitutes a true moral act. He concludes 
that it is the saint or the mystic who brings real change into the 
sensible world for he believes that: 
• (1) Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and 
have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the 
individuals to whom they come. 
(2) No authority emanates from them which should make it 
a duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their 
revelations uncritically. 
(3) They break down the authority of the non-mystical or 
rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding 
and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of 
consciousness. They open out the possibility of other 
orders of truth, in which so far as anything in us vitally 
responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith 
(James, 1902/1923, pp. 422-423). 
The supreme moral act consists of the transcendental changes that the 
mystic brings to the world. That mystical truths have no authority 
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•beyond the individual's willingness to believe is unimportant for 
James. What signifies is that 'goodness' is potentially realized as 
the concrete outcome of faith. The means through which mystically 
derived 'beliefs' or 'truths' are translated into actions with con-
crete results basically follows the pattern set out above. Mental 
effort is necessary to hold the new 'truth' or idea in consciousness 
so that it can be translated into an idea with immediate implications 
for action. How these truths are actually translated into ideas 
with concrete meanings is largely the subject of .James' pragmatism, 
and is discussed below in Chap. 7. 
The role of the saint ormystic is to break down the rationalistic 
barriers of society by appealing to the 'latent' moral nature of man; 
in this way, the saint enlarges the horizons for truth. James' com-
mitment to empiricism ensures that the events which come to be called 
good or evil must necessarily take place in the sensible world and 
are therefore given in perception. But the judgement that the events 
are good or evil is ethical and not perceptual. Nature is amoral with-
in her own limits and the attribution of good or evil is a subjective 
addition to the sensible world. A moral framework is superimposed 
over concrete existents in the same way that scientific theories are 
imposed on natural phenomena. The function of the saint is to pro-
vide new truths to encourage the individual to make ethical evaluations 
and to seek confirmation of these truths in perception. If the 'good-
ness' that the saint brings is accepted--for the saint entirely over-
comes evil in himself--then, James believes, the millnium may yet 
come. According to James, the saint comes closer to moral perfection 
than any other individual so that it is appropriate that he usher in 
the new order. 
In the saint we find that James discovers the apex 
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of Moral perfection. In saintliness he finds the highest 
development so far realized in the moral evolution of 
the world, an evolution which is advanced by the co-
operative efforts of God and good men (Brennan, 1961, 
p. 154; see also Brennan, 1961, pp. 10, 13). - 
That the saint is the ultimate harbinger of the millenium has 
interesting consequences. As James shows in the Varieties, the 
saintly type strains against the demands of the natural world in his 
struggle towards new truth (see James, 1902/1923, pp. 377, 297-309). 
There is a strong opposition between the demands of the 'inner' and 
'outer' worlds. The saint, caught up in the pursuit of a higher 
truth, often abuses the needs of his body. In other words, he strug-
gles against comfortable adjustment in the mundane world. 
The function of the saint is to guarantee a new set of ideals. 
These ideals cannot be gleaned from everyday experience; they are 
arrived at through the process of turning one's back on mundane events 
and needs and concentrating attention on 'unearthly' concerns. In 
psychological terms, the saint ignores or overcomes 'instinctive' 
impulses and, with effort, gives his attention to ideas which are 
'foreign to the instinctive history of the race'. James stresses 
throughout the Varieties that the course of the physical world (as 
man experiences it), is altered by the ideals of the saint and the 
truly religious man because these ideals change our subjective appre-
ciation of reality (see James, 1902/1923, pp. 377, 427, 500, 517-524; 
see also Chap. 7), Mystical states: 
are excitements like the emotions of love and ambition, 
gifts to our spirit by means of which facts already 
objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness and 
make a new connection with our active life. They do not 
contradict these facts as such or deny anything that our 
senses have immediately seized (James, 1902/1923, p. 427). 
James' insistence that the saint struggles to overcome his instinc-
tive proclivities towards adjustment in the sensible world in favour 
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of concentrating on 'other earthly' problems makes it clear that he 
believes that the natural and moral worlds are opposed in the demands 
they make on the individual. In James' view the saint struggles away 
from those actions that the ordinary man affirms.
24 
And in making 
each man potential saint and potential 'hedonist', James creates an 
internal conflict between the functions of volition (see James, 1902/ 
1923, p. 377; see also James, 1890, 2, pp; 578-579). The dimensions 
of this functional dualism become clearer when James' personal re-
actions to the Utopian community at Chataqua are examined. 
In his essay "What makes a life significant?" James recounts his 
attempts to discover what makes life morally significant. He studied 
various possibilities including self-sacrifice, 'working-class 
heroism', Fourrierism as developed in the settlement at Chataqua. 
Tolstoy's doctrines of toil, and intellectual idealism (see James, 
1899/1949, p. 306). Ultimately, he rejected all of these in favour 
of a fusion of novel ideas with the will and endurance to practice 
them (see James, 1899/1949, p. 306). For he says that whatever 
material progress results through science and technology to ensure 
man's comfort and health, the crucial factor in making the world better 
depends upon the combination of novel ideas and will': 
Society has, with all this, undoubtedly got to pass toward 
some newer and better equilibrium, and the distribution 
of wealth has doubtless slowly got to change: such changes 
have always happened, and will happen to the end of time. 
But if, after all that I have said, any of you expect that 
they will make any genuine vital difference on a large scale, 
to the lives of our descendants, you will have missed the 
significance of my entire lecture. The solid meaning of life 
is always the same eternal thing--the marriage namely, of some 
24. James has reasonable grounds for asserting that this is what 
the saint does. The Varieties includes several detailed accounts of 
the lives of the saints and the deprivations they subjected themselves 
to in pursuit of higher truth (see James, 1902/1923, pp. 296-325). 
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unhabitual ideal, however special, with some fidelity, 
courage and endurance; with some man's or woman's pains.--And, 
whatever or wherever life may be, there will always be the 
chance for that marriage to take place (James, 1899/1949, 
pp, 308-309). 
Through new ideals and our recognition of their importance: 
There are compensations: and no outward changes of the 
condition in life can keep the nightingale of its eternal 
meaning from singing in all sorts of different men's hearts. 
That is the main thing to remember. If we could not only 
admit it with our lips, but really and truly believe it, 
how our convulsive insistencies, how our antipathies and 
dreads of each other, would soften down! If the poor and 
the rich could look at each other in this way, sub specie  
aeternitas, how gentle would grow their disputes! what 
tolerance and good humor, what willingness to live and let 
live, would come into the world (James, 1899/1949, p. 310). 
The 'message' is compatible with the conclusions James later 
reached in the Varieties. But James' message has a more disturbing 
aspect when we examine the state of mind that produced it. James' 
reaction to his visit to Chataqua is important for the light it throws 
on his conception of morals and is thus worth quoting at some length: 
And yet what was my own astonishment, on emerging into 
the dark and wicked world again, to catch myself quite 
unexpectedly and involuntarily saying: "Ouf! what a relief! 
Now for something primordial and savage, even though it were 
as bad as an Armenian massacre, to set the balance straight 
again. This order is too tame, this culture too second-rate, 
this goodness too uninspiring. This human drama' without a 
villain or a pang; this community so refined that ice-cream 
and soda-water is the utmost offering it can make to the brute 
animal in man; this city simmering in the tepid lakeside sun; 
this atrocious harmlessness of all things,--I cannot abide 
with them. Let me take my chances again in the big outside 
worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings. There 
are the heights and depths, the precipices and the steep 
ideals, the gleams of the awful and the infinite; and there 
is more hope and help a thousand times than in this dead level 
and quintessence of every mediocrity." 
Such was the sudden right-about-face performed for me by 
my lawless fancy! There had been spread before me the realiz-
ation--on a small, sample scale of course--of all the ideals 
for which our civilization has been striving: security, 
intelligence, humanity, and order; and here was the instinctive 
hostile reaction, •not of the natural man, but of a so-called 
cultivated man upon such a Utopia. There seemed thus to be 
a self-contradiction and paradox somewhere, which I, as a 
professor drawing a full salary, was in duty bound to unravel 
and explain, if I could (James, 1899/1949, pp. 289-290). 
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James realizes that his position is paradoxical and can only 
conclude that the need for conflict and struggle is a basic part of 
man's highest nature and that it is a positive and elevating part. 
What seems basically consistent in the labyrinth of James' ethical 
system is the need for some sort of permanent struggle in the life 
of man: 
So I meditated. And, first of all, I asked myself what 
the thing was that was so lacking in the Sabbatical city, 
and the lack of which kept one forever falling short of the 
higher sort of contentment. And I soon recognized that it 
was the element that gives to the wicked outer world all 
its moral style, expressiveness and picturesqueness,— 
the element of precipitiousness, so to call it, of strength 
and strenuousness, intensity and danger.. What excites and 
interests the looker-on at life, what the romances and the 
statues celebrate and the grim civic monuments remind us of, 
is the everlasting battle ofthe powers of light with those 
of darkness; with heroism, reduced to its bare chance, yet 
ever and anon, snatching victory from the jaws of death. 
But in this unspeakable Chataqua there was no potentiality 
of death in sight anywhere, and no point of the compass 
visible from which danger might possibly appear. The ideal 
was so competely victorious already that no sign of any 
previous battle remained, the place just resting on its 
oars. But what our human emotions seem to require is the 
sight of struggles going on. The moment the fruits are 
being merelY eaten, things become ignoble. Sweat and 
effort, human nature strained to its uttermost and on the 
rack, yet getting through alive, and then turning its back 
on its success to pursue another more rare and arduous still 
--this is the sort of thing the presence of which inspires 
us, and the reality of which it seems to be the function of 
all the higher forms of literature and fine art to bring 
home to us and suggest (James, 1899/1949, pp. 289-290; see 
also James, 1890, pp. 578-579). 
This is James at his most romantic; Williams writes that: 
James.. .even while advancing the positivistic and instrumental 
diagnosis of the intellect, never relinquished the philoso-
phical ambition_..to become contemplatively a party to the 
ultimate nature of things. ...and yielded himself to 0 non-
intellectual, immediate romantic vision of reality, 2 p 
Williams (1942, p. 113), and Perry (193511974, 2, p. 277) state that 
25. Williams, 1942, p. 113; see also pp. 120-121 where Williams 
charges that James' Romanticism was compatible with National 
Socialism. 
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James was influenced In his Romanticism by Nietzsche although Perry 
emphasizes that James could not accept Nietzsche's philosophy because 
he ultimately preferred peace to war. James developed his views in 
"The moral equivalent of war"; peace is not the moral equivalent of 
war, and the "martial virtues" which usually surface during wartime 
are to be enlisted in the struggle to subdue nature (see James, 1910/ 
1949, pp. 324-326; see also Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 278-279). 
James was .commited to the idea of heroic struggle: 
' What is truly good. James says, is not the cooperative life 
with ease or the heroic life with war, but the cooperative 
life with heroism. Life is worth while if it is cooperative . 
and heroic at the same time. So far as I can see, James 
simply sets these qualities up as ideals and asks if we do 
not accept them intuitively just as he does (Bixler, 1942, 
p. 66; see also Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 271-279; Williams, 
1942, p. 113; and Wild, 1969, pp, 280-281). 
This streak of irrational romanticism is what makes James deplore - 
the community at Chataqua. It is peaceful, cooperative, and stagnant; 
there is no heroism or struggle left in its inhabitants. The real  
function of mental effort is to keep the individual striving and 
struggling to realize new ideals; it is not to facilitate a comfort-
able, placid existence, whatever struggle was involved in the genesis  
of that existence. 
This long digression into James' moral philosophy has been under-
taken to clarify his intentions with regard to the function of voli-
tion with effort. Volition with effort (as a psychological construct) 
cannot be equated with the will to believe (as a philosophical con-
struct) for reasons already cited. Psychologically, James cannot 
attach effort to a definable and restricted class of ideas without 
mitigating its fortuitous or adventitious significance. Thus, 'moral' 
in the psychological sense means that mental effort is exerted to 
hold an idea in consciousness until it stabilizes into a thought 
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with immediate action consequences. 'Moral' in James' philosophical 
sense means something quite different; it involves a rejection of 
the comforts of the mundane sensible world in favour of making unveri-
fiable ideas into verifiable ideas--in other words, the 'moral' 
individual works to promote the ethical/metaphysical rationalization 
of the sensible world so that eventually, ethics will be able to 
take its place beside science because it will include a set of objects 
or sensible experiences which verify abstract hypotheses (see James, 
1890, 2, pp. 569-579, 671). 26 
The intended psychological function of volition with effort 
becomes clear when the moral philosophy is examined: the real function 
of volition with effort is to change the world from what it is to 
what it should be. This is the explicit message of James' moral 
philosophy and the implicit meaning of his psychology. Volition with 
effort is not psychologically restricted to the will to believe, but 
it is there that it finds its legitimate function. When effort is 
applied to ideas which are already impulsive--from a psychogenetic 
perspective--no real change in the status quo is mediated. But when 
effort is applied to non-instinctive ideas, real changes take place 
in the mundane world so that rationalization can proceed and progress 
is assured. James is concerned with ethical evolution: he is not 
concerned with biological evolution and his commitments to Darwin and 
to Renouvier are merged in his translation of biological conceptions 
into postulates which describe ethical progress. 
In the Principles, James describes the genesis of ethical 
26. In Chap. 4 we discussed the problems that emerge when the attempt 
is made to discover sensible correlates for abstract hypotheses in 
regard to the 'reality' of scientific objects, Some of the same 
difficulties are encountered in the attempt to discover sensible 
correlates for ethical hypotheses and these problems are discussed 
in Chap. 7_ 
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postulates and the relationship between the back-door ideas and sen-
sible experience. Front-door experience includes all of the processes 
which influence the mind by way of "simple habits and association" 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 628; see also pp, 626-627). The back-door ideas, 
on the other hand, are products of "indirect causes of mental modi-
fication" (James, 1890, 2, p. 627), and: 
Our higher aesthetic, moral and intellectual life seems to 
be made up of affections of this collateral and incidental 
sort, which have entered the mind by the back stairs.. .or 
rather have not entered the mind at all, but got surrepti-
tiously born in the house. No one can successfully treat 
of psychogenesis, or the factors of mental evolution, 
without distinguishing between these two ways in which the 
mind is assailed (James, 1890, 2, p. 627). 
Front-door psychogenesis is responsible for the development of habits, 
ideo-motor actions, and the sensible beliefs which correspond to 
these action patterns. Back-door psychogenesis is responsible for 
ethical and metaphysical ideas so that: 
The moral principles which our metal structure engenders 
are quite as little explicable in toto by habitual 
experiences having bred inner cResions. Rightness is not 
mere usualness, wrongness not mere oddity, however numerous 
the factswhich might be invoked to prove such identity 
(James, 1890, 2, p. 672). 
James then goes on to say: 
No more than the higher musical sensibility, can the higher 
moral sensibility be accounted for by the frequency with 
which outer relations have cohered. Take judgments of s 
justice or equity, for example. Instinctively, one judges 
everything differently, according as it pertains to one's 
self or to some one else. Empirically one notices that 
everybody else does the same. But little by little there 
dawns in one the judgment "nothing can be right for me which 
would not be right for another similarly placed"; or "the 
fulfilment of my desires is intrinsically no more imperative 
than that of anyone else's"; or "what it is reasonable that 
another should do for me, it is also reasonable that I should 
do for him"; and forthwith the whole mass of the habitual 
get overturned. It gets seriously overturned only in a few 
fanatical heads.• But its overturning is due to a back-door 
and not to a front-door process (James, 1890, 2, p. 673). 
The relationship between the back-door ideas and the sensible 
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world is important here. When ethical ideas dominate consciousness, 
they do so in the sense of allowing the individual to recast his 
habitual perceptions into other forms. He does not simply regard 
events in terms of 'the movement of objects to and fro' and their 
sensible tactile effects on him; he begins to make judgements regard-
ing the rightness or wrongness of what is taking place before him 
and then to make corresponding adjustments to his behaviour. To do 
so, he must overcome his habitual modes of responding and attend to 
the 'new' ideas which are making their appearance in his consciousness. 
This becomes clear in the tension James creates between habitual 
modes of responding and new or ethical modes in his moral philosophy. 
The function of the saint (as opposed to the ordinary man) is to 
'seriously' overturn "the whole mass of the habitual" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 673). The function of the saint in each man is to attend to 
ethical ideas when they arise so that ethical ideas can be realized 
and the ethical/metaphysical rationalization of the world can proceed. 
Conclusion: The Will has Two Functions  
We began with the hypothesis that James constructed a dualistic 
theory of volition--not because ideo-motor action and volition with 
effort necessarily conflicted with one another, but because there - 
is a tension in consciousness between two antithetical sets of ideas. 
The two sets of ideas are distinguished psychogenetically; they are 
also distinguished according to whether or not they require mental 
effort to stabilize in consciousness. One set of ideas is therefore 
effectively realized at the expense of the other set, for the two 
sets of ideas have contradictory implications for behaviour. Further-
more, the 'strength' of the ideo-motor ideas is balanced by the 
adventitious possibility that effort will be aroused in conjunction 
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with the non-impulsive ideas, so that the tension between the two 
sets of ideas is maintained, not dissipated. Although James insisted 
that mental effort could be called upon to maintain any idea (instinct-
ive or non-instinctive) in consciousness, he made it clear that in 
normal individuals, mental effort was only necessary to make non-
instinctive motives prevail. Thus, the fortuitous arousal of effort 
does not act to bridge the contradictory sets of motives, nor does it 
act to elevate some of the instinctive tendencies into ethical postu-
lates. Instead, the appearance of mental effort in conflicts between 
normally impulsive ideas indicates that the normal inhibition process 
has been disrupted with the result that the normal functioning of the 
will has been impaired. 
In order to demonstrate that the will has two conflicting functions, 
we have examined James' theory of volition from several perspectives. 
The five types of decisions were reviewed in order to show that James 
believed that mental effort was only necessary (and in fact actually 
utilized), in the fifth type of decision-making (see James, 1890, 2, 
p. 535). Decisions made with effort were included along with ethical 
and metaphysical ideas to form the top level in the action hierarchy, 
and they were shown to be categorically distinguishable from the other 
levels of the hierarchy because they required effort for their imple-
mentation while the other modes of action did not. The relationship 
between volition with effort and the reflex paradigm was then reviewed, 
and it was established that once any idea stabilized in consciousness--
with or without mental effort--it would atuomatically be discharged 
into physical movement. Furthermore, it was ascertained that the 
sensible results of any action--ethical or mundane--are given in affer-
ent sensations. This has positive implications for James' realist 
epistemology because it means that the consequences of any action are 
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reflected back to the actor through his senses. It also means that 
James' theory of volition is structurally unified: any idea which 
stabilizes in consciousness will be released by the same reflex process, 
and the means of assessing the effects of the idea on the sensible 
world are identical in both types of volition. 
Problems arise in considering the status of mental effort however: 
James insisted on defining mental effort as a purely adventitious force 
in consciousness. He made the separation between mental and muscular 
feelings of effort, and he then claimed that efferent arousal of the 
nervous system did not produce experienceable feelings in the individual 
All sensation was mediated through the afferent system so that the felt 
effects of holding any idea in consciousness consisted of the afferent 
sensations that were aroused when the idea was released reflexively 
into movement. Mental effort by definition preceded the reflexive 
discharge of the idea, so that it was neither an efferent nor an affer-
ent sensation. Moreover, mental effort was not defined in terms of 
the impulsive or intentional quality of ideas, but existed as an inde-
pendent mental force which was fortuitously aroused in conjunction 
with certain ideas in consciousness. It therefore existed as a myster-
ious fiat of the mind--mysterious because by definition it could not 
be quantified, nor was it linked with any of the other dynamic pro-
cesses of the mind. James' theory of volition was therefore prevented 
from achieving a totally naturalistic or scientific status from the 
beginning. 
Non-impulsive ideas were then examined and it was determined that 
'non-impulsive' had two interrelated meanings: ideas were non-impulsive 
in the sense of being too weak to inhibit the quasi-automatic ideo-
motor actions, and/or they did not have immediate consequences for 
action and required translation as a part of the stabilization process. 
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Finally, non-impulsive ideas were shown to have different psychogenetic 
origins from ideo-motor ideas. An a priori distinction between the 
two categories of ideas and their corresponding requirements for mental 
effort was therefore established. But problems then arose because 
James indicates that impulsive ideas sometimes require mental effort 
before they can stabilize in consciousness. These cases initially 
seemed to contradict James statement that mental effort is not utiliz-
ed by normal individuals for the discharge of impulsive ideas. It 
was then demonstrated that the arousal of effort with ordinarily im-
pulsive ideas was limited to so-called pathological conditions, or 
that it was confounded with the habitual action patterns which are 
demanded by social conditions. The use of mental effort in these lat-
ter conditions was shown to have more in common with the development 
of strenuous ideo-motor patterns and less with mental effort as a 
fortuitous force which holds an idea in consciousness. In the examples 
of both the mother and the woman-of-all-work, the stimuli for continu-
ing to behave in a strenuous manner are given in perception and not 
through the arousal of an ethical or abstract idea in consciousness. 
This interpretation of the relationship between mental effort 
and impulsive ideas is strengthened by James' rejection of the instincts 
as the foundations of ethical actions. He did not follow Spencer and 
Darwin in this regard, but took his psychological definition of moral 
action from the psychiatric treatises of the time, He therefore con-
structed a psychological theory of volition wherein effort could be•
attached to any idea in consciousness should the need arise, thus 
preserving the independent status of mental effort. At the same time, 
• he also insisted in the Principles that the 'real' function of effort 
was to focus the attention on ethical/metaphysical ideas so that 
moral actions were equated with ethics. Thus, moral/ethical actions 
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were defined as those actions which utilize mental effort to stabilize 
non-impulsive conceptions with back-door psychogenetic origins. 
The moral philosophy was then examined to determine whether James 
had in fact equipped the individual with two sets of conflicting 
functions corresponding to the two antithetical sets of ideas in con-
sciousness. It was shown that James made a separation between the 
demands of the natural world of mundane adjustment and the demands of 
the worlds of freedom and that these demands conflicted with one another. 
Thus, man was equipped with two sets of functional responses which en-
abled him to satisfy some of the demands of both worlds. The cost 
was an irreconcilable conflict between motives. It was also shown 
that James considered this conflict of demands to be productive, for 
he romanticized and idealized the stress produced by the two conflict-
ing sets of motives, and the concomitant struggle against Nature. 
The true function of effort was therefore to permit the individual to 
struggle against the biological demands for adjustment in the sensible 
world and to focus his energies on ethical ideals, to reinterpret his 
perceptions in light of these ideals, and finally, to make changes in 
the sensible world so that the metaphysical/ethical rationalization 
of the sensible world could proceed. 
The function of volition with effort--and in this sense it corres-
ponds to the will to believe--is not to provide a link between the 
• two sets of ideas in consciousness, but to promote the metaphysical/ 
ethical rationalization of the sensible world. Only when this ration-
alization has taken place so that sensible metaphysical/ethical objects 
have been discovered (analogous to the objects of science), and meta-
physical/ethical postulates have been verified, can a link be forged 
between impulsive and non-impulsive ideas in consciousness, and the 
conflict between the two sets of tendencies reconciled. The 
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concretization of ethical ideas through mental effort works to begin 
this reconciliation. 
James' rejection of the theory of innervation therefore had im-
portant consequences for his moral philosophy and his pragmatism. 
The afferent sensations that are experienced when any action is per-
formed mediate the consequences of that action back to the actor. 
These afferent sensations thus constitute the verification of any idea 
in the sensible world. Once sensible objects have been discovered 
which correlate with ideas in consciousness, the will to believe is 
no longer necessary, and the ideas regarding the object take on an 
impulsive status. Until the ethical rationalization of the sensible 
world is substantially underway, however, the conflict between non-
impulsive and impulsive ideas will continue, and the need for mental 
effort will remain. 
It is important to emphasize that although the will has been shown 
to have two conflicting functions, the structure of the stream of 
consciousness is not impaired. If the non-impulsive ideas require 
effort to be discharged, it is not because they have no 'intentional-
ity' but because they are inhibited by the stronger, quasi-automatic 
ideo-motor ideas, and/or because they have not been translated into 
ideas with ideo-motor consequences. Not all ideas can be potentially 
discharged--James makes it clear that a vast number of ideashave no 
immediate consequences for action (see Chaps. 3 and 4). Furthermore, 
the mysterious fiat of effort is not specifically attached to any 
given idea in consciousness. It arises fortuitously when the idea 
presents itself, so that structurally, non-impulsive and impulsive 
ideas are indistinguishable in terms of the parameters laid down in 
Chap. 3--all thoughts arise in consciousness as unitary, intentional 
objects, so that mental effort is an independent addition to any given 
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thought. Moreover, all ideas are discharged according to the rules 
of the reflex paradigm, and all knowledge of the consequences of any 
action is mediated through the afferent sensations. The tension pro-
duced in the stream of consciousness between the two sets of ideas 
is given in terms of the a priori conflict between ideas with differ- 
ent psychogenetic origins and the corresponding demands of the two 
'worlds of experience'. 
.James' dissatisfaction with psychology as a vehicle for exploring 
metaphysical and ethical issues--particularly the problem of free will 
--has periodically been referred to. His conviction that he had gone 
as far as he could in developing an efficacious model of consciousness 
is reflected in the construction of the Principles. The chapter on 
the will is followed by a brief discussion of hypnotism which is in 
turn followed by the concluding chapter concerning the genesis of the 
necessary truths. This final chapter is particularly important, for 
it contains most of James' ideas on the evolution of scientific, meta-
physical and ethical ideas. Furthermore, it is the most speculative 
chapter in the Principles: it is a theoretical analysis, couched in 
evolutionary terms, of how the mind is psychogenetically structured 
to know the world, and how the particular structures of the mind deter-
mine the ways in which the sensible world is rationalized. In con-
trast to the rest of the Principles, it contains virtually no empirical 
studies to support James' conclusions. It therefore forms a bridge 
between his attempt to construct a naturalistic, scientific psychology 
of consciousness and his move into philosophy. The theory of voli- 
tion was James' last major strictly psychological theory. 
We have shown that James constructed a theory of consciousness 
which is structurally unified but functionally divided, and we have at-
tempted to delineate some of the factors which were responsible for 
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this construction. Thus, we have been arguing that the apparent incon-
sistencies in James' psychology are not idiosyncratic but are indi-
cative of two distinct and opposing strands of thought. On the one 
hand, he was committed to evolutionary theory and to a naturalistic 
explanation of the mind's operations in relation to the world. He 
believed that man's behaviour was largely attributable to his physio-
logical make-up and to his pre-determined instinctive reactions. His 
use of the reflex model places him firmly within the nineteenth century 
psychological tradition. But his commitment to Renouvier inspired 
him to search for some means of establishing that consciousness was 
in fact efficacious, and he therefore equipped the individual with a 
set of conflicting tendencies towards action and a mind that was by 
definition active and selective. If the reflex model was then uti-
lized to account far the dynamics of how impulses were translated 
into movements, the a priori conflict between instinctive tendencies 
and the active, selective powers of consciousness acted to minimize 
the chances that the organism was reacting in a purely automatic 
fashion. 
But the creation of a selective consciousness and the provision 
of conflicting tendencies did not guarantee that consciousness was 
truly efficacious. James was haunted by the idea that many ideo-motor 
and habitual reactions had the 'feeling' of being free actions when 
they were actually determined by inherited tendencies and the develop-
mental phase reached by the organism when it first encountered the 
object. He therefore introduced the 'mysterious' fiat of effort into 
his psychology to ensure that the individual had a means of overcoming 
his habitual reaction patterns. But with the introduction of mental 
effort, James' psychology overstepped the boundaries between scientific 
empiricism and metaphysical speculation. By definition, mental effort 
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stands outside the range of quantifiable and analyzable psychological 
constructions, and James' insistence on the necessity for such a force 
in consciousness was largely responsible for preventing his psychology 
from gaining acceptance as a unified scientific account of conscious-
ness.
27 
His attempt to reconcile his two conflicting philosophical 
commitments--to scientific naturalism and to the freedom of the will-- 
led to the development of the complex theories of belief and volition 
in the Principles. In the end, however, the two commitments are not 
reconciled, but are expressed in the functional duality that both 
major psychological theories exhibit. From a historical perspective, 
then, the two functions of consciousness, delineated here in terms of 
the theories of belief and volition, are important, in understanding 
James' positive and negative influence on the development of post-
evolutionary psychology. 
Moreover, the problems which led James to construct a functionally 
dualistic view of consciousness in the Principles had important impli-
cations for the philosophication of evolutionary postulates. We have 
shown that James' nineteenth century 'progressive' view of science was 
partially responsible for his construction of a functionally dualistic 
model of consciousness. While James created a radical evolutionary 
structure for consciousness, the world that is known by the mind is 
given in terms of primary and secondary qualities and the mathematical, 
mechanical terms of Newtonian science. It was not until he left 
psychology for philosophy that James seriously and systematically began 
to work on a reassessment of the nature of the physical world as it 
is known by the mind. He did not have a new theory of physics or 
'27. See Baldwin, 1891; Hall, 1891; Meyers, 1891; Peirce, 1891; Royce, 
1891; Santayana, 1891; Sully, 1891; and Ladd, 1892; for the reactions 
of James contemporaries to the Principles. 
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mathematics to offer and the status of science is therefore largely 
unchanged in his first philosophical writings. But he eventually 
developed new epistemological and metaphysical approaches to the study 
of the physical world, and these approaches both have their foundations 
in the psychology. 
James was never satisfied with the mind-body dualism he adopted 
in the Principles. Necessary to his psychology, it became a major 
stumbling block in his attempt to create a realist epistemology and 
metaphysic. Thus he made various attempts to show that the dualism 
was largely artificial in the first place. But to do away with mind-
body dualism, he found that he had to do away with the subject-object 
dualism which was a necessary condition for the unity of the stream 
of consciousness. Moreover, his reconstruction of the physical world 
required that he resolve the 'unstated' functional dualism of conscious-
ness. Psychologically, the 'tension' that results from the dual 
functions of the faculties of belief and volition could be productive; 
it increased options and seemed to guarantee that the mind was active 
in making selections. The mind was forced to make selections and 
this seemed to guarantee that the mind was not simply an epiphenomenal 
over-flow of brain events. Philosophically the dualisms became in-
creasingly problematic as James' philosophy took shape. The 'problems' 
of the preceding chapters--the subject-object dualism of the stream 
of consciousness in relation to the world, the dual functions of 
belief and volition and James' progressive' view of history, will 
therefore be re-examined in the light of James' philosophical theories. 
CHAPTER 7  
PRAGMATISM: AN EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY  
Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really 
rules for action, said that, to develop a thought's mean-
ing, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to 
produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. 
...To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, 
then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a 
practical kind the object may involve--what sensations we 
are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. 
Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, 
is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, 
so far as that conception has positive significance at all. 
This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of 
pragmatism. It lay entirely unnoticed by any one for twenty 
years, until I, in an address before Professor Howison's 
philosophical union at the university of California, brought 
it forward again and made a special application of it to 
religion (James, 1907/1913, pp. 46-47). 
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The Genesis of Pragmatism: Darwin and the Metaphysical Club
1 
Perry writes that "the influence of Darwin (on James) was both 
early and profound, and its effects crop up in diverse and unexpected 
quarters" (Perry, 1935/1974, 1, p. 469). That Darwin's theory had a 
profound and lasting influence upon James' philosophical career shows 
clearly in his major epistemological theory, pragmatism. This chapter 
will concentrate on pragmatism as an evolutionary epistemology, while 
taking into account the other major influences on its development as 
well. Whether a satisfactorily comprehensive epistemology can be 
derived from biological evolutionary premises is still a matter of de-
bate among contemporary psychologists.
2 
It is hoped that this account 
of James' pragmatism will lead, not only to a greater understanding of 
his philosophy per se, but to the realization that the problems he faced 
in attempting to construct an evolutionary epistemology may still be 
relevant to contemporary issues in philosophy and psychology. 
James recognized that epistemology was basic to psychology. When 
Ward criticized the Principles because it expressed a fundamental dual-
ism between psychology and metaphysics (see Ward, 1892, pp. 531-539), 
James replied: "There can be no psychology worth the paper it is written 
1. It should be noted that this chapter does not attempt to give an 
exhaustive examinEtion of James' pragmatism. It should also be noted 
that the discussion of perception and conception (based on James' 
pragmatic writings) is given in the last section of Chap. 3. This 
discussion was given in the earlier part of the thesis because it 
amplifies the discussion on the construction of the stream of conscious-
ness and the problems James faced in coming to terms with the problem 
of the 'knower' and the 'known'. 
2. See for example, Campbell, 1974. Campbell provides an appendix 
(pp. 4607463), which lists works recently published on this problem. 
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on (except the science of the correlation of brain states with objects 
known) until something sound in epistemology is done. Pray go ahead 
and do it" (James, quoted in Wiener, 1965, p. 108). James took up his 
own challenge: the result was his particular version of pragmatism. 
James first formally proposed pragmatism as a specific theory for deal-
ing with metaphysical issues in 1898, 3 in a,lecture entitled "Philoso-
phical conceptions and practical results", although anticipations of 
the theory are found in the Principles, and in The will to believe. 
James gave Charles Peirce credit for the invention of the theory in 1878, 
but Peirce vehemently replied that although pragmatism was indeed his 
philosophical offspring, James' version contained many major and serious 
incompatibilities with his own theory (see Thayer, 1968, pp. 135-141). 
3. See James, 1907/1913, p. 45, where James again states that "The 
pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes 
that otherwise might be interminable." The distinction between meta-
physics and epistemology appears to be confused in this passage, and 
Baldwin makes it clear in his definitions of metaphysics and epistemology 
that these two major branches of philosophy "collide" to a large extent 
(see Baldwin, 1901/1960, 2, p. 73). Metaphysics can be broadly con-
ceived as "the systematic interpretation of experience and the explica-
tion of all its implicates" (Baldwin, 1901/1960, 2, p. 73), while epist-
emology becomes the study of the origin of knowledge, the validity and 
limits of knowledge, and finally, the study of the nature of the objects 
of knowledge (see Baldwin, 1901/1960, 1, p. 335). Baldwin states that 
"The two inquiries are, however, so closely allied that it is impossible 
to carry on either independently. ...Some, accordingly, have refused to 
make any distinction between the two" (Baldwin, 1901/1960, 1, p. 336). 
Baldwin concludes that epistemology cannot give all that is required 
in metaphysics or ontology so that the distinction is retained although 
in practice many theorists fail to make the separation. Baldwin's 
analysis was selected as a reflection of the difficulties encountered 
in James' time. It was therefore decided to treat pragmatism as James' 
epistemology and radical empiricism as his metaphysic for reasons that 
will emerge more clearly in this, and the following chapter. James 
himself does not make this distinction between the two branches of his 
philosophy so that the distinction is somewhat arbitrary. However, 
broadly speaking, pragmatism appears to have more in common with epist-
emology than with metaphysics, for it was developed as a methodology  
for answering metaphysical questions, and as such conforms to Baldwin's 
definition of an epistemology. Radical empiricism thus emerges as the 
'result' of employing the pragmatic method, so that James believes that 
he can make ontological statements about the nature of mind, body, and 
the physical world of experience within radical empiricism. 
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A comparison of the two versions of pragmatism indeed gives credence to 
Peirce's rejection of James' theory
.4 
Morris writes that pragmatism is unique in philosophy because it 
is based on the premise that "the nature of meaning can be clarified 
only by reference to action" (Morris, 1970, p. 16). Thus pragmatism is 
a methodology for discovering meaning, and the meaning as much as the 
truth or falsity of a proposition can be determined only through an 
active process of verification. As Wiener writes, "The meaning of an 
idea grows out of the particular effects we perceive when we act on 
it; truth is what happens to ideas when they fit our experiences dy-
namically, that is, when the flux of experience becomes adapted to 
variations produced by our individual efforts" (Wiener, 1965, p. 102). 
The time was ripe for the development of pragmatism and Morris 
cites the conditions which led to this unique theory of knowledge as: 
1) the prestige which science and the scientific method enjoyed 
in the mid-nineteenth century; 2) the corresponding strength 
of empiricism in the then current philosophy; 3) the acceptance 
of biological evolution; 4) the acceptance of the ideals of 
American democracy (Morris, 1970, p, 5). 5 
These four conditions provided the basic framework for the type of 
philosophizing engaged in by the members of the famous 'Metaphysical 
Club'
6
, as Peirce named it, and the seeds of James' pragmatism were 
4. For an excellent discussion of the differences between Peirce 
and James, see Thayer, 1968, pp. 135-151. 
5. Morris claims that the early pragmatists accepted these four 
conditions as unproblematic (see Morris, 1970, p. 4). Morris then 
attempts to relate these four conditions to one another in an "unprob-
lematic" model to show that they provided an explicit and unified founda-
tion for pragmatism. This is somewhat misleading because the specific 
contents of the conditions and the relationships between them proved 
to be extremely 'problematic', as will be shown in the following pages. 
At this point however, it is convenient to accept these 'conditions' 
at their face value as the necessary conditions for pragmatism. 
6. Kuklick gives a good description of the membership of the Meta-
physical Club and the topics discussed. The evolutionary origins of 
(contd.) 
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sown in these early discussions. Charles S. Peirce was the first to 
specifically propose pragmatism as a theory in his 1878 paper, "How 
to make our ideas clear". Peirce's ideas were largely ignored by 
philosophers outside the Harvard circle, and historically, Peirce must 
be studied for his effect on the philosophy of the more popular James, 
for it was not until the 1930's that a renewed interest in the origins 
of American philosophy placed Peirce in the ranks of philosophic innova-
tors as a thinker of importance in his own right.
7 
 By the time James 
published his own theory of pragmatism, he had gained the self-
confidence which allowed him to break away from Peirce's influence so 
that he was now able to develop a theory of pragmatism suited to his 
own scientific and metaphysical concerns. 
But if James broke away from the specific doctrines of Peirce, his 
pragmatism was still largely a product of the conditions that gave the 
discussions of the 'Metaphysical Club' their particular flavour, as in 
fact these same conditions determined the wider scientific and philoso-
phic viewpoint of the late nineteenth century. Faith in the scientif-
ic method was strong; the achievements of science in the nineteenth 
century were impressive and the successes in biology, geology, and 
astronomy, aligned with the feeling that Newtonian physics had ulti-
mately succeeded in providing a mechanical basis for understanding the 
universe, led to an optimistic attitude that correct application of 
the scientific method would result in a unified theory of all aspects 
6. (contd.) pragmatism are documented by Kuklick and he describes 
its first appearances in the writings of Holmes, Wright, Peirce, and 
James (see Kuklick, 1977, pp. 47-54). 
7. Kuklick calls Peirce "the most powerful modern American thinker" 
(Kuklick, 1977, p. 104). On pp. 123-126, Kuklick documents Peirce's 
failure after 1884 to secure an academic position, and his obscure 
death in 1914. Peirce's works were first published in collected form 
in 1931-1938, many articles thus appearing in print for the first time 
(see Kuklick, 1977, pp. 644-645 for a short report on the present 
status of Peirce scholarship). 
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of experience (see Mackenzie, 1976, pp. 331-334). Correspondingly, 
the notion that: 
"pure reason" alone could delineate the ultimate nature of the 
universe had been called into question by the work of David 
Hume and Immanuel Kant. The result of their analysis strength- 
ened the prestige of empiricism in philosophy: empiricism is 
the view that all reasoning about the world should take off 
from and be in turn checked by "experience"--by what could be 
"observed" (Morris, 1970, p. 7). 
Empiricism and faith in the scientific method were natural counter-
parts. James' pragmatism sprang from the nineteenth century assump-
tion that scientific methodology provided the means of validating 
particular conceptions, and he found the philosophical support he re- 
- quired in the empiricist philosophy of Locke, Hume, and J.S. Mill. 8 
The acceptance of American democracy is put forth by Morris as inte-
gral to the development of pragmatism and certainly thinkers such as 
Dewey and Mead made use of the concept in their social theories (see 
Morris, 1970, p. 8). James, however, while always an enthusiast 
regarding the 'American way of life', never developed the 'social' 
or 'society-determinative' aspects of knowledge in his epistemology, 
so that 'Americanism acted only as a secondary, or inspirational 
influence upon the concrete development of his pragmatism. 
If the rising status of scientific method and the influence of 
traditional empiricism were necessary components of a suitable climate 
for the development of pragmatism, the acceptance of evolutionary 
theory, as it was proposed by Darwin in particular, was the critical 
factor in its birth. Morris writes: 
The major pragmatists all accepted the view that man emerged as 
one kind of living being within a long evolutionary process. 
8. This contrasts with Peirce's emphasis upon Kant. Peirce took 
the term 'pragmatism' from Kant (see Thayer, 1968, p. 139), while 
James writes: "the term is derived from the same Greek word 
Trpaypa, meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' 
come" (James, quoted in Thayer, 1968, p. 139). 
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Pragmatism is unmistakably a post-Darwinian philosophy. Its 
empiricism is a biologically oriented empiricism: "experience" 
itself progressively comes to be interpreted as involving a 
living organism and its world (Morris, 1970, pp. 7-8). 
Morris correctly concentrates upon biological experience as the heart 
of pragmatism. For James, human experience as such is central pre-
cisely because he accepted evolutionary theory. Moreover, if evolu-
tionary theory brought with it an explicit emphasis on experience, it 
also carried cosmological implications, and the pragmatists were the 
first group of philosophers to make these explicit. 
Wiener points out that Darwinism did not hold the answers to 
James' metaphysical problems (see Wiener, 1965, pp. 98-99). Instead, 
pragmatism was developed as a methodology for resolving metaphysical 
disputes that otherwise would not admit of solution. The proposal 
that pragmatism is an evolutionary epistemology means that pragmatism 
took its structure or its terms of argument from evolutionary theory, 
so that metaphysical disputes were to be resolved within the context 
of the new cosmology that grew out of certain selected and transformed 
premises of evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory concentrated 
on change, variation, and growth, and these concepts are central to 
James' pragmatism. 
Pragmatism did not result from a direct translation of Darwinian 
biology into philosophical terminology. Certain evolutionary postu-
lates were selected at the expense of others, and then transformed so 
that they took on new meanings and implications. We have already seen 
that James was not interested in the concept of the survival of the 
fittest, and therefore did not develop the idea in his psychology or 
philosophy. On the other hand, he found the concept of spontaneous 
variation extremely fruitful and he adapted it to serve as the psycho-
genetic basis for his theory of ethics. The relationship between 
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Darwinian biology and pragmatism is complex: the implications that 
Darwinian biology carried in its wake for the construction of a new 
cosmology can only appear obvious from the position of historical hind-
sight. The early pragmatists had the task of trying to determine exact-
ly what the epistemological and metaphysical implications of evolution-
ary theory were. They also had to find a means of reconciling evolu-
tionary concepts with the demands of their other philosophical commit-
ments. It is perhaps worth recalling at this point that Darwin himself 
was intent on preserving the uniformity of nature, and he used every 
means at his disposal to try to ensure that his biological theory was 
compatible with the mechanical world-view of the Newtonian era. How 
the concepts were selected by the pragmatists, and how they were trans-
formed into a new epistemology, is therefore discussed below. 
In the following statement, Wiener sums up the effects Darwinian 
biology had on James' pragmatism and indicates how the selective trans-
formation of biological concepts into philosophical concepts was 
achieved by James: 
James adhered closely to the observational evidence supporting 
Darwin's hypothesis, as Chauncey Wright did, for both were 
critical of the dogmatic claims of those who tended to make a 
gospel of evolutionism (Spencer, Fiske, Abbot, and Peirce). 
But the variety and complexity of nature which Wright called 
"cosmic weather" and Peirce "tychism", became for James the 
metaphysical ground of the theory of an open universe and 
individual moral freedom. What James as a metaphysician finally 
retained of evolution, namely, the ideas of temporalism and 
spontaneous variation, served him persistently in his defense 
of the primary importance of individual experience and person-
al freedom. That is the Ariadne's thread to James's philosophy 
of evolution. The elusive but genuine character of individual 
spontaneity in both the external world and in man is in James's 
view of evolution epitomized by "saltatory" mutations, original, 
spontaenous, irreducible phases of experience. James in his 
metaphysics dramatized the external world of sensations and the 
inner world of rational, moral, aesthetic, and religious senti-
ments. Take these spontaneous variations and creative impulses 
as you find them, and you have the ingredients of James's faith 
in the sufficiency of immediate experience, despite its transiency, 
and in the will to believe, despite the chilling, paralyzing 
doubts of scientific skepticism. Scientific and philosophical 
ideas become merely abstractions, useful only as intellectual 
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instruments or convenient fictions to aid the individual to 
find his way among the complex particulars that flow into 
and out of his stream of experiences. The arrogance of 
metaphysical evolutionism is due to its attempts to substitute 
scientific abstractions for the more deeply felt flux (Wiener, 
1965, p. 101; see also p. 265). 
The heart of James' pragmatism lies in its emphasis upon human 
experience. But if James found sufficient support for centering his 
philosophy on individual human experience in Darwin's writings, his 
interpretation of Darwin was coloured by his reading of Renouvier, and 
his contemporaries were critical. Wright, Holmes, and Peirce "early 
and severely criticized James' doctrine of the will to believe for 
putting man too close to the centre of the evolving universe"(Wiener, 
1965, p. 100). And in 1907, Holmes, on reading James' articles, 
"Pragmatism's conception of truth" and "A defense of pragmatism" wrote 
to James: 
For a good number of years I have had a formula for truth which 
seems humbler than those you give ... but I don't know whether 
it is pragmatic or not. I have been in the habit of saying that 
all that I mean by truth is what I can't help thinking. The 
assumption of the validity of the thinking process seems to mean 
no more than that: I am up against it--I have gone as far as I 
can go--just as when I like a glass of beer. But I have learned 
to surmise that my can't helps are not necessarily cosmic can't 
helps--that the universe may not be subject to my limitations; 
and philosophy generally seems to me to sin through arrogance. 
It is like the old knight-errants who proposed to knock your head 
off if you didn't admit that their girl was not only a nice girl 
but the most beautiful and best of all possible girls. I can't 
help preferring champagne to ditch water,--I doubt if the 
universe does (Holmes, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 459). 
The particular concepts that James extracted from Renouvier, from 
the writings of the British empiricists, and from Darwin compelled 
James the psychologist to emphasize man's central role as knower and 
interpreter of the universe. From British empiricism, "he was quick 
to note Locke's recognition of the practical motives in knowledge" 
(Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 449-450). The influence of Renouvier is 
obvious: if a proposition falls outside the ordinary empirical verifi- 
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cation process, then belief not qnly may be, but should be assumed, in 
accordance with religious and moral sentiments. Dilemmas which require 
the will to believe forresolution are, by definition, individual dilem-
mas (see James, 1890, 2, p. 672). James' contention that individual 
preferences did matter, that the universe was a culmination of the 
experiences of its inhabitants, and that those experiences were in part 
determined by individual interests and preferences, was a logical out-
come of his selective readings of Renouvier, the British empiricists, 
and Darwin. For James, the extension of evolutionary doctrine into 
psychology and philosophy implied that the concepts of temporalism, 
mutability, and adaptability must be applied to the understanding of 
human knowledge itself. 
The emphasis on the particulars of experience in James' pragmatism 
is inextricably linked with his psychological structure of conscious-
ness. James' insistence that feelings exist for the sake of insti- 
gating action is central to his pragmatism because it is only through 
active experience that feelings can be connected to external objects: 
feelings themselves are not initially cognitive of particulars. Feel-
ings, like objects, are not 'true' or 'false'--they simply exist. Truth 
becomes a property of particular thoughts or feelings when they are 
verified in the world and the problem of how percepts are related to 
concepts thus occupies a substantial portion of James' pragmatic 
writings.
9 
 
We have already seen that James maintained a largely Newtonian 
structure for the physical world in the Principles--the 'progressive' 
9. See Chap. 2, pp. 196-214, for a discussion of the relationship 
between percepts and concepts and James' difficulties in defining that 
relationship. See also Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 454-455; and Ayer, 
1968, pp. 293-294. 
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view of history largely dominates the 'relativistic' strand in that 
work, while the evolutionary influences on James' thought are developed 
in his construction of consciousness. This pattern is partly repeated 
in the pragmatism, particularly in regard to the status of the necessary 
truths and their relation to •science, as willbe shown below. Evolu-
tionary ideas are applied to the problem of how consciousness knows 
the world. Thus James was to argue that the meaning of an idea could 
only be developed after the idea had resulted in physical movement be-
cause only then does the individual experience the effects of the idea 
on himself, and on the physical world. The advent of evolutionary theory 
made it impossible for the early pragmatists to hold that there were 
permanent possibilities of sensation. If the physical world really is 
temporal and mutable, then the afferent sensations that are produced 
when an idea discharges into physical movement are unpredictable on an 
a priori basis at least. James was not concerned with constructing 
a new physical theory to describe or explain sensible experiences; he 
was concerned with developing an epistemology that would explore the 
meanings of truth through the processes of verification. His commit-
ment to an efficacious model of consciousness led him to postulate that 
the active interaction between the mind and the physical world would 
produce new experiences so that potential changes are possible in both 
ontological spheres. In James' view, the temporal and mutable status 
of the physical world depended at least in part on the sentient minds 
that knew it. 
Wiener writes that the two aspects of evolutionary theory: "l)the 
conception of random and therefore of spontaneous 'chance' variations; 
2) the conception of the action of the environmental conditions in 
selecting those variations having survival value and vigorously 
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eliminating all others" (Wiener, 1965, P. 103), had diverse effects 
upon James' thinking. While James transformed the first principle of 
evolutionary theory into the foundation of his psychogenetic model, 
much of his philosophy militates against the second premise of evolu-
tionary theory: 
there are for him originally chance variations which have no 
positive survival value, but nevertheless survive; there are 
even some which are in some degree (though not to a decisive 
degree) unfavorable to survival. And in man these, so to say, 
completely non-Darwinian values are for James the supreme 
values--the truly "valuable" things (Wiener, 1965, p. 104). 
Wiener errs here only in his under-estimation of the polarity James 
created between chance ideas of ethical actions and ordinary adjustment 
tendencies. Because man has the potential 'born in the house' to sacri-
fice his personal safety in attempts to implement his novel ideas 
(see James, 1890, 2, pp. 627, 672), the world is not free to evolve 
according to a strict biological model. James' selection of the first 
aspect of evolutionary theory and his rejection of the second also 
serves as an important demonstration that the philosophication of evo-
lutionary theory did not involve a parallel translation of biological 
principles into epistemological and metaphysical postulates. 
Campbell criticizes the early pragmatists for not extending the 
biological model of natural selection far enough in their development , 
of a selective view of mind (see Campbell, 1974, pp. 429-430). That 
Campbell, despite his strong desire to do so, is as yet unable to con-
struct a satisfactory realist epistemology, based on a biological 
natural selection model, which would be applicable to current problems 
within the philosophy of science, is perhaps evidence for the difficulty 
of such a task. And if the other members of the Metaphysical Club 
criticized James for over-emphasizing human experience and metaphysics, 
Campbell reminds us that they too, had their doubts about Darwinian 
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theory as an adequate vehicle for the development of pragmatism. 
Peirce, for example, gave equal weight to the theories of_Lamarck and 
Agassiz and doubted that Darwinian theory was or could be, 'proveable' 
(see Campbell, 1974, p. 439; see also Wiener, 1965, pp. 73-79). 
The early pragmatists did not agree on the adequacy of Darwinian  
theory as the foundation for the new philosophy; moreover, they were 
divided in their commitments to the various models of empiricism avail-
able. James and Wright based their pragmatic theories on British empir-
icism while Peirce followed the popular neo-Kantian movement. Further-
more, James' commitment to British empiricism was confounded by the 
particular neo-Kantian influence of Renouvier and this set him apart 
from the other members of the group. The members of the Metaphysical 
Club were not, therefore, united in either their selection of evolution-
ary postulates, in their selection of empiricist theories, or in the 
links they forged between them (see Wiener, 1965, pp. 71, 76). Wright 
argued that Darwin's theory vindicated J.S. Mill's logical system (see 
Wiener, 1965, p. 72), while Peirce believed that the eventual effect 
of Darwinian evolution would be "to destroy the mechanical association-
ism of Mill's mental chemistry" (Wiener, 1965, p. 72). Peirce's own 
contributions to logic and the philosophy of science were closely 
"related to the impact of evolutionism" (Wiener, 1965, p. 80). 10 The 
broad 'uniting' effect of evolutionary theory on the members of the 
Metaphysical Club was in providing the incentive to change the 'status' 
of philosophical theories so that "in the tradition of pragmatism, the 
10. Wiener gives a detailed account of the differences between the 
early pragmatists regarding their selections of evolutionary postulates, 
their other philosophical commitments, and their individual aims in 
uniting empiricism and evolutionary theory. His Book, Evolution and  
the founders of pragmatism, is the most thorough study to date on the 
relationship between evolutionary theory and the birth of pragmatism. 
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categories [of knowledge] were seen as but pragmatically useful ways 
of thinking, usually products of cultural history rather than biologi-
cal evolution" (Campbell, 1974, p. 444). 
Thus the intention of the pragmatists was not to develop an epistem-
ology based solely on biological evolution, but to reinterpret tradi-
tional philosophy according to the new perspective. Evolutionary theory 
provided the foundation for a new set of philosophical postulates; at 
the same time, it was equally influential in stimulating new lines of 
reasoning--new ways of asking old questions--as James explained when 
he called his book Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking)
1 
James thus believed that pragmatism was a 'coming together' of trends 
which had long existed as isolated portions of traditional philosophical 
systems. Darwinian theory provided the catalyst which drew these 'old 
ways of thinking' together. 
The 'Problematic' Conditions of Pragmatism  
So far, it has been argued that James' pragmatism had its roots 
in evolutionary theory and that evolutionary postulates were in turn 
applied to traditional empiricist philosophy which then took on new 
meanings for the members of the Metaphysical Club. Thus Morris conclud-
ed that evolution, empiricism, faith in the scientific method, and Ameri-
can democracy were the 'unproblematic' conditions for the birth of prag-
matism. The acceptance of these four conditions by the early pragmat-
ists accounts for the similarities in their works; the differences 
between them can likewise be explained by their particular selections 
within the given range of theories,coupled with an understanding of 
11. See James, 1907/1913, p. vii. It is perhaps significant that 
James dedicated Pragmatism to the memory of John Stuart Mill. 
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the individual goals they pursued in building their philosophical 
systems. An understanding of these 'unproblematic' features thus 
makes pragmatism intelligible (see Morris, 1970, p. 5). And up until 
now, this analysis has more or less agreed with Morris in treating 
these conditions as 'unproblematic'. However, doing so is misleading 
in a philosophical sense, if not in Morris's 'historical' sense. For 
while it might be 'unproblematic' that these four conditions were 
basic to the emergence of pragmatism, the conditions themselves--the 
theories and convictions--were problematic indeed; and the conjunction 
of empiricism and Darwinism vas especially so. 
Thayer, unlike Morris, writes that the origins of pragmatism are 
"cloudy" (Thayer, 1968, p. 5). He shows, in a historical/philosophi-
cal analysis of the rationalist-empiricist tradition, that the empiri-
cist position was and always had been, highly problematic. Morris 
makes no mention of the influence of rationalism on the development 
of pragmatism; he links Kant with Hume in a not altogether convincing 
attempt to show that the early pragmatists were all committed empiri-
cists (see Morris, 1970, p. 7, quoted above, p. 466). That James 
continually struggled to free his epistemology of rationalist impli-
cations and that he was not always successful in this endeavour pro-
vides partial evidence against Morris's assertion that the early prag-
matist commitment to empiricism was unproblematic. The point is that 
the differences between rationalism and empiricism had not been satis-
factorily resolved by earlier empiricist philosophers so that the same 
problems that confronted the British empiricists returned again to 
trouble James in his efforts to build an epistemology and metaphysic 
on the basis of sensory experience. Because the conflict between 
rationalism and empiricism was to prove so important in James' 
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philosophy, it is worth briefly summarizing Thayer's analysis. 
Thayer reminds us that rationalism and empiricism had grave diffi-
culties in arriving at a fundamental basis for human knowledge--the 
empiricists deriving their framework from feeling and sensation; the 
rationalists, from reason (see Thayer, 1968, p. 37). These problems 
date from the time of the scientific revolution, when the primary and 
secondary qualities doctrine, so successful in physics, led to severe 
epistemological problems for the philosophers of mind so that Thayer 
writes that Locke failed: 
to explain how we could know that some of our ideas do resemble 
"external" objects, [and] we are left, in Locke's theory with 
the uninvited conclusion that all we do know or can know is 
our own ideas. The understanding remains closed in its own 
private room and cut off from the world. Generally, if the 
seventeenth-century world picture was true, it could not 
possibly be known to be true (Thayer, 1968, p. 24). 
Furthermore, "Both Locke and Newton. ..are left affirming the existence 
of a world and of knowing minds but with no intelligible connection 
discoverable between them" (Thayer, 1968, p. 24). For Newton, sense 
experience had to account for the origin of science and mathematics, 
but the basic concepts of science and mathematics could be neither 
experienced by, nor derived from sensory observation. As Thayer goes 
on to say: 
It is interesting to see both Newton and Locke turn the very 
coinage of empiricism into possible counterfeit by declaring, 
in almost identical phrasing, that we can never know the nature 
of substance or what things "really" are. At best we can but 
know things by their properties and effects. Substances remain 
inaccessible, objective unknowns. It is attributes and exper-
ienced effects that constitute the ephemeral stuff of our tanta- 
lized reckonings with and probings into nature (Thayer, 1968, 
p. 25). 
Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, in their several ways, attempted to 
bridge the epistemological gap between Newtonian principles and sens-
ible knowledge so that Berkeley and Kant attempted "a reconstruction 
of philosophic theories of experience and knowledge" (Thayer, 1968, 
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p.25). Hume, conversely, made a separation between science, meta-
physics, and experience so that he 'ironically but effectively' des-
troyed the older rationalism and in conjunction with Kant, left the 
way clear for the development of irrationalism and romanticism (see 
Thayer, 1968, p. 26). Furthermore, all of these changes took place 
under one dominating assumption and that assumption was that Newtonian 
principles provided an Absolute framework for the workings of the 
universe. Thus philosophy was essentially left with a situation where: 
The subjectivity characteristic of modern philosophy derived 
its impetus from an intolerant Galilean cosmology.. .which drove 
mind and knowing out of nature, and from Locke's problem, which 
unintentionally left the knowing mind with nothing but itself 
for a subject matter (Thayer, 1968, p. 27). 
The end result of the rationalist-empiricist endeavour was a static, 
elementaristic, contemplative view of the universe, at least regarding 
man's role in it. Finally, rationalism had changed its colours but 
it had not disappeared. 
The growth of Romanticism effected a shift in emphasis from the 
mechanistic view of the Enlightenment towards a more evolutionary 
notion of progress (see Marcell, 1974, p. 73). The Romantic emphasis 
on feeling and emotion as modes of true understanding made their im-
pact on pragmatist thinkers and this 'impact' must be taken into ac- 
count in assessing James' search for a teleological basis for cognition. 
While he looked to Locke, not Kant, his search was still coloured by 
the Romantic movement. 
Adopting an empiricist position was in itself problematic; the 
demands or problems presented by rationalism could not be ignored 
and the Romantic movement coloured the perspective of the would-be 
empiricists. Furthermore, the combination of evolutionary theory and 
traditional empiricism soon proved to be problematic. Evolutionary 
theory appeared at first to provide the necessary link between 
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physics and biology; it was greeted as a means of demonstrating law-
ful continuity and progress in the biological world, compatible with 
physical mechanics. As Greene states "There was no room for genuine 
chance in Darwin's view of nature. Everything, he asserted repeatedly, 
was the result of fixed laws" (Greene,1959, p. 304). Darwin was 
intent on preserving and extending the uniformity of nature (see 
Darwin, 1859/1977, pp. 455-460), and when he dealt with psychological 
issues he spoke as an associationist. The assumption of the early 
pragmatists (notably Wright, and at times James), that evolutionary 
theory and empiricism were compatible doctrines was therefore not un-
founded. But Darwin's work had another strand 'submerged' beneath 
the mechanistic paradigm he wished to ratify. He, like the rest of 
his contemparies, incorporated a strong anthropomorphism in his 
writings (see Young, 1971, pp. 461-467). He attempted to counter 
the suggestion (made in the first edition of the Origin) that the sel-
ective process was sometimes voluntaristic (see Young, 1971, p. 465), 
by stating in the third edition of the Origin, that he meant "by 
Nature, only the aggregate action and product of many laws, and by 
laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us" (Darwin, 1872, p. 
59; quoted in Young, 1971, p. 466).. Darwin's work is overtly con-
nected with the mechanistic science of the nineteenth century and 
his manifest efforts to ensure that his theory of evolution was com-
patible with the science and psychology of his time were probably 
effective in convincing the pragmatists that evolution and empiricism 
were compatible. But the 'latent' strand of voluntarism had pro-
found consequences for the philosophication of evolutionary theory. 
While James railed against the anthropomorphism in the psychology 
of the empiricists, his objections were in fact to the use of anthropo-
morphic analogies of force as the means of 'explaining' mental events 
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in a mechanistic, materialistic paradigm of science (see James, 1880/ 
1920, pp. 207-219). And it is perhaps relevant that he did not 
object to the 'anthropomorphism' in Darwin's work. Instead, the early 
pragmatists took from Darwin's work precisely those implications which 
he himself tried so hard to suppress in the name of natural law. 
Greene writes: 
Oddly enough, it was precisely the element of chance variation, 
taking chance not simply as the reverse aspect of law but as 
its genuine opposite, which appealed to the American prag-
matists Charles Peirce and William James as a means of deliver-
ance from the mechanical determinism of nineteenth-century 
physics and chemistry (Greene,1959, p. 305). 
Greene then goes on to say that: 
William James, Henri Bergson, A.N. Whitehead and others,... 
• found in the idea of organic evolution the key to a new 
philosophy of nature in which spontaneity, novelty, creativity, 
and purpose had a place--a place denied them earlier in the 
mechanical cosmology inherited from the seventeenth century 
(Greene, 1959, p. 306). 
Theconnection between empiricism and evolutionary theory that 
Darwin tried to ensure was quickly broken down by the pragmatists in 
their attempt to create a philosophy of nature based on precisely 
those conceptions that Darwin himself recognized as incompatible with 
empiricism and formal science. The principles that were extracted 
from evolutionary theory by the early pragmatists were not compatible 
with many of the traditional empiricist concepts of mind and its re-
lation to the world, so that the birth of pragmatism depended on the 
reevaluation and reconstruction of empiricist principles. 
Faith in the scientific method accelerated with the acceptance of 
evolutionary theory, but its role in the construction of pragmatism 
is problematic in much the same way as the role of traditional empiri-
cism. Marcell writes: 
Although science was celebrated on many fronts as the agent of 
progress, there were those who recognized that the scientific 
method itself was corrosive of the comfortable absolutes that 
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had defined the moral and physical universe for centuries. The 
very function of science, until those turbulent decades after 
Darwin, had been to confirm and verify the regularity and 
harmony of the cosmos. By the turn of the century, many 
Americans were coming to share the unsettling conviction that 
advances in science, exhilarating as they were, lay directly 
behind the growing sense of uncertainty and alienation that was 
beginning to affect the popular consciousness. While the noted 
historian John Fiske, in surveying the "century's progress in 
science" in 1896i could serenely conclude that the "dynamical 
conception" of the world achieved by Darwin and Spencer revealed 
man to be "the child of the universe, the heir of all the ages, 
in whose making and perfecting is to be found the consummation 
of God's creative work", others found in evolutionary science 
not guaranteed progress but flux, indeterminacy, and, in Charles 
S. Peirce's phrase a "universe of chance". While his contempor-
aries were linking and even identifying science and progress, 
Peirce was specifically denying that happiness or social improve-
ment had anything to do with science. That which related to 
improvement, Peirce argued, was not science but some other 
valuative process (Marcell, 1974, pp. 34-35). 
The pragmatists began with the same optimism in scientific methodology 
as a means for developing a comprehensive view of 'physical' and 
'experiential' reality that was -sweeping the scientific and philoso-
phical world. But they soon discovered that the scientific method as 
it was constituted, with the defined aim of describing a regular, 
mechanical universe was not capable of dealing with the moral and 
metaphysical problems evolutionary theory left in its wake. Peirce 
began his quest for a new theory ofmeaning (see Thayer, 1968, pp. 120- 
132), and James ultimately narrowed the efficacious range of science 
in his philosophy while emphasizing the will to believe as a means 
of deciding between unverifiable options and stressing the cosmic 
importance of such decisions. 
The final condition Morris cites is the acceptance of American 
democracy. This condition as it applies to James is probably the 
most 'unproblematical' of the four as James was not concerned with 
developing a social theory (see Wiener, 1975, p. 115). His acceptance 
of American democracy led him to emphasize the importance of indivi- 
duality and freedom so that democratic theory played an 'inspirational' 
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role in shaping his thought. His emphasis on the individual and his 
failure to give social institutions their due in shaping conception 
(see Wiener, 1965, p. 112), is sometimes detrimental to his psycho-
logy. But James simply was not a social theorist; he formulated an 
individualistic, idealistic view of American democracy, selecting 
premises from it that corresponded with his philosophical commitments 
and left the matter there. He was influenced strongly by democratic 
ideals but he did not specifically explore the implications of the 
democratic theory. 
Pragmatism was thus born under extremely problematic circumstances 
for it had to reevaluate and assimilate the competing demands of 
several diverse and logically incompatible theories. The pragmatists 
were no freer than any group of philosophers have ever been to select 
particulars from theories and to ignore the larger assumptions in which 
these particulars were embedded. Their task was difficult and the 
ultimate success or failure of James' epistemology must be analyzed 
in terms of the historical conditions wherein it arose. 
We can conclude, thus far, that James' pragmatism is largely the 
result of the interaction of certain 'transformed' evolutionary con- 
, 
ceptions with other selected philosophical propositions. While James 
used 'scientific' evolutionary conceptions to limit the role of science 
in determining metaphysical choices and to simultaneously extend his 
metaphysic, that metaphysic took its content primarily from 
Renouvier's conception of free will. 
Thayer writes that the will to believe is the forerunner of James' 
• pragmatism, and the relationship between the two doctrines is obvious 
and substantial (see Thayer, 1968, p. 134). The will to believe in 
ideas unprovable by traditional or empirical methods has immediate 
consequences for the believer, and potential consequences for the 
concrete world of realities. A pragmatic approach to belief was the 
next step in James' philosophical development, for the pragmatic method 
was constructed to determine the active 'meanings' of beliefs, in terms 
of their practical consequences for the individual. Brennan writes: 
"Pragmatism means that concepts should be reduced td their positive 
experienceable operations" (Brennan, 1968, p. 53). Pragmatism is thus 
a method for analyzing problems; at the same time it is a theory of 
truth. Much has been written in praise of both the will to believe and 
pragmatism as bringers of moral and religious freedom into a world 
otherwise dominated by scientific materialism (see, for example, Roth, 
1969). If James was stimulated by the 'success' of the scientific 
achievements of his day, he was wary of their metaphysical and moral 
consequences. Thus, pragmatism as an epistemology must be assessed 
in terms of its success as a method for determining the meaning of any 
proposition and as a theory of truth regarding the discovery of objects 
in the three major spheres of reality as James isolated them. These 
include the ordinary world of sensible realities, the realm of science, 
and the domains of necessary truths, ethics, and metaphysics. 
James' Theory of Meaning  
The major proposition that was extracted and transformed out of 
Darwin's biological theory of evolution was the concept that the uni-
verse is both temporal and mutable; sensible objects and their relations 
change over time, and new objects and relations are spontaneously gen-
erated in time. This proposition had major epistemological implications. 
First of all, it meant that there were no guaranteed permanent possi-
bilities of sensation, so that perception became the critical means 
of ascertaining whether or not an idea in the mind had a sensible 
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correlate in the physical world. Secondly, James applied the concepts 
of temporality and.mutability to describe the status of human know-
ledge itself. The meaning and truth of a proposition could no longer 
be given in absolute a priori terms; 'new' ideas arose in the mind, 
through the process of spontaneous variation and a means of testing 
the truth or falsity of these ideas had to be determined. 
If the mind was in fact efficacious, and if novel ideas appeared 
in the mind through the process of spontaneous variation, the evolution 
of the universe would depend not only on biological changes, but on 
changes introduced by its sentient human inhabitants. Linking the novel 
ideas of the mind to some form of rationalistic Absolute violated 
James' primary belief in the efficacy of the human mind, and his insist-
ence that free-will was a viable possibility. His problem was to con-
struct an epistrimology that would guarantee that ideas in the mind 
could be verified in perception, without recourse to permanent possi-
bilities of perception. At the same time, he had tofind a means of 
determining the meaning of those ideas which did not have immediate 
implications for action without recourse to some absolute, a priori  
construction of Truth. He was to reason that if novel ideas were to 
be effective in facilitating the evolution of the universe, they must 
finally result in perceptually verifiable consequences. Thus, the 
meaning of a theory or concept became dependent upon the practical con-
sequences it had for the future, and a 'meaningful' concept could be 
defined as one which instills specific expectations in the individual 
as to the probable outcome of his future activities. If two theories 
lead to the same practical consequences, they are said to have the 
same meaning and any further argument is irrelevant. This is the core 
of James' pragmatic theory of meaning: to determine what an idea 
means is to determine what afferent sensations could be expected 
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should the idea beAischarged into physical movement (see James, 1907/ 
1913, pp. 46-47; quoted above, p. 461). 
James based his theory of meaning on Peirce's and this led to a 
dispute between the two: Peirce was concerned with developing a theory 
of meaning which would clarify scientific language by providing common 
definitions of conceptions. Peirce rejected nominalism in favour of 
realism, for he felt that specific scientific conceptions had to be 
universally recognized if they were to be of value in facilitating 
research. He criticized James' application of the pragmatic maxim of 
meaning to metaphysical disputes because he argued that when the mean-
ing of any metaphysical position is equated with practical consequences, 
that meaning cannot be assumed to have a universal character. Nor did 
James ever intend that it should, but this point is obscured by James' 
promotion of certain metaphysical and moral positions which he himself 
believed would have the best consequences for the individual. James 
intended, at least, to remain a nominalist. As Thayer writes: 
While Peirce dissented from James's Will to Believe and his 
account of truth, the underlying discord is realism vs. 
nominalsm. It divides James's pragmatism from Peirce's prag-
maticism. What counted as the "consequences" of thought or 
belief for James was just that level of experience which excluded 
generality, and thus meanings, for Peirce, viz., practical 
effects, sensations, conduct, actions. To James it is this 
level of live differences of choice, chance, and resolutions 
that is most "meaningful" (Thayer, 1968, p, 140). 
A lot of controversy has been generated over whether James' appro-
priation of Peirce:s doctrine of meaning could survive the translation 
into metaphysical and nominalist terms. The consensus appears to be 
that while James' theory contains serious problems, he opened the way 
for a freer account of truth and meaning (see Thayer, 1968, pp. 146- 
153; Ayer, 1968, pp. 196-201; and Roth, 1969, pp. 94-95). James, ac- 
cording to Roth, produced a theory of meaning that was broadly empirical, 
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future-oriented, and fallibilistic or situational (see Roth, 1969, 
pp. 94-95), and Roth concludes that James did in fact produce a viable 
theory of meaning. 
James' intention was to construct a theory of meaning that would 
put an end to otherwise interminable metaphysical disputes by looking 
. at the consequences of taking each .position, Unfortunately, he does 
not extend the analysis of his proposed method beyond this but goes on 
immediately to apply this conception to various metaphysical problems. 
And unfortunately,'he does it badly. In the Pragmatism he presents a 
hypothetical case wherein a theist and a materialist give complete 
explanations as to the history of the world: 
Both theories have shown all their consequences and, by the 
hypothesis we are adopting, these are identical. The prag-
matist must consequently say that the two theories, in spite 
of their different-sounding names, mean exactly the same thing 
and that the dispute is purely verbal. (I am supposing, of 
course, that the theories have been equally successful in 
their explanations of what is.) (James, 1907/1913, p. 97). 
James chooses the theistic approach on the basis of the optimism 
this should generate among men. Materialism, according to James, leads 
to pessimism, theism to optimism, and for James, this is the crucial 
difference in the 'meaning' of the two accounts (see James, 1907/1913, 
pp. 96-100). And this can be criticized in two ways. James may be 
justified in choosing theism in light of the consequences he sees 
accruing from this selection. But the choice must be seen as a personal 
choice. James is personally free to advocate theism; he is not free, 
• as a philosopher, to try to show that the practical consequences of 
the choice between materialism and theism can be pre-determined through 
his method of meaning. This runs against his nominalism, against his 
contention that "There can be no final truth in ethics, any more than 
in physics, until the last man has had his experience and said his 
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say" (James, 1891/1911, P. 184). If James' theory of meaning is really 
going to work in terms of the principles determined for pragmatism-- 
e.g., individualism, mutability, and temporalism, meanings cannot be 
legislated ahead of time. James' theory of meaning is only consistent 
with his broad philosophical position when the consequences of espous-
ing one view over another are decided by each individual. Some men 
may find more profound, life-giving options arise from selecting theism; 
others may find the same, or equally valuable consequences in accepting 
materialism. 
Once outcomes are concretized into universal effects, they simply 
become part of the pragmatic theory itself--part of its 'information' 
base--and the theory of meaning is no longer viable in resolving dis-
putes between metaphysical theories. The theory of meaning can be seen 
as the philosophical analogue to the psychological 'search' for the 
correct conception. This would mean that the theory of meaning should 
be utilized to determine what the correct conception or meaning of the 
dispute is--in the case cited above, (see James, 1907/1913, p. 97, 
quoted above, p. 485), the real meaning of the dispute is given as 
the optimistic or pessimistic consequences for the individual. The 
theory of meaning, like the search for the correct conception, is 
intended to reduce any dispute to its particular consequences. James 
'blurs' the philosophical purpose of the theory of meaning by making the 
consequences of the concepts fixed and universal. 
Furthermore, the pragmatic theory of meaning is limited expressly 
to the consequences that accrue to the individual through his accept-
ance of a given theory. James tries to limit the implications that 
result from thejuxtaposition of two theories by limiting consequences 
to the broad acceptance of one theory over another. If one accepts 
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theism, the consequences are limited to James' example of optimism 
and hope. But the very juxtaposition of theories, and the contents 
of the rejected theory, have consequences as well. Accepting theism, 
in conjunction with rejecting materialism, must carry different philo-
sophical implications for the individual than when he accepts theism, 
in conjunction with rejecting Manichaeanism, for example. The content 
of the rejected theory influences the way in which problems will be 
analyzed in terms of the structure of the accepted theory. James' 
psychology itself provides a case in point. 
Much of this thesis has revolved around the 'historical' sources of 
James' theories because his 'borrowings' and rejections havewider con-
sequences for the continuous development of his theories than are im-
mediately implied in his rejection or acceptance of particular postu-
lates. James' espousal of Renouvier's concept of free will and his 
subsequent rejection of automaton theory provides an obvious example. 
James did not simply affirm Renouvier's postulate by following 
Renouvier's lead and becoming a neo-Kantian philosopher. Instead, he 
began work on a psychological theory of consciousness which would leave 
room for the possibility of free will but serve, at the same time, to 
'correct' Spencer's definition of mind. Granted, James' theory of 
consciousness--in fact, his motivation to develop a psychological 
theory of consciousness--owes much to his positive borrowings from 
British empiricism and from Darwin, so that his psychology is 'more' 
than an affirmation of Renouvier and a rejection of automaton theory. 
At the same time, his 'rejections' and his 'borrowings' are consistent; 
he affirmed those postulates which pointed towards or could be made 
to point towards an efficacious consciousness, and rejected those which 
could not. He furthermore felt the need to systematically refute 
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statements which tended towards automatism within the empiricist 
tradition itself while largely accepting that system, so that his pro-
ductive postulates are constructed to countermand the postulates of 
other theories, as well as standing as postulates in their own right. 
His refutation of the theory of innervation is a case in point here. 
In short, James' whole psychology and philosophy is coloured not only 
by his acceptance of Renouvier, but by his rejection of the auto-
matists. Had he 'accepted' Renouvier in the context of rejecting 
Calvinist predestination, it is unlikely that he would have felt a 
strong compulsion to specifically refute Spencer. To make sense of 
James' theory of interest and conscious selectivity, we have therefore 
had to examine not only the positive influences upon his thought 
(e.g., Darwin, Renouvier, and British empiricism, but the negative 
ones (automaton theory and some aspects of British empiricism) as well. 
Thus the interaction between the selection of one theory and the 
rejection of arlother carries many meaningful consequences beyond the 
inspirational effects discussed by James in his Pragmatism. The 
rejected theory has a determinative effect upon what the individual 
will actually do. 
Fortunately, the validity of James' pragmatism does not rest on 
his theory of meaning alone. James developed a theory of truth in 
conjunction with his theory of meaning which was much more fully worked 
out, and which constituted the essence of his pragmatism. And within 
the framework of his theory of truth, he admitted that a one-dimensional 
view of practical consequences was insuffient to accept or reject a 
theory. For a given theory may yield suitable practical consequences, 
and at the same time it may clash with other truths or beliefs. He 
writes: 
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If I could restrict my notion of the Absolute to its bare 
holiday-giving value, it wouldn't clash with my other truths. 
But we can not easily thus restrict our hypotheses. They 
carry supernumerary features, and these it is that clash so. 
My disbelief in the Absolute means then disbelief in those 
other supernumerary features, for I fully believe in the 
legitimacy of taking moral holidays (James, 1907/1913, p. 79). 
His position is still problematic for he does not expand on the effects 
of the supernumerary features of the theory, or on those portions of it 
he selects for ratification because they coincide with other beliefs. 
Instead, he writes "I just take my moral holidays; or else as a profes-
sional philosopher, I try to justify them by some other principle" 
(James, 1907/1913, p. 79). James often displays this tendency to 
simply accept a proposition for its own merits, disregarding the con-
text in which it arose, or else he abstracts a belief and tries, as 
he says, to justify it by some other accepted principle. This often 
leads to problems in interpreting James' meanings as they attach to 
the selected portions of philosophical systems, for he is often un-
clear as to how much of the total system he has accepted. Whether 
the theory of truth is capable of coping with such selective borrowing 
and whether or not it constitutes a unified epistemological method 
must now be analyzed. 
James' Theory of Truth  
Thayer, discussing Peirce's belief that pragmatism had to be 
limited to a theory of meaning, adds that: 
questions of truth can arise when the method is applied to 
ekeing out the meaning of terms. Moreover, since the method 
enjoins us to look for the meaning of terms by considering their 
application to objects in experimental situations with (con-
ceivable) experimental consequences, some notion of truth and 
verification is foreshadowed in the method itself. Finally, 
there is evidently no reason why the term 'truth'is not a fit 
subject for pragmatic analysis of meaning. But a pragmatic 
definition of truth, if possible, is surely just that incursion 
of pragmatism into truth theory that Peirce renounced as 
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unpragmatic (Thayer, 1968, p. 135). 12 
And here we come to the final parting of the ways between Peirce and 
James. In choosing to develop a theory of truth in addition to the 
theory of meaning, James broke away from Peirce so that the pragmatic 
theory of truth must be regarded as a strictly Jamesian contribution 
to the pragmatic movement. This development finally declared James' 
philosophical independence from Peirce and Peirce was moved to re-name 
his own doctrine pragmaticism (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 409). 
Thayer is convinced that with the development of his theory of truth, 
James doubled the scope of pragmatism; in addition to determing the 
meaning of a concept, the pragmatist could also ask whether or not 
the idea was true. Furthermore, the theory of truth had two major 
functions: "because theories are instruments according to James, prag-
matism is a device enabling us in specific instances to discover and 
attain true beliefs; pragmatism is also a means for explaining the 
meaning of truth generally" (Thayer, 1968, p. 135). 
The need for a new theory of verification had its basis in the dis-
satisfaction the pragmatists felt with traditional empiricism. Accord-
ing to Thayer, the most bothersome points in British empiricism were 
the interpretation of sensation and ideas, and the reductionist ana-
lysis of mental phenomena (see Thayer, 1968, p. 137). We have shown 
that James' construction of consciousness was anti-reductionist; 
thoughts are not faint copies of sensations, and conceptualization 
does not copy reality. Thus as Thayer points out, James, and Peirce 
and Dewey with him were motivated to change the 'focus' of empiricism, 
12. See also Lovejoy, 1963, pp.3-5, for his distinction between 
theories of meaning and truth. Lovejoy claims that a theory of truth 
is not necessarily a logical outcome of a theory of meaning. 
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and to concentrate on the consequences of beliefs (see Thayer, 1968, 
p. 137). For James, this shift of focus meant that since conception 
does not 'copy' reality, truth becomes an active property of belief. 
"Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them" 
(James, 1909, p. v). Truth becomes a way of describing the relation 
between thought and reality; truth also becomes a process of validating 
or verifying an idea. 
The function of any feeling or thought is to lead us into a satis-
factory relationship with reality. Whether our ideas are true or 
false--and because conception does not 'copy' reality, we have no a 
priori knowledge about the truth or falsity of any idea--depends on 
active experience. The validation of any idea has ramifications for 
future experience because the validation or falsification of any, idea 
guides our future relationships with reality. 
Roth gives a good description of the way in which James' theory 
of truth was built on the 'redefined' evolutionary ideas that gave 
pragmatism its start: 
There are some implications of this idea that are of great 
importance. Man's experience and his world are continually 
moving and developing. Corroboration and verification are pro-
cesses that are temporal and ongoing. As long as experience 
continues, verification is incomplete and our knowledge is 
fallible. This means that when we speak of the truth of an idea 
we must always say that it is true "insofar" as it has been 
verified, or that it is true "to the extent that" it has been 
verified. A further implication is that if corroboration and 
verification are temporal processes, then truth itself is also 
temporal. Truth is a property of ideas, and if we live in a 
world in which both facts and ideas are present and changing, 
truth may grow, develop, and change. Thus, James suggests: 
"Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by 
events" (Roth, 1969, pp. 97-98; internal quotation from James, 
1909, p. vi). 
Truth is temporal; it is continually subject to experience so that 
verification is a life-long process. Verification, or the process 
by which ideas become true, is a dynamic process and the pragmatic 
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theory of truth as a process is the philosophical analogue of James' 
functional psychology. But James' pragmatic theory of truth is more 
complex than this description implies. We have already shown that the 
individual moves between several worlds of reality, and we have shown 
that the nature of belief varies as a function of the nature of the parti-
cular set of objects it is applied to. Thus, the process of verification • 
• and the meaning of truth must vary according to the nature of the worlds 
they describe. The process of verification is actually broken down 
into several processes of verification and the meaning of truth corres-
pondingly becomes the meanings of truth. 
Ayer illustrates this point by putting all of James' definitions 
of truth together: 
He gives various formulations of the theory, which are by no 
means obviously equivalent; to an unsympathetic critic it might 
even seem that some of them were mutually inconsistent. Thus, 
in his lectures on Pragmatism, he asserts successively that 'ideas 
(which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true 
just ip so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations 
with other parts of our experience'; that 'a new opinion counts 
as "true" just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's 
desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs 
in stock'; that 'if theological theories prove to have value for 
concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense 
of being good for so much'; and that 'for how much more they are 
true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths 
that also have to be acknowledged'; that 'the true is the name of 
whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, 
too, for definite, assignable reasons'; that 'true ideas are 
those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify; 
false ideas those that we cannot'; that 'truth happens to an 
idea', that its verity is in fact an event, a process, the 
process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-ficationOts 
validity is the process of its valid-ation'; that we have 'a 
general stock of extra truths, of ideas that shall be true of 
merely possible situations' and that 'whenever such an extra 
truth becomes practically relevant to one of our emergencies 
...you can say of it then either that "it is useful because it 
is true" or that "It is true because it is useful"; that 'both 
these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely, that here is 
an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified'; that '"the true", 
to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our 
thinking, just as "the right" is only the expedient in the way 
of our behaving; expedient in almost any fashion and on the 
whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experiences 
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in sight won't necessarily meet all further experiences equally 
satisfactorily'; and finally that 'the "absolutely" true, 
meaning what no further experience will ever alter, is that 
ideal vanishing point towards which we imagine that all our 
temporary truths will some day converge' (Ayer, 1968, pp. 196-197). 
This juxtaposition has the effect of making us ask along with Ayer's 
unsympathetic critic, whether indeed the definitions of truth are 
mutually consistent as James intended them to be. 
James explicitly set out to develop a pluralistic account of truth. 
He never intended that only one process of validation should be util-
ized, or that only one kind of truth could be generated. Instead, 
James proposed that the several definitions were consistent with one 
another because they shared a common quality: they all paid. Further-
more, the means to truth were consistent: all truths are made: 
Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of 
processes of leading, realized in rebus, and having only this 
quality in common, that they pay. They pay by guiding us into 
or towards some part of a system that dips at numerous points 
into sense-percepts, which we may copy mentally or not, but 
with which at any rate we are now in the kind of commerce vaguely 
designated as verification. Truth for us is simply a collective 
name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, 
strength, etc., are names for otherprocesses connected with 
life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth 
is made, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the 
course of experience (James, 1907/1913, p. 218). 
Instead of one absolute body of truth which we seek to discover, truth 
is at once a collective name for the processes of verification, and 
the collected habits of thought. Truths, as they are discovered, are 
equated with habits, for these 'truths' or 'facts' are the concrete 
ideas we rest with, in between bouts of verification: "truth becomes 
a habit of certain of our ideas and beliefs in their intervals of 
rest from their verifying activities" (James, 1907/1913, p. 222). 
Verification, in any sphere of reality is the important process for 
without active verification, there could be no habits to rest upon. 
But the individual cannot afford to rest upon the 'truths' he has gain-
ed for too long for: "Experience,... ..has ways of boiling over, and 
494. 
making us correct our present formulas" (James, 1907/1913, p. 222).
13 
And if we must content ourselves with a collection of verification 
processes and 'habits' of thought, James believes that we still aim 
for absolute truth: 
The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will 
ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we 
imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge. 
It runs on all fours with the perfectly wise man, and with the 
absolutely complete experience; and, if these ideals are ever 
realized, they will all be realized together. Meanwhile we. 
have to live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be 
ready to-morrow to call it falsehood. Ptolemaic astronomy, 
euclidean space, aristotelean logic, scholastic metaphysics, 
were expedient for centuries, but human experience has boiled 
over these limits, and we now call these things only relatively 
true, or true within those borders of experience. 'Absolutely' 
they are false; for we know that those limits were casual, 
and might pave been transcended by past theorists just as they 
are by present thinkers (James, 1907/1913, pp. 222-223). 
There is no assurance that absolute truth will ever be achieved: James' 
perception that the great systems of the past have succumbed to the 
growth of human experience now makes him wary of putting too much faith 
in the chance that Absolute truth will ever be a certainty.
14 
He 
13. The theory of truth is the philosophical parallel of the psycho-
logical description of the emergence of habit patterns out of the 
instinctive impulses. It also correlates with the psychological theory 
of belief and the 'selection' of physical objects and relations as 
'real' events. But the 'status' of external events has taken on a new 
dimension in the transition from the psychological to the philosophi-
cal paradigm: in the Principles, James maintains that although the 
external world is in a state of constant change, we impose our con-
ceptions upon it so as to get in perception not the same sensation, 
but the same object. He is now maintaining that experience is unstable 
enough to force the individual into 'correcting' his conceptions of events. 
14. This statement is important in showing the development of James' 
thought. In the Principles, he emphasized the cumulative growth of 
science, stating that ethics should take heart from the measure of 
progress so far achieved. The task of ethics was simply the longer task. 
While he recognized that scientific conceptions were discarded when they 
were found wanting, he claimed that the critical test of a scientific 
theory was the success or failure of the attempt to find empirical 
correlates for propositions. He has now moved out of the pre-evolution-
ary concept of discovery and is moving towards a relativistic concep-
tion of history and the process of discovery. The concepts of temporality, 
(contd.) 
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postulates instead, that the world is temporal and mutable, and truth 
is a cumulative process, determined by the experiences of the past,•
and open to change in the future: 
I have already insisted on the fact that truth is made largely 
of previous truths. Men's beliefs at any time are so much 
experience funded. But the 'beliefs are themselves parts of the 
sum total of the world's experience, and become matter, there-
fore, for the next day's funding operations. So far as reality 
means experienceable reality, both it and the truths men gain 
about it are everlastingly in process of mutation--mutation 
towards a definite goal, it may be--but still mutation (James, 
1907/1913, pp. 224-225). 
If absolute truth is unlikely to be achieved, the verification 
processes and the beliefs that generate and are generated within the 
search are crucial, for they are the particulars which both determine 
and constitute the eventual sum of experience. They are, pragmatical-
ly, the only truths that do matter, for they are the only truths avail-
able. These partial truths may be leading us to some ultimate goal 
or the world may in fact be undetermined. For the present, all that 
James can allow is that these truths constitute human experience. 
James makes the distinction between the pragmatist and the ration-
alist on the grounds of the mutability of experience. He says that 
both doctrines will allow that: "Experience is in mutation and our 
psychological ascertainments of truth are in mutation" (James, 1907/ 
1913, p. 226). But while the pragmatist contends that this is the 
real meaning of truth and experience, the rationalist holds that beyond 
experience "Reality stands complete and ready-made from all eternity, 
...and the agreement of ideas with it is that unique and unanalyzable 
virtue in them of which she has already told us" (James, 1907/1913, 
14. (contd.) and mutability, more or less confined to consciousness 
in the Principles are now taking on a broader frame of reference; 
they describe the 'conditions' of the physical world and man's relation-
ship to that world (See James, 1907/1913, pp. 224-225). 
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p. 226). For the rationslist, truth exists eternally and staticly 
apart from experience; for the pragmatist, truth is manufactured 
within the diversity of experience. 
If the rationalist has the problem of discovering 'pre-existing' 
truth, the pragmatist has the problem of relating the truths gener-
ated through one process to the truths generated through another. For 
the pragmatist the function of belief lies in making us act. Beliefs 
change according to new facts or truths and we act again. The 
rationalist struggles to bring his experiences in line with abstract 
principles; the pragmatist must struggle to connect his various worlds 
of experience together. James describes the 'truth' process as 
follows: 
In the realm of truth-processes facts come independently and 
determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs make 
us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or 
into existence new facts which re-determine the beliefs accord-
ingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls up, is 
the product of a double influence. Truths emerge from facts; 
but they dip forward into facts again and add to them, which 
facts again create or reveal new truth (the word is indifferent) 
and so on indefinitely. The 'facts' themselves meanwhile are 
not true. They simply are. Truth is the function of the beliefs 
that start and terminate among them (James, 1907/1913, p. 225). 
This basic verification process may be applied (with variations in 
methodology) to any one of the sub-worlds of reality. Given that we 
have different relationships with different levels of reality, we may 
fairly ask whether or not the truths manufactured in one realm may 
ever be applied with equal effect to another. That is, does pragmatism 
as a methodology serve any unifying function in tying experience togeth-
er, as rationalism does for its proponents, or is it in the end mere-
ly a collection of verification processes selectively applied to the 
various levels of reality? Does pragmatism have anything to say about 
the changes in meaning of a fact as it is transported from one level 
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of reality to another?
15 
Is the conclusion that truths pay a suffi-
cient ground for a unified epistemology, or does the meaning of 'pay' 
also change to correspond with the level of reality it is applied to? 
James refers to the 'whole coil and ball of truth'; in other places 
he speaks of 'systems of belief' wherein new theories are assimilated 
or accepted according to their 'fit' with the presently held system 
(see James, 1907/1913, p. 63). This implies that however mutable, 
temporal, and fluctuating our particular conceptions of 'truth' may 
be, conceptual systems will have a certain internal 'unity' for the 
individual. He has a certain stock of beliefs and he judges new exper-
iences in terms of their compatibility with his pre-established frame-
work of beliefs. If pragmatism is to serve as a full epistemology• 
it must be able to deal with the 'transportation' of 'truths' from 
one sub-world to another, and it mist provide a means for the subject-
ive, as well as the objective assessment of new ideas against pre-
existing value-structures for: "truth is made largely out of previous 
truths" (James, 1907/1913, pfl 224). 
Ayer believes that James errs in failing to make it explicit 
enough that beliefs work in different ways: 
The equation of true beliefs with those that work is intended 
to apply to beliefs of every sort. What he should have made 
much clearer than he does is that true beliefs are not treated 
by him as being all of a pattern. They all work, but they work 
in different ways. The criteria by which we have to assess a 
belief which relates to a matter of empirical fact are different 
from those which apply to a belief which is concerned only with 
relations between ideas: and these are different again from the 
criteria which apply to beliefs whose function is to satisfy 
our moral and emotional requirements. These distinctions are 
implicit in James's writing, but he does not draw attention to 
them. In my view, it is his failure to set them out explicitly 
that has been mainly responsible for the extent to which his 
15. Note the transposition of scientific objects from theoretical 
objects to sensible correlates for example. 
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• position has been misunderstood (Ayer, 1968, p. 201). 
Thus, Ayer believes that the problems in interpreting the theory 
of truth arise because James failed to differentiate clearly between 
the criteria necessary to distinguish the categories of belief from 
one another. White on the other hand, repeatedly criticizes Ayer 
for underestimating what he (White) calls the 'holistic tendency' in 
James' pragmatism (see White, 1973, p. 107; see also White, 1973a, 
p. 117). 
White claims that Ayer's analysis applies only to the 'trialistic' 
elements in James' Pragmatism, and fails to take account of the 'holi-
stic' aspects of that work. The 'trialistic' elements, White tells us, 
link pragmatism to James' psychology; the holistic elements foreshadow 
his radical empiricism. If White is correct, then the Pragmatism con-
tains, in effect, two answers to the questions posed earlier. White 
argues that James' pragmatism contains remnants of the 'trialism'-- 
the separation of experience into three distinct modes of reality 
which characterizes the Principles and The will to believe--when he 
separates belief into three major categories. These catdgories include: 
"(a) beliefs coerced by sense-experience, (b) beliefs coerced by the 
relations between concepts,and (c) beliefs established by other means" 
(White, 1973, p. 204). In contrast to the triali§tic system, wherein 
beliefs are accepted or rejected within relevant categories, White 
argues •that James also develops a holistic account of the means by 
which any belief is accepted or rejected. White derives this argument 
from James' pragmatic statements that a new belief is tested against 
the whole stock of opinions in trade (see James, 1907/1913, pp. 59-64). 
The problem with White's attempt to show at least the beginnings 
of unification through this type of holism is that White fails to en-
large upon the relationship between the psychological factors which 
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incline us towards belief or disbelief, and the means by which differ-
ent types of beliefs are verified. Even if White is correct in attri-
buting a holistic view to James in regard to his Pragmatism, this 
holism can only be applied to some aspects of the conscious processes 
whereby a new belief is assimilated or discarded. The new belief 
must be compatible with the old beliefs in stock: in fact, it must 
do more than this; it must serve "the function of giving human satis-
faction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts" 
(James, 1907/1913, p. 64). But the new belief must still be 'categor-
ized' and 'verified' according to the trialistic system. James writes: 
'Radium' came the other day as part of the day's content, and 
seemed for a moment to contradict our ideas of the whole order 
of nature, that order having come to be identified with what is 
called the conservation of energy. The mere sight of radium 
paying heat away indefinitely out of its own pocket seemed to 
violate that conservation. What to think? If the radiations from 
it were nothing but an escape of unsuspected 'potential' energy, 
pre-existent inside of the atoms, the principle of conservation 
would be saved. The discovery of 'helium' as the radiation's 
outcome, opened a way to this belief. So Ramsay's view is gener-
ally held to be true, because, although it extends our old ideas 
of energy, it causes a minimum of alteration in their nature 
(James, 1907/1913, pp. 62-63). 
The •point here is that the belief system as a whole may guide 
the investigator looking for particular kinds of answers; the parti-
cular questions asked about any new 'object' will be concerned with 
those properties it exhibits which do not fit in with our existing ideas. 
But the actual or specific answers to these questions, which determine 
acceptance or rejection of the belief, ■-.:an be found only in appropriate 
• mode of experience (or sub-world). The answer to the problem of how to 
align the discovery of radium and its 'upsetting' properties, with 
current ideas about the conservation of energy could only be found in 
science. Theology, metaphysics, and sensory experience have little to 
offer. Unless White can show that a holistic process of verification 
is explicitly utilized by James, we must reject this view as accurately 
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describing James' praomatic method of truth. White's 'holism' must 
be confined to the psychological continuity of consciousness as James 
structured it in the Principles. Ideas in the stream of consciousness 
are accompanied by 'fringes' which include emotional reactions, aesthe-
tic inclinations, and other associated feelings. Holism, in this sense 
is built into the structure of consciousness itself and its reappear-
ance in pragmatism would therefore emphasize the psychological founda-
tions of James' philosophy. This analysis, then, must still take 
account of the problem posed by Ayer and we must follow Ayer's example 
and examine the processes of validation as they are applied to the 
specific modes of experience. 
On the other hand, to simply conclude that the criteria for assess-
ing beliefs differ according to the kind of belief involved as Ayer 
does may not be sufficient to refute White's claim that James is attemp-
ting to move away from the trialism of the Principles by concentrating 
on the practical or perceptual consequences of belief and by insisting 
that 'new' truths must be evaluated in relation to the whole stock of 
opinions in consciousness. James' aims and his success in achieving 
them can only be revealed by an examination of. the methods of truth 
as they are applied to the sub-worlds of sensible objects, necessary 
truths and ideal relations, science, and ethics and metaphysics. 
The World of Sensible Reality  
Active experience is the crucial test of the truth or falsity of 
our ideas, and our relationship with the external world is necessar-
ily built upon a process of verification or validation of feelings or 
thoughts. James equates the process of determining the truth or falsi-
ty of ideas about the sensible world with the verification principles 
that apply to science, in an attempt to give a systematic interpretation 
501. 
of the adjustment process which is blind at onset, and acquires its 
ends through experience and development: 
Everywhere, these teachers [Schiller and Dewey] say, 'truth' 
in our ideas and beliefs means the same thing that it means 
in science. It means, they say, nothing but this, that ideas  
(which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true  
just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation  
with other parts of our experience, to summarize them and get 
about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following 
the interminable succession of particular phenomena. Any idea 
upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry 
us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other 
part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplify 
ing, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, 
true instrumentally (James, 1907/1913, p. 58). 
Because the phenomenal world is so diverse and fluctuating, concept-
ion cannot efficiently 'copy' its particulars as they appear in space 
and time. The individual is also congenitally equipped with basic needs, 
drives, desires, impulses, and these provide the impetus for the select-
ion of some objects as relevant, interesting etc., and the concomitant 
ant rejection of others. 'True' ideas therefore serve as links between 
biological needs and the external objects which satisfy or fail to 
satisfy these needs. 'True' ideas about the sensible world correspond, 
psychologically, to 'beliefs' about the sensible world (see Chap. 4); 
we have an idea and if we find that reality 'fits' our idea, we must 
call the idea true. Finally James makes a parallel between the verifi-
cation of ideas about the sensible world and the scientific method 
because in both cases objects are sought in the concrete physical world 
which correspond to ideas in the mind. 
The process of verification has major implications for individual 
adjustment and survival for it is the means through which 'habits' of 
belief are formed. 'True' ideas unite the phenomenal world of particu-
lars in the ways which best serve our biological and instinctive needs. 
As 'habits' of belief or truth develop, a new idea can be assimilated 
into the structure and "counts as 'true' just in proportion as it 
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gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his 
experience to his beliefs in stock. It must lean on old truth and grasp 
new fact" (James, 1907/1913, P. 63). The 'truth' or 'falseness' of 
ideas in this context consists of the relation between the idea and the 
world of sensible experience. Ideas'or feelings in themselves are 
neither true nor false any more than objects are true or false. Truth 
is manufactured out of the interaction between thought and reality so 
that James is thus able to write: "The true is the name of whatever 
proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for de-
finite, assignable reasons" (James, 1907/1913, p. 76). 
Good, in this sense, relates to our needs to adjust to the external 
world. A belief is good, if it extends our capacities for finding our 
way through the morass of sensible particulars and relations. An idea 
is good when it tells us what afferent sensations we can expect, or 
when it tells us which object will satisfy a demand. The terms 'good' 
and 'true' have no explicitly moral connotations. "True ideas are those  
we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are  
those we cannot" (James, 1907/1913, p. 201): this statement sums up 
James' theory of truth as it describes our practical relations with 
sensible reality. If an idea bears no resemblance to an object, or 
tells us nothing about possible relationships with objects, then it has 
no practical utility. The verification process is the only means we have 
of determining whether or not an idea 'fits' with the real world. If 
the idea does not 'fit', then it is false for that mode of experience, 
though it may very well be verifiable, and potentially 'true' in another 
world of experience. Thus, "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes 
• true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, .a pro-
cess: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. 
Its validity is the process of its valid-ation" (James, 1907/1913, 
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p. 201). 
Finally, ideas may be 'potentially' true. Along with our stock of 
verified truths, we hold ideas which we assume will be true because 
they fit in with our other verified beliefs. Potentially true ideas 
may tell us what to expect in situations we may not have encountered 
yet and these ideas, which connect with our validated beliefs or stock 
of 'truths', are extremely important, for we can appeal to these poten- 
tial truths in emergency situations. James believed that in the process 
of their verification, they 'save' us, and thus their 'practical' 
value, even in an unverified state, is high, so that it is well for us 
to believe in them even though we have not yet actually had occasion 
to verify them. The problem is that James does not make it clear that 
these ides are only potentially true when he writes: 
The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters 
of fact is a thing too notorious. We live in a world of realities 
that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful. Ideas that 
tell us which of them to expect count as the true ideas in all 
this primary sphere of verification, and the pursuit of such 
ideas is a primary human duty. The possession of truth, so far 
from being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means 
towards other vital satisfactions. If I am lost in the woods and 
starved, and find what looks like a cowpath, it is of the utmost 
importance that I should think of a human habitation at the end 
of it, for if I do so and follow it, I save myself. The true 
thought is useful here because the house which is its object is 
useful. The practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived 
from the practical importance of their objects to us. Their 
objects are, indeed, not important at all times. ...Yet since 
almost any object may some day become temporarily important, the 
advantage of having a general stock of extra truths, of ideas that 
shall be true of merely possible situations, is obvious (James, 
1907/1913, pp. 203-204). 16 
The perception (of a cow-path in the above example) serves a criti-
cal function in James' epistemology. The individual who is lost in the 
16. See also Lovejoy, 1963. Lovejoy states that pragmatic theories must 
have predictive potential if they are to be functionally meaningful. 
They must incorporate "some means of telling what predictors are to be 
accepted as sound while they are still predictions. ...Otherwise, the 
doctrine is sterile" (Lovejoy, 1963, pp. 12-13). 
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woods is faced with a problem which requires a decision on how he is 
to act to save himself. The perception of the cow-path provides the 
critical piece of information from the sensible world which allows him 
to arrive at the 'correct conception' or 'reasonable solution' of his 
dilemma. The existence of the cow-path is an undeniable fact for the 
individual; his task is to discover its 'meaning'--in this case, that 
there must be a human habitation at its end. Thus James concludes that 
the 'true' meaning of the perception of the cow-path is that there will 
be a human habitation at the end of it. 'True' ideas in this sense cor-
respond with correct conceptions; if the stimulus object, or physical 
fact, is not correctly or reasonably interpreted by consciousness, it 
has no practical value for the individual. The individual must come 
up with a belief or 'true' idea that is sufficiently stable or satis-
factory to inhibit any competing ideas in consciousness so that he will 
act. 
The problem is that James appears to be confounding truth with be-
lief when he states that "true ideas are those we can.. .verify" (James, 
1907/1913, p, 201). The cow-path is a fact; the true idea in conscious-
ness is that the path is there. The existence of the house at the end 
of the cow-path is an idea in consciousness that can be potentially 
verified but until it is verified, it is only a belief or potential 
truth. Believing that there is a house at the end of the path is useful; 
the belief in the possible existence of the house is sufficient to lead 
the individual along the path. But the idea of the house is not 'true' 
until the individual actually sees the house before him. The idea has 
to be verified; believing that the house is there does not mean that 
the house actually exists. Nor does it mean that even if the house 
exists, reaching it will guarantee salvation. The problem with James' 
emphasis on determining the consequences or meaning of any idea and 
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then correlating meaning with truth lies in the fact that the selection 
of any action in terms of its possible afferent effects or consequences 
still does not make those consequences determinable in any absolute 
sense beforehand. A stock of potentially true ideas enhances the indi-
vidual's chances for survival; it cannot guarantee it. Expectations 
regarding the potential afferent sensations or possible perceptions 
have a determinative effect on what the individual will actually do, 
but as Thayer points out "to believe that a fact will occur may be one 
of the causal conditions contributing to the actual occurrence of the 
fact; but the truth or falsehood of the belief, its truth value, are 
not causal agents" (Thayer, 1968, p. 155). 
The verification of ideas about the sensible world, and the dis-
tinction between 'true' or verified ideas and potentially 'true' 
ideas is particularly important because James had once again moved 
away from a 'copy' theory model for the verification of sensible 
ideas. He concluded in "The relation between knower and known" that 
if an idea enabled the seeker to find the object, the idea was true 
(see James, 1904/1909, p. 115). Substantively, the idea need not 
resemble the object--if the idea can lead the individual to the object, 
so that he recognizes the object as satisfying his demand, this is 
all that is required for the idea to be true (see Perry, 1935/1974; 
2, pp. 454-455). This step brought James' pragmatism into line 
with his psychology (see James, 1890, 1, p. 471; see also Chap. 3, 
pp. 204-214), and rid his epistemology of the last traces of the copy 
theory of the empiricist tradition. But James was commited to empiri-
cism so that the more abstract he made his definition as to what might 
count as a potentially true idea about the sensible world, the more he 
had to stress that the function of ideas was to lead the individual 
into sensible reality. Correspondingly, the actual perception that 
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verifies the idea in consciousness takes on an added importance. 
Finally, James' insistence that the individual was well-served by 
maintaining a 'general stock of extra truths' is evidence for White's 
hypothesis that James was moving towards a holistic account of knowledge. 
Unverified ideas about the sensible world are maintained in conscious-
ness as 'true' ideas so that psychologically speaking, they might be 
said to serve the same function as the unverified metaphysical axioms 
which guide our search for objects which will corroborate our theories 
and thus facilitate the rationalization of the sensible world. This 
seems to have been James' intention: ideas which belong to any sub-
world •of reality have a common function--they lead us into new and 
satisfactory relationships with reality. Thus James believed that prag-
matically speaking, unverified ideas could be treated as 'true' before 
they were verified in perception. This would satisfy Lovejoy's argu-
ment that if pragmatic theories are to be functionally meaningful they 
must incorporate "some means of telling what-predictors are to be 
accepted as sound while they are still predictions" (Lovejoy, 1963, 
p.12). The problem that arises is whether or not the evolutionary 
construction of pragmatism actually enables the individual to construct 
sound predictors of sensible reality beforehand, or whether such pre-
dictions are always subject to the exigencies of experience. As the 
following discussion of James' pragmatic conception of science will 
show, James was moving away from the Newtonian world-view of the 
Principles and into a more relativistic, evolutionary account of the 
physical world and man's relationships with that world. And in confound-
ing 'potential' and 'verified' truths, James once again appears to be 
lapsing into the same kind of rationalism that led him to postulate 
that the 'fit' between scientific hypotheses and the sensible world 
had so far been so successful that it would eventually be possible to 
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assume that scientific theories were true if they were logically con-
sistent (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 669-671). In the case of the potential 
truths, James seems to be assuming that the 'build-up' in consciousness 
of verified ideas about the sensible world will be so great that the 
individual will be able to make true or factual predictions beforehand 
concerning the existence of the sought-after object. That is, he fails 
to 'distinguish between the individual's psychological treatment of the 
ideas as true, and the epistemological problem of whether or not the 
idea really is true. 
The pragmatism in this sense can be taken as the 'halfway' point 
in James' philosophication of evolutionary theory. While he typically 
emphasizes that truth is made in the process of verification, that to 
be true, an idea must be verified in the sensible world, and that the 
world is still in the making, he occasionally lapses back into the 
progressive or Newtonian world-view in his attempt to emphasize the 
efficacious qualities of human consciousness in 'knowing' the world. 
Necessary Truths and Ideal Relations  
Like the world of sensible objects, the world of necessary truths 
and ideal relations is structured to facilitate the verification of 
new ideas. But the exact status of these 'truths' is difficult to de-
termine. In his 1904 paper, "Humanism and truth" James stated that: 
Relations of comparison are matters of direct inspection. As 
soon as mental objects are mentally compared, they are per-
ceived to be either like or unlike. But once the same, always 
the same, once different, always different, under these timeless 
conditions. Which is as much as to say that truths concerning 
these man-made objects are necessary and eternal. We can change 
our conclusions only by changing our data first (James, 1904/ 
1909a, 2,pp. 84-85; see also James, 1890, 2, p. 641). 
This is essentially the same position that James took in the Principles  
in 1890. But James did not consistently integrate his 1890 conception 
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of the immutable nature •of the necessary truths into his pragmatism 
and White concludes that: 
In spite of James' statement in 1904 that his pragmatism was 
compatible with the view that he held about necessary truth in 
the last chapter of the Psychology, I think that the passages 
I have just quoted from Pragmatism suggest that there he was 
moving away from the view advocated in his Psychology. In 
Pragmatism there is at least some tendency to maintain that the 
distinction between so-called a priori beliefs and a posteriori  
beliefs is not a sharp one (White, 1973, p. 210; see also pp. 
204-212, 339). 
The passages in the Pragmatism referred to by White include the fol-
lowing statement by James. In emphasizing the plastic nature of truth 
in general, James writes: 
But how plastic even the oldest truths nevertheless really are 
has been vividly shown in our day by the transformation of 
logical and mathematical ideas, a transformation which seems even 
to be invading physics. The ancient formulas are reinterpreted 
as special expressions of much wider principles, principles that 
our ancestors never got a glimpse of in their present shape and 
formulation (James, 1907/1913, p. 65). 
This passage seems to confirm White's hypothesis that James was 
moving towards a holistic conception of truth, where even the ancient 
truths of logic and mathematics were subject to change. If these 
truths, usually considered immutable by James, were subject to change 
over time, they would then be subject to the same need for verification 
as any other set of human ideas, and the pragmatic method could be 
applied to them as it is applied to other modes of human experience. 
But the passage quoted immediately above from James' Pragmatism is not 
as explicit as his 1890 and 1904 statements, and when taken in con- ' 
junction with his earlier position regarding the immutability of the 
necessary truths, it must lead us to ask what it is about the necessary 
truths that changes over time. While James was admittedly beginning 
to explore an alternative to the "Lockeian dualism between immutable 
and contingent truth, as well as from the Kantian pluralism between 
a priori and a posteriori truth" (White, 1973, p. 210),he appears to 
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retreat back into the dualisms when he finds himself forced to make 
his position more explicit. 
Following the same lines of dissection that were used in Chap. 4 
to separate the necessary truths and ideal relations from scientific 
theories, we find that the necessary truths and ideal relations must 
be treated separately from the larger system of thought in which they 
are embedded. James does not say that the ancient formulas themselves 
are subject to change, but rather that they are "reinterpreted as 
special expressions of much wider principles" (James, 1907/1913, p. 65). 
These 'ancient formulas' correspond to the 'necessary truths' of the 
Principles and they constitute a separate and definable 'sub-world' 
of their own which is distinguishable from the larger theories or 
systems where they are utilized. The systems of logic and mathematics 
change over time so that the necessary truths yield new meanings and 
'results' as consequences of the transformation of the systems. And the 
systems themselves are slow to change, according to James, because 
they are so deeply entrenched in our basic belief structures. These 
considerations make it difficult to separate the 'eternal facts' from 
the 'mutable' constructs within any given logical or mathematical 
system (see James, 1907/1913, p. 65). But James did make the separation 
in the Principles and he reinstates his distinction in the Pragmatism. 
The 'eternal' components of the systems are described by James as 
purely mental ideas and the relations between them: These facts are 
self-authenticating, and no sensory verification is necessary. 
But matters of fact are not our only stock in trade. Relations  
among purely mental ideas form another sphere where true and 
false beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute, or 
unconditional. When they are true they bear the name either of 
definitions or of principles, ...The objects here are mental 
objects. Their relations are perceptually obvious at a glance, 
and no sense-verification is necessary. Moreover, once true, 
always true, of those same mental objects. Truth here has an 
'eternal' character. ...It is but a case of ascertaining the 
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kind, and then applying the law of its kind to the particular 
object. You are sure to get the truth if you can but name 
the kind rightly, for your mental relations hold good of 
everything of that kind without exception. If you then, 
nevertheles5. , failed to get truth concretely, you would say that 
you had classed your real objects wrongly (James, 1907/1913, 
pp. 209-210). 
Ayer writes: "the truth of necessary propositions is wholly depend-
ent upon the conventions which govern the use of the signs by which 
they are expressed" (Ayer, 1968, p. 205). Ayer's interpretation of 
James' position appears, initially, to be too postivistic and too 
'sophisticated' to accurately describe James' position regarding the 
necessary truths. Ayer regards James' position as a somewhat simpli-
stic approximation of modern theory regarding the status of the ideal 
relations (see Ayer, 1968, pp. 205-206). He therefore demonstrates 
that James' major weakness lies in over-simplifying "the distinction 
between relations of ideas and matters of fact" (Ayer, 1968, p. 206). 
To this end, he points out the Kantian influences on James' theory but 
stresses that James 'corrects' for Kantian 'Absolutism' by allowing 
experience a potential effect upon the network of ideal relations. 
That is, the ideal network could be altered by "a radical alteration 
in the character of the realities with which we were confronted" 
(Ayer, 1968, p. 207). This is logical enough. The problem is to de-
termine what would thereby be altered in the ideal network. 
James writes: 
The hundredth decimal of 7, the ratio of the circumference to 
its diameter, is predetermined ideally now, tho no one may have 
computed it. If we should ever need the figure in our dealings 
with an actual circle we should need to have it given rightly, 
calculated by the usual rules; for it is the same kind of truth 
that those rules elsewhere calculate (James, 1907/1913, p. 211). 
Our concern now is to determine what the 'status' of the usual rules 
is. That the value of the hundredth decimal of Tr is predetermined by 
the rules is not a problematic statement; the problem comes in 
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deciding whether or not James would allow that the application of 
the same rules could give different values of 7 depending on whether 
7 was being calculated in, say, Euclidean or non-Euclidean space. In 
all cases, the value of the hundredth decimal of 7 is predetermined by 
the system, but the choice of the system is dependent on the conven-
tions of science and logic as Ayer describes them. James does in fact 
allow that mathematical and logical conventions are subject to change 
(see James, 1907/1913, p. 65, quoted above, p. 508), so that his posi-
tion is not incompatible with Ayer's analysis. At the same time, James 
fails to develop the implications of his theory to show specifically 
that while appljcation of the rules must be the same in all cases, 
where, to follow the example, the value of the hundredth decimal of 7 
is sought, the Particular integer that results from the calculations 
is dependent upon the 'larger' concepts of space and time wherein the 
rules are applied. 
James gives the necessary truths an analogous structure to sensory 
objects. The mental relations are as 'fixed' in their properties as 
sensible objects are and we cannot deny the 'realness' of these pro-
perties. James writes: 
Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects 
follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more 
play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do 
so with our sense-experiences. They coerce us; we must treat 
them consistently, whether or not we like the results. The 
rules of addition apply to our debts as rigorously as our assets 
(James, 1907/1913, p. 211). 
Not only are the ideal relations 'fixed' in their properties but 
they have direct consequences for our relationship with the sensible 
world. The mind is coerced by the ideal relations and the sensible 
objects, and by the 'products' of their interaction so that: 
Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of 
the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas 
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must agree with realities, be such realities concrete or 
abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty 
of endless inconsistency and frustration (James, 1907/1913, 
p. 211). 
Our ideas about the sensible world must agree with our experiences 
of sensible reality; this is what the whole process of verification 
is about. And our ideas of abstract realities must agree with those 
realities too, but here the meaning of 'agreement' is somewhat differ-
ent. We cannot fail to get the truth, according to James, if we apply 
the correct operations to the intellectual data at hand. The proposi-
tions are self-verifying and the 'answers' are absolute and pre-deter-
mined. This is the difference between appeals to an eternal system of 
'facts' and appeals to potential experience in the sensible world where 
the objects and their relationships are subjected to temporal changes. 
In the world of ideal relations, truth is not made, it is, so that 
the derivation of any abstract truth always follows the same eternal 
rules. On the other hand, the abstract truths can only be selectively 
applied to the concrete world. In the Principles James explicitly 
shows that mathematics and logic do not have "anything to say about 
facts, about what is or is not in the world" (James, 1890, 2, p. 650). 
Nature is plastic and thus provides instances where abstract truths 
. do describe the data; at the same time, she provides as many instances 
where they do not. Science can therefore be defined as the attempt to 
'fit' abstract truth and nature together. The 'rationalization' of the 
sensible world )s a product of the interaction of the ideal relations 
given in the context of scientific theory, and the sensible world (see 
James, 1907/1913, p. 225). Furthermore the ideal world and the sens-
ible world each contain more 'facts' or 'objects' than are united 
together in empirical science. The mind is tightly wedged between the 
two sub-worlds with the result that the rationalization of the 
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sensible world is controlled by constraints in both sub-worlds (see 
James, 1907/1913, p. 217; see also James, 1890, 2, pp. 647, 665, 667- 
669, 671). 
What, then, is the relationship between the pragmatic theory of 
truth and the ideal relations? So far it has been shown that James 
believed that the ideal relations were immutable and eternal, in con-
trast to the systems inwhich they are found. Thus, they are indisput-
able 'facts'. Because James declared that the ideal relations are 
'real l and eternal objects, the pragmatic method of truth is not appli-
cable to the ideal relations themselves. Lovejoy writes that James 
presented his "doctrine with an apparent exception in favour of 
'necessary truths'" (Lovejoy, 1963, pp. 10-11). Lovejoy adds that 
this is not an exclusive exception because truth consists in the corres-
pondence of the ideas with experience. This is valid enough as far as 
it goes, but Lovejoy, like James, fails to look at all of the epist-
emological consequences of having 'immutable' constituents buried in 
mutable systems. In the case of the necessary truths, truth is not 
made; it already exists awaiting discovery. fhe consequences are 
pre-determined in the sense that the right or wrong answer pre-exists; 
it awaits discovery. True ideas can be verified but they do not become  
true. The personal acquisition of the ideal relations extends the 
individual's potential for verifying other aspects of experience; and 
insofar as the ideal relations are related to other aspects of exper-
ience, the sum total of experience is increased so that the potential 
mutability of the universe is increased. But apart from their relat-
ionship to other aspects of experience the verifications within the 
system of abstract truth do not add to a growing body of truth for 
these verifications in themselves are self-authenticating. 
The major problem with the relationship between the ideal relations 
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and the pragmatic method lies in James' failure to make it explicit 
that the ideal truths give different results depending upon the frame- 
work or 'system' in which they are embedded. In the Principles he wrote: 
The axiom about figures being movable in space is rather a 
postulate than an axiom. So far as they are so movable, then 
certain fixed equalities and differences obtain between forms, 
no matter where placed. But if the translation through space 
warped or magnified forms, then the relations of equality, 
etc., would always have to be expressed with a position-qualifi-
cation added. A geometry as absolutely certain as ours could 
be invented on the supposition of such a space, if the laws of 
its warping and deformation were fixed. It would, however, be 
much more complicated than our geometry, which makes the 
simplest possible supposition; and finds, luckily enough, that 
it is the supposition with which the space of our experience 
seems to agree (James, 1890, 2, p. 658). 
James does not assume here that the same axioms could be utilized with-
in the 'new' space. Instead, he repeats his contention that we are 
'fortunate' that our 'experience' of space coincides with the ideal 
relations. Had he recognized that the value of the ideal relations is 
a function of the particular mathematical/logical system, his pragmatic 
theory of truth would have had wider implications for the selection of 
scientific, mathematical and logkal theories and he would have avoided 
the problems of rationalism that plagued him. 
Had James developed a relativistic system like the one just out-
lined, the pragmatic method could have been applied to the discovery 
of the properties of the necessary truths within any proposed system. 
Instead, James continued to try to show than an ontological status 
could be granted to abstract ideas analogous to that granted to physical 
objects. White comments: 
The main continuity arises from the fact that both books 
contain a distinction between beliefs that purport to 
copy something and beliefs that do not, although different 
kinds of beliefs are called copy-beliefs in the different 
books. In the Psychology the typical example of a copy-belief 
is a generalization like fire burns, water wets, or glass  
refracts; whereas in Pragmatism James speaks of less gener- 
al beliefs about sensible objects and of beliefs about 
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concepts as copying realities. He says that if you shut your 
eyes and think of a clock on the wall, you may form a belief 
which copies something about its dial. He also speaks of the 
conceptual belief that 2+2=4 as a copy-belief. Furthermore, he 
speaks in Pragmatism of all copy-beliefs as being "coerced". 
One therefore gets the impression that we are forced by reality 
to hold certain beliefs whereas we have a certain kindof 
freedom to accept or not to accept others (White, 1973, pp. 202-203). 
The problem is to determine how the 'coerced' beliefs can be 
equated with one another, in opposition to the 'uncoerced beliefs'. It 
is difficult to see how 2 + 2 = 4 is a copy belief for James makes it 
explicit in the Principles that mathematical relations are imposed 
on nature by the mind. If the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 is to be 
found in nature at all, it is found in the midst of other phenomena 
which at times would seem to indicate that 2 + 2= I (see James, 1890, 
2, p. 653). 2 + 2 = 4 is only self-verifying in the world of ideal 
relations, and if it is to be regarded as a copy-belief at all, it 
can only be regarded as copying itself; it cannot reliably copy anything 
in the physical world. 
The apparent inconsistency between the Pragmatism and the Princ-
iples is intensified when we come to James' contention that necessary 
relations are implicit in sensible phenomena themselves. He argues 
that the seven stars which make up the Great Bear constellation are 
implicitly bear-like in the pattern they present (see James, 1904/1909a, 
pp. 92-93): 
Are we to say that these stars were 'explicitly seven, explicitly 
bear-like, before the human witness came'? His answer is: 
not explicitly, because there is no subject here for truth or 
falsehood until the question of the number and appearance of 
• the stars is actually raised. Implicitly, because once the 
question of the number and appearance of the stars is actually 
raised, 'the stars themselves dictate the result'. The fact 
can therefore be said to 'pre-exist virtually' in the sense that 
if ever the question of its existence were to be raised, it would 
determine the answer (Ayer, 1968, p. 204). 
The perception of the stars in this pattern is dependent on a 
sentient human observer. The stars, like the rest of nature, 'yield' 
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Up their particular relations only in the presence of a selective 
consciousness. That there are specifiable additive relations in 
nature, that the stars conform to certain visual configurations, de-
pends totally on the presence of a human mind that perceives the rela-
tions. Nature is as at home with the additive relation wherein 2 + 2 
= 1 as it is with the relation 2 + 2 = 4. Similarly, the fact that 
the constellation looks like a bear is irrelevant to the movements of 
the stars themselves and their relations to one another. Holmes' 
criticism is relevant here (see Holmes, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 
2, p. 457, quoted above, p. 469). In placing the human intellect at 
the centre of the universe, James makes the error of confusing the 
'real' relationships between natural events with the ability of the 
human mind to impose its own order on natural events. This does not 
mean that these imposed relationships are not 'real' or 'valid' in 
human terms; it does mean that questions about how the physical world 
actually functions are made more difficult to answer by James' con-
founding of those patterns which are obviously imposed on natural 
phenomena by man, those which appear to result from the interaction 
between mind and nature, and those which coerce the mind. 
Finally, the existence of the abstract truths depends upon the 
human intellect. They too, must be discovered, as any other relations 
or objects must be discovered so that we must feel our way through the 
morass of abstract truths as we do through any mode of experience open 
to us. As White shows, James did make the distinction between neces-
sary and contingent truths, although as we have already shown, he 
tends to confound the distinction at times in both the Principles and 
the Pragmatism. This means, however, that in coming to terms with 
experience per se, we appeal to two sets of coercive objects. Exper-
ience in the sensible world is necessary to provide the 'objects' 
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which the necessary truths describe, but it is not, necessary to con-
sult the world of experience to determine many of the properties of, 
or relations between, these objects. They are 'given' in the meaning 
of the terms themselves. White makes this clear: 
In agreeing with Locke, James maintained that the truths of 
logic and mathematics are necessary and immutable, and that 
they are seen to be true merely by examining what James called 
"ideal conceptions". We compare these ideal conceptions and 
on the basis of that comparison arrive at beliefs such as those 
that comprise logic and mathematics. For this reason James 
maintains' that"the pure sciences" establish their truths as 
ordinary men establish the truth that no white thing is blaCk. 
Here he is obviously and avowedly Lockeian in his view, maintain-
ing that "to learn whether black an white differ, I need not 
consult the world of experience at all; the mere ideas suffice. 
What I mean by black differs from'what I mean by white, whether 
such colors exist extra mentem meam or not. - If they ever do 
exist, they will  differ. White things may blacken, but the 
black of them will differ from the white of them, so long as 
I mean anything definite by these three words". James then goes 
on to say, in 1;,.ffect that the logical statement that if Socrates 
is a man and every man is mortal, then Socrates is mortal, is 
true on the basis of "our insight into the very meaning of 
the word is" (there is no mention of insight into the meaning 
of . "every" and "and"). Similarly, he holds that arithmetical 
beliefs like the belief that 2+2=4 are established merely on 
the basis of our insight into the meaning of numerical 
expressions (White, 1973, pp. 175-176; internal quotations 
from JaMes, 1890, 2, pp. 643-644,649). 
And now at last we come to the real crux of the matter. White 
states that according to James, the necessary truths arose as accident-
al variations in the minds of our remoter ancestors, survived because 
they were useful, and were passed on as 'heritable variations' (see 
White, 1973, p..175; see also James, 1890, 2, pp. 627, 631). And as 
human variations they should be testable within the pragmatic method. 
The real difficulty here lies in the fact that while James insists 
that the necessary truths have evolved in human consciousness, he also 
implies that they transcend their human origins. James does not treat 
the abstract truths as testable variations--instead, he gives them 
an absolute status and then uses them to lead us into new relationships 
with the world on the basis of their absolute status: 
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In this realm of mental relations, truth again is an affair 
of leading. We relate one abstract idea with another, framing 
in the end great systems of logical and mathematical truth, 
under the respective terms of which.the sensible facts of 
experience eventually arrange themselves, so that our eternal 
truths hold good of realities too. ...Our ready-made ideal 
framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from the 
very structure of our thinking (James, 1907/1913, pp. 210-211). 
We must conclude that while James ascribes an empirical origin 
to the necessary truths (see Ayer, 1968, p. 206; White, 1973, P. 175; 
and James, 1890, 2, pp. 627, 631), he does not treat them in the same 
way as he treats the other kinds of truth. For James, the necessary 
truths transcend their origins, and exist as facts while other kinds 
of truth do not. The pragmatic method is not applied to the neces-
sary truths themselves, although James does apply it meaningfully to 
the conjunction of necessary truths and the sensible facts of exper-
ience, for this conjunction is the essential basis of science. The 
pragmatic theory of truth must now be discussed in relation to 'science' 
as it emerges from the marriage of abstract truths and experience. 
The World of Science  
In the analysis of the necessary truths and ideal relations, it 
was demonstrated that James' pragmatism continued to be plagued by 
problems of rationalism in regard to the values that could be assigned 
to the necessary truths. Thus he postulated that 7 had an eternal 
and fixed value, so that the necessary truths are not governed by the 
temporal and mutable properties of the rest of the evolving universe. 
They stand as eternal facts, and their status has not altered since 
the 1890 account in the Principles. But James has made significant 
changes regarding the status and discovery of scientific objects. We 
demonstrated in Chap. 4 that James' account of science was limited 
by his adherence to the mathematical/mechanical model of Newtonian 
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science. By the time he was in the process of constructing his prag-
matic method of truth, he had moved away from a rigid adherence to 
the Newtonian model, and was beginning to incorporate the concepts 
of temporalism and mutability into his analysis of scientific progress. 
Thus, he is moving away from the progressive view of history that 
dominated the Principles, and into a more relativistic and evolution-
ary account of science. 
The static, progressive view of science developed in the Principles  
clashed with James' theory of consciousness, which was structured 
in evolutionary terms. While consciousness was mutable, temporal, 
and subject to the effects of spontaneous variation, the underpinnings 
of the physical world were described in rigid mechanical terms. The 
function of consciousness (in regard to science), was therefore limit-
ed to the discovery of the eternal laws which governed the physical 
world. Moreover, James' tendency to confound necessary truths and 
scientific theories led him into a rationalist trap, so that he inti-
mated that as the rationalization of the world proceeded, sensory 
verification would eventually become irrelevant in determining the 
sensible effects of the motion of atoms (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 665- 
669; see also Chap. 4, pp. 261-277). 
By 1906
17 
James' conception of science had undergone a signifi-
cant development. He writes that: 
When the first mathematical, logical and natural uniformities, 
the first laws, were discovered, men were so carried away by 
17. The lectures which make up James' Pragmatism were first delivered 
at the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1906; they were repeated at 
Columbia University in 1907, and published in that same year as the 
Pragmatism. The only exception was the third lecture, "Some meta-
physical problems pragmatically considered" which is an expansion of 
James' 1904 paper, "The pragmatic method" which first appeared in 
the Journal of philosophy, psychology, and scientific methods, 1904, 
1, pp. 673-687. 
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the clearness, beauty and simplification that resulted, that 
they believed themselves to have discovered authentically 
the eternal thoughts of the Almighty(James, 1907/1913, p. 56). 
This statement in fact reflects his own exultant thinking in 1890. 
He now argues that scientific laws do not have this absolute status; 
like sensible phenomena and human consciousness itself they are both 
temporal and mutable: 
But as the sciences have developed further, the notion has 
gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only 
approximations. The laws themselves, moreover, have grown so 
numerous that there is no counting them, and so many rival 
formulations are proposed in all the branches of science 
that investigators have become accustomed to the notion that 
no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any 
one of them may from some point of view be useful. Their 
great use is to summarize old facts and to lead to new ones. 
They are only a man-made language, a conceptual shorthand, as 
some one calls them, in which we write our reports of nature; 
and languages, as is well known, tolerate much choice of 
expression and many dialects. 
Thus human arbitrariness has driven divine necessity from 
scientific logic (James, 1907/1913, p. 57). 
Scientific theories therefore reflect the variety and mutability of 
human thought. 
The measure of James' progress in bringing scientific activity 
into line with his theory of consciousness is most obvious in the 
revised status of atoms. He no longer insists that the sensible world 
is really constituted out of atoms and their movements to and fro, but 
argues that it is only through 'agreement' that scientific theories 
can be applied to the sensible world. "Any idea", writes James: 
that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, 
with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't 
entangle our progress in frustration, that fits, in fact, and 
adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree 
sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will hold true of that 
reality (James, 1907/1913, p. 213). 
Scientific theories, with their genesis in the world of ideal relations 
and necessary truth, often conflict with sensible experience, or 
common sense, and it is only through 'agreement' that scientific 
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theories can be applied to the sensible world. 'Agreement' describes 
the process wherein ideas lead us into useful conceptual areas, and 
useful sensory resting-places. 'Agreement' obtains between two other-
wise diverse sub-worlds when the ideas from one world can be usefully 
applied to another. Thus in the case of science: 
It is only thus that 'scientific' ideas, flying as tney do 
beyond common sense, can be said to agree with their realities. 
It is, as I have already said, as if reality were made of 
ether, atoms, or electrons, but we mustn't think so literally. 
The term 'energy' doesn't even pretend to stand for anything 
'objective'. It is only a way of measuring the surface of 
phenomena so as to string their changes on a simple formula 
(James, 1907/1913, p. 216). 
Conceptions of ether, atoms, electrons, and energy add to human 
experience because they facilitate the rationalization of the sensible 
world. But they do not facilitate its rationalization in any absolute 
sense: instead, they allow the thinker to impose order on the flux 
of phenomenal appearances. There is no 'guarantee''given in this 
statement that sensible objects are really made up of atoms in motion. 
But because scientific theories cannot be verified in any absolute 
sense, scientific activity does not become any less rigorous. Scienti-
fic truths must conform to the demands of the sub-worlds of ideal 
relations and necessary truths, and to sensory experience. The 
'squeeze' between abstract truth and concrete experience is intense; 
furthermore, the whole stock of opinions is brought to bear in deter-
mining which theory will be accepted and which will be rejected: 
Yet in the choice of these man-made formulas we can not 
be capricious with impunity any more than we can be capricious 
on the common-sense practical level. We must find a theory 
that will work; and that means something extremely difficult; 
for our theory must mediate between all previous truths and 
certain new experiences. It must derange common sense and 
previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to 
some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. 
To 'work' means both these things; and the squeeze is so tight 
that there is little loose play for any hypothesis. Our 
theories are wedged and controlled as nothing else is. Yet 
sometimes alternative theoretic formulas are equally compatible 
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with all the truths we know, and then we choose between them 
for subjective reasons. ...Truth in science is what gives us 
the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste included, but 
consistency both with previous truth and with novel fact is 
always the most imperious claimant (James, 1907/1913, p. 217). 
• Several points emerge in this statement. First of all, the pattern 
of scientific activity has not changed from the pattern described in 
the Principles. The search for scientific truths still consists of 
the attempt to discover sensible correlates for abstract theories. 
But the meaning of truth in regard to scientific objects has undergone 
a substantial change since 1890. When sensible correlates are discov-
ered for abstract scientific hypotheses, the hypotheses are said to 
be true. But they are not true in any absolute sense. What is taken 
as 'true' in the pragmatism is that there is a correspondence between 
the idea and the sensible object. When this correspondence is dis-
covered, the theory is said to 'work'; that is, it satisfies our 
demands for a link between previously accumulated knowledge and the 
new experience. 
The appearance of the sensible object in the place predicted by 
the theory is a fact because the reality of the sensible object and 
its relations cannot be denied. Moreover, the absolute truth of the 
ideal relations and necessary truths cannot be denied so that the self-
verifying mathematical objects which are embedded in the scientific 
theory are also real facts. James makes it clear that facts are 
neither true nor false; they simply exist: "Truths emerge from facts; 
but they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts 
again create or reveal new truth.. .and so on indefinitely" (James, 
1907/1913, p. 225). That truth and fact are not synonymous is further 
revealed in James' insistence that we can choose one theory over ano-
ther to be 'true' when both explain all the 'facts' equally well '(see 
James, 1907/1913, p. 217; quoted immediately above). The foundations 
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of the more relativistic pragmatic view of science are of course 
contained in the Principles: James made it clear that scientific 
objects were believable because they were generated as intermediary 
truths between two sets of 'facts'. But he failed to make an explicit 
distinction between the temporal, mutable nature of scientific 'truth-
seeking' per se and the genesis of science in the worlds of sensible 
experience and necessary truth. He argued that scientific progress 
was cumulative, and implicitly ratified this conclusion when he con-
founded the necessary truths with the theories wherein they were em-
bedded. 
James has made substantial advances in constructing a relativistic 
theory of scientific progress but he is wary of extending the license 
for individual decisions as to what constitutes a scientific truth 
too far. To this end, he makes it clear that scientific activity is 
rigidly constrained by the sensible world, by necessary truth, and 
by the whole stock of accumulated truths and opinions (see James, 1907/ 
1913, pp. 60-63, 217). This is particularly necessary because the 
function of science is to "summarize old facts and to lead to new ones" 
(James, 1907/1913, p. 57). The subjective role of consciousness 
in the rationalization of the world is critical: 
A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it 
gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel 
in his experience to his beliefs in stock. It must both 
lean on old truth and grasp new fact; and its success (as 
I said a moment ago) in doing this, is a matter for the 
individual's appreciation. When old truth grows, then, by 
new truth's addition, it is for subjective reasons (James, 
1907/1913, p. 63). 
In the temporal, mutable, evolving universe, the generation of 
truth is the responsibility of each individual; at the same time, ) 
truth accumulates 'for subjective reasons': 
We say this theory solves it on the whole more satisfactorily 
than that theory; but that means more satisfactorily to 
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ourselves, and individuals will emphasize their points of 
satisfaction differently. To a certain degree, therefore, 
everything here is plastic (James, 1907/1913, p. 61). 
Because everything here is plastic, the truths that man creates have 
implications for the evolution of the universe. James warns us that 
beliefs must correlate with the sensible world: "Woe to him whose 
beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in 
his experience; they will lead him nowhere or else make false connex-
ions" (James, 1907/1913, p. 205). It is impossible to discuss James' 
theory of truth in relation to science while ignoring the broad 
functional implications of pragmatism. Truth is not simply related to 
the correlation between ideas and sensible objects; it has to have 
some intrinsic 'value' for the individual as well: truth is: 
essentially bound up with the way in which one moment in our 
experience may lead us towards other moments which it will 
be worth while to have been led to. Primarily, and on the 
common-sense level, the truth of a state of mind means this 
function of a leading that is worth while (James, 1907/1913, 
p. 205). 
The value of any truth is thus calculated in terms of its usefulness 
for the believer (see James, 1907/1913, p. 204). And because the 
evolution of the universe depends on individuals creating new truths, 
these truths have real, practical consequences. 
James writes that the human •hope is always for an absolute type 
of truth which will tie the whole world together, even if it appears 
unlikely that this hope will ever be realized: 
The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will 
ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we 
imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge. 
It runs on all fours with the perfectly wise man, and with the 
absolutely complete experience; and, if these ideals are ever 
realized, they will all be realized together (James, 1907/1913, 
pp. 222-223). 
It is therefore interesting to speculate, in light of James' hopes 
for a unified, predictive science and an ethically rationalized 
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cosmos, that the methods of pragmatism are, finally, only steps 
along the way towards an ultimately unified epistemology: "Like the 
half-truths, the absolute truth will have to be made, made as a 
relation incidental to the growth of a mass of verification exper-
ience to which the half-true ideas are all along contributing their 
quota" (James, 1907/1913, p. 224). This interpretation of James' 
aims would be compatible with his pluralistic world-view and his 
'voluntarist' account of consciousness. As Marcell writes: 
Since, from the point of view of James's psychology, human 
will and purpose played such a dominant role in the con-
struction of ideas in the first place, the validity of the 
pragmatic criteria of their verification implied a great 
deal more than a simple epistemological device for estimating 
an idea's validity. Pragmatism suggested that in a plural-
istic, additive world in which novelty was real and the will 
truly creative, history, as men experienced it, was by nature 
voluntaristic. When James proclaimed that the value of an 
idea was to be judged by how effectively it served to "carry 
us prosperously from one part of our experience to any other 
part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, 
simplifying; saving labor", he revealed how pragmatism assumed 
and built upon a particular philosophy of history (Marcell, 
1974, p. 187). 
The creation of truth is an ambulatory process: its generation 
depends on the specific consequences that holding any belief has 
for the individual. It looks towards the future: it is cumulative 
and progressive (see James, 1907/1913, pp. 122-123, 205, 218,224-225, 
257). Although James insists that scientific truth is subject to 
the processes of temporalism and mutability, he still looks towards 
the possibility of a science which provides ultimate truths about 
the universe because the mind is so tightly wedged between the various 
levels of experience. Marcell makes this point in regard to morality 
but it can equally well be applied to James' theory of scientific 
progress: 
But James's pragmatic pluralism too had a logic, and while 
it denied the coercive fatalism of rationalism's block 
universe, it also had to show that there was sufficient 
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continuity in the universe for human thought and action to 
proceed effectively and meaningfully from one object and 
point in time to another. If morality could be real only in 
a universe of chance and choice, it could similarly be real 
only in a universe in which there was a certain amount or 
quality of continuity in experience. While accepting empiri-
cism's external multiplicity, James had to show that Wright's 
nihilistic, morally naked universe was inadequate to the 
larger demands of experienced reality (Marcell, 1974,p. 185). 
Marcell goes on to show that James' objection to the empiricism of 
Wright and the associationists lay in their insufficient attention to 
the fact that experience was not made up of discontinuous and unre-
lated events, and their failure to see that percepts and concepts were 
always inextricably related in consciousness (see Marcell, 1974, pp. 
185-186). This illuminates James' view of science because it recalls 
his insistence that man's consciousness is the 'glue' which holds 
things together in the shifting, temporal universe. 
Finally, James' pragmatic view of science is compatible with 
White's insistence that James is moving towards a holistic epistemo- 
logy, and away from the trialism of the Principles. Scientific theories 
work only when they integrate the whole stock of previous truths with 
new experiences. At the same time, James' attempts at constructing 
a holistic approach to human knowledge place certain constraints on 
the construction of an independently temporal, mutable model of science. 
As James shows in his example re the discovery of radium, the 'accept-
able' explanation of the phenomenon was the explanation which coincid-
ed with the principles concerning the conservation of matter and 
energy (see James, 1907/1913, pp. 62-63, quoted above p. 499). Dis-
coveries are made in the context of existing theory and 'opinion', 
and anomalous discoveries are integrated into existing theory with as 
little disruption to the theory as possible. He still regards 
scientific progress as largely cumulative, so that his 'holistic' 
account of experience includes the whole stock of human experience 
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and opinion. At the same time, James recognizes that scientific theories 
are discarded when "human experience boils over those limits" (James, 
1907/1913, p. 223), so that the 'limits' of a scientific theory are 
casual, not absolute (see James, 1907/1913, p. 223). What satisfies 
the demand for truth in one era will no longer satisfy its demands in 
the next. James emphasizes the relative, mutable nature of the 'truths' 
of science. And he emphasizes the consequences of scientific truths 
in relation to the future of science itself and the future of concrete 
reality (see James, 1907/1913, pp. 186-187). But his failure to over-
come the problems of rationalism in regard to the necessary truths, 
and his seeming reluctance to rank science with ethics and metaphysics 
in the reconstruction of the world-view prevented him from developing 
all of the implications of his revised, evolutionary view of scientific 
progress. 
Metaphysics and Ethics  
• The heart of James' pragmatic theory of truth lies in its application 
to moral, metaphysical, and religious questions. "The pragmatic method 
is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise 
might be interminable" (James, 1907/1913, p. 45). James claims that 
the pragmatic method solves these disputes by looking at the consequences  
of holding either position; if there is no potential difference in the 
consequences of accepting either position, 'practically speaking', the 
theories are the same. If different consequences would accrue, then 
a 'real' basis for choosing one position over the other exists and a 
real choice can be made. But he also insists that the pragmatic method 
can be used for arriving at 'true' beliefs (see Thayer, 1968, p. 135). 
James argued that metaphysical, moral, and religious hypotheses were 
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not only psychologically believable (and thus 'true' for the individual), 
but that these could be made true when the individual acted in accord-
ance with his beliefs. He could make this argument because he correlat-
ed truth with consequences, and because he translated the meaning of 
metaphysical statements to correspond with practical consequences in 
the world (see James, 1907/1913, pp. 45-50, 85-122). The individual 
therefore had to perform three basic operations: he had to evaluate 
metaphysical and ethical hypotheses in terms of their meanings or potent-
ial consequences for action, and he had to select hypotheses to be true 
for himself on the basis of their potential consequences. He then had 
to put the selected belief into operation, so that its truth would no 
longer be a matter of faith, but would be verified or falsified by 
felt consequences or afferent sensations. 
James' pragmatic theory of ethics and metaphysics is much more 
closely tied to his psychology than is his theory of science. We have 
already shown that James' psychological theories of reality and volition 
were constructed so that the possibilities for indeterminism and free 
will were maximized. The pragmatic theory oi truth thus has its roots 
in the 'active' function of belief and in volition with effort. The 
discussion of volition with effort emphasized that ethical and meta-
physical ideas had to eventually be discharged as muscular movements: 
changes in the sensible world could only be mediated through the trans-
lation of anti-impulsive ideas into impulsive ideas--that is, ideas 
with immediate implications for action. This translation process effect-
ively means that abstract universals must be transformed into ideas 
about particulars in order to determine their 'meanings'for the indivi-
dual. James' pragmatic theory of truth is therefore largely concerned 
with the construction of a method for ensuring that ethical and meta-
physical ideas can be evaluated in terms of their possible consequences 
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or 'values' for the individual and for the universe: 
It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes 
collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to 
this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There 
can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference 
elseaere--no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express 
itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct conse-
quent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, 
and somewhen. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to 
find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, 
at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that 
world-formula be the true one (James, 1907/1913, pp. 49-50). 
'True' beliefs, religious or otherwise, serve the purpose of making 
the individual 'feel' better about life; more importantly, they impel 
him to take particular actions that he might not perform if he believed 
in different postulates. This is James' rationale for claiming that 
God's "services are needed in the dust of our human trials" .(James, 
1907/1913, p. 72). James' pragmatic notion of God was ,specifically 
devised to meet the emotional and ethical demands for a religion which 
would be compatible with evolutionary doctrine. Evolutionary theory 
had been correlated with materialism and atheism; James countered the 
materialist arguments by transforming biological evolutionary postulates 
into theological, ethical, and metaphysical sL,stems. But his theory 
of truth is a strange mixture of logic and polemic for he was simultan-
eously attempting to construct a new theory of truth and to justify 
his personal religious and ethical conclusions. James emphasized that 
the comfort afforded by certain beliefs justifies their existence and 
the Varieties affords many examples of his pluralism and tolerance in 
this regard. But James is not exactly true to his pluralism when he 
looks at the consequences of holding certain ethical and metaphysical 
positions. He wrote: "The true is the name of whatever proves itself 
to be good in the way of belief, and good too, for definite assignable 
reasons" (James, 1907/1913, p. 76). He then quickly went on to develop 
his meaning of 'good' in relation to 'true', stating that: 
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If there be any life that it is really better we should lead, 
and if there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us 
to lead that life, then it would be really better for us to 
believe in that idea, unless, indeed, belief in it incidentally  
clashed with other greater vital benefits (James, 1907/1913, 
157-7677 
This statement gives us the key to understanding the limits of 
James' pluralism as it applied to the choice of beliefs, for now James 
goes on to use the pragmatic method to specifically demonstrate the 
concrete advantages of choosing certain beliefs, and discarding others: 
He was interested in the import of metaphysical and theological 
"world formulae" in the life of the individual. If these 
formulae are not merely verbal, they must have effects on the 
practice of those who uphold them, and James insisted •that such 
effects could be traced. The belief that a seeing force and 
not a blind one governs the universe creates optimism, and thus 
confidence in the future is the effective ,pragmatic meaning of 
the terms "cosmic design" and "divine creator". Whereas Peirce 
had construed practical consequences to be those which are 
experimentally and publically determinable for the community, 
James interpreted "practical" to mean the particular import 
that a belief has in the life of the individual (Ezorsky, 1967, 
p. 427). 
An ethical or metaphysical idea can be accepted as true if it 
potentially has concrete consequences for the individual. Metaphysical 
axioms--for example, "nothing can happen without a cause" (James, 1890, 
2, p. 611)--direct our search for sensible objects and relations which 
partially verify the belief. Psychologically, these sensible objects 
and relations serve as facts, and the idea is accepted as true. But 
the meaning of the potentially 'true' idea is changed when James aligns 
the 'truth' of its consequences with 'goodness'. 'Divine creator' prag-
matically translated becomes 'confidence in the future'. The trans-
lation of meaning is crucial; it moves the discussion away from the 
creator as a being with particular attributes and towards one of the 
possible ethical effects of believing in him. It also moves the dis-
cussion away from ordinary verification procedures and into the realm 
of personal values. 'Good' has a potential double meaning here: an 
531. 
idea is 'good' or 'true' when it leads to the discovery of sensible 
correlates. But it also seems to be 'good' or 'true' if James believes 
that it has a positive ethical value. 
Whether James is justified in making these translations is debatable; 
Russell asserted that the terms do not have the same meaning, nor do 
they express the same propositions (see Russell, 1910/1966, pp. 124-126). 
Russell also criticizes James, because, he says, it is extremely dif-
ficult to predict the actual consequences of holding many beliefs. 
Russell uses the example of the idealistic beliefs that inspired the 
French Revolution to make his point. Believing in these doctrines had 
many consequences--some obviously good and some obviously bad. "It 
is almost impossible," says Russell, "to disentangle what the effects 
have been; and even if we could ascertain them, our judgment as to 
whether they have been good or bad would depend upon our political 
opinions" (Russell, 1910/1966, p. 119; see also p. 118). If the hist-
orical consequences of holding a belief cannot be determined, then it 
must be equally impossible to predict,the consequences (or determine 
the meaning) of holding any given belief. It is therefore difficult 
to conclude that the belief is true because of the consequences that 
can be expected to ensue, or to accept partial sensible evidence as 
actually verifying the truth of the belief. 
Lovejoy's point that a pragmatic epistemology needs be predictive 
of consequences is relevant here (see Lovejoy, 1963, p. 12), because, 
in light of Russell's criticism, the question arises as to whether prag-
matism can be constructed as a predictive theory for all types of 
questions or whether its predictive 'value' must be limited to questions 
about the existence of sensible objects where there is a large sum of 
experience to 'back up' the prediction. James himself wrote that 
'experience has a way of boiling over'. 
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John Dewey makes several cogent criticisms ofJames' theory in his 
article "What pragmatism means by practical". Dewey begins his argu-
ment with the statement that 'meaning' differs according to the type . 
of object at stake. But as he shows, the function of meaning changes 
according to the nature of its objects, and Dewey is quite justified 
in demanding that James clarify the direction of the intended shift in 
meaning. Dewey writes: 
But "returning with it into experience we gain a more confiding 
outlook on the future. If not a blind force, but a seeing force, 
runs things, we may reasonably expect better issues. This vague  
confidence in the future is the sole pragmatic meaning at present  
discernable in the terms design and designer"... .Now is this 
meaning intended to replace the meaning of a "seeing force which 
runs things"? Or is it intended to superadd a pragmatic value 
and validation to that concept of a seeing force? Or does it 
mean that, irrespective of the existence of any such object, a 
belief in it has that value? Strict pragmatism would seem to 
require the first interpretation (Dewey, 1916, p. 314). 
Dewey's conclusion that 'true' pragmatism required the first 'trans-
lation' hypothesis is consistent with Russell's and leads Dewey to 
make a further criticism (again comparable with Russell's) regarding 
the consequences of ideas and their truth or falsity: 
But at other times any good which flows from acceptance of 
a belief is treated as if it were an evidence, insofar, of the 
truth of the idea. This holds particularly when theological 
notions are under consideration. Light 'would be thrown upon 
how Mr. James conceives this matter by statements on such 
points as these: if ideas terminate in good consequences, but 
yet the gooJness of the consequences was no part of the intention 
of an idea,' does the goodness have any verifying force? If the 
goodness of consequences arises from the context of the idea 
in belief rather than from the idea itself, does it have any 
verifying force? If an idea leads to consequences which are 
good in the one respect only of fulfilling the intent of the 
idea (as when one drinks a liquid to test the idea that it is 
a poison), does the badness of the consequences in every other 
respect detract froul the verifying force of consequences (Dewey, 
1916, pp. 319-320). 18 
18. Russell's and Dewey's criticisms were applied to James' pragmatic 
theory as a whole and not simply in relation to ethical decisions and 
their meanings. Their comments seem, however, to have special relev-
ance to ethical issues and have therefore been discussed in this section. 
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We would assume that the 'badness' of the consequences in this 
case does not detract from the 'truth' of the idea. But Dewey is quite 
right in pointing Out that 'truth' cannot be equated with 'goodness'. 
The verification process in this sense is a testing process if we ac-
cept Russell's statement that the consequences of holding any ethical 
idea are unpredictable. Furthermore, once the idea has been 'verified' 
in the sensible world, the task of evaluating the results still awaits 
us as Dewey shows. The results can be examined from two perspectives: 
the intention of the idea can be assessed in determining whether 'good-
ness' was an intended part of the idea. If it was not, it is diffi-
cult to see how 'goodness' helps to verify the idea. The perception 
that the consequences were good would constitute an addition to the 
perception that the idea was true, the 'object' discovered. Similarly, 
if the consequences are bad, the idea itself may still be true: the 
liquid was poison. The consequences of any verified idea have future 
consequences for behaviour so that new intentions are formed on the 
basis that an idea is true and that it has positive or negative conno-
tations. 
In moral decisions the necessity of assessing the consequences of 
enacting any particular belief is particularly important, for ethical 
beliefs, by definition, do not have predetermined consequences--pre-
determined in the sense that the consequences are necessarily pre-
dictable according to empirically derived ideas about the physical world. 
The bottle contains poison or it does not; our physical constitution 
allows us •to perform the action or it does not, and whereas we may be 
• ignorant of the consequences in store for us, James' realism forced 
him to make the division between those actions where will is efficacious 
and those where it is not (see James, 1890, 2, p. 560). But ethical 
postulates do not have an a priori correspondence to particular objects, 
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and as Chap. 6 demonstrated, James took a nominalist stand and postu-
lated that abstract conceptions must be translated into ideas about 
particulars. The drunkard must realize that drinking the particular 
glass of brandy makes him a drunkard. The theist must similarly find 
ways of translating his belief in God into an impulsive idea which can 
be verified, which can yield 'true' particulars. 
Earlier we stated that the 'particular' truths discovered were used , 
as partial ratifications for the abstract notion in consciousness. 
Therefore, the evaluation of consequences is particularly important. 
There are several steps in the over-all process of 'verifying' a meta-
physical axiom or ethical postulate: first, the axiom or postulate must 
be translated into a particular idea which can be enacted in the world. 
Second, the results must be assessed for their truth or falsity; that 
is, particular consequences are predicted--or, to put it another way, 
particular afferent sensations are expected to result. If the pre-
dicted consequences ensue (the sensations are experienced), then the 
idea is true; if not, it is false. If true, then the individual 
must assess its relation to the abstract truth itself. This is the 
third step of the process and the one which troubles Russell, for the 
actions taken to 'make' ideas true often have diverse consequences and 
the 'goodness' or 'badness' of the belief is not unequivocal (see 
Russell, 1910/1966, p. 119). The pragmatist has the difficult task 
of selecting a mode of action which will not contradict the ideal belief 
itself, and he also has the equally difficult task of separating the 
true effects of his action from the whole range of consequences which 
might be related to it. Only then can he decide whether or not his 
original intention--his ideal--was verified in the sense of yielding 
the desired consequences. 
This explains Russell's emphasis on the distinction that must be 
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made between criterion and meaning. He claims that "The arguments 
of the pragmatists are almost wholly directed to proving that utility 
is a criterion; that utility is the meaning of truth is then supposed 
to follow" (Russell, 1910/1966, p. 121). Russell demonstrates that 
a property A is only a criterion of a property B when "the same objects, 
possess both" (Russell, 1910/1966, p. 120). Furthermore, property A 
is a useful criterion of B if it is easier to discover whether an 
object possesses property A than whether it possesses property B 
(see Russell, 1910/1966, p. 120). Russell shows that properties A and 
B may be the only intersecting properties the two objects share. In 
this case, the pragmatic equation between the two may lead the indivi-
dual to treat the two objects or ideas as the 'same' when in fact 
important differences exist between them. 
Dewey asserts that James' theory of truth was put forth as part of 
an 'anti-rationalist' crusade, so that his main objectives were to 
show that truth does not have an a priori status; instead, it is made. 
James also wished to show that truths are valuable because they are 
dynamic and practical rather than static (see Dewey, 1916, pp. 320-321). 
Dewey writes that "The special question of how truths are made is not 
particularly relevant to this anti-rationalist crusade" (Dewey, 1916, 
p. 321). This is unjustified: the satisfactory resolution of how 
truths are made is relevant to the outcome of James' battle with 
rationalism. But there are constructions in James' pre-pragmatist 
philosophy and psychology which seem to account for his apparent 'blind-
ness' to some of the philosophical issues Dewey raises. 
James emphasized that the meaning came from the practical import 
a belief has for the individual. Thus, the meaning of 'divine creator' 
could be optimism for one individual and pessimism for another, so that 
pragmatism is non-predictive. The pragmatic method can be applied to 
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determine the differences between two theories but the meanings that 
are abstracted and translated into practical or satisfying consequences 
are not predictable from the structure of the theories themselves. 
And this is where the will to believe becomes so important. The prag-
matic meanings are not expressed within the terminology used in reli-
gious, metaphysical, or moral postulates. 
These postulates have no obvious implications for particular actions, 
and when they are given the status of absolute truths, the kind of be-
lief inspired may even be passive in nature. But if we ask as James 
does, what the consequences are of believing in one theory or another, 
- 
then the perspective changes so that the emphasis is necessarily placed 
on the particular acts an individual performs in the light of his belief. 
The consequences are not predictable in any universal sense when the 
perspective shifts, but they can now be related to particular acts 
that the individual performs, for he is saying in effect "I believe 
and I will act in this way or that--I will act as if my belief were 
actually true and verified." The delineation of particular consequences 
leads to the affirmation of particular actions and these actions, in 
turn, have real consequences in the physical world. 
The truth or falsity of the belief is thus equated with the perform-
ance of specific acts. Volition with effort, as opposed to ideo-motor 
action, is necessary for the performance of any action based upon meta-
physical, moral or religious hypotheses, because, by definition, the re-
quired acts run counter to the 'instinctive history of the race'. Actions 
performed in this way require mental effort for there is nothing in the 
physical world per se to facilitate an unhesitating psychological fiat 
for their performance. They run counter to habit, counter to ordinary 
adjustment, and it is only through clearly willing their enactment that 
psychologically speaking, the individual can make them happen at all. 
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From a psychological point of view, James' translations of metaphysi-
cal, ethical,and religious ideas into ideas which have concrete conse-
quences for the individual is the only means through which these ideas 
can have any real effect in the world. If they have no consequences 
for behaviour, they have no real consequences at all. 
It must be emphasized that James did not intend his theory of truth 
to be loosely used in selecting the possible consequences of espousing 
one idea over another for its sheer expedient value (see Dewey, 1916, 
pp. 327-328; Thayer, 1968, pp. 152-153; Marcell, 1974, p. 155; and 
Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 210). The means for deciding metaphysical 
issues is based on the will to believe (see Thayer, 1968, p. 153), and 
the will to believe may only be exercised in cases where the option is 
living, forced, and momentous and where the proposition cannot be decid-
ed on intellectual grounds. Moral and metaphysical decisions are thus 
tightly wedged between sensible facts and scientific 'truths'. If a 
decision can be made on criteria other than faith, then it must be made 
according to those criteria. Further, decisions on faith must be com-
patible with the stock of existing truths gle_ned from experience, 
from logical/mathematical systems, and from the empirical evidence 
of science. We are not free to believe whatever we want to believe, 
and we are not free to employ simple expediency as a criterion for 
accepting or rejecting any option. 
James' theory of truth is a functional theory. As Thayer writes: 
In the case of truth, we are directed accordingly to consider 
how ideas affect the situation in which they occur with respect 
to the purposes and interests involved. But this is to observe 
and talk about performances, or operations of ideas in relation 
to all the other constituent conditions of a situation. Funda- 
mentally, truth or falsehood (just as usefulness or uselessness) 
pertain to operations rather than to the things operating. 
Specifically, where our choices and purposes are clear, ideas, 
beliefs, or statements that operate effectively relative to those 
purposes are "true"; if ineffective or obstructive in operating 
to the same end, they are "false" (Thayer, 1968, p. 161). 
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As Thayer goes on to say, judgements of truth or falsity are relative 
to the situation, but once the operations are performed, though these 
operations differ, depending on the mode of experience involved, the 
truth or falsity of the judgements are as objective as is possible or 
desirable (see Thayer, 1968, p. 162). But what 'true' judgement means 
must be analysed. We must ask what it is that becomes true. When theism 
is accepted because of the optimism it brings into the world, and theism 
and optimism are equated in James' translation of terms into their conse-
quences, what becomes true are the positive effects of optimism in the 
world. The metaphysical quandary as to the actual existence of God 
remains unsolved. What we are testing are the specific effects of believ-
ing in God in particular ways. James theorizes that belief in theism, 
in free will etc., may eventually add to the likelihood that these 
hypotheses are actually true (see James, 1902/1923, P.  519); he can go 
no further than this, and it is highly questionable whether or not he 
can go this far within the confines of the pragmatic theory of truth. 
And in his radical empiricism, he concludes that philosophers can only 
debate about those things which can be drawn -rom experience (see James, 
1909, p. xii). 
If we look at James' pragmatic theory of truth in relation to the 
criticisms made of it, we end up with two possible paradigms. As 
Thayer,and Dewey before him, have pointed out, James denies that there 
is a distinction between the process of verifying an idea as true and 
an idea itself as true. The process of verifying an idea is an active 
experience, where certain events and consequences are part of the exper-
ience, so that truth is equated with the function of the idea. This 
is quite different from knowing whether or not a statement is actually 
true. When metaphysical, moral, and religious hypotheses are tested, 
this obliteration of the distinction between the process of verification 
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and the truth or falsity of the idea itself becomes critical if we 
are concerned with establishing absolute truths in regard to these 
ideas. If we say that a metaphysical idea is true within the process 
of its verification and this process is connected with certain active 
ways of functioning within a situation, then the idea--for example, 
"God exists"--is 'true' as it operates in relation to the situation of 
the individual. But the idea is 'true' only within the verification 
process itself. The consequences of believing in any 'idea' and act-
ing in accordance with the idea have traditionally been separated from 
the ultimate truth or falsity of the idea itself. 
And this is the very distinction that James is trying to get rid 
of--that is, the joint Platonic and rationalist position that truth is 
independent of human agency. Had he accepted that the verification 
process and the 'truths' themselves could be distinguished he would, 
once again, have been led back to the old empiricist problem of the in-
ability of the mind to know anything beyond itself. Instead, he tries 
to develop ,a theory of truth wherein the verification process is equated 
with truth because this allows him to build ur a body of truth based 
upon man's concrete experiences. That is to say, he extends the range 
of potential experience for the individual so that moral and metaphysi-
cal ideas can now have real effects in the world. Truth in this sense 
must always be connected with an ongoing, verification process; it must 
be completely manufactured in the concrete world, for that world in 
itself does not contain any particular objects which correspond to the 
human ideals (see Brennan, 1961, p, 35). Truth as process in this 
sense is compatible with James' notion of a mutable, temporal world. 
Further, the fact that the consequences of selecting a particular meta-
physic or religion are not predictable is consistent with James' 
emphasis on individualism, and James would have made his theory more 
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convincing had he tried to link the ultimate selectivity that exists 
in the metaphysical-ethical sphere of reality as he describes it in 
the Principles, with his indeterminist view of the universe and his 
notions of pluralism. ,Instead, his rather rigid definitions of 'mean-
ings' and his strong injunctions as to which alternative yields the 
most 'good' are misleading, for James at times seems to be forcing a 
position as rigid and deterministic as the old Absolutism he personally 
and philosophically reacted against. 
Conclusions  
James summed up his theory of truth as follows: 
'The true', to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the  
way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient  
in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; 
and expedient in the long run and on the whole of the course; 
for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't 
necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily 
(James, 1907/1913, p. 222). 
'Truth' is equated with correct or satisfactory ways of thinking, as 
'right' is with satisfactory ways of behaving, for 'true' ideas and 
'right' actions taken together 'pay' when theL; result in predicted af-
ferent sensations. But 'true' ideas and 'right' ways of behaving are 
not verified or verifiable for all time because mind and world are 
contantly changing. The mind must continually accommodate itself to 
new conditions. Moreover, new ideas in the mind facilitate the discov-
ery of new objects and relations in the world, and actions generated 
as a result of novel ideas produce real changes in the physical world. 
Finally, ideas have many ways of 'working' within the context of meet-
ing the demands made on individuals by the various worlds of reality. 
Each world makes different 'demands' and the processes of validation 
vary as a function of the nature of the demands made by each mode of 
reality. James explicitly states that his theory of truth is unified 
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because it stresses that the consequences of ideas determine their mean-
ings and because truth is made (see James, 1907/1913, p. 218; quoted 
above, p.493). But beyond this, the meanings of truth vary according 
to the nature of the problem at. hand, and this is why James claimed that 
more than one method of truth was necessary. 
Both the methods of truth and the 'true' ideas that they generate 
have been shown to differ substantially as functions of the reality they 
are aimed towards. And this is consistent with James' claims for prag-
matism, What does appear to be problematic is the finding that the 'be-
liefs', 'facts', or 'truths' gleaned from one level of experience are 
not directly 'translatable' into 'truths' appropriate to another level 
while James sometimes indicates that they are. This results because 
James does not properly distinguish between criteria and meaning and 
because the 'consequences' of ethical beliefs do not necessarily 'veri-
fy' the original postulate. All that they verify is the individual's 
belief in the postulate (See Russell, 1910/1966, p. 124). 
White claims that James is moving towards a holistic methodology 
(see White, 1973, P. 202), but this statement :s applicable only to the 
general way in which problems are approached (that is, the focus on the 
consequences), and to the final assimilation of new truths into the 
whole stock of opinions. It cannot be applied to the individual verifi-
cation processes because the 'meaning' of what is verified in each real-
ity is not consistent. 'Truths' have elements in common but they are 
not equivalent, and while this is consistent with James' insistence that 
there are many kinds of truth, it is still problematic because the mean-
ings of the common elements change as a function of the type of truth 
that is being generated. The consequences of believing in the objects 
of the sensible world and the necessary truths are pre-determined. The 
objects of science occupy a halfway place between these two rigid worlds, 
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so that some of the consequences of believing in a theoretical postulate 
are predetermined; some are subject to change. This contrasts with 
the consequences of believing in metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical 
postulates where the consequences verify the belief while not necessar-
ily verifying the truth of the original postulate itself. Abstract ideas 
are therefore divided into two categories: the necessary truths trans-
cend their 'human' origins to become absolutes awaiting discovery, while 
metaphysical, aesthetic, and ethical postulates of the same psychogenetic 
origin 'transcend' their origins in the absolute commitment given over 
to them by the believing individual, but are not self-verifying proposi-
tions, nor are the consequences of believing in them 'translatable' into 
verification of the postulates themselves. 
The other common element--that truth is made--similarly has differ-
ent meanings depending on the type of truth that is sought. At the 
structural. level, the mind is a cohesive amalgam of the truths gleaned 
from the various sub-worlds so that 'truths' interact with one another, 
and the individual's motivation to perform this action rather than that 
stems from the whole collection of 'truths'. r9ncepts from one sub-
world obviously interact to fund behaviour--the most outstanding example 
of this interaction being scientific discoveries. But there is nothing 
in James' pragmatism to suggest that the 'holism' goes beyond this inter-
action and much to suggest that the separations between sub-worlds are 
maintained. 
Pragmatism and the Principles. 
The Pragmatism provides a valuable extension for James psychology, 
whatever its failings, for it shows how James intended the mind to act-
ually function in the world--how he intended consciousness to relate to 
the demands of the various sub-world. Furthermore, there are the 
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beginnings of a psychological holism as White points out, in the em-
phasis on consequences and the 'whole stock of opinions'. The pragmatic 
writings show, more clearly than the psychology, how tightly the mind 
is wedged between its various 'real worlds'. 
These real worlds can be depicted as a psychological network which 
acts to limit credulity so that the full stream of consciousness acts 
as a selective mechanism for the acceptance or rejection of incoming or 
internally generated information as potentially true or false. The open-
ings for free will are narrow and restricted by the heavy weight of ex-
tant belief networks so that acts of free will typically occur 'outside' 
of the extant stock of opinions--a decision is made to 'believe' because  
the old stock of ideas cannot provide evidence pro or con for the compel-
ling idea, and the individual feels that a decision is mandatory. However, 
decisions to believe in unverifiable propositions can also be made against 
other demands in consciousness, so that the individual exerts effort to 
hold the novel ideal in consciousness, over and above older, perhaps more 
instinctive ideas. This whole process is possible because there is a 
certain tension within the stream of consciousess itself between the 
various systems of 'realities', since all systems are incomplete and 
partial. 
James' aim was to create a unified, voluntaristic, functional con-
ception of consciousness and the beginning of a 'holistic' approach to 
mind--given in the Principles as the structural unity of the stream of 
of consciousness--is ratified by the pragmatic writings. He hoped to 
extend his psychological theory by asserting that all beliefs must be 
assessed in terms of their consequences for the individual so that con-
sciousness could have a unified function correlating with its unified 
structure. The focus is once again on the active aspect of the idea so 
that pragmatism is the philosophical analogue of the psychology: all 
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impulses automatically discharge themselves into movements unless inhib-
ited and the philosophical analysis must therefore concentrate on the 
consequences, actions, or movements that result from holding any belief 
in consciousness. James' ratification of the reflex model in psychology 
had lasting consequences for his philosophy. Unfortunately, neither 
James' psychology nor his pragmatism attain the unity or holism he hoped 
for. The functional dualisms of the Principles assert themselves once 
again in the pragmatism.within the diverse methodologies of truth. 
Perry gives a good description of the 'world-view' James was 
attempting to construct and the role of consiousness in that nascent 
world-view: 
In - Philosophy 3, after announcing that pragmatism would be 
his method and "pluralistic panpsychism" his doctrine, he 
first expounded the instrumental view of scientific laws; 
and, in order to explain the harmony between nature and the 
scientific mind, advanced Peirce's hypothesis of the evolution 
of the physical order through the "survival of the coherent". 
Turning to the problem of the unity of the world, he explained 
such degrees and varieties of unity as the world possesses, 
in terms of experienced relations. To avoid subjectivism, 
he argued for the "conterminousness" of minds, that is, their 
convergence in or towards the same experiences--defending 
this view against the skeptic on the one hand and the 
absolutist on the other. Borrowing Peirc,:'s term, he adopted 
the "tychistic" theory that the ultimate origins of things 
are both plural and spontaneous. No philosophy, he said, 
can really avoid the recognition of a sheer datum at some 
point. But beings of independent and accidental origin 
can come into interaction with one another, through a 
spreading "consciousness of transition". This notion 
suggests different spans of consiousness and the possibility 
of a consciousness such as God with a span far exceeding 
that of man. Change occurs in "finite increments"; and 
the "quantity of being" is finite, though conceptual space 
and time be infinite. Such a view of the world is not only 
the most economical description of the discoverable facts, 
but commends itself as the best postulate for action. It 
eliminates the problem of evil, and "goes with empiricism, 
personalism, democracy and freedom" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
pp. 373-374). 
The human mind, in this context, gives the world its coherence; it 
does this in terms of the relations of experiences. Experience is 
extended into action and the world becomes more 'practically' and 
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'intellectually' intelligible.
19 
In using pragmatism in this sense, 
James is extending the structure of consciousness laid down in the 
Principles and the Pragmatism thus provides the necessary link between 
James' psychology and his radical empiricism and pluralism. 
James believed that the pragmatic theory of truth was simply a 
collective name for the various processes whose only common elements 
were that they manufactured truths and that those truths paid at some 
level of reality. Given the internal differences between the methods 
of truth and their consequences, it is necessary to look briefly at 
the relations between the different types of truth. Using the prag-
matic method, the 'optimism' that is generated by believing in God, 
and the house that is predicted to lie at the end of the cow-path are 
alike in that both the optimism and the house are consequences of the 
ideas. The ideas pay--it is useful for us to believe them to be true--
because by finding the house we save ourselves (see James, 1907/1913, 
pp. 205-207); by believing in God, we promote good in the world and 
'save ourselves' in a wider context. The processes of verification 
are obviously different in both cases and the means of assuming the 
belief to be true in terms of the payment of particular consequences 
also differ in both cases. Finding the house at the end of the path 
verifies the belief that it might be there, The original concept-- 
that we wish to be saved, or that it would be to the good were we to 
be saved, leads to a concentration on the particular means by which 
we are to be saved, so that the idea of connecting the percept of the 
19. It is possible to hypothesize that James believed that as the 
world became more rational and intelligible, the internal problems 
in the psychology and the pragmatism would be resolved. The problem 
with this interpretation, however, is that the particular internal 
difficulties of the pragmatism were not recognized as problems by 
James himself. 
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path to the notion of a house at the end of it can be considered the 
'right' conception or the 'particularized' conception of the more 
abstract notion of survival. Finding the house, then, pays for the 
abstract notion: that we desired to be saved is verified by the set 
of actions we take. But the actions we take as a result of believing 
in the existence of God only serve to verify that we believe in God, 
as Russell demonstrated. They cannot show anything about the exist-
ence or non-existence of God. 
Furthermore, the consequences of believing in •the existence of 
the house are definite; the house is there or it isn't, so that we ap-
peal to empirical facts to determine the consequences of the belief. 
The consequences of believing in ethical or religious postulates are 
not necessarily empirically verifiable as Russell again demonstrated, 
so that the consequences themselves must be assessed in terms of whether 
they are positive or negative, or more often, a mixture of both. 
James' failure to make these distinctions explicit and his failure to 
show in detail how the consequences themselves must be assessed and 
finally related back through the 'right conception' to the abstract 
ideas is in fact injurious to his pluralistic ideal as Perry describes 
it (see Perry, 1935/1974; 2, pp. 373-374). The example of the house 
and the optimism both show that consequences are applied to the 'right 
conception' rather than the abstract postulate. The consequences may 
validate the postulate simultaneously with the conception or they may 
not. And when the consequences cannot necessarily be seen to simul-
taneously validate the postulate along with the conception, then 
James' failure to take them back up to the original postulate restricts  
the movement of consciousness upwards. 
James gives some thought to this when he states that new truths 
are aligned to the whole stock of opinions, thus extending the range 
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of experience and emphasizing that new truths must make a difference 
to our experiences. Practically, the truths of science may expand 
common-sense understanding of phenomena (see James, 1907/1913, p. 216), 
and they certainly have drastic technological implications (see James, 
1907/1913, pp. 186-187). The translations of moral,metaphysical, and 
religious ideas into practical ideas may eventually serve James' end 
of making this a more moral and equal world for humanity. But the 
processes in themselves remain distinct; the process for discovering 
truth in science cannot be utilized in affirming moral ideas. Nor 
will the 'will to believe'--so indispensible to the concretization 
of moral ideas--do anything in terms of telling us whether or not mole-
cular theory is trite (at least in James' view). The processes of 
verification, and the ideation and action that correspond to them, must 
remain independent. This is of course partly due to James' firm 
espousal of positivism and his corresponding desire to limit the potent-
ial influence of scientific theories upon metaphysical and moral 
systems.
20 
The division between scientific and met.physical hypotheses is 
problematic given James' desire to deyelop a mutable,temporal plural-
istic world-vew.
21 
The will to believe, is, by James' definition, 
applicable only in those cases "where the issues are momentous, living 
and forced, and where no empirical evidence can be discovered to 
20. See Mackenzie, 1977, where he argues that something like the 
'will to believe' is indispensible in affirming the truth of scientific 
theories and is necessary to the adoption of any kind of a realist, 
rather than a positivist, position. 
21. Mills attempts to show that James did in fact link science and 
religion through the will to believe. His analysis is unconvincing 
however, because the only evidence he adduces to support it is to 
argue that James insisted that volition was everything in the production 
of truth (see Mills, 1964, pp. 255-257), 
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resolve the dilemma. Scientific theories do not require the will to 
believe because they are derived from the necessary truths and are 
verified by appeal to the sensible world. Their 'objects' are only 
secondarily verified (see Chap. 4, pp. 261-285), but they are believ-
able or coercive because they provide some evidence for a correspondence 
between the two coercive sub-worlds of sense and necessary truth. 
James' view of scientific progress has substantially changed since 1890. 
Scientific theories are described as useful ways of linking phenomena 
together, so that concepts of atoms and forces are 'useful' concept-
ions; they must not be taken as literal descriptions of what the under-
lying reality is really like (see James, 1907/1913, P. 91). Scienti-
fic theories are also subject to change over time as their usefulness 
is outgrown and they no longer sufficiently explain new experiences 
(see James, 1907/1913, p. 57). That scientific theories must change 
over time is commensurate with James' extension of evolutionary prin-
ciples in his Pragmatism. He is beginning to overcome the rather 
explicit dichotomy between the evolutionary structure of •the stream 
of consciousness and the mechanistic construcdon of the physical 
world that characterized the Principles. That is, evolutionary prin-
ciples are not limited to descriptions of the structure of conscious-
ness per se, but are now more explicitly applied to the products of 
the mind's activity. This is a significant step forward in the philo-
sophication of evolutionary theory for it foreshadows the next stage 
of James' development when he will argue that our perception that the 
world really is temporal and mutable can be used to hypothesize that 
the underlying structures of phemomenal appearances are subject to 
temporal changes (this development is discussed in Chap. 9). 
But James does not altogether succeed in developing an evolution-
ary concept of scientific progress in his pragmatism. He is still 
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hampered by rationalist constraints in his definition of the necessary 
truths which maintain their immutable, absolute status. His failure 
to recognize that the necessary truths can yield different values as 
functions of the systems in which they are embedded, serves to limit 
the possibilities for a major theoretical shift in the scientific 
world itself. And it is almost paradoxical that James' move towards 
a holistic account of consciousness actually works against the develop-
ment of an evolutionary theory of scientific progress. The effect of 
bringing the whole stock of previous truths to bear on any new 'exper-
ience' actually serves to limit the production of radical explanations 
or theories. The 'acceptable' or 'true' theory is the one that dis-
rupts the whole stock of previous truths as little as possible (see 
James, 1907/1913, p. 217;quoted above, pp. 521-522).Thus he concludes 
that scientific theorizing is tightly wedged between the demands of 
the abstract and sensible sub-worlds, and that it is subject to the 
demands of cumulative.human experience. Finally, it is significant 
that James does not use the will to believe to overcome the restraints 
on scientific theorizing. Ethical and metaphysical truths are made 
true largely by going against the accumulation of experience; scienti-
fic hypotheses are not. Therefore, while James argues that atoms and 
forces must not betaken as literal interpretations of underlying 
causes, thus progressing from his 1890 position where he implies that 
the physical world is actually made up of atoms moving to and fro, 
he does not take the next step and argue that new modes of describing 
underlying causes could potentially be generated, and with faith in 
their 'truth', eventually yield verified objects in the physical world. 
The methods of truth are constructed according to the trialistic 
separations of the Principles so that each method is restricted to 
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A definable set of problems. Thus, the methods of truth that apply to 
ethical and metaphysical problems cannot be legitimately applied to 
science for example. The restrictions on the applicability of the methods 
of truth reinforce the continuous or 'progressive (as opposed to a rela-
tivistic, evolutionary) view of human progress which dominates the Prin- 
ciples. This view of progress was related to James' acceptance of the 
'Newtonian' world-view as it applied to scientific progress and his 
early insistence that the metaphysical and ethical rationalization of 
the world would follow on the heels of the scientific rationalization. 
Pragmatism as an evolutionary epistemology. 
The reappearance of a continuous or progressive strand in the 
pragmatism is rooted in the conditions which gave birth to pragmatism. 
Pragmatism has its roots in the empiricist tradition of philosophy as well 
as in evolutionary biology, and the historical conjunction of the two 
had implications for the theory of history which emerged in the early 
pragmatist writings.' Darwin explicitly constructed his biological 
theory of evolution so as to be compatible with the mechanistic model 
of the physical sciences, and with the associationist paradigm of mind. 
Furthermore, evolutionary theory played a major part in reinforcing 
the continuous or progressive view of history, for its achievements 
first appeared to consolidate Newtonian science by extending its range 
into the biological world. Thus, James initially conceived of prag- 
matism not as a radical new mode of conceiving human history, but as 
"A new name for some old ways of thinking". Evolutionary theory in 
this sense becomes the new piece of experience which must be assessed 
and integrated into the whole stock of previous truths and experience. 
That pragmatism went well beyond James' stated aim is a measure of 
the achievement of the early pragmatists. 
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The reappearance of the continuous or progressive view of history 
conflicts with the evolutionary view of progress that James overtly 
defends in the pragmatic writings. We have shown that James attempted 
to redefine all of the sub-worlds of reality in terms of the concepts 
of temporalism and mutability. Furthermore, the evolutionary structure 
of the stream of consciousness is extended by James' major attempt to 
show that the products of conscious activity are subject to changes 
over time. The function of consciousness is to generate a plastic, 
mutable body of truths which change over time, so that the idea that is 
'true' today may no longer hold 'true' tomorrow. The notion that the 
truth of an idea could be assessed in terms of its consequences grew 
out of the transformation of biological evolutionary ideas and the 
theories of truth and meaning were intended to function as sets of 
methods for attaining knowledge in an uncertain universe. James' trans-
formation of evolutionary postulates led him to believe that more than 
one method of truth was necessary if man was ever to be able to compre-
hend the pluralistic worlds of experience. Pragmatism is therefore an 
evolutionary epistemology and it stands as th, first major development 
in post-evolutionary philosophy. At the same time, we have shown that 
pragmatism partially ratifies the static or progressive view of history 
--the world-view that James set out to replace. Thus, the pragmatic 
writings must be regarded as transitional works: the overall conception 
of pragmatism is evolutionary, relativistic, and intended to facili-
tate the growth of knowledge in a recognizably changeable and temporal 
universe, while some aspects of the individual methods of truth hark 
back to the older world-view. 
The transitional nature of the pragmatism can be related to 
several factors. James began his restructuring of the various worlds 
of reality from the perspective of human consciousness so that he 
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first applied the selected evolutionary postulates to the construction 
of consciousness itself, and then went on to apply the same concepts 
to the restructuring of the several worlds that were 'known' by 
consciousness. The particular problems that he encountered in attempt-
ing to restructure the worlds of knowledge werelargely due to his sel-
ection of human consciousness as the centre of the universe, the sel-
ection and transformation of certain biological postulates and the 
rejection of others, and the universal difficulties in recasting the 
world in evolutionary terms that'confronted scientists and philosophers 
alike in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Young, 
1971, pp. 443, 447, 499-500). 
We have already stated that James rejected Darwin's law of the 
survival of the fittest for inclusion in his philosophy, and built his 
psychogenetic theory on the principle of spontaneous variation. He 
therefore attempted to account for the survival of spontaneous varia-
tions in terms of their 'usefulness' for the individual. But he had 
the problem of accounting for how changes actually took place over 
time, and more importantly from James' perspective, how the sentient 
human thinker could infer that real and significant changes were tak-
ing place.
22 
 At the same time, he had the problem of accounting for 
stability in the various worlds of reality--if the truth of today was 
liable to be overthrown by the truth oftomorrow as experience boiled 
over the limits set for it, some truths seemed to James to remain basi-
cally unchanged over time. That is, he was faced with the problem that 
the accumulation of human experience indicated that the universe often 
gave the appearance of 'working' according to definable laws. The 
22. The difficulties James experienced in regard to determining the 
meaning of novelty and causation are discussed in Chaps. 8 and 9. 
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problem was to discover, from an epistemological perspective, what 
these laws might be, or at least how the universe might best be ration-
alized so that human knowledge, although continually subject to change, 
could serve in the prediction of afferent sensations. 
It must be stressed that James was not interested in determining 
what the new physical and biological postulates would be: he was inter-
ested in solving the epistemological problems of how consciousness 
dealt with a temporal, mutable universe, and what the impact of a 
consciousness that was constructed in temporal mutable terms would be 
on that universe. He therefore took consciousness as the centre of 
the universe, so that human consciousness becomes the glue that holds 
the experience of the evolving universe together in some kind of co-
herent form. This is a major reversal of the rationalist-empiricist 
tradition, wherein the universe was held together by mathematical/ 
mechanical laws, the task of mind being to discover these regular laws 
beneath the shifting phenomenal appearances that present themselves 
to perception. Thus, in his pragmatism, James argues that while science 
postulates that the universe seems to be conEJtuted out of atoms, 
forces and ethers, we must not really believe in them (see James, 1907/ 
1913, p. 216; quoted above, p. 521). Scientific theories serve the 
function of rationalizing appearances, but James is insisting that all 
that we really know are the appearances. 
As James extended the principles of temporalism and mutability to 
the various sub-worlds of reality, he was to emphasize the apparently 
static features of human conception to an ever increasing degree (see 
Chap. 9, pp. 655-662). We see in the pragmatic writings that he is 
uneasy with the concepts of temporalism and mutability--this comes 
through in his stress on the importance and weight of the accumulated 
truths of human experience and his continual reminders that new truths 
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must be assimilated into previously discovered truths (see James, 
1907/1913, p. 217; quoted above, pp. 521-522). The rationalist elements 
in James' theories of truth now become more comprehensible: James' 
rationalist tendencies now appear not simply as negative intrusions 
from a rejected world-view, but as structures deliberately incorpor-
ated into the new epistemology to ensure that mind could carry out the 
function of holding the universe together in coherent form. It is 
necessary to keep in mind that the notion that truth was relative and 
not absolute originated with James; if he was unable to free himself 
' completely from rationalistic constraints, he still went farther than 
any of his contemporaries in the immediate philosophication of evolu-
tionary theory. 
James' problems in delineating 'workable' methods of meaning and 
truth are in part due to the difficulty of the task itself, the novelty 
of the endeavour, and finally to the selection by the early pragmatists 
of the 'unproblematic' conditions for their doctrine. James returned 
again and again to British empiricism for the substance of his psycho-
logy and philosophy. He recognized, in many instances, that the empiri-
cist structures had contrary implications for the evolutionary, view 
he was attempting to present, and he attempted to correct these with 
new postulates of his own. At other times he accepted the structures 
of empiricism and incorporated them into his own theories. The effects 
of this selective borrowing show in his psychological theory of reality: 
he accepted the traditional 'breakdown' of experience into the sub-
worlds of facts,and values, and of facts into necessary and contingent, 
analytic and synthetic. When he came to apply his pragmatic methods 
to these sub-worlds for the purpose of showing how truth was generated, 
he was in the position of applying evolutionary constructs to stati- 
cally structured traditional reality. The conditions for the birth of 
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pragmatism in fact proved to be extremely problematic. 
The inconOstences and internal problems of the pragmatic methods 
of truth coupled with the progressive evolutionary stand James took 
on epistemological issues account for the mixed reception his Prag-
matism received. It was a tremendously popular work, exciting comment 
from all quarters of the philosophical establishment.
23 
Pragmatism 
as James conceived it has not been a particularly 'successful' doctrine 
and yet it has left an indelible mark upon modern philosophy, witness 
the number of prominent philosophers--Ayer, White, Thayer, and Morris-- 
who have commented in detail upon it, and who have obviously found 
valuable ideas in it for the extension of their own particular 
philosophical understanding. 
Thayer writes that by concentrating upon the consequences of 
beliefs James, Peirce, and Dewey between them changed the 'focus' of 
empiricism (see Thayer, 1968, p. 137). James' contribution to this 
shift in emphasis is perhaps the most outstanding achievement of his 
pragmatism. As Thayer points out, James was the first to construct a 
theory of truth along the relativistic lines e_manded by the new evolu-
tionary theory. If the theory of truth itself turns out to be several 
distinct methods of truth with different modes of verification, the 
overall idea of truth as relativistic, mutable, temporal, and manu-
factured out of human experience provides at least an alternative 
framework for philosophy. The pragmatic theory of truth forms a major 
portion of James' attempt to restructure empiricism in such a way as 
to bridge the epistemological gap between Newtonian mechanics and 
human experience. James' half-hearted rationalism reflects his 
23. See Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 453-454, 463-468, for a detailed 
account of the reception of James' Pragmatism. James' critics 
included Stumpf, Royce, Everett, Ward, and Hodgson. 
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difficulties in making the shift so that the physical laws which 
describe the universe can, as scientific formulations, be made de-
pendent on experience. There may be absolute universal laws but insofar 
as these may only be assumed to exist beyond human experience in its 
totality, they are not available as hypotheses for philosophy. Truth 
in the Jamesian sense is a distinctly human experience and man finally 
becomes the measure of progress in the world. The theory of truth 
necessitates a view of man's intelligence as the measure of the 
evolving universe, so that any absolute coming together of experience 
must be a human experience. With James' theory of truth, evolutionary 
theory comes of age within philosophy. 
CHAPTER 8  
557. 
RADICAL EMPIRICISM AS THE IDEAL  
The Problem  
James' first systematic description of radical empiricism appears 
in the preface to The meaning of truth ' when he says that he is "inter-
ested in another doctrine in philosophy" which he calls radical empiri-
cism (James, 1909, p. xii). Thus, the pragmatic theory of truth is 
described as "a step of first-rate importance in making radical empiri-
cism prevail" (James, 1909, p. xii). James' commitment to radical 
empiricism was intense: in 1905 he was writing to Ferrari: "I am inter-
ested in a metaphysical system" ("Radical Empiricism") which has been 
forming itself within me, more interested in fact, than I have ever 
been in anything else" (James, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p.387). 
Perry believed that James' enthusiasm for radical empiricism was justi-
fied because: 
the notion of pure experience was his deepest insight, his 
most constructive idea, and his favorite solvent of the 
traditional philosophical difficulties. Pragmatism provided 
his method or technique and pluralism the architecture of 
the finished product; but radical empiricism gave him his 
building material (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 388). 
James adoped a form of psychophysical parallelism in the Principles  
to describe the mind-body relation and the corresponding subject-object 
distinction in order to satisfy the positivistic constraints he felt 
must be imposed upon psychology if it was to attain a real place within 
science. But his dissatisfaction with dualism in the Principles is 
immediately evident, and the seeds of radical empiricism appear in the 
structuring of the stream of consciousness, and in the descriptions 
of percepts and concepts with their phenomenal overtones (see Wilshire, 
1. Radical empiricism is first mentioned in the preface of The 
will to believe (see James, 1897/1911, p. vii). 
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1968, p. 5; see also James, 1890, 1, pp. 299-305). The theories of 
Darwin and Renouvier initially motivated James to restructure conscious-
ness and to redefine its ends and its functions. In his pragmatic 
writings, he extended his usage of the concepts of temporalism and muta-
bility to apply to the physical world as well as to the consciousness 
that knows the world. In turn, this restructuring led James to the 
conclusion that the focus of empiricism itself must be changed from 
the absolute a priori view of truth which the mind gradually attained 
to a view of truth as an active process where the content of feelings 
could only be verified through interaction with an external world. And 
here of course, in dealing with conception and its relation to the 
external world James ran into the same epistemological gulf between 
the knower and the known that had plagued empiricists and rationalists 
alike from the beginnings of the scientific revolution. This substant-
ial gap between percepts and concepts, subject and object, knower and 
known was the barrier that had to be overcome if a functional view of 
man was to be possible. James thought that the gap could be bridged 
if he could show that real relations obtained between objects in the 
sensible world, that these relations could be perceived, and beyond 
that, conceptualized for what they were. As we will show in detail, 
James modified his concept of pure experience to provide an ontological 
equivalence between thoughts and things. The ontological equivalence 
between thoughts and things was to be obtained by making relations be-
tween objects--both mental and physical--into real events with an 
equivalent ontological status to the objects themselves. 
Perry writes that James was "reared in the tradition of British 
Empiricism, and he was never emancipated" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 
494). At the same time James realized that his philosophical system 
could not rest on the arbitrary dualism adopted in the Principles and 
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that his epistemology required a firmer metaphysical foundation. 
Writing in 1907 to Strong in reply to Strong's comments on the radical 
empiricism papers, James says: 
But the problem there was metaphysical, not epistemological; 
it was an analysis of the nature of what is experienced, not 
of the meaning of knowing, and whatever' epistemology I may 
have brought in was by the way, and illustrative, not funda-
mental (James, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 550). 
James' relationship with the British empiricists is complex: 
while their influence remained profound, the combined influences of 
Darwin and Renouvier eventually forced him to acknowledge that the meta-
physical basis of British empiricism could not provide a viable base 
for his own epistemology. He had already discarded substantial portions 
of the British empiricist epistemology in his psychology and his prag-
matism and he was now to discard portions of the traditional empiricist 
metaphysic in radical empiricism. At the same time, he interpreted 
Locke and Berkeley as providing the basis for his own radical version 
of empiricism because they provided a concrete means of understanding 
the dualism between subject and object: 
The entering wedge for this more concrete way of understanding 
the dualism was fashioned by Locke when he made the word 
'idea' stand indifferently for thing and thought, and by 
Berkeley when he said that what common sense means b3; realities 
is exactly what the philosopher means by ideas (James, 1904/ 
1967a, p. 10). 2 
2. The essays which make up Essays in radical empiricism (first 
published in collected form in 1912, according to James' wishes), were 
originally published as individual papers in the years 1884, 1904, 1905,and 
1906. In 1942, Perry brought out a new edition of the Essays, which 
was subsequently, reprinted in 1967. In the 1942 edition, Perry omitted 
several of the essays which had appeared in the 1912 edition: the 1884 
paper was omitted because Perry claimed that it was written before 
James' theory of radical empiricism had matured. Several other papers 
were also omitted in the 1942 edition because Perry felt that "they 
are primarily controversial in character" (Perry, 1942/1967, p. v, 
preface to the Essays). The 1967 reprint of the 1942 edition has been 
used in this thesis, and references to the individual papers which make 
up the Essays are referred to by their original publication dates--for 
example, 1904/1967a. Papers which were omitted in Perry's 1942 edition 
(contd.) 
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Many of James' colleagues (notably Peirce, Dewey, and Baldwin) took 
their philosophical starting point from Kant: James' adherence to 
the British empiricists determined the problems he chose for analysis, 
and the particular solutions he devised. This allegiance to British 
empiricism set him apart from his contemporaries and is in part re-
sponsible for the 'uniqueness' and 'radicalness' of his solutions to 
problems which engaged much of nineteenth century thought. 3 
James wrote that radical empiricism consisted of a postulate, a 
statement of fact, and lastly, a generalized conclusion. His postulate 
states that: "the only things that shall be debatable among philoso-
phers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience" (James, 
1909, p. xiii).. James' statement of fact is : "that the relations be-
tween things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much 
matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, 
than the things themselves" (James, 1909, p. xii). He concludes from 
this: 
that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next 
to next by relations that are themselves part of the exper- 
ience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no 
extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses 
in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure (James, 
1909, pp. xii-xiii). 
We see immediately how far James deviated from the traditional 
empiricism when he proposed his radical version; he included relations 
2. (contd.) are referred to by their original publication date and 
the date of the first edition of the Essays--for example, 1905/1912a. 
3. Kuklick believes that James was less committed to British empiri- 
cism than Perry claims. Kuklick shows that many of James' views did 
not in fact contradict the neo-Kantian philosophy of his day as it 
was expressed by Royce and Bradley. Kuklick allows that James believed 
that his own metaphysics was incompatible with neo-Kantianism, so 
that Perry's view is vindicated in terms of James' own assessment of 
his position. At the same time, Kuklick makes a convincing case for 
the presence of neo-Kantian elements in James' radical empiricism 
(see Kuklick, 1977, pp. 316-319). 
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as real aspects of experience, and he used 'experience' to include 
everything 'real', so that: 
Nothing shall be admitted as fact, ...except what can be 
experienced at some definite time by some experient; and 
for every feature of fact ever so experienced, a definite 
place must be found somewhere in the final system of reality. 
In other words: Everything real must be experienced some-
where, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere 
be real (James, 1905/1967d, p. 160). 
Some of the epistemological problems of the earlier empiricists 
have already been discussed above (see Chap. 1, pp. 10-29, and Chap. 7, 
pp. 462-482). James had struggled throughout his career to find 
workable solutions for these difficulties. The first part of James' 
solution appears in the Principles as the structurally unified stream 
of consciousness. But he was unable to construct the stream of cons-
ciousness without basing his psychology on a mind-body dualism and a 
corresponding Subject-object distinction, and in addition, his various 
philosophical commitments led him to incorporate a functional dualism 
into the psychology. James had never been happy with the legislated 
dualism of the Principles, and he reali4ed that it was imperative that 
he provide a metaphysical basis for reality where one central concept 
would serve the same analogous function in unifying the possible worlds 
of reality, as the concept of feeling united the internal aspects of 
consciousness; furthermore, the new 'conception' had to unite thecogn-
itive and physical worlds. That concept was to be 'pure experience'. 
Berkeley and Hume agreed that there could be no unperceived 
perceptions (see Acton, 1967, p. 299; see also MacNabb, 1967, p. 83). 
Furthermore, Hume wrote: 
Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our 
reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt 
those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those 
that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence 
of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, 
that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd 
and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible 
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qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which 
has such an existence (Hume, 1739/1962, 1, IV, III, p. 81). 
These conclusions rest on the doctrine of primary and secondary quali-
ties; they are also compatible with a kind of philosophic theism which 
minimally relies upon the concept of a remote God initially designing 
the world, and maximally upon a conception of a God who constantly 
maintains the permanent possibilities of perception. The much afore-
mentioned success of Newtonian physics provided a rationale for the 
continued acceptance of the distinction between the 'contents' of per-
ception and the 'ideas' about reality, and for the conclusion that 
these 'ideas' could not be derived from purely perceptual experience. 
Furthermore, as Thayer shows, Hume strengthened the separation between 
ideas and perceptual experience when he stated that necessary relations 
were to be found only between ideas in the mind and not between objects 
(see Thayer, 1968, P. 68; see also Hume, 1739/1962, 1, III, VII, pp. 
44-51). The laws of association, described as propensities of mind, 
determine our conceptions of cause and effect. 
James' commitment to the notions of temporalism and mutability 
made it impossible for him to incorporate the metaphysics of the 
British empiricists into his philosophy without substantial revision. 
The guarantee of permanent possibilities of perception was nullified 
for James when he accepted evolutionary theory. Instead, James insist-
ed, ideas must bring us into confrontation with objects, and the rela-
tions between events must be posited to exist outside of cognition as 
real events in the sensible world. If the possibilities of perception 
are liable to change, this change in their status can only be account-
ed for if there is a'real and viable interaction between objects. Simi-
larly, if the individual is to perceive these changes (or permanencies), 
his mind must be structured so as to allow him to perceive external 
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relations between objects as well as the objects themselves. James 
describes the distinction as follows: 
Years ago, when T.H. Greene's ideas were most influential, 
I was much troubled by his criticism of english sensational-
ism. One of his disciples in particular would always say to 
me, 'Yes! terms may indeed be possibly sensational in origin; 
but relations, what are they but pure acts of the intellect 
coming upon the sensations from above, and of a higher nature? 
I well remember the sudden relief it gave me to perceive one 
day that space-relations at any rate were homogeneous with 
the terms between which they mediated. The terms were spaces, 
and the relations were other intervening spaces. For the 
Greenites space-relations had been saltatory, for me they became 
thenceforward ambulatory. 
Now the most general way of contrasting my view of know- 
ledge with the popular view (which is also the view of most 
epistemologists) is to call my view ambulatory, and the other 
view saltatory; and the most general way of characterizing the 
two views is by saying that my view describes knowing as it 
exists concretely, while the other view only describes its 
results abstractly taken (James, 1909, pp. 138-139). 
The building blocks of James' ambulatory view of 'knowing con-
cretely'are contained in his conception of pure experience, and he 
writes: 
My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there 
is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of 
which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure 
experience', then knowing can easily be explained as a particu- 
lar sort of relation towards one another into which portions 
of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part 
of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject 
or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the 
object known (James, 1904/1967a, p. 4). 
With this explanation of knowing as a relation between parts of 
experience, James hopes to plunge the individual into a world that is 
directly known as it is experienced: 
The great obstacle to radical empiricism in the contemporary 
mind is the rooted rationalist belief that experience as immed- 
iately given is all disjunction and no conjunction, and that 
to make one world out of this separateness, a higher unifying 
agency must be there (James, 1909, p. xiii). 
For James, the external world is composed of objects and the relations 
between them and he incites his readers again and again to plunge 
back into the rich, flowing, changing world of experience. Having 
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structured consciousness as a selective, changing, personal, continu-
ous, cognitive process, he is now ready to complete the fashioning of 
an external world which corresponds with, and is immediately access-
ible to that consciousness. In fact, he goes much farther than mere 
parallelism with the revised concept of pure experience for he is to 
argue that both mind and the world are types of pure experience taken 
in different ways. To this end, James asserts in his famous paper "Does 
consciousness exist?" that the word 'consciousness' stands not for an 
entity but for a function: 
There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, 
contrasted with that of which material objects are made; but 
there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and 
for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. 
That function is knowing. 'Consciousness' is supposed neces-
sary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get 
reported, are known. Whoever blots out the notion of conscious- 
ness from his list of first principles must still provide in 
some way for that function's being carried on (James, 1904/ 
1967a, pp. 3-4). 
By asserting that "thoughts in the concrete are made of the same 
stuff as things are" (James, 1904/1967a, p. 37), and by denying that 
consciousness is itself composed of a substance qualitatively distinct 
from the substance of the material world, James hopes to make a case 
for the "neutral monism" (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 232) of the world of 
pure experience. He states that this idea is not as radical as it may 
first appear: Kant, he says, essentially laid the notion of the sub-
stantial soul to rest when he described the transcendental ego in its 
stead. As a consequence, the empiricist writers have developed a 
concept of the 'spiritual principle' where it becomes a name only "for 
the fact that the 'content' of experience is known" (James, 1904/1967a, 
p. 2). Moreover, he cites Baldwin, Baudin, Ward, King and Alexander 
as publishing articles in which they seem "just on the point of aband-
oning the notion of consciousness, and substituting for it that of an 
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absolute experience not due to two factors".
4 
James suggests that 
these writers have not been radical enough in discarding consciousness 
as an entity. According to Perry, by the time James came to actually 
write the Essays, he had outgrown the influence of the positivists 
and Renouvier so that James' radical empiricism is in agreement with 
some of the general philosophical trends of the times, and at the same 
time, it is an individual contribution (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 
390). Perry sums up the gradual evolution of James' thought as it 
culminated in radical empiricism with its central concept of pure 
experience: 
The same desire to escape the dualism of subject and object 
which had led to his "phenomenalism" drove him to look beyond 
the intrinsic duality of phenomena. In 1884, in the earliest 
working out of his theory of knowledge, he substituted a 
relation within consciousness for the supposed relation of 
consciousness to an outside object; and described "knowledge 
by acquaintance" as the case in which the mind actually crosses 
the path of nature, through a point of intersection common to 
both. In the Principles he perpetually converted the subject  
of consciousness into content of consciousness. With such 
doctrines germinating in his mind for twenty-five years there 
is no need of attributing his radical empiricism to any source 
outside of James himself (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 390-391). 
But having proposed the neutral monism of pure experience, James 
had problems as difficult to resolve as those he encountered in his 
reading of the British empiricists. Perry states James' major prob-
lem succinctly: 
But now he had definitely renounced dualism, and in place of 
thoughts and things there were only "experiences". If these 
possessed the uniqueness and indivisibility of thoughts, they 
must lose the commonness and permanence of things; and there 
would remain only the desperate alternative of solipsism. If, 
on the other hand, they possessed the commonness and permanence 
of things, then they could never enter directly into a uniquely 
individual conscious experience. How to conceive experience 
so that it could retain both sets of properties, composing both 
4. (James, 1904/1967a, p. 2). James also states that R.B. Perry is 
already "over the border"--one of James' few references to Perry. 
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the immediate and the transient life of the subject and 
the stable world of common objects--that was James's 
problem (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 394). 
James built his radical empiricism around his concept of pure 
experience and the relations between its parts; these ideas will now 
be defined and discussed in terms of the advantages James hoped to 
gain through their inclusion in philosophy. They are complex ideas 
and it is necessary to look at them in some detail before evaluating 
radical empiricism in light of the major difficulties that Perry and 
others had with accepting the doctrine. 
Pure Experience  
'Pure experience' is the name which I gave to the immediate 
flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflect- 
ion with its conceptual categories. Only new-born babes, or 
men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs., illnesses, or blows, may 
be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of 
a that which is not yet any definite what, tho' ready to be all 
sorts of whats; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in re-
spects that don't appear; changing throughout, yet so confusedly 
that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distin- 
ction or of identity, can be caught. Pure experience in this 
state is but another name for feeling or sensation. But the 
flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with 
emphases, and these salient parts become identified and fixed 
and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through 
with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions. 
Its purity is only a relative term, meaning the proportional 
amount of unverbalized sensation which it still embodies. 
Far back as we go, the flux, both as a whole and in its parts 
is that of things conjunct and separated. The great continua 
of time, space, and the self envelope everything, betwixt them, 
and flow together without interfering. The things that they 
envelope come as separate in some ways and as continuous in 
others. Some sensations coalesce with some ideas, and others are 
irreconcilable. Qualities compenetrate one space, or exclude 
each othej from it. They cling together persistently in groups 
that move as units, or else they separate. Their changes are 
abrupt or discontinuous; and their kinds resemble or differ; and, 
as they do so, they fall into either even or irregular series 
(James, 1905/1967a, pp. 93-95). 
'Pure experience' describes the first 'interaction' between the 
sentient being and the external world--in its pure state, James says, 
it is merely another name for feeling or sensation and it is retained 
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in our later 'cognitive' apprehension of reality as the unverbalized 
sensations we receive. The definition of pure experience is given 
totally in terms of the human observer: this does not mean that the 
existence of the external world is dependent upon sentient beings, 
but it does mean that 'pure experience' as a metaphysical view of real-
ity is dependent upon a perceiving individual. Pure experience is 
'composed' of feelings or sensations and in this sense, the doctrine 
can be described as a psychological, or subjective view of reality. 
The concept of pure experience is derived from James' interpre-
tation of evolutionary theory: he claims that we developed abilities 
to 'intellectualize' our relationship with 'reality' because the natur-
al world is a dangerous place--it kills as well as sustains--and to 
the extent that we are able to separate and conceptualize our exper-
iences, we are prepared to act and react, and thereby save ourselves. 
Once we have developed our conceptual powers, we have the option of 
following new intellectual demands, or of returning with our new under-
standing to the flux of experience once again. James would have us 
follow the latter course, for only then, he says, do thoughts follow 
their ultimate and real function which is to bring us into new rela-
tionships with the sensible world (see James, 1905/1967a, pp. 96-97). 
The separation of pure experience into subjective and objective 
elements is achieved with the development of cognition; pure experience 
is neither mental nor physical, but consists of a co-mingling of sensa-
tions or feelings belonging to the individual (see James, 1905/1967a, 
p. 92). This is the insight that led James to make the subject-object 
distinction secondary; at the primitive level of pure experience, the 
individual is unaware of where the object itself leaves off, and his 
own 'mind-body' begins. In this model, the awareness of 'self' is a 
secondary development; it is a reflective, or second experience. This 
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is an extension of the psychological concept of self (see James, 1890, 
1, pp. 291-293) where any concept of self is given in relation to a 
particular facet of experience. The concept of self is relative; the 
fact that we retain our 'impression' of self-identity is taken care 
of in James' earlier structuring of consciousness as continuous in 
the midst of change. The concept of pure experience is therefore 
structurally parallel with James' earlier definition of consciousness; 
pure experience is continuous and constantly changing, and when it 
is taken as the combination of reality and observer, it can be declared 
to be selective and personal as well. These last two qualities may 
be seen as 'latent' potentials in the would-be knower; any 'piece' of 
pure experience contains the perceiving consciousness and the field 
of reality in one event. The characteristics of the potential 'knower' 
are as much a part of any 'unit' of pure experience as the external 
'objects' and 'relations' which extend the experience in space and time. 
This definition holds as long as the observer and the object 
are described in conjunction with one another so that the experience 
is composed of cognitive and physical elements. But James was put- 
ting forth pure experience as an objective theory which would support 
a realist view pf the external world so that he maintained that pure 
experience was composed of the personal independent biographies of 
all of its participants, be they.potentially sentient or not (see 
James, 1904/1967a, pp'. 11-15). In this way, the object of potential 
perception continues to exist independently of any sentient knower 
(see James, 1904/1967a, pp. 12-14). The division of experience into 
knower and known is a secondary process, where a new dimension is 
added to the primitive relation between the components that make up 
the whole of the concatenated universe (see James, 1904/1967a, pp. 
9-10, 23). James wants to extend his psychological view of pure 
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experience into a metaphysical view of a concatenated universe and 
to do this he must show that the 'pure experience' notion can be used 
to describe objects independently of any sentient observer, and at 
the same time, show that the mental and physical qualities of any 
event are truly ontologically continuous. 
In his essay "Does consciousness exist?" James says that the 
Kantian philosophers maintained that "consciousness is one element, 
moment, factor.. .of an experience of essentially dualistic inner 
constitution" (James, 1904/1967a, p. 8). He then reverses this position 
so that: 
Experience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity; and the  
separation of it into consciousness and content comes, not  
by way of subtraction, but by way of addition--the addition, 
to a given concrete piece of it, of other sets of experiences, 
in connection with which severally its use or function may be 
of two different kinds. ...Just so, I maintain, does a given 
undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of asso-
ciates, play the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of 
'consciousness'; while in a different context the same 
undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, 
of an objective 'content'. In a word, in one group it figures 
as a thpught, in another group as a thing. And, since it can 
figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to 
speak of it as subjective and objective both at once (James, 
1904/1967a, pp. 9-10). 
James must now show that 'subjective' and 'objective' can be 
taken as 'characteristics' of experience which are determined by 
their relationships at given intersections in time and space. 'Subject-
ive' and 'objective' are to be used to describe secondary, or function-
al relationships between the parts of experience, for James is determ-
ined to rid the terms of their traditional status as the primary, 
ontological distinctions between events. If this could be success-
fully done, the gap between mind and nature would disappear, and we 
would have an a priori guarantee that our perceptions of the world 
were accurate. In order to close the gap between mind and nature and 
to guarantee that the perceiving mind actually 'gets' the real 
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object, James hypothesized that any given experience can be in two 
places at once, while remaining one thing in itself: 
if the 'pure experience' of the room were a place of inter- 
section of the two processes, which connected it with differ-
ent groups of associates respectively, it could be counted 
twice over, as belonging to either group, and spoken of 
loosely as existing in two places, although it would remain 
all the time a numerically single thing (James, 1904/1967a, 
p. 12). 
'Pure experiences' may be treated in this manner because of the 
multiplicity of relations to the rest of experience that each 'exper-
ience' exhibits. Thus James can describe the 'room experience' as 
being subject to various mental and physical operations which it under-
goes as a piece of experience: 
The physical and the mental operations form curiously incom-
patible groups. As a room, the experience has occupied that 
spot and had that environment for thirty years. As your field 
of consciousness it may never have existed until now. As a 
room, attention will go on to discover endless new details in 
it. As your Tental state merely, few new ones will emerge 
under attention's eye. As a room, it will take an earthquake, 
or a gang of men, and in any case a certain amount of time, 
to destroy it. As your subjective state, the closing of your 
eyes, or any instantaneous play of your fancy will suffice. 
In the real world, fire will consume it. In your mind, you 
can let fire play over it without effect. As an outer object, 
you may pay so much a month to inhabit it. As an inner content, 
you may occupy it for any length of time rent-free. If, in 
short, you follow it in the mental direction, taking it along 
with events of personal biography solely, all sorts of things 
are true of it which are false, and false of it which are true 
if you treat it as a real thing experienced, follow it in the 
physical direction, and relate it to associates in the outer 
world (James, 1904/1967a, pp. 14-15). 
And this leads us straight into the traditional subject-object 
problem. James tries to nullify the traditional distinction between 
subject and object when he states that the subjectivity and objectivity 
of any experience "are functional attributes solely" (James, 1904/ 
1967a, p. 23)--that is, when the 'piece' of experience is the subject 
of contemplation. In immediate, or 'pure experience' he says that 
the experience "is only virtually or potentially either object or 
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subject" (James, 1904/1967a, p. 23). For James, experiences do not 
immediately 'come' to us separated into subjective and objective 
components. Experiences are made of precisely what they appear to be 
made of: thus 'experience' is a collective term "for all these sens-
ible natures, and save for time and space (and, if you like, for 
'being') there appears no universal element of which all things are 
made" (James, 1904/1967a, p. 27). By insisting that experiences are 
'unique' in their construction, James can move onto the next stage 
which is to show that 'subject' and 'object' are not separated by a 
whole order of being at all, but instead must have some attributes 
at least in common, else it could not: 
be so hard tg tell, in a presented , and recognized material 
object, what part comes in through the sense organs and what 
part comes 'out of one's own head'? Sensations and apperceptive 
ideas fuse here so intimately that . you can no more tell where 
one begins and the other ends,'than you can tell, in those cun-
ning circular panoramas that have been lately exhibited, where 
the real foreground and the painted canvas join together 
(James, 1904/1967a, pp. 29-30). 
Fite pointed out that 'experience' in the sense James is using 
it "invariably turned out to be subjective" (Fite, quoted in Perry, 
1935/1974, 2, p. 391). James replied to Fite that the subject-object 
distinction followed the experience, and that he had in fact already 
made this point in some detail in his essays (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
pp. 391-392). James' rationale for making the subject-object dist-
inction follow experience was to preserve an essential realism for 
the physical world, while still making that world immediately avail-
able to the necessarily subjective observer. He drew the distinction 
between mental and physical events in terms of their consequences  
and attempted to equate events through emphasizing the difficulties 
that ensue when the individual tried to make an absolute distinction 
between the subjective and objective components of any given piece of 
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experience. James hoped in this way to defend himself against the 
charge that his world was subjective. The existence of 'mental' 
fires depended upon sentient beings while the existence of 'real' 
fires supposedly did not. However, the separation of experience into 
mental and physical worlds depended upon sentient beings, and James 
made it fairly explicit that the physical world was constituted out 
of those parts of experience which we separate out of the experience-
chaos because they appear to act independently and lawfully from our 
vantage point. That is, the determination that 'real' fires burn 'real' 
sticks is a product or deduction made by the selective, sentient obser-
ver, and therefore any particular physical universe described de- 
pends upon the perceptions and deductions of an observer. In this  
sense any particular universe is subjectively derived because James 
then went on to say that the remoter aspects of the physical world 
are 'constructs' out of our conceptions. James writes: 
Why, for example, do we call a fire hot, and water wet, and 
yet refuse to say that our mental state, when it is 'of' these 
objects, is either wet or hot? 'Intentionally', at any rate, 
and when the mental state is a vivid image, hotness and wetness 
are in it just as much as they are in the physical experience. 
The reason is this, that, as the general chaos of all our 
experiences gets sifted, we find that there are some fires 
that will always burn sticks and always warm our bodies, and 
that there are some waters that will always put out fires; 
while there are other fires and waters that will not act at 
all. The general group of experiences that act, that do not 
only possess their natures intrinsically, but wear them adject-
tively and energetically, turning them against one another, 
comes inevitably to be contrasted with the groups whose members, 
having identically the same natures, fail to manifest them in 
the 'energetic' way. ...Mental fire is what won't burn real 
sticks; mental water is what won't necessarily (though of course 
it may) put out even a mental fire, Mental knives may be 
sharp, but they won't cut real wood. Mental triangles are 
pointed, but their points won't wound. With 'real' objects, 
on the contrary, consequences always accrue; and thus the real 
experiences get sifted from the mental ones, the things from 
our thoughts of them,fanciful or true, and precipitated to- 
gether as the stable part of the whole experience-chaos, under 
the name of the physical world. Of this our perceptual exper-
iences are the nucleus, they being the originally strong exper-
iences. We add a lot of conceptual experiences to them, making 
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these strong also in imagination, and building out the 
remoter parts of the physical world by their means; and 
around this core of reality the world of laxly connected 
fancies and mere rhapsodical objects floats like a bank 
of clouds (James, 1904/1967a, pp. 41-33). 
This construction is problematic from an empirical perspective: 
the extent of the separation between energetic and non-energetic 
fires would appear to support the strong empirical proposition that 
the difference between them is fundamental, and the fact that the 
separation is a product of cognitive development does not appear to 
make it any less real. Realism in James' sense appears to grow out 
of the separation of events into knower and known and in this sense 
the conclusion that a real world exists independently of human exper-
ience depends upon human subjectivity. At least, the conclusion that 
a particular real world exists is subjectively derived. To put the 
problem in slightly different terms, we might ask what the status of 
any piece of pure expeTience is before it is divided into knower and 
known. Perry, trying to come to grips with the problem of whether 
James had succeeded in ensuring a realist base, asks the same question 
when he considers the status of the parts of nature which lie beyond 
human cognition (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 388). 
Perry shows that in making 'pure experience' antedate the subject- 
' object distinction, James abandoned idealism for a type of realism 
where consciousness exists within the larger totality of experience 
as a whole. And he criticizes James for failing to make his position 
clear. The adoption of realism forced James to consider the status of 
"those parts of nature that lie beyond the mental reach of man. They 
consisted of further experiences, no doubt--but whose?" (Perry, 1935/ 
1974, 2, p. 388). Thus, Perry goes on to say, James wavered between 
adopting panpsychism or alternatively making these experiences 'poten-
tial' experiences of man, so that his realism has remained ambiguous 
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to his critics (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, P. 388). It remains ambigu-
ous because the determination of those experiences which will consti-
tute any particular reality is given to human observers. Any exper-
ience which is not available to human cognition necessarily has a 
dubious ontological status in James' conception because it cannot be 
qualitatively distinguished and therefore described as acting in any 
particular way.
5 
And this becomes a serious difficulty when James 
turns to the problem of causation. His philosophy of pure experience 
makes it impossible for him to derive any underlying causal principles - 
for events beyond our experience of feelings of activity and our 
perceptual observations and conceptual extractions of the relations 
between events. 
James' desire to show that the subject-objective distinction is 
'learned' through experience is consistent with his epistemological 
contention that feelings are not initially 'cognitive' of anything 
beyond their own existence but become cognitive of the external world 
through the process of experience and interaction (see James, 1885/ 
1909, pp. 5-6). Thus, the subject-object distinction comprises the 
sophisticated understanding of reality; primitive experience contains 
no 'pre-determined' separations, and James account of the means 
whereby events are differentiated into physical and mental objects 
5 It is perhaps significant that in 1890, James had written: 
it seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not thought or 
this thought or that thought, but my thought, every thought  being 
owned. Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor 
similarity of quality and content are able to fuse thoughts to-
gether which are sundered by this barrier of belonging to 
different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts 
are the most absolute breaches in nature. Everyone will recog-
nize this to be true, so long as the existence of something 
corresponding to the term 'personal mind' is all that is 
insisted on, without any particular view of its nature being 
implied (James, 1890, 1, p. 226). 
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is based upon his psychological account of the development of 
perception and conception. 
James invokes evolutionary processes to provide a naturalistic 
explanation for the development of perception and conception, and the 
congruent subject-object distinction (see James, 1905/1967a, pp. 96- 
97). But he does not develop this theme any further, and all that 
such passages really do is to demonstrate James' conviction that the 
affections and the higher cognitive faculties emerged in a 'natural-
istic' context and therefore have a 'naturalistic' relationship with 
the concrete world. Basically, we are cognitive of reality because 
our conceptual faculties were originally separated out of the greater 
flux of reality. James says that rationalists and naturalists alike 
agree that the mind has a naturalistic basis, but they part company 
when the question of the function of mind is raised (see James, 1905/ 
1967a, p. 97). Perhaps this consensus on the natural genesis of mind 
makes James confident that he can forego any detailed analysis of the 
means by which some experiences 'grew less active' while others re-, 
tained their 'energy
,
.
6 
James never worked out a means of determining 
the genesis of ideas which satisfied him so that the 'causal' state-
ments in the essays can only be presented as possible hypotheses and 
James make this clear in his discussion: 
If one were to make an evolutionary construction of how a lot 
of originally chaotic pure experiences became gradually differ-
entiated into an orderly inner and outer world, the whole 
theory would turn upon one's success in explaining how or why 
the quality of an experience, once active, could become less so, 
6. James is discussing the genesis of what he refers to as 'appre- 
ciations'--beauty, ugliness, love, hatred, pain and pleasure. He 
argues that these qualities appear to coexist in the object and the 
perceiver so that they occupy a half-way position between mind and 
object, and are therefore less active than the 'purely physical 
energies' of objects (see James, 1904/1967a, pp. 34-35). 
577. 
and, from being an energetic attribute in some cases, 
elsewhere lapse into the status of an inert or merely 
internal 'nature'. This would be the 'evolution' of the 
osychicalfrom the bosum of the physical, in which the 
esthetic, moral and otherwise emotional experiences would 
represent a halfway stage (James, 1904/1967a, pp. 35-36). 
The benefits of an evolutionary analysis are obvious: if the concept-
ual areas of knowledge evolve from the physical, and the metamorphosis 
is given strictly in terms of energy then there is a naturalistic 
bond between external objects and conceptions of them and James would 
have grounds for an ontological equivalence between thoughts and things. 
Marcell writes that James' radical empiricism was an attempt "to 
put the Humpty-Dumpty atomism of empiricism back together again while 
still avoiding the holistic monism of the rationalists" (Marcell, 
1974, p. 180). James went about reconstructing empiricism by making 
experience holistic and prior to any intellectual distinctions through 
the concept of pure experience and the concretization of the relations, 
and he countered traditional monism with a view of the universe as 
a 'concatenated structure' (see James, 1909, pp. xii-xiii). These 
concepts gave James the philosophical structure he needed to support 
his psychological constructs of the cognitive processes as functions 
of separation and selection. The division of events into mental and 
physical objects requires an active, sentient participant and any 
separations that result are sophisticated products of the active intel-
lect. In taking this stand, James felt he had succeeded in construct-
ing an alternative to the older empiricism. The concept of pure exper-
ience provides the basis for James' later pluralism, because the cuts 
and selections that are made (which eventually lead to the reconstruct-
ion of the sensible world) first depend upon the excursions of the 
individual into the neutral monism of pure experience. Later, in 
his final philosophy, James will extend his notion of pluralism to 
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include objective criteria for the apprehension of 'truly' novel 
events in the concrete world. 
All traditional epistemologies and psychologies demand that a 
distinction be made at some point between physical and mental events 
--between the 'qualities' of our cognitive experiences, whether they 
are perceptual or purely conceptual. For the individual moving at 
some intersection between mental and physical events, the distinction 
is experientially primary; psychologically, cognition means making 
subject-object distinctions. And James is careful to make qualitative 
distinctions between the two types of experience (see James, 1904/ 
1967a, pp. 31-33). What he does deny is that there is a real ontolo-
gical distinction to be made between them and he attempts to show that 
there cannot be one, through the use of the 'affectional facts' (see 
James, 1905/1967c, pp. 137-142). 7 These stand 'evolutionarily' be-
tween the psychical and the physical, and serve as connections between 
the two. They account for much of the 'blurring' that takes place 
in the strict analysis of perceptions into their 'mental' and 'physi-
cal' content. Perception thus becomes an interaction between the 
object and the observer and this accounts for James' description of 
knowledge as a relation between two experiences wherein one becomes  
the knower and the other the known. 
James' use of the affectional facts to show that the subject-
object distinction is really not as clear-cut as it might intuitively 
appear is important in the history of philosophy. Although James' 
7. The' 'affectional facts' correspond to what would more commonly 
be called the emotions. James now i.efers to the emotions as affections 
in order to stress that the affections do not 'exist' solely in the 
mind of the perceiver, nor in the physiplogical movements of his body,but 
also in the objects which evoke them in the sentient observer. The 
status of the affectional facts is discussed in more detail below in 
the critical appraisal of radical empiricism. 
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specific use of evolutionary premises to lend support to his pure 
experience hypothesis is sometimes fragmentary and unsatisfactory,
8 
the broad evolutionary concepts of temporalism and mutability were 
crucial in providing inspiration for a functional psychology of exper-
ience. If the subject-object distinction must be made in all epistem-
ologies, James shows clearly that there are no absolute lines of 
demarcation for making it. James' particular value for psychology 
in this regard lies in his refusal to take scientific constructs into 
account as determining the boundaries for the objective and subjective 
qualities of any experience. Instead, he constructs a consciousness 
where the distinction between subject and object is made according 
to the functional relationship between the parts of any experience. 
Because James' own empiricism was so thoroughly grounded in the 
older British empiricism, he still had the psychologically problemat-
ic doctrine of the primary and secondary qualities to deal with. Al-
though he had succeeded in recasting the doctrine in evolutionary 
terms in the Principles, his analysis of the worlds of reality remains 
based on the doctrine s, so that those objects which are perceived through 
tactile sensations constitute the 'primary' reality. Similarly, his 
view of scientific objects and their 'indisputable' realness owes much 
to the doctrine. At the same time, both the Principles and the Prag-
matism incorporate an alternative relativistic strand which clashes 
8. This does not mean that radical empiricism is not based on evolu- 
tionary principles. It is an evolutionary metaphysic in the same sense 
that pragmatism is an evolutionary epistemology because it is based 
on the principles of temporalism and mutability. The 'fragmentary' 
application of evolutionary principles refers to James' tendency to 
use evolutionary theory as a mandate for his assumption that the psychi-
cal was generated out of the physical, and that there is no ontologi-
cal difference between thoughts and things without specifying or 
even hypothesizing about the mechanics which might engender such 
transformations (see James, 1904/1967a, pp. 34-36). 
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with the "Newtonian" strand.
9 
In his radical empiricism, James is 
experimenting with the idea that a 'return' to pure experience as 
the starting point for metaphysics will allow him to derive a psycho-
logy of mind which is independent of the constraints traditionally 
imposed by physics. The sciences are to be taken as products of 
the experiencing mind and James' view of science now tends to be 
relativistic rather than absolute. The primary and secondary quali-
ties distinction can therefore be treated as a piece of 'scientific 
legislation'. 
Psychologically, as the older empiricists recognized, the indi-
vidual makes no distinction between the primary and secondary quali-
ties of an object: 
The shifting place of 'secondary qualities' in the history 
of philosophy is another excellent proof of the fact that 
'inner' and 'outer' are not coefficients with which experiences 
come to us aboriginally stamped, but are rather results of a 
later classification performed by us for particular needs. 
The common-sense stage of thought is a perfectly definite 
practical halting-place, the place where we ourselves can pro-
ceed to act unhesitatingly (James, 1905/1967c, p. 146). 
The need to separate these qualities arose from intellectual, not 
practical, needs, and the intellectual need to make the separation 
appears to arise as a result of the practical successes of holding 
them initially together: 
9. This has already been discussed in Chaps. 4 and 7. It should 
be noted that the radical empiricism essays were published (1904- 
1905) before the majority of the pragmatic writings (1885, 1895, 
1904-1909) so that James' resolution' of the primary-secondary 
qualities distinction is not to be taken as a resolution of the 
opposing strands of the pragmatic writings themselves. Instead, the 
writings on radical empiricism 'verify' the existence of a relativ-
istic strand in the pragmatism. That the radical empiricist 
'solution' was not without problems is perhaps confirmed by the 
fact that the pragmatic view of scientific progress is not complete-
ly relativistic or evolutionary. The relationship between radical 
empiricism and pragmatism is discussed below. 
581. 
By engendering and translocating just these qualities, active-
ly efficacious as they seem to be, we ourselves succeed in 
altering nature so as to suit us; and until more purely intel- 
lectual, as distinguished from practical, needs had arisen, 
no one ever thought of calling these qualities subjective. 
When, however, Galileo, Descartes, and others found it best 
for philosophic purposes to class sound, heat, and light 
along with pain and pleasure as purely mental phemonema, they 
could do so with impunity (James, 1905/1967c, p. 147). 
The separations can be made with impunity because of the essent-
ially plastic nature of 'pure experience', and the separations are 
themselves artifacts: 
Even the primary qualities are undergoing the same fate. 
Hardness and softness are effects on us of atomic interactions, 
and the atoms themselves are neither hard nor soft, nor solid 
nor liquid. Size and shape are deemed subjective by Kantians; 
time itself is subjective according to many philosophers; and 
even the activity and causal efficacy which lingered in physics 
long after secondary qualities were banished are now, treated 
as illusory projections outwards of phenomena of our own 
consciousness. There are no activities or effects in nature, 
for the most intellectual contemporary school of physical 
speculation. Nature exhibits only changes, which habitually 
coincide with one another so that their habits are describable 
in simple 'laws' (James, 1905/1967c, pp. 147-148). 
James echoes Hume when he says that causal efficacy and activity are 
illusory projections of our minds onto nature. But where such con-
clusions lead Hume to skepticism, James uses them to strengthen his 
pure experience hypothesis. Science operates by imposing selected 
operations and distinctions upon a seemingly 'independent' natural 
world. James recognizes that the primary and secondary qualities 
doctrine was a piece of scientific legislation, and that its contents 
are subject to change as the science it inspired develops. The fact 
that the doctrine was so successful and at the same time that its 
efficacy could decrease as a function of the development of the science 
it set in motion gives James grounds for a relativistic treatment of 
science and for emphasizing the importance of human experience on 
the one hand, and the 'independence' of nature on the other. Yet there 
is a compatibility between the two: nature exhibits "changes which 
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habitually coincide"(James, 1905/1967c, p. 148), and we perceive 
these coincident changes and designate them as laws. This is the 
climax of James' assertion that human consciousness lies at the centre 
of the evolving universe. Science grows out of the cuts and select-
ions men make tn pure experience, and science is always selective 
and therefore subordinate, in James' thinking, to the whole of exper-
ience and more particularly, to the selective consciousness. 
As he perceives that scientific theories are not absolute des-
criptions of nature and are therefore potentially fallible, and as 
he now tends to 'subjectify' even the primary qualities, James is led 
closer to his final conception of a pluralistic universe, wherein 
pluralism is a fact of the universe itself. James is now replacing 
the moral argument for a pluralistic universe (as given in The will  
to believe) with a metaphysical claim that pluralism is the funda-
mental principle of the universe. The particular view of science and 
its relationship to events in the physical world is used as evidence 
for James' hypothesis that intuitively, there is no immediate discrim-
ination made between objects and the formulations we impose upon them 
to describe their behaviour. Nature appears to act according to laws 
so that it intuitively appears that the law is an objective property 
of nature. James (following Hume) argues that this is not the case, 
and he therefore emphasizes that nature exhibits only changes (see 
James, 1905/1967c, pp. 147-148). Within certain physical limits we 
select the changes that appear to coincide and give these the status 
of laws. At the same time, we necessarily ignore other manifestations 
present in the same field of nature. If, correspondingly, scientific 
explanations are subject to change, then it can be argued that nature 
is to that extent independent and pluralistic because it lends itself 
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to any schema we might devise for it. 
James' first great break with British empiricism was the estab-
lishment of 'pure experience' as preceding the subject-object distinct-
ion. His second break comes with his proclamation that "the relations  
that connect experience must themselves be experienced relations,  
and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as  
anything else in the system" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 42). James' con-
cept of the relations was an integral part of the pure experience 
philosophy; the relations provide the connections between the parts 
of pure experience, which includes consciousness and any and all ob-
jects which that consciousness is eventually said to know. It is 
James' particular use of the relations as real existants in the con- 
crete world, and in consciousness, which allows him to make experience 
antecendent to the subject-object distinction. 
The Relations  
James begins his essay "A world of pure experience" with the 
declaration that his empiricism is a radical empiricism because it 
demands that relations between experiences be considered as real as 
the objects themselves and he thereby makes his most important break 
with Hume (see James, 1904/1967b, p. 42). James is delivered from 
Hume's skepticism because he is now able to extend the scope of his 
realist hypothesis. He writes that traditional empiricism, exempli-
fied by the writings of Berkeley, Hume, and the Mills "has always 
shown a tendency to do away with the connections of things, and to 
insist most on the disjunctions" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 43). Conse-
quently, the older empiricists and rationalists found it necessary 
to add "transexperiential agents of unification" (James, 1904/1967b, 
p. 43), to their world-view in order to make it coherent. For James, 
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the inclusion of conjunctive relations as real aspects of experience 
does away with the need'to seek any higher unifying agency because 
the conjunctive relations provide the essential links between exper-
iences at any level. If he can make a convincing case for the in-
clusion of conjunctive relations as real properties of the physical 
world, James will be able to replace transempirical agents with real 
observables and this will give him the advantage of having all that 
is necessary for knowledge available in the sensible world itself. 
James will then have firm grounds for exhorting philosophers and 
scientists to return to the direct study of the physical world, and 
he will also be able to justify his limiting of philosophy to the 
study of experienceable events. 
The conjunctive relations in order of their 'degree of intimacy' 
are: 1) "merely to be 'with' one another in a universe of discourse" 
(James, 1904/1967b, p. 44)--this relation is described as "the most 
external relation that terms can have and seems to involve nothing 
whatever as to farther consequences" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 44); 
2) simultaneity and time-interval; 3) space-adjacency and distance; 
4) similarity and difference--these carry "the possibility of many 
inferences" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 44); 5) activity--these relations 
tie terms "into series involving change, tendency, resistance, and 
the causal order generally" (James, 1904/1967b, pp, 44-45); and 
6) relations: 
experienced between terms that form states of mind, and are 
immediately conscious of continuing each other. The organization 
of the Self as a system of memories, purposes, strivings, fulfil-
ments or disappointments, is incidental to this most intimate 
of all relations, the terms of which seem in many cases actually 
to compenetrate and suffuse each other's being (James, 1904/ 
1967b, p. 45). 
No single one of these 'sets of relations' is sufficient in itself 
to connect all the experiences that make up the universe. Therefore 
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the universe appears to be chaotic because the intimacy between the 
parts is not perfect: 
No single type of connection runs through all the experiences 
that compose it. If we take space-relations, they fail to 
connect minds into any regular system. Causes and purposes 
obtain only among special series of facts. The self-relation 
seems extremely limited and does not link two different 
selves together (James, 1904/1967b, p. 46). 
James writes that this lack of unity or 'disjunction' between 
things had caused the British Empiricists to overemphasize the 'lack 
of unity' between events (see James, 1904/1967b, p. 46). Radical 
empiricism, he says, treats both conjunction and disjunction as real 
while stressing "that there appear to be actual forces at work which 
tend, as time goes on, to make the unity greater" (James, 1904/1967b, 
p. 47). 
The most important, and the most troublesome conjunctive rela-
tion, according to James, "is the co-conscious transition, so to 
call it, by which one experience passes into another when both belong 
to the same self" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 47). James seeks a solution 
to this difficulty by making personal consciousness an experienced 
continuity, so that even changes in consciousness are experienced 
as part of the continuity of consciousness as consciousness passes 
from event to event. By making the experience of continuity the means 
of affirming real continuity, James gets rid of the problem of find-
ing a transcendental means of unifying the self. Further, the same 
continuous consciousness can have experiences of both continuity 
and discontinuity without any 'gaps' in its essential unity. Dis-
junction, then, becomes merely another kind of experience. 
James refers to the structure of the stream of consciousness 
as the basis for the proposition that the personal consciousness ex-
hibits relations of continuity, and that continuity describes changes 
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or breaks in the flow of mental events (see James, 1904/1967b, p. 
48, where James makes this explicit). But in order to tie the 
external' and 'internal' relations together James must again con-
front the problem of the 'knower' and the 'known'. He writes that 
radical empiricism's greatest advantage is in saving us from "an 
artificial conception of the relations between knower and known" 
(James, 1904/1967b, p. 52), and he summarizes the traditional subject-
object problem as follows: 
Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its 
object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities; 
and thereupon the presence of the latter to the former, or 
the 'apprehension' by the former of the latter, has assumed 
a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to 
be invented to overcome. Representative theories put a mental 
'representation', 'image', or 'content' into the gap, as a 
sort of intermediary. Common-sense theories left the gap 
untouched, declaring our mind able to clear it by a self-
transcending' leap. Transcendentalist theories left it 
impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and brought an 
Absolute in to perform the saltatory act (James, 1904/1967b, 
PP. 52-5). 
James believes that he has solved the problem with his conception 
that the "knower and the known are: 1) the self-same piece of exper-
ience taken twice over in different contexts"(James, 1904/1967b, p. 
53). This refers to perception, where "the mind enjoys direct 'ac-
quaintance' with a present object" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 54). The 
relations between the mental and physical aspects of any piece of 
experience have already been described above (see James, 1904/1967a, 
pp. 9-10, 12, 14-15; quoted respectively above, pp. 569-570). In 
addition, the knower and the known may be: 
(2) two pieces of actual experience belonging to the 
same subject, with definite tractsof conjunctive transitional 
experience between them; or 
(3) the known is a possible experience either of that 
subject or another, to which the said conjunctive transitions 
would  lead, if sufficiently prolonged (James, 1904/1967b, p. 53). 
James states that condition (3) can always be 'formally' and 
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'hypothetically' reduced to condition (2) and that one demonstration 
will suffice to describe them both (see James, 1904/1967b, p. 54). 
Conditions (2) and (3) refer to conceptual knowledge but in this 
context, James is speaking only of the knowing of a percept by an 
idea. An idea is cognizant of reality if it is capable of leading 
the individual into the presence of the cognized object. If James' 
'idea' of Memorial Hall is capable of leading him to the actual Hall, 
then his idea of the Hall can be said to be cognizant of the real Hall. 
The process wherein an idea actually leads one to the desire object 
consists of the series of 'felt-transitions'. Our experience of 
the felt-transitions comprises the ambulatory process whereby an idea 
brings us into touch with reality. We identify that reality as the 
object of our idea and this identification includes "all that the  
knowing of a percept by an idea can possibly contain or signify" . 
(James, 1904/1967b, p. 56; see also pp. 54-55). The 'extremes' 
between the idea and the object are connected by .a series of 'rela-
tions' that connect the whole universe of . experience. James can then 
say that: 
Knowlege of sensible realities thus comes to life inside the 
tissue of experience. It is made; and made by relations that 
unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain intermediaries 
are given, such that, as they develop towards their terminus, 
there is experience from point to point of one direction fol-
lowed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that 
their starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus  
an object meant or known. That is all that knowing (in the 
simple case considered) can be known-as, that is the whole 
of its nature, put into experiential terms (James, 1904/1967b, p . 57) . 10 	' 
10. Note the similarity of this statement to James' earliest 
hypothesis regarding the manufacture of knowledge in his paper 
"Remarks on Spencer's definition of mind as correspondence" (see 
James, 1878/1920, p. 67). He has now replaced the teleological 
standpoint with a metaphysical argument to come to the same basic 
conclusion--that is, that knowledge is made by the mind interacting 
with 'experience' or 'physical reality'. 
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The significance of this statement is that percepts not only 
serve as verifications of conceptions, "but the percept's existence 
as the terminus of the chain of intermediaries creates the function. 
Whatever terminates that chain was, because it now proves itself to 
be, what the concept 'had in mind'" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 61). But 
here James takes another leap when he uses this conclusion to argue 
against the need for a representative theory of perception: 
an experience that knows another can figure as its representa-
tive not in any quasi-miraculous 'epistemological' sense, but 
in the definite practical sense of being its substitute in 
various operations, sometimes physical and sometimes mental, 
which lead us to its associates and results. By experimenting 
on our ideas of reality, we may save ourselves the trouble 
of experimenting on the real experiences which they severally 
mean. The ideas form related systems, corresponding point 
for point to the systems which the realities form; and by 
letting an ideal term call up its associates systematically, 
we may be led to a terminus which the corresponding real term 
would have led to in case we had operated on the real world 
(James, 1904/1967b, p. 61). 
This is a big leap because James is at last stating that the•
mental world contains related systems that actually correspond point 
by point to the systems in the external world.
11 
So far, in his 
philosophy and psychology, James has been unwilling to go as far as 
this in constructing a parallel betweep conception and the perception 
of actual objects and has held the various levels of reality apart. 
Though he says that 'actually' knowing anything remains in doubt 
11. The rationalist overtones should be noted. We have already dis-
cussed James' tendencies towards rationalism regarding scientific 
verifications and we have also looked at his pragmatic conception of 
potential truths ?Mich are treated as real truths by individuals. James 
is asserting here that the correspondence between the mind and the physi-
cal world is sufficiently close to allow mental verifications to sub-
stitute for perceptual verifications. As James extends the principles 
which were originally used to describe the mind to include the physi- 
cal world, the need for perceptual verification decreases. At the same 
time, his insistence that the sensible world is temporal and mutable 
leads him to emphasize the need for perceptual verification in other 
parts of his work. The conflict between James' rationalist, ideal-
ist tendencies and his empiricist, realist construction is never 
satisfactorily resolved in his work. 
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until perceptual verification takes place he does say that "We were 
virtual knowers of the Hall long before we were certified to have been 
actual knowers, by the percept's retroactive validating power" (James,•
1904/1967b, p. 36). 12 In the interest of using the relations as a means 
of holding experience together through the whole range of its manifesta-
tions in the concrete physical world and finally in man's abstract con-
ceptual world, James makes his theory of knowledge more passive and 
less ambulatory than it appeared in the Principles and will appear in 
pragmatism. Knowledge becomes an almost passive process governed by 
"relations that 'unroll themselves in time" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 57). 
This view of knowledge rests on the earlier concept of ideo-motor 
action which James has now translated into metaphysics. Ideo-motor 
actions are based on the 'experiences' of the individual, built up through 
his interaction with reality. It is only within such a psychological 
schema that James can uphold the idea that such precise knowledge virt-
ually exists before perception actually takes place. In his later prag-
matism, James will stress the active, ambulatory side of the process 
which is necessary to ensure confidence in the potential or 'virtually' 
knowable outcomes of any experience. For now, James is developing a 
conception of the universe where the physical and mental aspects of 
experience are simply parts of the same experience. To this extent, 
they, must be in agreement. James is trying to preserve a realist account 
of the physical world and he tries to guarantee that such a world exists 
with the concept of virtual knowledge. 
The problem of error intrudes here; James is quite aware that all 
12. This kind of 'virtual' knowledge is included in James' pragmatic 
theory of truth, so that the store of 'unverified' truths is almost as 
important as the store of verified truths in facilitating. adaptive 
actions. Pragmatic epistemology is therefore based on the metaphysic 
of radical empiricism. 
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of our ideas are not true of the physical world--their content may pre-
clude verification, or the external world may not contain the sought-
after object at all. At the same time, the concrete world may contain 
objects or relations which we are incapable of discovering in perception. 
It appears the the 'fit' between the mental and physical worlds depends 
on the intersection between the sentient actor and the concrete object. 
We are virtual knowers of Memorial Hall only if the Hall exists and our 
ideas about it are of such a nature as to lead us, through the series of 
felt transitions, into an actual percept of the Hall. If we do not get 
the percept, either the Hall does not exist, or our ideas about how it 
exists are false. The virtual relationship between the mental and physi-
cal aspects of experience includes only those experiences which can be 
verified so that epistemologically, the potential for error is still there. 
In the stage preceding any attempt at verification the only 'given' 
is the state of experience itself and this experience is.'true'stmply by 
virtue of the fact that it exists. This applies to perceptual and con-
ceptual experience so that any experience is as 'real' as any other. 
James is using truth in two ways here: on the one hand, truth is simply 
another name for the process of experience. On the other, truth refers to 
the act of verification where two parts of the same experience collide 
and the sentient experient conceives of himself as the knower of the 
object. The point is that the terms 'truth' and 'falsity' have no real 
meanings within the context of pure experience itself. They have only 
retroactive significance. It is only when experience is separated into 
knower and known that questions about the 'fit' between ideas and objects 
can be asked and answered. Perc2ption, in this sense, precedes the di-
vision of experience into subject and object. As James postulates that 
nothing intervenes between the physical object and the mind that 'knows' 
it he is confident that pure experience itself, which includes the 
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relations that tie its parts together, provides a guarantee for know-
ledge. 
This is the foundation for a guaranteed knowledge of the universe 
and it is basic because James has never been able to rely on permanent 
possibilities of sensation; the stress in the Principles is on the 
psychological means used to bring us into real relationships with a 
phenomenally plastic universe. James employs the subject-object dis-
tinction at the primary level in his psychology in order to maintain 
the unity of the thought in consciousness. The problem is then to 
determine what the mind could 'know' about the physical world, indepen-
dently of its own necessarily subjective perspective. While the 
Principles contains many examples of 'certain' knowledge, these 
'certainties' are products of the coercion of the mind by the sen-
sible properties of objects, and the subject-object barrier is 
broken down by the strong qualities of objects working on a sense/ 
mind conglomerate which is structured to receive them. Radical 
empiricism by contrast essentially makes the world directly 'know-
able' and James can use time as the medium for the unfolding of 
relations. 
The need for specific verification shrinks as the external world 
is organized into specific relations between events and as the mind 
and world are developed as aspects of the same universe of experience. 
Wild comments: 
As he has suggested in his pragmatic theory of knowledge, a 
thought first anticipates a perception of some kind, and then 
embarks on a procedure of discovery to see if it can be found. 
If, by gradual transitions, this procedure finally leads to 
the experience exactly as it was anticipated, then the theory, 
or anticipation was true. But in this relational experience 
or fulfillment, no epistemological chasm between a mind thing 
and a physical thing has to be bridged. The whole procedure 
occurs within the experienced world. ...The perception (pure 
experience) issimply there. As it comes before us "in its 
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passing", it "is always truth" (Wild, 1969, p. 364). 
Because no 'epistemological chasm' remains to be breached, James now 
places the emphasis on the process of experience itself rather than on any 
definite perceptual or conceptual 'resting-place' as he will do in his 
pragmatism. He writes that most of our knowing is 'virtual' knowing 
and stresses that we hold many ideas that we do not bother to verify, 
but simply believe because nothing overtly contradicts them: 
To continue thinking unchallenged is, ninety-nine times out  
of a hundred, our practical substitute for knowing in the  
completed sense. As each experience runs by cognitive transi-
tion into the next one, and we nowhere feel a collision with 
what we elsewhere count as truth or fact, we commit ourselves 
to the current as if the port were sure (James, 1904/1967b, 
p. 69). 
James emphasized the 'felt transition' between the 'parts' of any 
experience so that: 
Our experience, inter alia, is of variations of rate and of 
direction, and lives in these transitions more than in the 
journey's end. The experiences of tendency are sufficient to 
act upon--what more could we have done at those moments even 
if the later verification comes complete?(James, 1904/1967b, 
p. 69). 
James feels certain that he takes care of the potential criticism 
that he is content with a substitute for knowledge when genuine knowledge 
is possible "by first making knowledge to consist in external relations 
...and by then confessing that nine-tenths of the time these are not 
actually but only virtually there" (James, 1904/1967b, pp. 71-72), and 
he then appeals back to his notion of pure experience: 
The instant field of the present is always experience in its 
'pure' state, plain unqualified actuality, a simple that, as 
yet undifferentiated into thing and thought, and only virtually 
classifiable as objective fact or as some one's opinion about 
fact. This is as true when the field is conceptual as when it 
is perceptual. 'Memorial Hall' is 'there' in my ideas as much as 
when I stand before it. I proceed to act on its account in either 
case. Only in the later experience that supersedes the present 
one is this naif immediacy retrospectively split into two parts, 
a 'consciousness' and its 'content', and the content corrected 
or confirmed. While still pure, or present, any experience--mine, 
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for example, of what I write about in these very lines-- 
passes for 'truth'. The morrow may reduce it to 'opinion' 
(James, 1904/1967b, pp. 74-75). 
James' intention obviously was to retain the notion of a functional 
consciousness which actively generates knowledge in the world. He 
maintains that the Absolutist position is just as liable to undergo a 
reduction from truth to opinion at any given time as his radical empiri-
cism is: 
Why insist that knowing is a static relation out of time when 
it practically seems so much a function of our active life? 
For a thing to be valid, says Lotze, is the same as to make 
itself Valid. When the whole universe seems only to be making 
itself valid and to be still incomplete (else why its ceaseless 
changing?) why, of all things, should knowing be exempt? Why 
should it not be making itself valid like everything else? 
That some parts of it may be already valid or verified beyond 
dispute, the empirical philosopher, of course, like any one 
else, may always hope (James, 1904/1967b, pp. 75-76). 
James is using radical empiricism to support a temporal, mutable 
view of the universe. His goal is to show that conscious processes and 
the workings of the greater mass of experience are integrated experiences 
which unroll themselves in time together. But this brings problems: 
James emphasizes that the subject-object distinction must still be made. 
The necessity of having verification procedures to confirm the solid 
existence of other parts of experience undermines the concept of pure 
experience. If every event accessible to human experience is contained 
within pure experience, the need for verification becomes a secondary 
process--a confirmation of what is already given in the state of pure 
experience. But James believes that the subject-object distinction 
must still be made if pure experience is to be translated into actual 
knowledge about the world. And from a psychological viewpoint, verifi-
cation is necessary to ensure the personal continuity of the stream of 
consciousness and to account for the fact that conception leaves the 
train of perceptual input at some point and becomes subjective. At 
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the same time, James must find a way to show that there is a real 
basis for perception in order to guarantee his realist view of the con-
crete world. In other words, he needs a common world. The abstract 
or necessary truths will not fill the demand because they make only a 
partial fit with the concrete world, and cannot describe its vagaries: 
they are definitionally opposed to the description of mutability and 
temporalism. James' psychology and philosophy demands that the con-
nection between minds be made at the perceptual level because of the 
evolutionary basis of consciousness, and the corresponding philosophi-
cal demand that minds must be capable of intersection at concrete 
places. •The concept of a world of pure experience, bound together by 
the relations, rests upon the possibility that two minds can know the 
same object. 
Two Minds Can Know One Thing  
If James was to make good his claim that: "Radical empiricism 
has, in fact, more affinities with natural realism than with the views 
of Berkeley or of Mill" (James, 1904/1967b, p. 76), it was necessary 
for him to show that two minds could know one thing, and that the thing 
known in common was an object of perception. There were good reasons 
for choosing perceptions as the meeting points for minds. First, such 
a view can remain neutral in terms of subscribing to any particular 
underlying basis for the reality perceived. In the Principles James 
argued that the universe appeared to actually have an atomic structure 
and to 'work' according to various universal laws not intuitively 
perceivable. In his pragmatism, however, he would argue that these 
presumed underlying bases of reality were products of the intellect 
and the necessary truths; they were secondarily imposed on the physical 
world, were subject to change and were based in part on the results of 
595. 
experience. They were not primary. Second, centering the 'commonality' 
of experience in perception gave James the advantage that while the 
same object might give rise to individual variations in perception, 
the object still 'projects' enough common elements to ensure inter-
subject agreement. But third and most crucial, the meeting of minds 
at the perceptual level is congruent with the evolutionary premises 
that run through the whole of James' psychology and philosophy. 
According to James, perception constitutes our closest cognitive 
relationship with physical reality. James selects the sensible world 
as the sphere of reality where all ideas are finally verified; this 
is a 'common-sense' selection because James shows in his psychology 
that it is the one level where we do not doubt that the objects have 
an independent existence from our thoughts about them. All philosophies 
demand some ultimately common world of truth or reality. The perceptual 
world is the obvious choice in an evolutionary-based functional psychol-
ogy because survival depends on the success of our adaptations to the 
pressures of the physical world. And if our physical and mental facul-
ties are products of evolution (and James believed that they were: see 
James, 1904/1967a, pp. 35-36; 1905/1967a, p. 97), this implies that at 
some level at least, a common sensible world must exist for the species. 
Fundamentally, men must interpret external events in substantially 
similar ways. If we confront the tiger in the forest we must recog-
nize that the tiger is a dangerous object; in this way the object's 
primary qualities become of secondary importance when the functional 
aspects of perception are emphasized. Perceptions (as opposed to 
sensations) give us not only the sense-data required to 'separate' 
the object from the 'experience-mass' that confronts us in any sensa-
tional situation, but perceptions also include the affectional facts 
which give us the 'meaning' of the object. These-considerations made 
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James' break with traditional empiricism almost inevitable and he 
wrote: 
For the Berkeleyan school, ideas (the verbal equivalent of 
whLt I term experiences) are discontinuous. The content of 
each is wholly immanent, and there are no transitions with 
which they are consubstantial and through which their beings 
may unite. Your Memorial Hall and mine, even when both are 
percepts, are wholly out of connection with each other. Our 
lives are a congeries of solipsisms, out of which in strict 
logic only a God could compose a universe even of discourse. 
No dynamic currents run between my objects and your object. 
Never can our minds meet in the same. 
The incredibility of such a philosophy is flagrant. It is 
'cold, strained and unnatural' in a supreme degree; and it may 
be doubted whether even Berkeley himself, who took it so 
religiously, really believed, when walking through the streets 
of London, that his spirit and the spirits of his fellow 
wayfarers had absolutely different towns in view (James, 1904/ 
1967b, pp. 76-77). 
Berkeley's position is less incomprehensible than James presents 
it when it is put in context with the view of nature which predomin-
ated in Berkeley's time. Marcell describes that view as follows: 
The structure of nature did not vary. Each category and each 
entity in creation had its origin in the divine blueprint 
used to construct the universe. That blueprint was infinitely 
complex, highly integrated, and rigidly economical. Nature 
allowed no redundancies or duplications. The variety of types 
within creation was deliberate, sufficient, and constant. Each 
entity's characteristics bore the indelible imprimatur of the 
creator, which located it in the so-called great chain of 
being, the familiar eighteenth-century metaphor for nature's 
organization of life. The possibility of a species of plant 
or animal becoming extinct or evolving out of earlier forms 
conflicted with the assumption of special creation underlying 
the great chain of being, and consequently an evolutionary 
view of nature eluded eighteenth-century thinkers. Change 
in time was real, but it was developmental, not structural. 
Sports and mutants were known to have occurred and survived, 
but they did not imply continuing, creative evolution. Nature 
was hierarchical, not organic:"the generally accepted idea of 
a Great Chain of Being implied that anything which did not 
form a part of an existing species would find no room for 
itself on a ladder of nature, all of whose rungs were already 
occupied" (Marcell, 1974, p. 55). 13 
13. Although Marcel refers to eighteenth-century American ideas of 
stability and the great chain of being, his words apply equally well to 
the British situation (see Lovejoy, 1936/1965, Chaps. 8 and 9 for an 
extended analysis of these concepts). 
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The possibilities of perception are guaranteed in this view of 
the cosmos because the universe is connected through the extra-experi-
ential existence of God. God is responsible for the connections and 
disjunctions of objects and these relations therefore exist 'beyond' 
nature as the means of cause and effect; they cannot be conceived of 
as essential parts within nature. Thus, all that can exist to be per- 
ceived are the perceptions themselves. The goal of man was to discover 
the eternal, fixed, 'discoverable' and stable laws of the universe, 
and because these laws existed 'beyond' perception, agreement at the 
perceptual level was irrelevant.
14 
Because the possibilities for per- 
ception were regarded as permanent, there was no particular need to 
study them in terms of inter-observer reliability. And if physical 
objects were perceived to be sensibly discontinuous, then the common 
world must be sought at the higher intellectual ranges: agreement on 
universal laws was crucial. Given this world-view, it was logical 
for Berkeley to conclude that percepts are not shared. It is difficult, 
in any event, to determine exactly what can be said to be shared in 
any given percept; there is a tension between the stress placed upon 
so-called 'common' elements, and the 'distinct' or 'individual' features 
of any given event. 
James' attempt to show that we do have percepts in common was 
fraught with problems, and has not escaped criticism (see Ayer, 1968, 
pp. 228-256, for example). Briefly, Ayer argues that James' theory 
of intersecting biographies conflicts with his theory of personal id- 
entity. Moreover, James' claim that we can infer that two people share 
14. Agreement was still guaranteed by God as the ground for perception 
and it remained relevant for practical life. This explains why Berkeley 
identified his view with common-sense realism, confusing the criterion  
for physical reality with its meaning. It is also worth noting that James 
made a similar confusion between criterion and meaning in his pragmatism 
(see Chap. 7, pp. 531-535). 
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a common percept by analyzing their behaviour is disputable. James 
seeks to solve the problem by stating that we have physical space in 
common and Ayer concurs with this, but makes the distinction between 
common space, and the imputation that because we can locate the same 
object in space, we necessarily share the same percept of the object. 
James' arguments for the existence of shared percepts are based 
on his inferences about the existence of other minds--he assumes that 
other minds exist on the basis of his perceptions of the bodily activ- 
ities of other individuals (see James, 1904/1967b, p. 77). Furthermore, 
the bodily activities of other individuals alter the objects in James' 
perceptual world and: 
It is only as altering my objects that I guess you to exist. 
If your objects do not coalesce with my objects, if they be 
not identically where mine are, they must be proved to be 
positively somewhere else. But no other location can be 
assigned for them, so their place must be what it seems to be, 
the same. 
Practically, then, our minds meet in a world of objects 
which they share in common, which would still be there, if 
one or several of the minds were destroyed (James, 1904/1967b, 
p. 77). 
The substance of James' natural realism is to be found in this 
common world of objects,and the means whereby these common objects 
are 'known' by several minds at once is derived from James' concept 
of pure experience. James extends the definition of pure experience 
so that the same piece of experience may figure simultaneously in many 
different contexts if it can figure simultaneously in the two that 
denote the knower and the known (see James, 1904/1967b, p. 80). -But 
James realizes that natural realism cannot be fully supported through 
the insistence that percepts are held in common. James may have the 
basis for a 'common-sense' realism consisting of shared objects which 
can be deduced from behavioural evidence, but the problem still remains 
as to whether percepts themselves are actually held in common. James 
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writes that the problem is empirical and that in fact, we do not have 
the same percept of the common object (see James, 1904/1967b, p. 82). 
He makes this assertion because he insists that individual conscious-
nesses are unique. Once we 'have' a percept, we continue to have more 
percepts, and eventually we have concepts which are unique virtual 
knowers of reality. Our minds are not 'conterminious' in any real sense 
(see James, 1904/1967b, p. 83), and James must now find some means of 
showing that our percepts have common elements. He concludes that 
their mere co-joining in space may be sufficient: 
In general terms, then, whatever differing contents our minds 
may eventually fill a place with, the place itself is a numeri-
cally identical content of the two minds, a piece of common pro-
perty in which, through which, and over which they join. The 
receptacle of certain of our experiences being thus common, 
the experiences themselves might some day become common also. 
If that day ever did come, our thoughts would terminate in a 
complete empirical identity, there would be an end, so far as 
those experiences went, to our discussions about truth. No 
points of difference appearing, they would have to count as 
the same (James, 1904/1967b, pp. 85-86). 
James' notion of the space common to two minds at once is based 
on the empirically derived conclusion that we commonly identify the 
objects of our percepts to be in the same place--that is, we point to 
the same spot when we are asked to identify a common object. Moreover, 
the sensations of the body are used to indicate common locations--you 
feel my touch from the 'inside' at the same point that I feel it from 
the 'outside' (see James, 1904/1967b, pp. 84-85). In this way, common 
space is determined through perceptual and sensational modes of exper- 
ience. With this meeting of percepts through spatial relations, James 
felt that he had shown that radical empiricism is congruent with natur-
al realism and that there is a 'natural' basis for his epistemology. 
This, for James, concludes the structure of his metaphysics: the rest 
of his radical empiricist essays are devoted to working out his system 
in more detail through amplification of the roles of the relations, of 
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the Ways two minds can know the same thing, of the roles of the 
affectional facts, and of experience of activity. 
So far, we have looked briefly at some of the historical problems 
James tried to solve, and the doctrines he devised to come to terms 
with them. It is now time to look at radical empiricism in a more 
critical light to try and determine whether or not it provides a coher- 
ent metaphysical basis for James' epistemology, and whether the epistemo-
logical advances James was simultaneously making in his pragmatism can 
be fitted into the metaphysics of radical empiricism. We must also 
look at James' tendencies towards subjectivity and idealism balanced 
against his proclamations of realism,and determine whether he preserv-
ed both the functional nature of thought and the independence of 
objects in the external world. 
Problems with Radical •Empiricism  
The concept of 'pure experience' figures in all of James' works. 
In the Principles it describes the first experiences of the aboriginal 
world before the interaction between feelings and concrete events sepa-
rates it into 'known' and 'knowing' parts. At the same time as the 
individual is separating events outside himself, feelings are different-
iated into percepts, concepts, sensations, emotions, volitions, etc. 
The concept of pure experience is used psychologically in the Principles; 
it describes the first sensational relationships the individual parti-
cipates in, and allows James to develop a selective view of conscious-
ness based on the developmental process (see James, 1890, 1, p. 488). 
But in the Essays in radical empiricism, 'pure experience' is expanded 
to include sophisticated experience and is used as the base for James' 
hypothesis that thoughts and things really are ontologically equivalent. 
And this hypothesis is problematic: until the development of 
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radical empiricism, James' philosophy has been intentionally dualistic. 
His professed dissatisfaction with this dualism and his appeals to 
positivism as the pragmatic rationale for making use of the dualism 
in no way make his philosophy any less dualistic. Thus, the explicit 
ontological equivalence between thoughts and things that defines James' 
radical empiricism raises questions about how well James' preceding 
work fits in with the new doctrine. His psychology is built on the 
existing tension between mind and the external world. The function of 
mind is to know and thus act on the physical world and the pragmatic 
motif runs throughout the Principles: verification is an active process 
and the discovery of the confirming percepts is crucial because the 
external world is not immediately or intuitively organized for the ob-
server. But with the advent of radical empiricism, the tension dis-
appears--mind and object are no longer structurally opposed: they are 
simply aspects of the same, ultimately closed, universe of experience. 
The first major problem is to determine whether Fite's criticism 
that James' conception of experience was necessarily subjective is valid 
(see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 341, quoted above, p. 571). James believ-
ed that everything that could be experienced was necessarily part of 
the 'stuff' of pure experience. Anything that could not be experienced 
was, by definition, excluded from the stuff of pure experience.
15 
Furthermore, James postulated that an object could be said to continue 
to exist in the absence of an observer because it had actually been 
experienced.
16 
But this approach comes very close to subjectivism: 
15. Kuklick points out that James had to make this distinction to 
support his realism and to avoid constructing another form of the 
absolute block universe (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 324). 
16. As Kuklick points out, James had the second alternative of granting 
existence to potential experiences; Kuklick claims that James did not 
seriously develop this approach because it could be too easily trans-
formed into rationalism (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 325). 
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'reality: can only be granted to those objects which have been exper-
ienced at some time by some sentient being. The postulate 'protects' 
James' intention to develop a realist conception of the physical world 
and it correlates with empiricism, but it also confounds 'existence' 
with 'knowledge'. Furthermore, the granting of existence to any parti-
cular object would also appear to depend upon the recognition of the 
observer that the object was real--that is, objects are granted inde-
pendent existence at the point when the piece of pure experience is 
'functionally' divided into knower and known by the observer. If the 
observer fails to make the distinction, a 'state' of pure experience 
would logically appear to continue for both the potential subject and 
object. 
This leads into the second aspect of the problem: what happens 
to the object--what status does it have--when it ceases to be in the 
presence of a sentient observer? As Kuklick shows, James grappled 
somewhat unsuccessfully with the problem, and it was here that he found 
panpsychism exerting its strongest appeal (see Kuklick, 1977, pp. 324- 
325). Panpsychism was an appealing way out of the quandry because 
according to that doctrine, each object, 'sentient' or not, had its 
own experience of itself. But this 'experience' was necessarily differ-
'ent from the experience of the 'sentient' observer and at any rate, 
the attribution of 'self-experience' to inanimate objects would bring 
James perilously close to the mind-dust theory that he had rejected so 
many years before. The best he could do was to describe objects in 
terms of space-time relationships so that each object could be given 
an 'independent' biography as a guarantee of its existence (see James, 
1904/1967a, pp. 20-22). This solution, however, is still subjectively 
oriented for the space-time relationships themselves make up a portion 
of pure experience, and therefore require 'recognition' by sentient 
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observers. As Kuklick states, James never really did resolve the prob-
lem of the form in which objects continued to exist apart from the 
impositions made upon them by observers.
17 
Whether or not James actually succeeded in vanquishing the tradi-
tional ontological dualism between thoughts and things is another 
serious question. Lovejoy comments on the difficulties of making the 
switch from dualism--and any dualistic approach brings in its wake a 
long philosophical history--to James' neutral monism, and concludes 
that James' legislation that "one thing may without contradiction be 
a member of two or more classes" (Lovejoy, 1930/1960, p. 57), is an 
insufficient postulate to refute dualism, including James' own as it 
appears in the Principles: 
Nothing could illustrate better than James' belief in the 
pertinency and efficacy of this short and easy method for 
disposing of dualism how little the true grounds of that hypo-
thesis were kept in view twenty-five years ago, even by the 
ablest of those who then set about the establishment of an 
alternative form of realistic philosophy. It has, I trust, 
been made sufficiently evident in the preceding lecture that 
neither the thesis of the non-identity of perceptual content 
and cognoscendum, nor that of the non-physicality of content, 
rests upon arguments so simple and slight that they can be 
dissipiated merely by bringing to mind the logical truism that 
a thing may without contradiction belong to two classes. Few 
philosophers can have been unaware of this possibility. But 
from the general possibility you cannot infer the particular 
fact. We May always entertain, in advance of inquiry, the 
hypothesis that a thing known to have certain properties or 
relations, abc, may be numerically identical with a thing which 
is otherwise known to have certain other properties, xyz. And 
the whole point of the argument for the two sorts of dualism 
lies in the contention that the experienced properties and 
relations of the datum are, in certain specific respects, incom-
patible with those assumed to belong to the particular 
17. (See Kuklick, 1977, p. 326). James' radical empiricism may seem 
superficially similar to Berkeley's subjective idealism, which also equ-
ates existence and experience. The difference between them is highlighted 
by this problem of the status of objects when not actually being per-
ceived. For Berkeley the problem was not serious, since the omnipresent 
Mind of God kept the objects in view, and kept their relationships in 
order, independent of any specific human perception. God, in Berkeley's 
theory, thus provides the extra-experiential ground and glue of percep-
tions. It was just any such extra-experiential factors that James was 
determined to exclude. 
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cognoscendum, and are also incompatible with the defining 
properties of the class of "physical objects". I shall not 
again repeat these arguments; but it is evident that the 
dualist's premises could be relevantly and effectually attacked 
only by examining, point by point, the specific differences 
asserted by him to subsist between perceptual content and physi-
cal object, and proving each of them separately to be a differ-
ence which does not exclude existential identity (Lovejoy, 
1930/1960, pp. 57 7 58). 
In short, James fails to show that the differences exhibited by 
the 'physical' room and the room of our perception are not fundamental 
to the real identity of each. As Lovejoy points out, James was endeav-
ouring to get round the problems of the representative theory of per-
ception which states that the physical object and the mental image 
of it constitute two distinct realities (see Lovejoy, 1930/1960, p. 56). 
The object in the mind is related somehow to the physical event which 
accounts for our knowledge of reality, For James, perception seemed 
to be immediate, without any intervening image; therefore he argued 
that "The puzzle of how the one identical room can be in two places 
is at bottom just the puzzle of how one identical point can be on two 
lines. It can, if it be situated at their intersection" (James, 1904/ 
1967a, p. 12; see also Lovejoy, 1930/1960, pp. 56-57 for an expanded 
version of these points). 
The problem with this analysis, as Lovejoy demonstrates, is that 
James does not go on to develop the set of relations that would make 
it possible for us to conceive of the relation of mental and physical 
events as intersecting parts of experience analogous to his example 
of the two lines. The problem of how one point can be on two lines 
at once is covered by the spatial relations, constructs, and defini- 
tions within the science of geometry. If we know what these relations 
are, and agree with their logical consistency as a system, there is no 
paradox involved in the premise that the two lines simultaneously 
occupy one point. James feels it is sufficient to say that the 'room' 
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as a piece of experience: 
is a member of diverse processes that can be followed away 
from it along entirely different lines. The one self-identical 
thing has so many relations to the rest of experience that you 
can take it in disparate contexts. In one of these contexts 
it is your 'field of consciousness'; in another it is 'the room 
in which you sit', and it enters both contexts in its wholeness, 
giving no pretext for being said to attach itself to conscious- 
ness by one of its parts or aspects, and to outer reality by 
another. What are the two processes, now, into which the room-
experience simultaneously enters in this way (James, 1904/1967a, 
pp. 12-13). 
,James then describes the two processes the 'room-experience' parti- 
. cipates in: the 'room-experience' exists simultaneously as a piece of 
the 'real world and as such includes "the history of the house of 
which the room is a part" (James, 1904/1967a, p. 13), and it exists 
as an object of our perception, which includes the observer's personal 
biography (see James, 1904/1967a, p. 13). 
The functional distinction between the two experiences is immedi-
ately obvious as James admits. The problem is that without a detailed 
examination of the relations between the 'room' and the percept of the 
room to show how experiences can be ontologically equivalent, we are 
forced back into the same epistemological dualism that has troubled 
thinkers since the Greeks first tackled the problem. James has hither-
to built his psychology of perception upon the concept of selectivity 
so that percepts are learned, and they always include the accompanying 
states of consciousness of the observer. It is fair to a'sk then, 
when confronted with the room, exactly what portions of its total 
existence enter our consciousness: what happens when two 'experiences' 
intersect? We must, if we follow James' psychology, conclude that we 
'get' what actually exists before us, but we get it according to the 
psychological laws of perception--and beyond that, we 'get' it from 
the standpoint of our unique individual consciousness. James allows 
this when he writes: 
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The presentation, the experience, the that in short (for 
until we have decided what it is it must be a mere that) 
is the last term of a train of sensations, emotions, decisions, 
movements, classifications, expectations, etc., ending in the 
present, and the first term of a series of similar 'inner' 
operations extending into the future, on the reader's part 
(James, 1904/1967a, p. 13). 
That the 'room' and the percept of the observer stand in some type 
of relation is not to be denied. There are at least some experienced 
'felt' relations between them, and if the individual merely happens 
to recall a room not immediately present, we can allow that at least 
a virtual relationship exists between the 'real' room and the 'recol-
lected' room. But beyond this, 'mind' and 'room' would remain struct- 
urally (and spatially' and temporally) independent of each other. James 
equates the observer and the object in terms of their ontological 
status: they are trains of pure experience. But James agrees that 
they are different trains which maintain their independence from one 
another even at the moment of intersection. Thus, the two distinct 
categories of traditional dualism are replaced, in James' analysis, 
with two different contexts of experience. The distinction between 
them is not one of ontology but of contingent separation so that the 
knower and the known are denoted as two different functions of the 
same piece of experience. 
But can James collapse the ontological distinction without laps-
ing into subjectivism or idealism? James tries to show that thoughts 
and things are homogenous in some of their categories. He says that 
their relations in time are identical, that both may have parts and 
both may be complex or simple. And they can both be "compared, added, 
and subtracted, and arranged in serial orders" (James, 1904/1967a, 
p. 29). Furthermore, James writes that in studies of perception it 
is often difficult to tell which parts of the percept come from the 
object and which parts come from the mind (see James, 1904/1967a, 
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pp. 29-30). But Lovejoy's criticism applies here: is there enough 
identity shown between the two to actually dispense with the older 
dualism and thereby maintain the existential identity of the two classes 
of events (see Lovejoy, 1930/1960, pp. 57-58, quoted above, pp. 602- 
603). James after all demonstrated in the Principles that logical 
operations can be imposed upon all categories of reality but that the 
given reality maintains its independence. 
James claims that "As 'subjective' we say that the experience re-
presents; as 'objective' it is represented" (James, 1904/1967a, p. 23). 
The division of any experience into subjective and objective parts is 
performed by consciousness alone so that: "subjectivity and objectivity 
are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is 
'taken', i.e., talked-of, twice, considered along with its two differ-
ing contexts respectively" (James, 1904/1967a, p. 23). Specifically, 
the problem is to determine whether the subject-object distinction can 
be taken as a purely functional distinction. James now launches into 
a description of the functional differences between thoughts and things: 
"Mental fires is what won't burn real sticks; mental water is what 
won't necessarily (though of course it may) put out even a mental fire" 
(James, 1904/1967a, p. 33). The fact that James can show a certain 
homogeneity between thought> and things--for example, they both have ex-
tension, although the quality of that extension varies according to the 
type of object discussed (see James, 1904/1967a, p. 33),--must be placed 
against the potentially real structural distinctions that can be drawn 
between thoughts and things. That is,functional distinctions may in 
fact arise because they are reflections of real structural distinctions. 
Lovejoy, commenting on these same passages in James' essay, "Does 
consciousness exist?" writes: 
Now the attributes here assigned to "mental" and "real" 
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objects respectively are plainly irreconcilable with the 
identity of the two classes. If the knife which is, either in 
fancy or in "true" perception, my immediate datum is incapable 
of cutting "real" wood, it has not the characteristics which by 
the definition given, are essential to "real" knives. While we 
may "take" an individual thing or event in two relations or con-
texts, we do not thereby make it possible for it at once to have 
and not have the same relation to a given other term, or to 
cause and not cause the same effect. The final outcome of James's 
reasoning on the matter is thus a complete relapse into the dual-
ism from which he set out to escape. But of this he does not 
seem to have been clearly aware; he apparently continued to be-
lieve that by means of the simple analogy of the point at the 
intersection of two lines he had justified the belief in the 
numerical identity of percepts and concepts with the physical 
objects they disclose (Lovejoy, 1930/1960, p. 59). 
Up until the development of radical empiricism, James' psychology 
emphasized that these structural and relational separations are the 
critical ones made by the individual. It was shown above that James 
succeeded in constructing a unified structure for consciousness at the 
expense of incorporating a mind-body dualism and a corresponding subject-
object distinction into his psychology. In order to preserve the struct-
ural unity of consciousness and to guarantee the efficacy of conscious-
ness per se, James built his psychology around a mind-body dualism so 
that consciousness could be defined as something 'more' than the left-
over effluvia of brain-states, and he ratified the subject-object dist-
inction so that consciousness did 'more' than simply 'represent' the 
objects presented to it. Thus he claimed that we use sensations as: 
stepping stones to pass over tothe recognition of realities whose 
presence they reveal. The grass out of the window now looks to 
me of the same green in the sun as in the shade, and yet a painter 
would have to paint one part of it dark bown, another part bright 
yellow, to give its real sensational effect (James, 1890, 1,p. 231). 
Perceptions, then, are not accurate sensational representations of 
the object before the perceiver--instead, they serve as signs or guides 
for our ideas about the world. The mind is not totally constrained by 
the world before it and thoughts about objects and the objects themselves 
may have few real intersecting points. The structural unity of mind is 
therey preserved in the Principles, and the independent structures of 
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the physical world are also preserved because they are free to vary, 
independently from the mind that knows them. At the same time, the 
epistemological problems of how the mind knows the object are also 
apparent in this account. 
But there are some collisions between mind and world that are not 
as free to vary in James' psychology, and these involve the actual ef-
fects objects in the world have upon the senses. James claimed that we 
had to believe that the dagger was sharp because we could not help receiv-
ing certain tactile sensations when it came into contact with our skin 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 306). He ratifies this conclusion in the radical 
empiricism when he writes that: "Mental triangles are pointed, but their 
points won't wound. With 'real' objects, on the contrary, consequences 
always accrue; and thus the real experiences get sifted from the mental 
ones" (James, 1904/1967a, p. 33). The basic structural differences be-
tween thoughts and things are implicitly, if not explicitly retained and 
these are not simple functional distinctions. As Lovejoy's analysis 
reveals, whether the dagger can really cut (physical) or not (mental) 
is the critical factor in determining whether the individual is exper-
iencing the physical dagger or the mental dagger. 
James' famous dictum that consciousness will stand for a function 
only and that the word consciousness can no longer be used to stand for 
an entity (see James, 1904/1967a, p. 3), is problematic. If mental and 
physical objects exhibit functional differences only, what accounts for 
these functional differences if not some difference in structure? James' 
only way out is to show that thoughts are more substantially composed 
of felt-sensations than he has previously allowed in the bulk of the 
Principles. His attempt to make a case for this interpretation of mind 
revolves around the status of the affectional facts and their 'derivation' 
within the context of the James-Lange theory of emotion. This attempt 
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will be discussed below, but first it is necessary to look at the ef-
fects  on cognition when structural dichotomies are discarded. 
Wild makes a valuable comparison between the two meanings of pure 
experience as it is used, first in the Principles, and later, in James' 
radical empiricism: 
On the former view, experience may have an over-arching structure 
that is neither purely subjective nor purely objective but with 
a place for both of these phenomena. On the latter view, pure 
experience itself is composed of units which are themselves 
neither the one nor the other, but neutral to the whole distinction. 
(Wild, 1969, pp. 361-362). 
Actually, radical empiricism, and its all-inclusive concept of pure exper-
ience can be seen as an extension of James' psychological construction of 
consciousness. There are strong parallels between James' construction of 
a structurally unified consciousness which performs various functions and 
the world of pure experience in radical empiricism. The concept of one 
unified structure performing distinct functions is extended, in radical 
empiricism, to include the whole cosmos, instead of being limited to con-
sciousness per se (see Kuklick, 1977, p. 320; see also Marshall, 1974, p. 
312). In the radical empiricism writings, pure experience has become the 
'all-pervasive' universe and all separations are artificial or secondary. 
Because all separations are secondary or epistemological rather 
than primary or ontological, James should, according to Lovejoy's analysis, 
take extreme care in delineating the point where subject and object are 
functionally separated into new sets of relations at given intersections 
in time and space (see Lovejoy, 1930/1960, pp. 57-58). The character-
istics that pertain to 'knowers' alone and to the 'known' in itself must 
be taken into account if James is going to be able to support his realist 
hypothesis concerning the status of the physical world. At the same 
time, the 'breaking' points between sensation, perception, and conception 
must be delineated, or at least acknowledged if James is going to be 
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able to defend the efficacy of human consciousness. Otherwise, con-
sciousness becomes a simple continuum from sensation to conception: 
it merely becomes more 'abstract' as the train of sensation merges into 
perception, and finally, conception. 
The other problem lies in James' use of the analogy between the logi-
cal operations that can be imposed on physical events, and the intro-
spective 'operations' which describe mental events. In the Principles,  
logical operations belonged to the 'realm' of necessary truth and because 
of their abstract quality, could be used to describe the objects of any 
given reality indifferently without changing the structure or 'composi-
tion' of that reality. Thus science 'works' by applying the necessary 
truths to the physical world and so 'discovers' objects which confirm 
hypotheses. If James is to be successful in showing that thoughts and 
things are ontologically equivalent, he must show that his usage of 
logical operations and relations has now substantially changed from his 
usage in the Principles. That is, he must go beyond analogy and show 
how logical operations and relations really do guarantee that thoughts 
and things are ontologically equivalent. And this, as Lovejoy shows, 
James fails to do. 
In the Principles, James could afford to blur the dividing point 
between the qualities possessed by an object and those imposed upon it 
by the mind for he had already insisted on the ontological, structural 
separation between minds and objects. Similarly, the boundaries between 
the dualistic functions of the mind itself are often blurred in the 
psychology (note the difficulties encountered in trying to determine 
the proper application of volition with effort). Within the context of 
radical empiricism, however, James may not be justified in taking such 
a cavalier approach. If functional distinctions are to replace ontolo-
gical distinctions, the cut between mental and physical 'functions' 
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must be very explicitly made, for the functional separation of two 
aspects of a single piece of pure experience has now become the only 
means of ensuring that thoughts and things remain distinguishable. 
There are two problems which must be resolved in James' attempt to 
extend structural unity to all aspects of experience before the theory 
can be accepted. First of all, he must systematically show there there 
are reasonable grounds for assuming that thoughts and things are not  
ontologically distinct. Secondly, he must show that Lovejoy's criticism 
is invalid; that is, that he has not simply incorporated the same old 
dualisms into his theory under the disguise of new nomenclature. 
-The subject-object distinction remains the crucial distinction in 
James' work. As in all traditional western philosophy, the subject-
object mind-matter distinction remains intact, only now at an avowedly 
experiential, rather than ontological, level. And if the distinction 
between subject and object, or mind and matter, is functional, empirical, 
and contingent, rather than ontological, then we are left with a lot of 
problems to solve on how the distinction arose in the first place. 
James' surmise that it can be accounted for on an evolutionary basis 
(see James, 1904/1967a, pp. 35-36), has little to recommend it as he 
fails to develop the idea, and comes suspiciously close to saying that 
mind is made up of the 'left-overs' from physical evolution (see Burtt, 
1932, pp. 318-319), thus demoting mind to a secondary position, when 
his original intention was to show that consciousness was necessarily 
efficacious, that consciousness constituted the centre of the universe. 
James' psychology presents a view of man wherein the individual 
struggles between two poles of existence in his attempts to adapt to 
and to transcend reality. The universe has essentially been an open 
universe, the limits on discussion imposed only by an avowedly legis-
lated positivism. But this picture changes with the development of 
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radical empiricism. The same effect is apparent in James' pragmatism 
when he develops the idea that metaphysical, religious, and moral issues 
must be decided in terms of their practical consequences for the indivi-
dual in the concrete world, so that hypotheses are to be translated 
into practical terms. In radical empiricism, James seems to be effect-
ing a continuum from sensation to perception to conception. This is neces-
sary if he is to be able to show that thoughts and things are ontologi-
cally equivalent. But it has the effect of reducing (at least potential-
ly) the independence of human conception from sensation, or from co-
ercion from sensible objects. 
This narrowing of the universe of discourse is made even more expli-
cit when James writes "that the only things that shall be debatable 
among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from exper-
ience" (James, 1909, p. xii). As James' thought develops, the 'knowable' 
universe (or at least the means for acquiring knowledge of the universe), 
gradually shrinks or diminishes. In making the experience of unity 
antedate the subject-object distinction, James makes the subject-object 
distinction subordinate to unity, and the initial disparity between mind 
and world and the potential realms of knowledge gives way to a series of 
intersections in time and space where mind and world become functionally 
separate as a result of the experiences of the observer. 
Wild writes that the 'lived body' has become the central focus of 
James' radical empiricism: 
This concerns the notions of the lived body which is found in 
the Principles, but is now considered in new contexts, and developed 
in new ways at certain points in the Essays. It is worthy of note 
that in these passages, it is not the brain alone that attracts 
James' attention, but the lived body as a whole. This body is 
the centre of the individual's world. As James puts it "every-
thing circles around it, and is felt from its point of view". 
This body is not only an object in the world, but also its subject-
ive centre. Here, at least, the objective and the subjective 
coincide. Finally, it is because of our ability to follow the 
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expressive gestures of the living body of another and to mesh 
our actions with his, that solipsism is no problem for us in 
real life (Wild, 1969, p. 365; internal quotation from James, 
1905/1967d, p. 170). 
Thus, as Wild goes on to say, the separated consciousness is replaced by 
the idea of the meaningful behaviour of the living body (see Wild, 1969, 
p. 365). This notion of the 'lived body' coincides with James' concep-
tion of the affections as the links between the mental and the physical. 
The merging of the subjective and objective aspects of experience 
is best described by James in his essays "The place of affectional facts 
in a world of pure experience", and "The experience of activity". In 
trying to show once again that thoughts and things are made of the same 
'stuff' he returns to the James-Lange theory of emotion to argue that 
the affections are not wholly mental phenomena, but are experienced 
physically as well. Moreover: 
The various pleasures we receive from an object may count as 
'feelings' when we take them singly, but when they combine in 
a total richness, we call the result the 'beauty' of the object, 
and treat it as an outer attribute which our mind perceives 
(James, 1905/1967c, p, 143). 
Object, mind, and body are all necessary for affectional experiences, 
and their modes or attributes seem to coalesce into one experience. Thus, 
the judgement that an object is beautiful is subjective but 'beauty' 
is treated as belonging to the object. Functionally, the object is 
beautiful. We impose our own feelings upon the object and treat it as 
if it 'really' possessed the qualities; the separation of the attributes 
of the experience into distinct categories is a second experience (see 
James, 1905/1967c, p. 145). James says that the ambiguous status of 
the affectional facts is completely natural (see James, 1905/1967b, p. 
132), but as Williams states, almost all theories of perception includ-
ing Cartesian dualism are compatible with such findings (see Williams, 
1942, p. 118). James claims that: 
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as soon as the relations of a thing are sufficiently various 
it can be sorted variously. Take a mass of carrion, for example, 
and the 'disgustingness' which for us is part of the' experience. 
The sun caresses it, and the zepher wooes it as if it were a bed 
of roses. So the disgustingness fails to operate within the realm 
of suns and breezes,--it does not function as a physical quality. 
But the carrion 'turns our stomach' by what seems a direct 
operation--it does function physically, therefore, in that limited 
sense of physics. We can treat it as physical or as non-physical 
according as we take it in the narrower or in the wider context, 
and conversely, of course, we must treat it as non-mental or as 
mental (James, 1905/1967c, pp. 152-153). 
James believes that our abilities to treat an event as mental or 
non-mental, because of the various 'sorts' that can be made on any piece 
of experience, provide evidence for his philosophy of pure experience. 
He shows that those qualities which were legislated as secondary quali-
ties in the scientific revolution have real physical effects and this 
in itself is a significant advance on the old Lockian position. The 
assessment of whether an effect is 'real' or 'subjective' depends on 
where the cuts are made by the sentient participant and he is at liberty 
to make them where he will. The concept of the 'lived body' is import- 
ant here because the secondary qualities can be shown to have actual physi-
cal effects upon real objects--that is on the bodies of the observers. 
The feelings provide the experiential link between mind and body, so 
that experientially it is impossible to tell whether the quality in 
question is a result of a particular feeling imposed on the object, or 
whether the object exhibits certain effects which give rise to the feel-
ing through the body of the sentient participant. These separations 
can only be made after the fact of the experience and therefore consti-
tute new experiences. While James' argument is valuableibecause it 
shows that the secondary qualities produce physical effects in the sent-
ient being, it raises several questions. 
We must grant that our particular feelings are products of the 
mind-body-object relationship but we are still left with the problem of 
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subjectivism. That there can be no perception without a perceiver 
is standard empiricist dogma from Berkeley on down. And if the primary-
secondary qualities distinction is nullified (and not replaced by any 
other qualitative distinction) then we have no basis to separate out 
any 'real' qualities objects may possess independently of our perceptions 
of them. Because we impose qualities outwardly onto objects, and they 
correspondingly impose theirs inwardly upon the 'mind-body', there are 
no clear-cut means of determining at the moment of experience what the 
object really is. Therefore, in James' schema, the final functional 
separation between knower and known is necessarily idiosyncratic,
18 
un-
less some type of ontological distinction is made between knower and 
known and this is precisely the type of distinction that James is abol-
ishing. What characteristics an object might possess in the absence of 
a sentient participant simply cannot be known. The secondary nature 
of the subject-object distinction means that the cut-off point for the 
independence of the object from its knower is determined by the would-be 
knower. This does not mean that objects do not have coercive properties: 
it does mean that the observer is incapable of making exact distinctions 
as to what these might be. The primary integrity of objects as such is 
not preserved within the field of pure experience. This is because 
instead of making explicit functional intersections between the proper-
ties of the knower and the known, or the thought and the object, James 
purposely intensifies the 'blurring' of theii- boundaries. 
James abolishes the primary-secondary qualities distinction in 
favour of a secondary separation of the 'concatenated' structure he gives 
to the universe. The primary and secondary qualities distinction was 
18. In epistemological terms that is. Evolutionarily or psychologic-
ally, the particular effects of primary and secondary qualities on the 
observer may have a determinative naturalistic or social basis. 
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developed in the first place as a means of establishing the essential 
properties of objects as distinct from the effects they produced in 
the observer--and it requires that there be an observer and an observ-
able object. James is attempting to overcome the resulting separation 
of man and nature (see Chap. 1, pp. 27-29), by making all distinctions 
between knower and known secondary and participatory. He is concerned 
with maintaining the unique status of the knower, reversing the older 
empiricism which implied a universal observer. The older empiricism 
sacrificed the individual standpoint of the observer in favour of guar-
anteed properties for objects. James sacrifices the integral properties 
of objects as real knowables to enhance the role of the subject. 
James affirms again and again that a functional distinction must  
be made between, knower and known, but he stipulates that it is the ob- 
server who treats the context in which the object is taken, as physical 
or non-physical. In the Principles and the Pragmatism he stresses that 
sensible objects have real coercive powers so that when we select ob-
jects from the various levels of reality to be 'real', we are constrain-
ed by the limits of the concrete world and the demands of our mind- 
body complex in the choices we make. It appears that he hopes to build 
his realism on the basis of these constraints. But in the context of 
pure experience the effect of the constraints is diminished with the 
equation of thoughts and things at the ontological level. What this 
means is that we are in danger of assigning a property to an object 
which it may appear to exhibit, but only exhibits when it is known to 
the observer. James is willing to put up with such difficulties as part 
of the price to be paid for a selective individual concept of conscious-
ness and for a 'bridging' of the old epistemological chasm between sub-
ject and object. In James' system, objects can only be conceived of 
in the context of their relationship with the observer. 
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If we look at the mental status of the cuts we make in nature, 
we find that in James' account they comprise our cognitive understanding 
of reality. Cognition is the separation of undifferentiated feelings. 
To survive, and to develop conceptions about the world, we must first be 
able to separate the object from the mass of experience on the basis of 
the effects it will produce in us. The 'synesthesia' that James uses to 
describe our first 'sensational' experiences is,a primitive experience 
and must give way to some more sophisticated means of classifying real-
ity. The primary and secondary qualities doctrine had pernicious effects 
on the development of epistemology but it formed the basis of an extreme-
ly successful science, and James admits that its founders were free, 
within the context of the pure experience theory, to carve up the 
world in this way. 
James continually advocates the return to experience for objective 
verification of conceptual insights. But what this is to mean is diffi-
cult to assess. Finding an object that corresponds to the idea in the 
mind may be easy enough. But finding out about the object through the 
perceptual mode is more difficult. The perceptual relationship with 
reality is confounded in the same way that the primitive 'felt' relation-
ship is--that is., the percept is partly physical, partly 'mental' , so 
that while there may be no need for mental images to intervene between 
the thought and the object, mental 'additions' are still a part of the 
experience, and the connection between thoughts and objects through pure 
experience complicates the separation of object properties from subject-
ive additions to objects. The problems for science within such a model 
are most clearly shown in James' article, "The experience of activity". 
In "The experience of activity", James concludes that activity, 
and hence, human causation, consists of "Sustaining, persevering, striv-
ing, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving 
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our intention--this is action, this is effectuation" (James, 1905/ 
1967d, p. 183). Furthermore, "I conclude, then, that real effectual 
causation as an ultimate nature, as a 'category', if you like, of real-
ity, is just what we feel it to be, just that kind of conjunction which 
our own activity-series reveal" (James, 1905/1967d, p. 185). James 
feels 'free to make this equation because he has already described the 
correspondence between consciousness and the external world through the 
vehicle of pure experience so that: 
What it is 'known-as' is what there appears. The experiencer 
of such a situation possesses all that the idea contains. He 
feels the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the 
triumph, or the passive giving up, just as he feels the time, 
the space, the swiftness or intensity, the movement, the weight 
and color, the pain and pleasure, the complexity, or whatever 
remaining characters the situation may involve. He goes through 
all that ever can be imagined where activity is supposed. If we 
suppose activities to go on outside of our experience, it is in 
forms like these that we must suppose them, or else give them 
some other name; for the word 'activity' has no imaginable 
content whatever save these experiences of process, obstruction, 
striving, strain, or release, ultimate qualia as they are of the 
life given to us to be known (James, 1905/1967d, pp. 166-167). 19 
There is little scope left for science in such a paradigm, unless 
it can be built upon some type of mind-dust theory to describe the 
behaviour of atoms striving to come together, and scientists have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to subscribe to such a view. The imposition 
of such a subjectivity complicates the search for regular laws to des-
cribe the conjunctions and disjunctions in nature. The early history of 
comparative psychology clearly illustrates the difficulties in the view 
that the feelings of 'sustaining', 'persevering', and 'striving' in 
animals could be productively described as analogous to those in humans 
(see Mackenzie, 1977, pp. 54-100). If such a paradigm is not viable 
19. Note the connection with James' volitional paradigm wherein all  
awareness of activity is described in afferent terms so that all know-
ledge of the world is connected to the actor's effects on the world. 
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for the biological sciences, it is difficult to see how it could be 
applied to the physical sciences, and James is silent on this point. 
And while science may attempt to base itself on the knowledge provided 
in sensation, as was the claim in the scientific revolution, Thayer 
shows that Newton could not make a continuous link-up between sensation 
and the mechanical laws he derived for the universe so that an epistem- 
ological gulf was created between the two conflicting forms of knowledge 
(see Thayer, 1968, pp. 24-25). 
The dual nature of action, so problematic in the Principles, is now 
resolved into one broad description of experience that covers man's 
activities and the activities of the rest of the world. James is com-
ing very close to the panpsychism he will briefly adopt in the Plural-
istic universe, and in the statement quoted immediately above, he nulli-
fied all the tension he created in describing man's dual tendencies in 
the Principles. The capacity for free will pitted against the adaptive 
tendencies is lost in the equation of activity with sensation. 
James gets rid of the 'two-man' paradigm of the Principles, replac-
ing it with a continuum of feelings which are verified through a comple-
mentary time-space continuum. He concentrates on the sensations produc-
ed by effort--mental or physical--rather than the nature of the ideas 
which provoke mental or physical effort in the first place. This contra-
dicts the explicit separation he made earlier in "The feeling of effort" 
and the Principles between mental and physical feelings of effort. The 
distinction between the two types of feelings has, up to this point, 
constituted the dividing line between habitual or ideo-motor activity 
and volition with effort. But volition with effort is now experienced 
within the context of pure experience and James says that: 
the only 'free will' I have ever thought of defending is the 
character of novelty in fresh activity-situations. If an 
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activity-process is the form of a whole 'field of conscious-
ness', and if each field of consciousness is not only in its 
totality unique. ..but has its elements unique (since in that 
situation they are all dyed in the total) then novelty is 
perpetually entering the world (James, 1905/1967d, p. 185). 
Novelty is a characteristics of pure experience--in the same way 
that James previously claimed that consciousness was constantly changing, 
the whole cosmos is now depicted as being in a state of constant change. 
Free will now consists in the development of novel conceptions or ideas 
in conjunction with novel events in the physical aspect of pure exper-
ience. Will operates within the context of experience: willed actions 
involving effortful volition are no longer seen as involving a struggle 
against the demands of reality. Instead, free will is linked with the 
continuous production of new events so that the exhibition of free will 
becomes a natural effect of James' insistence on the uniqueness of each 
consciousness, in conjunction with his extension of the principles of 
mutability and temporality to describe the workings of the physical 
world.
20 
 
In conclusion, it seems clear that James was primarily intent on 
showing that the inextricable unity of the subjective and objective 
elements of an idea could be extended to include the bodily sensations 
as well. The use of the bodily sensations would thus serve to illust-
rate the impossibility of making clear, structural distinctions between 
thoughts and objects, on pragmatic grounds, by the would-be knower. 
Thus, instead of merely failing to meet Lovejoy's criteria in establish-
ing clearly demarcated relations to show how subject and object were 
ontologically indistinguishable, James is in fact attempting to illu-
strate the impossibility of making such demarcations at all. 
20. The changing status of free will in James' philosophy is 
discussed again in Chap. 9. 
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But the theory still presents difficulties: it was shown above that 
the James-Lange theory of emotion was problematic because it neglected 
the cognitive or conceptual aspect of emotion and because it ratified 
an elementaristic, reductionist approach to feeling. These criticisms 
may equally well apply to the concept of pure experience and its divi-
sion into knower and known. Without a strong emphasis on the concept- 
ual aspect of the knower-known distinction, the attribution of quali-
ties to objects is inescapably anthropomorphic. Furthermore, if the 
elementaristic reductionist qualities of the theory of emotion are to 
be implicitly integrated into the theory of consciousness as a whole, 
then the same criticisms that James levelled at traditional empiricism 
may in turn be applied to his radical version. Building novelty into 
the universe will not necessarily make James immune to such charges 
since his earlier psychology stressed that the phenomenal appearance 
of objects was constantly shifting, so that the observer looked for 
signs of similarity to facilitate recognition of familiar objects. That 
is to say, from a psychological point of view, James had already made 
novelty a quality of the phenomenal universe; at the same time he found 
it necessary to maintain the subject-object distinction to preserve 
the efficacious quality of consciousness and the independent reality 
of the physical world. 
In brief, James tends to reduce both conception and volition to 
sensation. If the James-Lange theory is at odds with James' broader 
structure of consciousness, he is then obligated to show how the exten-
sion of the theories of emotion and afferent sensation can in fact be 
extended to cope with abstract conceptualizations. The dichotomy be-
tween necessary truth and the sensible world, so explicit in the Prin-
ciples, is not resolved in the radical empiricism and it is difficult 
to see how extending the theory of emotion and emphasizing the analogy 
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between afferent feelings and feelings of mental effort (so emphati-
cally held apart in both "The feeling of effort" and the Principles), 
can resolve this particular dichotomy. 
Wild is more positive than this in his appreciation of James' radi-
cal empiricism and writes: 
But the disciplined study of the facts of the life-world and 
their meanings will be the condition for any genuine advance. 
By following James in this arduous task, we may hope to work 
out a literature close to the concrete, and a critical philo-
sophy which will help men not only to think in a more disci-
plined and more open way, but to build a world order that is 
more sound and truly human (Wild, 1969, pp. 387-388). 
Wild's optimism may in fact be warranted; at the same time, the substan-
tial problems in radical empiricism would first have to be resolved 
so that the 'concrete' in Wild's statement could be defined and inter-
preted according to human conceptualizations which were not totally 
constrained by the contents of the concrete world. James' theory has 
been greeted with a substantial amount of critical comment; as the next 
two sections will show, critics have taken exception to James' subject-
ivism or latent idealism and his corresponding failure to guarantee 
the existence of an independent physical world. 
Ayer's Criticisms  
Ayer's criticisms and appreciations of James' radical empiricism 
are put forward in the context of his attempt to develop a 'world 
picture' (he would hardly accept the term 'metaphysic'), based on his 
own brand of linguistic phenomenalism. Eschewing James' attempt to 
identify reality with experience, Ayer writes: 
The most that I shall try to do for James' neutral monism' is 
to make out a very general case for the weaker thesis that our 
conception of the physical world can be exhibited as a theory 
with respect to our experiences. ...This is not perhaps quite 
so far as James would have wished to go, but I think that it 
gives him most of what he wanted (Ayer, 1968, p. 303). 
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The similarities between Ayer's program and James' could tempt one to 
analyze Ayer's theory as a refinement of James' own position. It 
would be misleading to do so however. Ayer's linguistic phenomenalism 
is based on ordinary language statements as a means of reconstructing the 
world on phenomenalistic lines. It thus departs from James' intentions 
in two ways. First, while James for a time considered accepting pheno-
menalism as the basis for radical empiricism, he eventually rejected it 
as being unable to account for the stability or permanence of objects 
in the world.
21 
As we have seen, radical empiricism had its own ser-
ious problems in this regard, but James could not accept a position 
that seemed to surrender to the problem at the outset. Second, and 
much more seriously (for modern versions of phenomenalism are unlike 
those that were known to James), Ayer's linguistic phenomenalism inter-
poses statements between experience and reality. Ayer's position is 
not ultimately a theory about the relationship of experience and reality, 
but about the relationship of statements about experiences and state- - 
ments about reality. True to the traditions of phenomenalism and analytic 
philosophy, Ayer does not attempt to characterize the nature of reality 
as such. Were his theory to be interpreted as an attempt to do so 
however (for such an attempt was central to James' own aims), it would 
have to be seen as a theory in which two classes of cognitive construct-
ions (statements about experiences and statements about reality) were 
required to mediate between experience and reality. As such, Ayer's 
21. In 1898 James wrote: 
The greatest difference between the phenomenist and the common sense 
view is that the latter gives stable elements whilst the former 
is afflicted by a restlessness which is painful to the mind. In 
it one never gets out of the conception of the flux, or process; 
although it might well seem that all the actual found its place 
in the flux (James, quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 370). 
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theory would fail to come to grips with James' central intention to 
avoid any intervening steps between the experience and the universe 
of which it was a part. 
These comments are not intended as a criticism of Ayer's position. 
He ic writing from within a different philosophical tradition than 
James, with different aims, and priorities, and his linguistic phenomen-
alism may well be a more viable position than James' own. The differ-
ences between their intentions are important to bring out however, 
since otherwise Ayer's theory could seem to have more relevance to James' 
than it in fact has. 
Nevertheless, if Ayer's theory cannot stand as an updating of James', 
it is still based on an acute critical analysis of the latter. As a 
result, his criticisms of'pure experience', taken according to James' 
realist ambitions, are very much to the point. Ayer begins his analysis 
of James' theory with an attempt to determine what James meant by 'pure 
experience'. He believes that if James meant only that the world can 
be constructed out of experiences, then his own phenomenalism is compat-
ible with James' intentions (see Ayer, 1968, p.329). But if James 
meant that pure experience is all there is--and Ayer believes that this 
was most likely James' intention--then "the thesis is very dubious 
indeed" (Ayer, 1968, p. 330). Ayer argues that he can find no warrant 
for James' statement that pure experience is all that exists, because 
James attributes the experiences to sentient human beings (see Ayer, 
1968, p. 330). 22 Ayer then states that experiences "have only a 
22. That James did intend to maintain a realist foundation for his meta-
physic seems clear enough. When James makes the functional distinction 
between knower and known, he explicitly states that physical objects 
continue to exist whether or not an observer exists to perceive them 
(see James, 1904/1967a, pp. 14, 22, 32; 1905/1967b, p. 124; 1905/1967c, 
pp. 139, 154; see also Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 536, 545). And when 
James writes that "the experience is a member of diverse processes that 
(contd.) 
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secondary title to existence, since it is only through their association 
with living bodes that they gain the necessary foothold in an objective 
time-order" (Ayer, 1968, P. 330). Furthermore, Ayer adds that there 
is empirical evidence to show that at one time the world did not con-
tain sentient human beings and it is logical to suppose that it will no 
longer contain any at some time in the future (see Ayer, 1968, p. 330). 
He concludes that James' theory is only viable if the theory is modified 
so that the world can be constructed out of pure experience. Ayer be-
lieves that such a theory can be constructed with human experience as 
its foundation; it contains "no predicates that are not cashable at 
the experiential level, but it does not carry the implication that 
they are actually cashed in every instance in which they are exempli-
fied" (Ayer, 1968, p. 331). Sentient beings occupy limited time-space 
regions and the fact that these time-space regions are limited "ensures 
that there are more occurrences than ,are actually observed" (Ayer, 
1968, p. 331). 
Ayer's criticism of James' concept of pure experience is compatible 
with Perry's problem with the conception: as Perry asks, "had he really 
succeeded in distinguishing between pure experience and subjective or 
conscious experience" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 391). Later on Perry 
comments: 
There remains only one last possibility, which is to distinguish 
experience from the experienced. Existence would then coincide 
22. (contd.) can be followed away from it along entirely different 
lines. The one self-identical thing has so many relations to the rest 
of experience that you can take it in disparate systems of association" 
(James, 1904/1967a, p. 12), he is trying to make it explicit that the 
object in question is simultaneously maintained in many sets of relations, 
some of which we choose to 'take' it in. Knowledge therefore depends 
upon the presence of sentient beings, for without sentence, there 
can be no breakdown of experience into knower and known. 
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with the content of experience, but would be independent of 
any act of experiencing on the part of the mind. This alter-
native would be the most consistent with James's theory that 
mind is a peculiar type of relationship among terms which in 
themselves are neither physical nor mental.  A Pluralistic  
Universe does not clearly affirm this alternative, and even 
compromises it through identifying the continuum of experience 
with consciousnesses great and small (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
p. 592). 
James creates the difficulties when he limits philosophical dis-
cussion to 'things that can be experienced' and then fails to expand on 
what this means in terms of science and metaphysics. He cannot rely 
upon his previous writings to give the contents of these areas their 
ontological status because he has changed the metaphysical basis of 
his philosophy from a legislated dualism to a neutral monism. Ayer puts 
the case succinctly when he compares the 'trueness' or 'falsity' of 
statements about the world with the ontological status of the world 
described: 
There is no conflict so long as we concern ourselves only with 
questions of truth or falsehood, without venturing into ontology. 
But if we insist on posing the ontological question, then the 
scientific and common-sense descriptions of the world do come 
into conflict, if only because they compete for the same regions 
of space. We can consistently accept the common-sense statement 
that there is a table here, together with the scientific state-
ment that there is a set of particles here, because there are 
independent ways of testing both statements, and these different 
groups of tests can each be satisfied. Put if we are constructing 
a picture of the world, then I do not see how we can consistently 
think of this area as being exclusively occupied by a solid, 
continuous, coloured object and as being exclusively occupied 
by a set of discontinuous, volitile, colourless, shapeless 
particles. In this position we have to opt for one view or the 
other. At the same time we must not be misled into thinking that 
we are pronouncing on a question of fact (Ayer, 1968, p. 333). 
Although we can assume that James meant to account for these quali-
tative shifts as functions of the various manifestations of any one 
piece of experience, he doesn'tsay so. Instead he claims that the 
physical world is built up through the conceptual extensions of our 
original percepts of it: 
Of this our perceptual experiences are the nucleus, they being 
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the originally strong experiences. We add a lot of conceptual 
experiences to them, making these strong also tn imagination, 
and building out the remoter parts of the physical world by 
their means; and around this core of reality the world of 
laxly connected fancies and mere rhapsodies floats like a bank 
of clouds. In the clouds, all sorts of rules are violated 
which in the core are kept. Extensions there can be indefinitely 
located; motion there obeys no Newton's laws (James, 1904/1967a, 
pp. 33-34). 
We must then ask what the precise status of Newton's laws is. They 
are not directly experienced, nor are they immediate abstractions of 
common-sense experience, but they appear to describe the physical 
world in universal terms. However, in James' radical empiricism, they 
appear merely as products of intellectual ends: "There is no original 
spirituality or materiality of being, intuitively discerned then; but 
only a translocation of experiences from one world to another; a group-
ing of them with one set or another of associates for definitely pract-
ical or intellectual ends" (James, 1905/1967c, p. 148), and: 
Chemical 'affinities' are a purely verbal metaphor; and, as 
I just said, even such things as forces, tensions, and activities 
can at a pinch be regarded as anthropomorphic projections. So 
far, then, as the physical world means the collection of contents 
that determine in each other certain regular changes, the whole 
collection of our appreciative attributes has to be treated as 
falling outside of it. If we mean by physical nature whatever 
lies beyond the surface of our bodies, these attributes are inert 
throughout the whole extent of physical nature (James, 1905/ 
1967c, pp, 149-150). 
James' concern is to show the interrelationship between the indivi-
dual and the external world as 'felt', interconnected experiences which 
are made up of contributions from the observer and the object. This 
system would be compatible with the view that the fruits of science 
are products of the same stream of consciousness which generates the 
affections. Thus, in a multi-dimensional philosophy of experience, we 
should not only be able to perceive the table in varying ways, but also 
to conceive of it in different ways without destroyina its essential 
independence as an object. Such a system is of course open to charges 
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of subjectivity, but these charges are as operative at the perceptual 
cut as at the atomic level. Any system which takes its starting point 
from observables or potential observables has subjective elements. 
This does not mean that we cannot posit a real external world; what 
it does mean is that we select the units which shall be taken as the 
ontological basis of that world. 
In his 'revision' of James' radical empiricism Ayer attempts to get 
around subjectivity by insisting upon the universality of the qualia, 
by denying that he is ontologizing at all, and by claiming that he is 
merely describing our theoretical activity (see Ayer, 1968, pp. 334-335). 
Ayer ends his analysis by stating that only problems of truth and false-
hood matter at any level, and that ontological questions might best be 
avoided altogether (see Ayer, 1968, p. 334). He argues that when the 
entities which make up the system are treated ontologically, their re-
ification as such is likely to be "treated as a matter of convenience" 
(Ayer, 1968, p. 335). Ayer then states that this "thesis, which is often 
attributed to James, that truth is a matter of convenience is not accept-
able: and in fact we have seen that James did not hold it, except in 
the domain of morals and theology" (Ayer, 1968, p. 335). The precise 
relationship between James' pragmatism and his radical empiricism is 
discussed below. Nonetheless, there is no indication •in James' radi-
cal empiricism that the ontological status of pure experience was to 
be treated as a matter of convenience. 
Whether philosophers and psychologists should best avoid ontologi-
cal questions cannot be legitimately discussed within the scope of 
this thesis. From a psychological point of view (or from a pragmatic 
perspective), however, once the subject-object distinction is made by 
the observer--on an ontological basis, or on James' functional level-- 
the observer treats the distinction as real, as ontological, as James 
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makes clear in both the Principles and the radical empiricism. Thus 
the major importance of James' radical empiricism for us is that it 
illustrates both the importance of making cuts in experience and the 
arbitrary nature of the cuts we make in carving up the universe. 
Other  Critics of Radical Empiricism  
Wild and Ayer give the most detailed critiques of James' radical 
empiricism. Other critics are inclined to slight radical empiricism 
in favour of other aspects of James' work but their comments should be 
briefly reviewed before we draw the final conclusions about the place 
of radical empiricism - in James' thought. 
Flournoy's account is entirely sympathetic and emphasizes the ad-
vances James made in resolving the epistemological gaps existing in 
traditional empiricist and rationalist philosophies. He does not allude 
to any of the problems which other critics see in radical empiricism 
and his enthusiasm is worth noting in the context of making an evalu-
ation of James' impact on his contemporaries (see Flournoy, 1917). 
Perry's work has been used throughout this thesis as a major source 
for understanding James' thought and for insights into James' views on 
various philosophical positions which are at times somewhat obscurely 
given in his writings. Perry's extreme sympathy for James must be ta-
ken into account, however, and Perry's own philosophical viewpoint col-
oured his interpretation of James' philosophical problems and his as-
sessment of the satisfactoriness of their resolution (see Kuklick, 1977, 
p. 317). Perry was a prominent exponent of the new realism along with 
Holt, Marvin, Montague, Pitkin, and Spaulding (see Hirst, 1967b, p. 78). 
The new realism owed much to James' radical empiricism (see Hirst, 
1967b, p. 83), claiming a real existence for logical and mathematical 
truths along with the contention that the appearances of an object are 
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objective characteristics of the object and that these characteristics 
are directly apprehended through perception. Furthermore, these appear-
ances--which include optical illusions--are public and need not be 
mental as they can be photographed (see Hirst, 1967b, p. 73). Thus, of 
the controversial resolution of the subject-object distinction, Perry 
can write: 
The philosophical fruitfulness of James's enrichment of conscious 
experience lay especially in its giving empirical meaning to 
that relation of "subject" and "object" which under different 
names and aspects was in James's day considered to be the distinct-
ive feature of knowing (Perry, 1958, p. 84). 
Perry interprets James' radical empiricism as a breakthrough in the 
'ways' we are able to think about knowledge; if James' system was not 
a logical success, Perry argues that it was a pioneering step in the 
right direction. Perry goes on to show that James' return to experience 
was a truer empiricism than the older British empiricism because it 
restored the notion of experience as it originally 'comes' to the indi-
vidual, undivided into artificial elements. James went further: at 
the moment of 'experience', consciousness incorporates elements of the 
object which simultaneously 'belong' to the physical world (see Perry, 
1958, p. 96). For Perry, James outlines a viable alternative to the 
Cartesian dualism of substance, although Perry concedes that the concept 
is only tentatively worked out. Perry ends his discussion of James' 
metaphysics with a tribute to James' originality and timeliness in the 
history of thought. It is worth remembering that while James was devel-
oping his final notions of radical empiricism, Perry was pursuing simi-
lar research and James acknowledged that Perry's view of consciousness 
was more like his own than any other that he knew of.
23 
23. See James, 1904/1967a, p, 24; Perry's views on consciousness are 
put forward in his article "Conceptions and misconceptions of conscious- 
ness" (see Perry, 1904, pp, 282-296). 
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• 	McGilvary belongs to that group of James' contemporaries who found 
his radical empricism exciting and productive. McGilvary believes 
that the notion of fringe states in consciousness is particuarly prom-
ising, and his article "The 'fringe' of William James's psychology: 
The basis of logic" (see McGilvary, 1911, pp. 137-164), attempts to 
use the fringe states as the psychological relations within conscious- 
ness and to extend James' radical empiricism in terms of a logical ana-
lysis of mind and experience. 
While James provided some of his. contemporaries with a 'fruitful 
system', radical empiricism was criticized by others, and a glance at 
the appropriate volumes of the Journal of philosophy, psychology, and  
scientific methods, and the Philosophical review (circa 1905-1912), 
shows that the merits of radical empiricism, often taken in conjunction 
with Dewey's instrumentalism and Schiller's humanism, were widely dis-
cussed and criticized for a number of years. Perry notes that James 
categorized these criticisms under the heading 'Miller-Bode objections', 
and he struggled to come up with satisfactory answers to the problems 
they 'exposed' in radical empiricism (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 393). 
Bode objected that the attempt to reduce everything to pure exper-
ience was futile 'essentially because this leads to solipsism--"the 
philosophy of pure experience does not account for our awareness of a 
world beyond our individual experience; and it also fails to show how 
there can be a world that is common to a multiplicity of individuals" 
(Bode, 1905a, p. 153). Bode gives a fairly detailed examination of the 
problems in James' account of perception and insists that the percept-
ions of space are psychologically distinct from the perceptions of 
objects, for one thing, because spatial perceptions always involve a 
coloured background. Bode goes on to say that there may be correspond- 
ing elements in perception where the differences are indiscernable 
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between observers, but these corresponding elements are obtained by 
later abstraction; they are not immediately distinguished, and as such 
may not be of much value in constructing a common world. Bode also 
questioned the status of those parts of the world which are not exper-
ienced and concluded that the pure experience hypothesis does not  
account for a world beyond immediate experience, nor does it provide 
a viable alternative to British empiricism or to Kantian idealism (see 
Bode, 1905a, pp. 128-133). 
Later in the same year, Bode reiterated that pure experience had 
no real standing ground; his criticism this time centred around the 
difficulties in distinguishing between perceptions and images. He 
showed that James' functional explanation was insufficient: 
so long as it is impossible to trace in the different stages 
of a conscious process a continuity or identity of a logical 
or teleological kind. So long as experience thrusts itself 
upon us in its characteristically crude, disjointed fashion, 
an explanation in terms of functional reference to what has 
gone before must remain hopelessly inadequate (Bode, 1905b, 
p. 690). 
Needless to say, these were not easy criticisms to answer and Perry 
says that James produced many pages of notes in an attempt to make his 
position inviolable (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 393). James attempted 
a partial answer to Bode's criticism in his article "Is radical empir-
icism solipsistic?" (see James, 1905/1912, pp. 235-238), which does 
little more than repeat James' belief that experience must be taken 
as it comes, that we live forward and understand backwards, and that 
static substitutions need not be made for the active transitions within  
experience. The Philosophical review and the Journal of philosophy, 
psychology,and scientific methods provided a forum for discussing the 
merits of radical empiricism and James' failure to satisfactorily 
refute his critics may account for the very limited success of radical 
empiricism as such in American philosophy. 
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Modern critics of James' work are even less inspired by radical 
empiricism. Coplestone dismisses it as "embryonic rather than a full-
grown world-view"(Coplestone, 1966, 8, p. 333), after a brief discussion 
of its major constructions. It receives scant mention in the commemor-
ative volume which appeared in 1942: Williams describes it as one of 
James' greatest achievements (see Williams, 1942, p. 117), but quickly 
goes on to point out that James' natural realism did not really support 
objectivism, and he does not indicate any specific future for the 
doctrine. Reck, in his Introduction to William James concludes that 
the doctrine was fertile as the forerunner of logical empiricism and 
various types of realism although it was never properly worked out. 
Reck then limits himself to describing radical empiricism and does not 
expand on its implications beyond this (see Reck, 1967, pp. 57-68). 
Brennan, in his William James simply restates James' definition 
of radical empiricism and does not give any commentary beyond this. 
In his Ethics of William James, he points out that pure experience and 
subjective experience are not adequately distinguished, and submits 
that: "To validate the peculiar forms of relation which hold together 
scientific, aesthetic, and ethical systems, Radical Empiricism must 
find something in experience which testifies to their existence" (Brennan, 
1961, p. 73). Brennan is primarily interested in developing James' 
moral philosophy, and his criticisms of radical empiricism centre 
around its adequacy as a supportive metaphysic for a philosophy of 
morals. He concludes that the pure experience hypothesis is not suf-
ficient to satisfy our intellectual demands and takes the position that 
we must go beyond pure experience to create a new morality. 
Dooley contends that James' works are essentially unified through 
his humanism, and his book is devoted to a demonstration of humanism 
as the unifying theme throughout James' philosophical and psychological 
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theories. He feels that radical empiricism substantiates the view of 
James as as humanist but unfortunately he fails to draw any implica-
tions beyond this in his book Pragmatism as humanism: The philosophy  
of William James. His book is valuable, however, because it emphasizes 
the ways in which James' whole 'metaphysic and cosmology is centered 
in human consciousness (see Dooley, 1974). 
Boring views James as a phenomenologist (see Boring, 1942, pp. 310- 
327), because,he says, James was satisfied with psychical givens, and 
he cites James' impatience with the study of sensation (and the work 
of Wundt and Fechner as evidence for his judgement). Further, Boring 
says, a break was made between phenomenology and positivism in the early 
twentieth century, and he uses the criterion that phenomenology is 
opposed to reductionism to conclude that it is compatible with James' 
concept of consciousness. In this article Boring judges that James' 
primary gift to modern psychologywas the establishment of criteria for 
making the choice between phenomenology and reductionism, and that his 
legacy is fundamentally phenomenological. Boring theorizes that James' 
radical empiricism could have provided the basis for an American school 
of phenomenology, although this has not happened within psychology. 
James has perhaps been most inspirational for modern phenomenologi-
cal philosophy. Phenomenologists have become interested in James' work 
(particularly the Principles), in part because of its influence on 
Husserl and in part for its own sake. While the consensus is that James 
was not a phenomenologist, there have been a fair number of books pub-
lished in the last three decades which examine James' thought in terms 
of what it can productively provide for phenomenology. Work in this 
area includes Linschoten's On the way towards  a phenomenological psycho-
logy (1968), Wilshire's William James and phenomenology (1968), 
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Gurwitsch's The field of consciousness (1957), Spiegelberg's The pheno-
menological movement (1960) and Wild's The radical  empiricism of William  
James (1969). 
Wilshire aims to show that James is "neither a pure functionalist, 
nor an introspectionist, nor a behaviorist; if he is any single thing, he 
is a pioneering phenomenologist (Wilshire, 1968, p. 7). Although the 
phenomenologists credit James' psychology with providing the concepts most 
compatible with their philosophy, Wilshire recognizes that any real rela-
tionship between James and phenomenology must be found in the new meanings 
James' psychology takes on within his radical empiricism (see Wilshire, 
1968, pp. 14,16). Basically, phenomenology requires that a mental state 
involve the concept of its object and Wilshire claims that the external 
relationship between thought and object--that is, the dualism of the Prin-
ciples--is reversed in radical empiricism so that the relationship becomes 
internal and therefore compatible with the phenomenological concept of 
intentionality. Phenomenologists, concludes Wilshire, must still look to 
the Principles for the 'thicker' account of James' concept of experience. 
In the Principles, "James had not yet explicitly affirmed that the same 
pure experience supplies the 'stuff' of both mind and matter, but his 
reasons for believing this are clearer" (Wilshire, 1968, p. 171)., Pheno-
menology, according to Wilshire, affirms the conclusions in James' radical 
empiricism, but must take the subject-matter from James' psychology. 
Wilshire shows at length how James' theories differ substantially from 
phenomenology and admits that: "we look in vain for a completed phenomeno-
logical account of the way in which the act of cognition construed as a 
phenomenal presentation of the body is presented in necessary connection 
with the object cognized" (Wilshire, 1968, pp. 177-178). 
The main impetus for a phenomenological interpretation of James' 
work is historically taken from Husserl's reading of James' Principles 
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and the inspiration he derived from it. Later phenomenologists have 
studied James in light of Husserl's debt to him, and for what James 
himself could provide for their own development as philosophers. In 
the debate as to whether or not James can be judged as a pre-phenomeno-
logist against his own intentions, we must decide whether in the long 
run the compatibilities between James and the phenomenologists outweigh 
the stated differences. Wilshire answers this question when he writes 
that "if one can be sure of anything about Husserl, it is that he did 
not intend to do empirical psychology. He intended to discover a "new 
a priori science" (Wilshire, 1968, pp. 180-181). And if James had any 
consistent aim in his whole psychology and philosophy, it was a commit-
ment to empirical knowledge. Within the legislated unity of his radi-
cal empiricism, he maintains the functional, if not ontological, dis-
tinction between the knower and the known. Truth for James is always 
found in the moment of perceptual verification, or it is potentially 
Present in the felt transitions of his radical empiricism. Function-
ally, a priori statements cannot be applied. His is a philosophy of 
expectation, and no more. For the phenomenologist, "The truth of pheno-
menological statements is logically prior to the truth or falsity of 
all empirical statements and to the correctness of all purposive 
actions" (Schmitt, 1967, p. 150). This is a direct contradiction of 
James' philosophical ends. Phenomenology is a descriptive philosophy; 
James' is essentially one of action. There are points in common between 
the two: there are 'phenomenological' elements in James' account of 
perception, and Schmitt notes that both James and the phenomenologists 
opposed reductionism, Hume's particular brand of phenomenalism, and 
the psychological atomism ofWundt (see Schmitt, 1967, pp. 137-138). 
James' philosophy has been productive in the phenomenological 
movement, and his radical empiricism contributed to the profundity of 
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that influence. But his major influence on the phenomenological move-
ment has been through the Principles, and radical empiricism has not 
been specifically taken up by phenomenologists as a.viable part of 
their philosophy. Finally, radical empiricism has had no acknowledged 
influence on modern psychology: the modern histories of psychology 
dismiss it with a brief description or they fail to mention it at 
all.
24 
It must be concluded then, that radical empiricism is largely a 
failure. But like all of James' failures, it is a significant failure. 
The analysis of radical empiricism shows the difficulty of accounting 
for the experienced, interconnected relationship between mind and the 
world starting from a strictly psychological point of view. The prob-
lems that the British empiricists faced in establishing a coherent 
view of mind have been attributed to the difficulties that resulted 
through the subordination of their constructions to the physical 
sciences. The same case cannot be made for James' radical empiricism; 
the active role of consciousness dominates his works and the demands 
of science are always subordinated to his psychological theory of know-
ledge. His attempt, therefore, to construct a unified view of cons-
ciousness and reality should be noted by psychologists precisely be-
cause it did not succeed. 
James based his concept of consciousness on selectivity and the 
'cuts' we make in experience. The structure of experience changes from 
the external 'over-arching' reality of the Principles to the all-envelop-
ing integration of mind and reality of the Essays. The notion of cons-
cious selection remains constant throughout James' works: we learn 
24. See, for example, Watson, 1978; Boring, 1950; Marx & Hillix, 1963. 
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from James, if in a somewhat negative way, that cuts must be made. 
Through his often brilliant, and sometimes false, analysis of how the 
mind comes to terms with reality, we may, perhaps, gain some idea of 
the relationship between consciousness and the world and our effective 
roles in the world. 
Perhaps psychology and physics will someday provide the world with 
a unitary ontological basis for sensation and thought and the behaviour 
of atoms. Perhaps not. Whether monism is a real possibility or whether 
we must make do with various dualisms or pluralisms where we make the 
cuts for the sake of expediency and progress cannot yet be determined 
and James could not be expected to provide a solution to this problem. 
What he did do was to provide a controversial set of concepts for us 
to examine, and this is a positive step in itself. Thayer argued that 
James changed the focus of empiricism when he put his pragmatic theory 
of truth forward; with radical empiricism he took another major step 
and demonstrated clearly (if sometimes negatively) that whatever else 
is basic to the 'old' or to the 'new' world-view, a subject-object 
distinction must be made at some point in epistemology. Furthermore, 
the point at which it is made determines the specific contents of the 
epistemology--how 'subject' and 'object' are defined determines what 
is 'known' about their relationship, and out of this 'knowedge' grows 
the world-view--scientific, metaphysical , , and ethical. That James re-
cognized that the system he had developed in radical empiricism was 
beset by major difficu)ties shows to some degree in his subsequent 
work, A pluralistic universe, and more strongly in his final work, Some  
problems of philosophy, where he finally returns from his long philoso-
phical quest to the problems which had motivated him to begin the 
Principles more than thirty years before. 
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Conclusion: The Relationship Between Radical Empiricism and  
Pragmatism  
Radical empiricism as the evolutionary metaphysic. 
Before examining James' final philosophy it is necessary to look 
at the relationship between pragmatism and radical empiricism. Prag-
matism has been discussed as an evolutionary epistemology, and there 
are substantial reasons for treating radical empiricism as corresponding 
evolutionary metaphysic. James' construction of the stream of consious-
ness has been treated as an evolutionary concept (see Chap. 3, pp. 156- 
160), and radical empiricism has been described as an extension of 
the characteristics of the stream of consiousness to the characteristics 
of experience itself: 
As James suggested, he picked up and extended the stream of 
consciousness doctrine of the Principles. There, consciousness 
carved out the enduring objects that comprised the world. Now, 
James said, consciousness itself was only one mode of organizing 
a neutral realm of experience which carried within it the 
elements of its construction into consciousness and objects 
(Kuklick, 1977, p. 320). 
The neutral monism of pure experience is an extension of James' defini-
tion of thoughts or ideas; subjective and objective (or mental and physi-
cal) aspects of thoughts and of pure experience are inextricably united. 
The stream of thought and pure experience are both continuous and con-
stantly changing. Finally, novelty, as the product of conscious select-
ion by the mind or natural selection in the physical world, is integral 
to both conceptions. Radical empiricism can therefore be viewed as 
James' attempt to extend the evolutionary conception of mind, developed 
in the Principles, into a metaphysical world view. Radical empiricism 
gives him the vehicle for discussing all of the metaphysical problems 
and possibilities which could not, he believed, be legitimately discussed 
within the context of the scientific, supposedly positivistic psychology. 
Radical empiricism therefore takes up where the psychology leaves off. 
641. 
The psychology is by and large an introspective work; the intro-
spective method was considered at the time to be a legitimate means 
of studying psychological problems and James also made extensive use 
of non-introspective empirical data to support his hypotheses. No such 
data base or methodology existed for the radical empiricism however, 
so that any 'scientific' credibility that radical empiricism exhibits 
• is based on extending the data base of the psychology into metaphysics. 
This accounts for the subjectivity of the doctrine and it also accounts 
for many of the internal difficulties of the theory because the solu-
tions reached in the psychology were gained at the price of incorporat-
ing a mind-body, subject-object distinction into the psychology. These 
solutions therefore cannot simply be extended into a metaphysic that 
does away with such distinctions without considerable revision of the 
solutions themselves. 
If radical empiricism is taken as James' major attempt to extend 
the evolutionary concepts gained from biology, appl ied to psychology, 
and 'transformed' into philosophical assumptions, into a description 
of the relations and operations of the physical world itself, the inter-
nal problems with the theory become more comprehensible. Evolutionary 
theory was first applied to the associationist, mechanistic materialist 
world of Newtonian science and Darwin was concerned with showing that 
his theory extended the applicability of these conceptions to the 
natural sciences. James' paradigm reverses this position: he wanted 
to show that the external world really exhibited novelty, mutability, and 
continuous change, and that mind and world exist in a state of a priori  
interaction (see James, 1904/1967b, pp. 62-75). Mind and world are 
the products of the continuous interaction of the objects and relations 
of pure experience. Evolution in James' sense is a continuous and 
non-predictive process--that is, James' definition of the evolving 
642. 
universe includes the mind as an efficacious aspect of the universe, 
so that variations within that universe are the result of biological 
and mental spontaneous variations. The world is therefore capable of 
exhibiting real changes over time. Nature does not necessarily exhibit 
lawful, mechanical, quantifiable patterns as Darwin, Spencer, and their 
supporters tried to maintain. Instead, James believed that man must 
return to pure experience, to perception, if he was going to truly 
participate in the evolution of the universe. 
James made his most explicit attempt to describe the pluralism of the 
world of pure experience in A pluralistic universe, and there he wrote: 
Pragmatically interpreted, pluralism or the doctrine that it is 
many means only that the sundry parts of reality may be externally  
related. Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment 
of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, 
but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything. 
The word 'and' trails along after every sentence. Something 
always escapes. 'Ever not quite' has to be said of the best 
attempts made anywhere in the universe at attaining all-inclusive- 
ness. The pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic 
than like an empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected, 
however much may report itself as present at any effective centre 
of consciousness or action, something else is self-governed and 
absent and unreduced to unity. ...For pluralism, all that we are 
required to admit as the constitution of reality is what we our-
selves find empirically realized in every minimum of finite life. 
Briefly it is this, that nothing real is absolutely simple, that 
every smallest 'bit of experience is a multum in parvo plurally 
related, that each relation is one aspect, character, or function, 
way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else; and 
that a bit of reality when actively engaged in one of these rela-
tions is not by that very fact engaged in all the other relations 
simultaneously. The relations are not all what the French call 
solidaires with one another. Without 16 -iing its identity a thing 
can either take up or drop another thing, like the log which I 
spoke of, which by taking up new carriers and dropping old ones 
can travel anywhere with a light escort (James, 1909/1967, pp. 
321-323). 
This world is radically different from the orderly, mathematical, 
mechanical conception of the Newtonian philosophers. And this is the 
world as James believed it to really exist. Knowledge of this world 
is subjective, and 'real' knowledge of events is limited to the moment 
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of finite perception. The pure experience philosophy is put forward 
then, as a hypothesis concerning the 'real' nature of the universe, 
and the 'real' nature of the universe is described by James in terms 
of elevated and transformed evolutionary concepts. But how can such a 
world be known methodically by man? James had the problem of convinc-
ing his audience that the pluralistic concept of pure experience is a 
viable concept in itself, that such a world exists and that it can be 
known. 
The simultaneous appearance of pragmatism, radical empiricism  
and pluralism. 
It is in answering these questions that the methodology of prag-
matism becomes important. James' psychology and his radical empiricism 
can be taken as the polar points in his thought. The dualistic psycho-
logy gives way to the neutral monism of pure experience, and pragmatism 
can be placed between them as the mediating methodology. Because the 
discussion of pragmatism precedes the discussion of radical empiricism, 
this thesis might well give the impression that the writings on prag-
matism came before James' radical empiricism, and that pragmatism looks 
forward to James' attempt to ontologically equate mind and matter. In 
fact, the discussion on pragmatism is given first because the issues 
selected for discussion from James' pragmatism have a closer relation-
ship to the problems discussed in the preceding chapters on the nature 
of reality and volition. It was therefore decided to introduce James' 
philosophy through his pragmatism for the sake of continuity. 
Although James officially introduced his version of pragmatism in 
1898 (see above, p. 463), the lectures that make up Pragmatism: A new  
name for some old ways of thinking, were not delivered until 1906-1907. 
The essays which were later collected as Essays in radical empiricism  
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were written and published in the years 1904-1905 (see McDermott, 
1967, pp. 824-844). Pragmatism as a detailed philosophical statement 
therefore followed immediately on the heels of the essays on radical 
empiricism. And in 1909, both The meaning of truth and A pluralistic  
universe appeared. 
The meaning of truth was published by James in answer to critics 
of the earlier Pragmatism and it includes: 
all the work of my pen that bears directly on the truth-question. 
My first statement was in 1884, in the article that begins the 
present volume. The other papers follow in the order of their 
publication. Two or three appear now for the first time (James, 
1909, p. viii). 
This shows that James was already developing the basis of his prag-
matic theory long before he completed the Principles. Further, when 
we look at the earliest publication dates for the articles that com-
prise the bulk of The meaning of truth and those which make up A plural- 
istic universe we find that half of those from The meaning of truth  
were first published in 1908 and 1909 (the rest appearing in 1885, 
1895, 1904, 1905, and 1907), while the lectures later published as 
A pluralistic universe first appeared in print between 1905 and 1909 
(see McDermott, 1967, p. 850). This is a rather roundabout way of 
emphasizing that James''philosophy cannot accurately be viewed from 
a strictly 'chronological' perspective. Pragmatism, radical empiricism,. 
and pluralism were developed concurrently. 
Although the substantial writings on pragmatism and radical empiri-
cism appeared later in James' life, neither doctrine was a 'new' part 
of James' thought when it finally appeared in print. James was influ-
enced by Peirce's 1878 paper "How to make our ideas clear", while radi-
cal empiricism is first mentioned by name in the preface of The will  
to believe (1897), when James says that the philosophical attitude 
expressed in the essays could best be called radical empiricism. Both 
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pragmatism and radical empiricism were integral parts of James' thought 
before they appeared in substantial works, and although he maintained 
that the reader could accept pragmatism without accepting radical 
empiricism, James' saw both conceptions as necessary and congruent 
parts of his philosophy (see James, 1909, p. ix). 
Taken on its own, the pragmatism exhibits a somewhat curious ten-
sion between a relativistic, pluralistic conception of the world, and 
a reflection of the 'trialistic' or 'discrete' realities system of the 
Principles. And as such, its role as a 'mediating' doctrine, stand- 
ing between the Principles and the pluralistic radical empiricism, 
makes sense. But the picture is more complex than this. 
James' Principles has been repeatedly analyzed here, and by other 
critics, in terms of its dualism--Reck, for instance, writes: "This 
work, as we have noted, contains, besides an immeasurable wealth of 
scientific detail and philosophical suggestiveness, two main strands 
--the physiological, behavioral strand and the introspective, phenomen-
ological strand" (Reck, 1967, p. 85). James' dissatisfaction with the . 
dualist approach of the Principles is fully documented in the litera-
ture (for example, See Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 72-75); his meta-
physical concerns break through again and again, and he finds it im-
possible to restrict psychology within the limits he sets for it. And 
the recognition of the apparance of these two strands within the 
psychology is important for the analysis of James' philosophy. Prag-
matism, it appears, has the task of mediating between the two strands 
in the Principles, and the conflict between the 'holistic' and 'trial-
istic' elements in the pragmatism provides evidence for its close links 
with the problems of the Principles. Furthermore, the existence of 
two opposing strands within the pragmatism shows that James was attempt-
ing to make a transition between the old world view and his vision of 
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the 'new' but that he could not achieve this 'all at once'. 
James allows his metaphysical conjectures a fairly free reign in 
his radical empiricism and an even freer one in his A pluralistic  
universe. He rejected positivism and went on to examine the philosophi-
cal possibilities for developing his notion of pure experience, and 
he found support in the works of Fechner and Bergson (see James, 1909/ 
1967, pp. 133-331). He sketched a cosmology that he hoped would super- 
sede the Newtonian world-view with its elementaristic associationist 
psychology and he provided an alternative epistemology to British em-
piricism. He is often wildly romantic and polemical in his assertions, 
and we note that there is a complete absence of 'data' in these works, 
in comparison to the Principles which contains an immense wealth of 
'observable evidence', research findings, and information gained through 
introspective experience. In the Principles, James sought a data base 
for his conclusions according to the postulates of the scientific 
method, and though metaphysics intruded, James concluded many of his 
discussions with the statement that psychology was inadequate to answer 
the questions he raised. When he turned to metaphysics in the context 
of philosophy, he could do so with some confidence because he had made 
his way there through the Principles. He had made the 'cuts' that 
differentiated psychological science from metaphysical speculation, 
and he had a huge 'data base' beneath him. By now, he believed that 
his stream of consciousness, and his theories of volition, emotion, 
perception, conception, and the perception of space would support his 
metaphysical hypotheses. But James recognized that the psychological 
constructions were not an entirely sufficient foundation for his meta-
physics when he wrote: 
I am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to which I 
give the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that 
647. 
the establishment of the pragmatic theory of truth is a step 
of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail 
(James, 1909, p. xii). 
Pragmatism, in James' own words, is the mediating doctrine--the 
'active' component of his philosophy. Pragmatism is to make radical 
empiricism prevail: this implies that radical empiricism cannot yet stand 
on its own and this fits in with James' arguments for a will to believe, 
his pragmatic contention that truth is made, and his broad use of the 
evolutionary concepts of temporalism and mutability as guarantees that 
change is possible. It also dramatizes his humanistic notion that 
man's consciousness lies at the heart of the developing universe, and 
that man's actions count in the making and changing of the world. In 
the Pragmatism, he expresses his humanism as follows: 
Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem to ourselves to make 
ourselves and grow, are the parts of the world to which we are 
the closest, the parts of which our knowledge is the most intimate 
and complete. Why should we not take them at their face value? 
Why may they not be the actual turning-places and growing-places 
which they seem to be, of the world--why not the workshop of 
being, where we catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may 
the world grow in any other kind of way than this?(James, 1907/ 
1913, pp. 287-288). 
Pragmatism was devised as a method for "settling metaphysical 
disputes that otherwise might be interminable" (James, 1907/1913, p. 45). 
Thus James used the pragmatic method to 'confirm' his hypotheses of 
radical empiricism and pluralism. Radical empiricism, however, is 
rarely mentioned in the works on pragmatism. Instead, James' pragmatism 
seems to be more closely related to the problems of the Principles. 
The reader often gains the impression--on reading the pragmatic writ-
ings after the psychology--that James was now using philosophy as the 
means of resolving certain issues that could not be resolved within the 
context of psychology. It also seems likely that James' dissatisfaction 
with the restricting and unsatisfactory dualisms of the Principles led 
him to break that work into two philosophical strands so that the 
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subjective, phenomenal, metaphysical speculations of the Principles  
largely find their way into radical empiricism, while the pragmatic 
writings are more concerned with the active, epistemological issues. 
This division of labour makes a fair amount of sense: James is freer 
to be speculative and pluralistic in his metaphysics if he thinks that 
he can rely on pragmatic methodology as a corrective and as a means 
of verifying or 'making true' his metaphysical statements. The tension 
in the pragmatism therefore reflects both the degree of success and 
the problems still extant in James' attempts to work out satisfactory 
methodologies for solving metaphysical issues. This interpretation of 
the relationship between radical empricism and pragmatism also corre-
lates with James' view that metaphysical truth is a possibility--that 
metaphysics should take heart from physics and recognize that the task 
of rationalizing the world from a metaphysical perspective is simply 
the harder task (see James, 1890, 2, p. 671). Metaphysical axioms 
or theories serve a valuable role because they provide the 'goal' for 
the methodological thinker. 
Pragmatism as the 'methodology' serves as the 'active' part of 
James' philosophy, and its 'activity' works in two ways. It looks 
back to the Principles to determine which concepts have empirical sup- 
ort, and thus can provide a substantial basis for the experience philo-
sophy, and it looks 'forward' to the metaphysical 'ends' of radical 
empiricism to select the postulates that James will attempt to trans-
late into empirical 'givens'. 
If such a relationship between the two 'philosophies' was James' 
intention, many of the problems in his work become clearer. The prag-
matic theory of truth now makes sense as a set of processes for deter-
mining truth at various 'reality' levels for James has stated his hopes 
that unity is increasing in the world, and he sees this unity evolving 
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through the accumulation of experience: 
The world is in so far forth a pluralism of which the unity is 
not fully experienced as yet. But, as fast as verifications come, 
trains of experience, once separate, run into one another; and 
that is why I said, earlier in my article, that the unity of 
the world is on the whole undergoing increase. The universe 
continually grows in quantity by new experiences that graft them-
selves upon the older mass; but these very new experiences often 
help the mass to a more consolidated form (James, 1904/1967b, 
pp. 89-90). 
If the pragmatic theory of truth really 'works' it will work by bring-
ing the various levels of reality into closer and closer conjunction, 
and the differences between the pragmatic theories of truth will then 
disappear when a truly pluralistic world of experience comes into being. 
If we take the world of pure experience as the world James aims to 
make true,several difficulties in the integration of his work disappear. 
The world of pure experience has been shown to be a strangely passive 
world, where the will to believe is no longer emphasized, essentially 
because thoughts and things have been ontologically equated. The 
'passive' nature of the world of radical empiricism is exhibited in 
James' concentration on the 'virtual' aspects of truth (see James, 1904/ 
1967b, p. 68), his description of the verification process as a series 
of 'felt transitions' (see James, 1904/1967b, pp. 66-69), and his exten-
sion of thoughts to include concomitant physical sensations (see James, 
1904/1967b, p. 65). James strengthens the bond between objects and 
ideas by stressing the validity of virtual knowledge and emphasizes 
that virtual knowledge can and does substitute for actual knowledge 
(see James, 1904/1967b, p. 68). The same theme appears in the pragmat-
ic writings, but there the use of virtual knowledge is limited to the 
verification of ideas about physical objects (see James, 1907/1913, 
pp. 202-205). James extends this conception in radical empiricism to 
make the connection between conceptual knowledge of the 'remoter' port-
ions of the physical world and the occasional perceptual intersections 
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of our lives with these remoter objects and relations: 
The objective nucleus of every man's experience, his own body, 
is, it is true, a continuous percept; and equally continuous 
as a percept (though we may be inattentive to it) is the material 
environment of that body, changing by gradual transition when 
the body moves. But the distant parts of the physical world 
are at all times absent from us, and form conceptual objects 
merely, into the perceptual reality of which our life inserts 
itself at points discrete and relatively rare (James, 1904/1967b, 
P. 65). 
James' rationale for extending the unit of thought to include 
physical sensations now becomes clear. The difference between perception 
and conception is now largely given in terms of the particular individ-
ual's position in time and space. Virtual knowledge is equated with 
perceptual knowledge (see James, 1904/1967b, pp. 61-65), and verifi-
cation or 'knowing' thus consists in the ambulation or 'felt transitions' 
between concept and percept (see James, 1904/1967b, pp. 62-75). Know-
ledge, or conception is therefore as subject to change as perception 
and James writes: 
According to my view, experience as a whole is a process in 
time, whereby innumerable particular items lapse and are super-
seded by others that follow upon them by transitions which, 
whether disjunctive or conjunctive in content, are themselves 
experiences, and must in general be accounted at least as 
real as the terms which they relate (James, 1904/1967b, p. 62). 
and: 
Why insist that knowing is a static relation out of time when 
it practically seems so much a function of our active life? 
For a thing to be valid, says Lotze, •is the same as to make 
itself valid. When the whole universe seems only to be making 
itself valid and to be still incomplete (else why its ceaseless 
changing?) why, of all things, should knowing be exempt? Why 
should it not be making itself valid like everything else? 
That some parts of it may be already valid or verified beyond 
dispute, the empirical philosopher, of course, like any one 
else, may always hope (James, 1904/1967b, pp. 75-76). 
The analysis of the relationship between radical empiricism and 
pragmatism does not resolve the substantial difficulties of radical 
empiricism. It does however show that James was not proposing radical 
empiricism as a 'finished' philosophical statement. Instead, radical 
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empiricism is the vehicle for James' hypothesis that the world really 
is temporal, mutable, continuous, and pluralistic. Radical empiricism 
therefore can be taken as a hypothesis for analyzing the mind and world 
in a radical evolutionary way with the hope that the radical evolution-
ary view will eventually prevail. 
It is probably fair to conclude that the greatest virtue of James' 
radical empiricism is the redefinition of physical reality and the re-
lationship of the mind to the redefined physical world, not in the sense 
of making an ontological equation between thoughts and things, but in 
presenting a relativistic view of reality and of knowledge itself. In 
this sense, radical empiricism is a polemic for a new evolutionary 
world-view, and as such performed a vital role in turning the selected, 
transformed evolutionary conceptions into common assumptions about the 
world. If James' philosophy had a role in effecting such a change, 
then his work, in the final analysis, is a success. 
CHAPTER 9  
SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY:  
THE FINAL PHILOSOPHY  
652. 
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Introduction  
Perhaps the most telling evidence for the interpretation given 
in Chap. 8 to the relationship between radical empiricism and pragmatism 
lies in James' last, and sadly incomplete book, Some problems of philo-
sophy. It is unfortunate that James did not live to complete this work 
because it is his most confident and serious philosophical production. 
Perry writes: 
The serious enterprise of James's last days, however, was the 
composition of the most technical and carefully reasoned of 
all his books. ;..This volume represents a definite turning 
away from polemics, popular and literary appeal, mysticism, 
and flights of imaginative speculation (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, 
pp. 661-662). 
Some problems of philosophy marks an interesting close to James' varied 
career. He intended the book to be read by philosophers which accounts 
for the careful reasoning and serious tone. But he had planned to make 
changes in the text and when directing that it be published after his 
death, he wrote "Say that it is fragmentary and unrevised. Call it 'A 
beginning of an introduction to philosophy'. Say that I hoped by it 
to round out my system, which now is too much like an arch built only 
on one side" , (James, 1911, pp. vii-viii). 
The lack of mysticism, polemic, flights of imagination and their 
replacement by a sober confidence is important; James was aware that 
this was his last chance to complete his philosophy, and he had at last 
succeeded in coming to terms with some of the philosophical dilemmas 
that had plagued him for so many years. In light of this new confidence, 
it is significant that Some problems of philosophy so often looks back 
to his early psychology and that it is dedicated to Renouvier whom he 
had so long ago 'outgrown' philosophically: 
... he (Charles Renouvier) was one of the greatest of 
philosophical characters, and but for the decisive impression 
made on me in the seventies by his masterly advocacy of pluralism, 
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I might never have got free from the monistic superstition 
under which I had grown up. The present volume, in short, 
might never have been written. This is why, feeling endlessly 
thankful as I do, I dedicate this text-book to the great 
Renouvier'smemory (James, 1911, 'Dedication'; see also Perry, 
1935/1974, 2, p. 662). 
James' final philosophy is linked to his radical empiricism, prag-
matism, and pluralism, but there are several factors which distinguish 
it from the earlier philosophical writings. James' philosophy consist-
ently had its roots in his systematic and empirically oriented psycho-
logy and the final philosophy is no exception. But some of the signi-
ficant differences between the earlier and the final philosophy lie 
in the particular use James made of the psychology in Some problems of  
philosophy, in his recognition that he had not succeeded in solving 
many of the problems of the Principles in radical empiricism, and in 
his admission that these problems would not lend themselves to immedi-
ate solutions. James' earlier philosophy provided the foundations for 
the construction of a mutable, temporal, pluralistic view of the physi-
cal world, based on the conception of consciousness first developed 
in the Principles. The evolutionary view of the physical world is 
ratified in the final philosophy but it is now stripped of the romant-
icism and idealism which marred the pluralistic pure experience philo-
sophy. James' venture into radical empiricism gave him confidence in 
the hypothesis that the sensible world could be reconstructed in temp-
oral and mutable terms and he could now begin the reexamination of 
the roles of percepts and concepts with the goal of 'rationalizing' 
the new view of reality. Thus, there is far more emphasis on the role 
of science and its relation to mind in the final philosophy than there 
is in the radical empiricism. Furthermore, there are echos of the 
limitations and restrictions that restrain James' psychological theor-
izing in the means he uses to limit the scope of philosophy to certain 
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metaphysical and epistemological questions. These limitations are 
made most explicit when James abandons the attempt to insist on an 
ontological equivalence between thoughts and things and confines him- 
self to the claim that percepts and concepts are "made of the same kind 
of stuff" (James, 1911, p. 107). 1 
Percepts and Concepts  
James begins with a breakdown of percepts and concepts according 
to their functional differences, and this reappraisal of the distinction 
is valuable for it leads James back once again into an analysis of the 
fundamental interrelationship between them so that: "We harness percept-
ual reality in concepts in order to drive it better to our ends" (James, 
1911, p. 65). He argues from the standpoint of a confirmed empiricist: 
Perry writes that the "affirmation of the priority of perception to 
conception, both genetically and cognitively, is 'the tendency known  
in philosophy as empiricism'; to which, in the remainder of the book, 
the author will hold fast" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 663; see also 
James, 1911, p. 106). 
James shows that historically all of the sciences grew out of 
philosophy and separated from philosophy as: 
The fertility of the newer conceptions made special departments 
of truth grow at such a rate that they became too unwieldy with 
details for the more universal minds to carry them, so the 
special sciences of mechanics, astronomy, and physics began to 
drop off frbm the parent stem (James, 1911, p. 21). 
Philosophy thereby became the repository for all the questions that 
the specialized sciences were unable to answer. Philosophy had come 
to mean 'metaphysics' in contrast to those studies of reality which 
1. The relationship between the psychology and the final philosophy 
and the limitations imposed on both are discussed in more detail below. 
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were organized into sciences, and James argues that this separation 
should give way to the view that "philosophy must include the results 
of all the sciences and cannot be contrasted with the latter" (James, 
1911, p. 27). But he also concludes that such a unification belongs 
to the future and that he will therefore concentrate on metaphysics 
in the restricted sense of the term. Within this framework, percepts 
and concepts are to be used as the basic 'units' and the metaphysical 
view James now presents is built on the derivations of the discrete 
functions of, and relations between, percepts and concepts (James, 
1911, pp. 28, 47). 
James returns to an analysis of the functions of percepts and con-
cepts with the aim of determining their explicit roles in the ration-
alization of sensible reality. Thus, science progresses as follows: 
The 'rationalization' of any mass of perceptual fact consists 
in assimilating its concrete terms, one by one, to so many 
terms of the conceptual series, and then in assuming that the 
relations intuitively found among the latter are what connect 
the former too. ...We may well call this a theoretic conquest 
over the order in which nature originally comes. The conceptual 
order into which we translate our experience seems not only a 
means of practical adaptation, but the revelation of a deeper 
level of reality in things. Being more constant, it is truer, 
less illusory than the perceptual order, and Qught to command 
our attention more (James, 1911, pp. 70-71). 
Because conception is necessary for the construction of scientific 
systems, James says that philosophers have traditionally accorded it 
a more exalted role than perception: 
The Platonizing persuasion has ever been that the intelligible 
order ought to supersede the senses rather than interpret them. 
The senses, according to this opinion, are organs of wavering 
illusion that stand in the way of 'knowledge', in the unalter-
able sense of that term. They are an unfortunate complication 
on which philosophers may safely turn their backs (James, 1911, 
p. 75; see also James, 1890, 1, p. 479). 
2. See also James, 1890, 2, pp. 651, 664-665, 667, where James 
expresses the same conception of the genesis of science. 
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James proposes to replace the elevation of concepts with the 
view that percepts and concepts are "made of the same kind of stuff, 
and melt together when we handle them together" (James, 1911, p. 107). 
Here the extravagancies of radical empiricism give way to a functional 
interactionist view of conscious processes, and the world is brought 
back together through epistemological means. This perspective replaces 
the legislated ontological equivalence between thoughts and things: 
The two mental functions thus play into each other's hands. 
Perception prompts our thought, and thought in turn enriches 
our perception. The more we see, the more we think; while the 
more we think, the more we see in our immediate experiences, 
and the greater grows the detail and the more significant the 
articulateness of our perception (James, 1911, pp. 108-109). 
Knowledge, in James view, is the product of the interaction between 
percepts and concepts. At the same time, he believes that the per-
ceptual world constitutes the primary reality, and he returns to the 
Principles for evidence to support this conclusion (see James, 1911, 
p. 111ff.). The reference to the work on the perception of reality 
in the Principles is significant: the mind-matter distinction acts as 
the fundamental basis for James' distinctions between the various sub-
worlds of reality in that work, and the reference to the Principles, 
appearing immediately after James has explicitly equated percepts and 
concepts •(rather than thoughts and things) in an ontological state-
ment, underscores the conclusion that he has now abandoned the attempt 
to ontologically equate thoughts and things. Once again, however, 
James is faced with the problem of how the mind knows the world, and 
once again, he must redefine the relationship between perception and 
conception: 
In the last resort a concept can only be designative; and... 
the concept 'reality', which we restore to immediate perception, 
is no new cbnceptual creation, but only a kind of practical 
relation to our Will, perceptively experienced, which reasoning 
had temporarily interfered with, but which, when the reasoning 
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was neutralized by still further reasoning, reverted to its 
original seat as if nothing had happened. That concepts can 
neutralize other concepts is one of their greatest practical 
functions (James, 1911, pp. 111-112). 
James' return to theory of reality of the Principles after his 
long forays into philosophy, and his reassessment of the functions of 
percepts and concepts, are necessitated by the changes he has made, 
through the philosophication of evolutionary theory, in the construction 
of the physical world that is known by the mind. The reevaluation of 
the roles of percepts and concepts is now undertaken with the goal of 
establishing pluralism as the foundation of his world picture. To this 
end, he stresses that concepts, taken in isolation, cannot provide an 
accurate view of reality: 
I believe that philosophy stands at present at the beginning 
of a new sort of activity, not unlike that which began with 
Locke, and which will end by defining (in ways not dreamed of 
till quite recently) the limits of what the conceptual or 
logical method can accomplish, and the parts of reality which 
escape treatment by fixed logical categories or concepts. I 
am quite sure that in establishing the inadequacy of concepts, 
the door will be opened to much vagueness and extravagance, and 
that possibly something like the excesses of the German romantic 
school in philosophy may yet be in the order of the day. That 
will doubtless be a pity, and must be counted to the disadvantage 
of the movement. But it gives me very little anxiety, for I 
think that the final upshot and result will be a greater 
distinctness and clearness than philosophy has ever seen. 
... But, dear old friend, neither you nor I will be there!! 
(James, in a letter to Pillon, 1909; quoted in Perry, 1935/1974, 
2, p. 662). 
James believed that a new philosophy, based on perception, was 
in the making; and Perry writes that Some problems of philosophy is 
James' attempt to go beyond the immediate 'romantic' phase he envisaged 
(and indulged in himself), and to provide a clear base for the develop-
ment of the new metaphysic (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 662). His con-
viction that conceptual knowledge is largely static and his oft-repeated 
assertion that perception is prior to conception is more than a des-
cription of a psychological hierarchy of knowledge acquisition: it pro- 
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vides the baseline for James' new empiricism, which Perry says: "im-
plies particularism, pluralism and novelty" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 
663). James has used percepts and concepts as the fundamental units of 
consciousness throughout his philosophy and his return to percepts and 
concepts is not in itself significant. It is what James does with 
perception and conception at each stage of his philosophy that makes 
their analysis significant in each of his works, so that the examin-
ation of James' philosophical development can be given in terms of his 
progressive redefinition of perception and conception. 
The influence of Bergson
3 
is strongly felt in James' final defini-
tions of the functions of percepts and concepts as they supplement 
each other in 'knowing' the world: 
The deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual 
experience. Here alone do we acquaint ourselves with continuity, 
or the immersion of one thing in another, here alone with self, 
with substance, With qualities, with activity in its various 
modes, with time, with, cause, with change, with novelty, with 
tendency, and with freedom. Against all such features ofreality 
the method of conceptual translation, when candidly and critically' 
followed out, can only raise its non possumus, and brand them 
as unreal or absurd (James, 1911, p. 97). 
In passages like this, James goes far beyond a 'mere' functional des-
cription of the roles of percepts and concepts and his conception of 
the roles of percepts and concepts is now qualitatively integrated 
into, his pluralism. James is now embarking on his final philosophy of 
meliorism which holds that the fate of the universe depends upon a plural-
ism of independent powers so that the universe will evolve 'success-
fully' only if these powers work towards its success (see James, 1911, 
pp. 228-220). The meaning of freedom therefore undergoes a change in 
contrast to earlier definitions given in the Principles and The will  
3. See James, 1911, pp. 96-97 where he acknowledges Bergson's 
influence on his definition of the functions of perception and conception. 
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to believe. In these earlier works, free will was based upon the 
'chance' hypothesis, wherein a "margin of indeterminism" (Perry, 1935/ 
1974, 2, p. 663), existed, leaving a potential opening for acts of free 
will. Within these limits, novelty was possible. James now rejects 
this 'tychistic' concept of chance as a "negative intellectualise 
(Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 664), and turns instead to Bergson's notion of 
'creative evolution'. James then moves on to create a "really growing 
world" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 664), through the affirmation of the 
human experience of novelty. 
The 'awareness' of novelty--which is central to pluralism--is 
grounded in perception: 
Pluralism, ...taking perceptual experience at its face-value, 
is free from all these difficulties. It protests against 
working our ideas in a vacuum made of conceptual abstractions. 
Some parts of the world, it admits, cannot exist out of their 
wholes; but others, it says, can. To some extent the world 
seems genuinely additive: it may really be so. We cannot 
explain conceptually how genuine novelties can come; but if 
one did come we could experience that it came. We do, in fact, 
experience perceptual novelties all the while. Our perceptual 
experience overlaps our conceptual reason: the that transcends 
the why. So the common-sense view of life, as something really 
dramatic, with woTk done, and things decided here and now, is 
acceptable to pluralism.'Free will' means nothing but real 
novelty; so pluralism accepts the notion of free will (James, 
1911, pp. 140-141). 
Free will is now subsumed under the concept of meliorism. This is a 
radical departure from the position James takes in the Principles be-
cause he now makes free will an indigenous part of reality rooted in 
the perception of novelty; this replaces the earlier notion where novel-
ty is achieved by individuals fighting against a constricting coercive 
concrete world. Freedom is found in the perceptual flux itself and 
this conception of freedom carries the seeds for the beginnings of a 
'natural morality', a possibility James largely rejected in the Principles. 
Furthermore, the function of perception as a means to knowledge 
has undergone a transition. In the Principles, James emphasized the 
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tendency of the observer to seek common or seemingly permanent quali-
ties in the spatial-temporal repetition of sensible objects (see James, 
1890, 1, p. 231). Conceptions about reality grew out of the seemingly 
constant qualities of the sensible world. Now, however, James is em-
phasizing that perception also performs the opposite function--it faci-
litates the recognition of novel phenomena--that is, novel occurrences 
are real events in the external world, and their appearances can only 
be recognized through perception. The potential for novelty in the 
world and the human capacities for recognizing novelty and for effort-
ful volition are combined to present a world-view wherein mind and 
matter 'evolve' or work together in the production of a new world: 
We can create the conclusion, then. We can and we may, as it 
were, jump with both feet off the ground into or towards a 
world of which we trust the other parts to meet our jump-- 
and only so can the making of a perfected world of the plural-
istic pattern ever take place. Only through our precursive 
trust in it can it come into being (James, 1911, p. 230). 
James' renewed discussion of concepts and percepts is undertaken 
to show what kind of world-views result when either perception or con-
ception is given priority in 'knowing' the world. Putting our faith 
in conceptual knowledge means for James that we essentially accept a 
static and immutable kind of 'Absolute' which is incompatible with the 
fullness of the reality to be known. The characterization of the cog-
nitive faculties represents, in minature, two distinct world-pictures. 
But how closely related is the real concrete world to our per-
ceptions and conceptions of it? Within the framework of pure experience, 
James promotes an ontological equivalence between thoughts and things. 
In Some problems of philosophy  he says that percepts and concepts  
are of the same stuff--that is, our experiences are consubstantial (see 
James, 1911, pp. 107-109). But the percept is not necessarily consub-
stantial with the object of perception. James intended Some problems  
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of philosophy as a metaphysical examination of the units of mind and 
their relations to the world (see .James, 1911, p. 46). He realized 
in the context of developing radical empiricism that the pragmatic 
method could not actually be used to resolve certain metaphysical dis-
putes (see James, 1905/1967d, p. 180). The pragmatic method was useful 
in allowing him to hypothesize that the universe is really pluralistic, 
that novelty is a real quality of the physical universe, that the mind 
can become cognizant of novelty, and that the mind--through the exercise 
of effortful volition--can meet the novelty of the physical world with 
novel constructs of its own. But if these hypotheses are actually to 
become true, James realized that he must first provide a basic concept-
ual framework for viewing mind and its relationship to reality in a way 
that would make his hypotheses plausible. This reconstruction of the 
relationship between mind and matter is the aim of Some problems of  
philosophy. In setting up a new conceptual framework for exploring 
the interaction between the mind and the world, James found that he 
must once again begin by separating, or 'pushing apart' the mental and• 
physical aspects of reality. This 'pushing apart' is most clearly demon-
strated in James' attempt to resolve the problem of causality once 
again, this time in terms of a model based on our perceptual experiences 
of the relations between objects. 
The Twin Problems of Causality and Novelty  
Causality. 
James concludes Some problems of philosophy with a discussion on 
the problem of causality, stating that: 
The attempt to treat 'cause', for conceptual purposes, as a 
separable link, has failed historically, and has led to the 
denial of efficient causation, and to the substitution for it 
of the bare descriptive notion of uniform sequence among events. 
Thus intellectualist philosophy once more has had to butcher 
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our perceptual life in order to make it 'comprehensible' 
(James, 1911, pp. 217-218). 
But James was fully aware of the problems that arose when perceptual 
experiences of causation were taken as the 'true' nature of causality, 
and which had led Hume to make his denial of 'efficient causation': 
If we took these experiences as the type of what actual causation 
is, we should have to ascribe to cases of causation outside of 
our own life, to physical cases also, an inwardly experiential 
nature. In other words, we should have to espouse a so-called 
'panpsychic' philosophy. This complication, and the fact that 
hidden brain-events appear to be 'closer' effects than those 
which consciousness directly aims at, lead us to interrupt the 
subject here provisionally. Our main result, up to this point, 
has been the contrast between the perceptual and the intellectual-
ist treatment of it (James, 1911, pp. 218-219). 4 
Unfortunately this is as far as James went. Perry writes that "He 
promised a discussion, in later chapters, of idealism, of psychophysics, 
and of Bergson" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, pp. 665-666), but James died be-
fore he could fulfil these intentions. 
Had James lived to fulfil his plans, we would have been closer to 
understanding how he iptended to relate mind to the physical world. It 
is clear that he had abandoned the problematic thesis of the radical 
empiricism where he postulated that the affectional experience of effort 
could be used to infer the nature of causal relations between non-
sentient objects, for he 'reinstates the 1880/1890 distinction between 
physical and mental effort in his final philosophy: 
As I now write, I am in one of these activity situations. I 
'strive' after words, which I only half prefigure, but which, 
when they shall have come, must satisfactorily complete the 
nascent sense I have of what they ought to be. The words are 
to run out of my pen, which I find that my hand actuates so 
obediently to desire that I am hardly conscious either of 
resistence or of effort. Some ofithe words come wrong, and 
4. Or, as Perry writes: "If we ask whether all causes are of this 
experiential sort, the answer must depend on how we conceive the relation 
of mind and body and on whether we accept or reject the panpsychistic 
view of the physical world" (Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 665). 
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then I do feel a resistance, not muscular but mental, 
which instigates a new instalment of my activity, accompanied 
by more or less feeling of exertion. If the resistance were 
to my muscles, the exertion would contain an element of strain 
or squeeze which is less present where the resistance is only 
mental. If it proves considerable in either kind .I may leave 
off trying to overcome it; or, on the other hand, I may 
sustain my effort till I have succeeded in my aim (James, 1911, 
pp. 210-211). 
Once again, James enters into the problem of separating the particu-
lar qualities which characterize mental phenomena from those which may 
characterize physical operations. The fact that perception is defined 
as the function of perceiving outward events and registering the changes 
and consistencies of the temporal mutable world (in contrast with con-
ception which is regarded as an organizing faculty and therefore as 
static and ill-equipped to replicate the external world as it 'happens') 
does not mean that perception can necessarily represent causal or under-
lying processes (see James, 1911, pp. 47-50). Therefore James once 
again finds it necessary to advocate a reexamination of the relation-
ship between mind and brain to gain a more fundamental notion of causa-
tion--an option he pragmatically rejected in the essays on radical em-
piricism. 5 
The logical conclusion would seem to be that even if the kind 
of thing that causation is, were revealed to us in our own 
activity, we should be mistaken on the very threshold if we 
supposed that the fact of it is there. In other words, we seem 
in this line of experience to start with an illusion of place. 
It is, as if a baby were born at a kinetoscope-show and his 
first experiences were of the illusions of movement that reigned 
in the place. The nature of movement would indeed be revealed 
to him, but the real facts of movement he would have to seek 
outside. Even so our will-acts may reveal the nature of causation, 
but just where the facts of causation are located may be a further 
problem. With this further problem, philosophy leaves off com-
paring conceptual with perceptual experience, and begins 
5. See James, 1905/1967d, pp. 182-3, 188; James is aware that his 
pragmatic solution will not resolve the metaphysical or physiological - 
problems of determining the nature of causation. 
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enquiring into physical and psychological facts (James, 1911, 
pp. 216-217). 
Philosophy, then, can only go so far in seeking the nature of 
causation and the potential answers to this metaphysical puzzle appear, 
for James, to lie in the empirical sciences of physiology and psycho-
logy. He has come full circle in the end. 
Novelty. 
Perry writes that James' universe became more and more interesting 
as his philosophy matured. And his universe became more interesting 
as a function of the availability of the physical world to perceptual 
experience (see Perry, 1935/1974, 2, p. 667). The evolutionary concepts 
of temporalism and mutability reappear in Some problems of philosophy  
in their strongest form as James moved towards the position that true 
novelty in the concrete world is immediately available to perception: 
When perceptible amounts of new phenomenal being come to birth, 
must we hold them to be in all points predetermined and neces-
sary outgrowths of the being already there, or shall we rather 
admit the possibility that originality may thus instil itself 
into reality? 
If we take concrete perceptual experience, the question can 
be answered in only one way. 'The same returns not, save to 
bring the different'. Time keeps budding into new moments, every 
one of which presents a content which in its individuality 
never was before and will never be again. Of no concrete bit•
of experience was an exact duplicate ever framed (James, 1911, 
pp. 147-148). 
James' insistence that change is directly perceived, and his em-
phasis on the essentially 'static' nature of conception constitute a 
significant reinterpretation of the percept-concept relationship as it 
is given in the Principles. At the time when he was writing the Princi-
ples, James subscribed to the position that novelty arose by chance in 
an otherwise orderly world. And at the human level, novelty was gener-
ated through the fortuitous application of effort. Like all traditional 
philosophers, he noted that the phenomenal appearances of things were 
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constantly changing, so that the individual never actually got the 
same perception twice, but James stressed that the perceiver tended 
to ignore the phenomenal shifts and to concentrate on those elements 
which appeared to be stable over time. These selections were eventu-
ally represented as stable conceptions so that the table was 'called' 
square even though it rarely presented a truly square appearance to 
perception, and the grass was 'called' green, even though the artist 
would sometimes have to represent it as yellow or brown "to give its 
real sensational effect" (James, 1890, 1, p. 231). It is significant 
that in 1890 James did not argue that the shifts in phenomenal appear-
ances had any particular implications for the philosophication of evolu-
tionary theory. 
In the final philosophy, however, James has revised his conception 
of the physical world so that novelty is a real and ever-present quality 
of the continually changing universe. Awareness of novelty is now gen-
erated through the individual's perceptions of the sensible world and 
the continual shifts in the phenomenal appearances of objects and events 
are taken as evidence that novelty or mutability is a genuine character-
istic of the physical world. Correspondingly, James now emphasizes the 
'static' nature of conception as a control for cognition. The function 
of conception does not differ substantially from the Principles to the 
final philosophy--James' statement that "'White' means a color quality 
of which the mind appoints the standard and which it can decree to be 
there under all physical disguises" (James, 1911, p. 105), could easily 
have appeared in the Principles (see James, 1890, 1, pp. 459-468). But 
the rationale for defining conception in this way has changed as James' 
philosophy has matured. 
James is attempting to combine "logical realism" with empiricism 
by making concrete percepts 'primordial ',while concepts are of 
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secondary origin (see James, 1911, P. 106). Our conceptual abilities 
allow us to link perceptual inputs according to their common elements 
while James insists that these common elements are never identically 
perceived (James, 1911, pp. 104-106). In the Principles, James also 
decreed that the appearances of objects are constantly fluctuating 
(see James, 1890, 1, p. 231). But he does not use the fluctuating 
appearances as indicators of real novelty and while not subscribing 
to the Millian view of the permanent possibilities of sensation, he 
ratifies the validity of the mathematical/mechanical Newtonian science. 
James' insistence, in the final philosophy, that the phenomenal fluctu-
ations can be taken as indicating that novelty is a real quality of 
the physical world means that a new network of rationalization is re-
quired to make the temporal, mutable universe comprehensible. Corres-
pondingly, James must also ensure that the objects and relations which 
undergo these real changes are recognized by the individual when they 
reappear in new phenomenal forms. In the Principles he could rely on 
the definable coercive properties of objects (notably through his 
use of the primary and secondary qualities distinction), in conjunction 
with the mind's tendencies to seek out the 'same' and to ignore the 
'different'. The universe of the Principles is a lawful universe; 
real changes are possible but they are largely fortuitous events, and 
as such can be recognized as radical departures from the norm. While 
James certainly never shared Mill's confidence in the permanent 
possibilities of sensation (see Chap. 3, pp. 138-141), he had not 
yet succeeded in extending his derivation of evolutionary conceptions 
to radically describe the physical world. Now, in his final philoso-
phy, he has to ensure that some means of making permanent connections 
between events is retained. Conceptualization is given this function, 
and it is to this end that James emphasizes the static nature of 
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conception. 
The rigidification of the conceptual system is necessary to 
•ensure that there will be a mental 'carry-over' of essential elements 
from one perceptual experience of an object to the next. If we never 
have the same perception twice, we must have some means of recognizing 
that we are in fact perceiving the same object. The sensible world of 
the final philosophy (contrasted with the sensible world of the Prin-
ciples) is a fluid world and the importance of a stable conceptual 
ability increases as a direct function of the amount of visible 
change allowed to 'really' take place in the concrete world. 
The 'play' between perception andconception facilitates the devel-
opment of broad scientific systems; at the same time we return to live 
in our 'biographies'. The isolation of the so-called common elements 
of experience in conception, and our tendency to seek uniform under- 
, 
lying causal explanations to account for phenomenal experience, leads 
to the development of scientific/mathematical/logical theories which 
purport to 'explain' thatappearances in this sense do not conflict 
with our 'ordinary' experiences so that we can move through the two 
worlds at will: 6 
Biography is the concrete form in which all that is is immedi-
ately given; the perceptual flux is the authentic stuff of 
each of our biographies, and yields a perfect effervescence 
of novelty all the time. New men and women, books, accidents, 
6. They do not conflict unless we declare one or the other 'real' 
and then they become incompatible as Ayer pointed out in his example 
of the solid brown table and the colourless electron cloud that physics 
declares it to really consist of (see Ayer, 1968, p. 333). James allow-
ed for this in his 1890 assertion that men of science forget theoretical 
abstractions when the sensible world makes demands upon their attention 
(see James, 1890, 2, p. 294). Both sub-worlds demand recognition as 
the 'real'_world, and only one can be 'answered' or ratified at any 
given moment. Finally, James gives no indication that he is rescinding 
his 1890 conclusion that the world of sense is typically selected as 
the 'most' real world. 
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events, inventions, enterprises, burst unceasingly upon the 
world. It is vain to resolve these into ancient elements, or 
to say that they belong to ancient kinds, so long as no one of 
them in its full individuality ever was here before or will 
ever come again. Men of science and philosophy, the moment 
they forget their theoretic abstractions, live in their bio- 
graphies as much as any one else, and believe as naively that 
fact even now is making, and that they themselves, by doing 
'original work', help to determine what the future shall become 
(James, 1911, pp. 151-152). 
James appears to have reverted back to the 'separate realities' 
system he developed in the Principles (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 291-302). 
But there is a significant difference: the mutable. character of the 
physical world is conceptualized so that the novelties manifested in 
perception are theoretically contrasted with ideas about their under-
lying causes. Science and perception cannot be resolved into comple-
mentary tasks through the processes of discovery because the goal of 
science is to determine what the laws are that underlie novel percept-
ual experiences. At the experiential level, there is a sharp distinc-
tion between our apprehension of sensible novelty and the scientific 
theories we develop to provide an underlying unitary basis for the 
appearances of things: 
So far as physical nature goes few of us experience any tempt-
ation to postulate real novelty. The notion of eternal 
elements and their mixture serves us in so many ways, that we 
adopt unhesitatingly the theory that primordial being is inalter-
able in its attributes as well as in its quantity, and that 
the laws by which we describe its habits are uniform in the 
strictest mathematical sense. There are the absolute conceptual 
foundations, we think, spread beneath the surface of perceptual 
variety. It is when we come to human lives, that our point of 
view changes. It is hard to imagine that 'really' our own 
subjective experiences are only molecular arrangements, even 
though the molecules be conceived as beings of a psychic kind. 
A material fact may indeed be different from what we feel it 
to be, but what sense is there in saying that a feeling, which 
has no other nature than to be felt, is not as it is felt? 
Psychologically considered, our experiences resist conceptual 
reduction, and our fields of consciousness, taken simply as 
such, remain just what they appear, even though facts of a 
molecular order should prove to be the signals of the appearance 
(James, 1911, pp. 150-151). 
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Our viewpoint changes according to the 'reality' we are partici-
pating in at any given time, so that novelty is perceived and exper-
ienced at the concrete physical level; at the same time our conceptual 
faculties allow us to organize the world according to eternal postu-
lates. Our conceptual 'maps' and perceptual experiences serve us in 
different and equally important ways, and the two merge in a psycho-
logical, or experiential sense. This, too, is the viewpoint of the Prin-
ciples, but James' conception of the physical world is substantially 
changed, and he now presents the paradigm as stating a problem rather 
than providing a resolution. While the phenomenal appearances of 
change are now taken to indicate real changes, these changes cannot 
be assimilated into orderly descriptive conceptions about reality: 
I have already compared the live or perceptual order with the 
conceptual order from this point of view. Conception knows no 
way of explaining save by deducing the identical from the 
identical, so if the world is to be conceptually rationalized 
no novelty can really come. This is one of the traits in that 
general bankruptcy of conceptualism...--conceptualism can name  
change and growth, but can translate them into no terms of its 
own, and is forced to contradict the indestructible sense of 
life within us by denying that reality really grows (James, 
1911, p. 152). 
-James' theory of novelty depends upon the complementary idea of 
the concatenated universe. There are many systems of concatenation 
that hold the universe together and these systems are partial while 
each 'event' belongs to many systems (see James, 1911, pp. 129-131). 
Thus we are capable of moving from one type of event to another: the 
concatenated systems are reminiscent of the regions of reality described 
in the Principles but in that work, the discussion was confined to the 
psychological possibilities for reality, and the realities themselves 
were only tenuously linked through the sentient consciousness. The conca-
tenated universe includes all possibilities for relationships between 
events, and the events include physical and mental objects. In this 
671. 
sense, the notion of the concatenated universe seems to be composed 
of that totality designated as pure experience in radical empiricism. 
It is therefore necessary to determine whether the concatenated uni-
verse of the final philosophy has more in common with the concept of 
pure experience, or with the system of realities given in the Principles,  
in order to discover how James might have intended to resolve the 
problem of how conceptions 'know' the mutable world of perception. 
If the concatenated systems described in the final philosophy 
seem to have most in common with the pure experience hypothesis, there 
are several arguments that tell against such an analysis and lead to 
the conclusion that James was only concerned with demonstrating the 
functional relationships between events without saying anything about 
their ontological status. He intended to emphasize the non-determina-
tive aspects of the relationships between events •so that he could show 
that novelty is a fundamental aspect of the universe. The partial 
systems of the concatenated universe hang together in such a way that 
the individual is able to move from one area to another without losing 
his personal continuity, and in the following statement, James limits 
the universal connections between things to gravitational forces: 
From the point of view of these partial systems, the world 
hangs together from next to next in a variety of ways, so that 
when ycu are off on one thing you can always be on to something 
else, without ever dropping out of your world. Gravitation is 
the only positively known sort of connection among things that 
reminds us of the consolidated or monistic form of union. 
If a 'mass' should change anywhere, the mutual gravitation of 
all things would instantaneously alter (James, 1911, p. 131). 
It seems clear from this that James had given up on making onto-
logical statements concerning the status of the objects and relations 
that make up the concatenated universe. Instead, he now states that 
perception gives us an idea of what causal agencies might be like, but 
it may not provide us with any clear-cut examples of them. The 
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next step in James' quest for the determinants or 'causes' of novel 
events lies in an examination of mind-brain events. Willed actions, 
he believes: 
reveal the nature of causation, but just where the facts of 
causation are located may be a further problem. With this 
further problem, philosophy leaves off comparing conceptual 
with perceptual experience, and begins enquiring into physical 
and psychological facts (James, 1911, pp. 216-217). 
In the Principles, James stated that it was impossible to determine 
whether the expenditure of effort was a truly free volitional act or 
whether the expenditure was determined (see James, 1890, 2, pp. 571- 
572). Therefore, the question of free-will could not be resolved in 
the context of empirical psychology. Now he is saying that willed actions 
at least have the appearance of constituting real causes, and thus ap-
pear to be productive of real novelty, but whether or not this is the 
case can only be determined through an analysis of mind-brain relations: 
Perception has given us a positive idea of causal agency but 
it remains to be ascertained whether what first appears as 
such, is really such; whether aught else is really such; or 
finally', whether nothing really such exists. Since with this 
we are led immediately into the mind-brain relation, and since 
that is such a complicated topic, we had better interrupt our 
study of causation provisionally at the present point, meaning 
to complete it when the problem of the mind's relation to the 
body comes up for review (James, 1911, p. 217). 
The Return to Dualism  
Unfortunately, James never got back to the mind-body problem. 
So far, we have attempted to show that James' final philosophy ratifies 
many of the structures of the psychology, and that James himself refer-
red back to the psychology for empirical support for his final meta-
physic. If this approach is valid, it may then be possible to return 
to the Principles for some indication of how James planned to treat 
the mind-body problem in his last work. We have shown that James be-
lieved that the physical nervous system was a plastic, mutable, 
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developing network, describable in evolutionary terms (see Chap. 3, 
pp. 142-148). This view of the nervous system supported an evolution-
ary interpretation of biological development. At the same time, it 
enabled James to account for the resumption of functioning over a period 
of time by an organism whose brain had been partially ablated. On the 
one hand, the nervous sytem could be viewed as a mechanical assembly 
of neurons; on the other, it could be taken as a mutating, interrela-
tional system, adaptive in itself, and as such a 'suitable' organ of 
consciousness. Such a view of the nervous system could be potentially 
productive in an attempt to show that novelty was a product of physical 
growth and change for as Marshall writes: 
James did not deny that higher states emerge from lower. 
He merely denied that the transformation from lower level 
multiplicity to higher level unity occurs in the mind; and 
more particularly, he objected to the view that higher 
states can be regarded as 'and-summations' of the lower 
(Marshall, 1974, p. 306). 7 
Marshall's comment on James' position regarding the relationship 
of consciousness to the nervous system is applicable to James' final 
philosophy as well as to his psychology for James once again saw pan-
psychism as a problematic doctrine: 
If we took these [active and perceptual] experiences as the 
type of what actual causation is, we should have to ascribe 
to cases of causation outside of our own life, to physical 
cases also, an inwardly experiential nature. In other words 
we should have to espouse a so-called 'pan-psychic' philosophy 
(James, 1911, p. 218). 
James' rejection of panpsychism as a complication to be avoided (see 
James, 1911, p. 218), lends some support to the hypothesis that he may 
have intended to enlarge on the model of mind-brain relations developed 
in the Principles, and it also serves as a warning that he did not 
7. Marshall is commenting on James' rejection of both the mind- 
dust theory and Fechner's panpsychism in the Principles. 
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intend to develop a model wherein the nervous system could be imbued 
with a kind of 'biological' consciousness or knowledge of its own, 
any more than he had in the Principles. 8 
But there are problems with concluding that James intended to 
ratify the psycho-physical parallelism of the Principles in his final 
philosophy. As Wild points out, James had never been satisfied with 
the doctrine (see Wild, 1969, P. 371), and in fact 'broke through it' 
in certain portions of the Principles (see James, 1890, 1, p. 301; 2, 
pp. 442-485), so that the concept of the 'living body' originates in 
the psychology (see Wild, 1969, pp. 365, 376). Wild therefore believes 
that the notion of the 'living body' acts as the resolution of James' 
difficulties with psycho-physical parallelism and in conjunction with 
James' conception of the 'lived biography', acts as a concretization 
of the ontological equation between thoughts and things (see Wild, 1969, 
pp. 370-372). At the same time, Wild admits that James did in fact 
incorporate a kind of atomism into his conception of pure experience 
in his effort to ontologically equate thoughts and things. Wild points 
out that James spoke of "mere bits of pure experience" and "a unit of 
pure experience" which is neither a physical nor a mental fact,.. .At 
one point he even refers to these pure experiences as 'so many little 
absolutes' without relations to anything outside" (Wild, 1969, p. 367; 
8. James kept to this model throughout the Principles--the only 
exception being the theory of emotion. James based his psychology on 
a positivistically defined empirical parallelism between mind and brain: 
we must...ask ourselves whether, after all, the ascertainment of  
a blank unmediated correspondence, term for term, of the succession  
of states of consciousness with the succession of total brain  
processes, be not the simplest psycho-physic formula, and the  
last word of a psychology which contents itself with verifiable  
laws, and seeks only to be clear, and to avoid unsafe hypo-
theses (James, 1890, 1. p. 182). 
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see also James 1904/1967a, p. 15; 1905/1967b, pp. 127, 134). Wild 
justly claims that these atomistic absolutes violate James' theory 
of the fringe relations between all 'parts' of experience. Furthermore, 
Wild claims, the 'little absolutes' make no connection with the con-
crete world as James' broad theory demands (see Wild, 1969, pp. 367- 
368)., In spite of these difficulties, however, Wild believes that 
James' conception of the 'living body' was successful and eventually 
productive for phenomenology (see Wild, 1969, pp. 377-378).. 
Wild does not discuss James' final philosophy at all and this is 
unfortunate because Wild's comments on whether James' conception of 
• the living body is carried over into the final philosophy would no 
doubt have aided the attempt to clarify James' intentions. Briefly 
then, the problem is to decide whether James intended to ratify the 
psycho-physical parallelism of the Principles--unsatisfactory as that 
position might be--or whether he intended to build on the concept of 
the living body. 
There is good reason to believe that James was in fact moving back 
towards a position similar to his early psycho-physical parallelism. 
Granted, James abjures positivistic science in his last work, claiming 
that such a position only includes descriptive and predictive accounts 
of natural phenomena without connecting them in any ultimate sense (see 
James, 1911, p. 203). At the same time, he recognizes that the analysis 
of perceptions alone reveals the nature of events without revealing 
their causes (see James, 1911, p. 216). Perception cannot therefore 
be used as the means of arriving at explanations for events; to use it 
in this way leads to panpsychic accounts wherein concrete objects come 
to be imbued with "an inwardly experiential nature" (James, 1911, p. 
218). He had already made a break between thoughts and things when 
he postulated that percepts and concepts were made of the same stuff 
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When this statement is combined with his conclusion regarding the 
nature of causation, it seems clear that James is once again moving 
towards a position wherein the appearances of events must once again 
be separated from their underlying substrates. The experiences of the 
living-body complex are used solely as a guarantee that activity, novel-
ty, and temporality are real qualities of the world. The exploration 
of the causes of these events--the 'new' rationalization of the world-- 
now demands a separation between appearances and substrates. 
It is also interesting that James felt it necessary to ratify 
once again the doctrine of the will to believe in his final philosophy. 
He instructed that a series of notes, entitled "Faith and the right to 
believe" be included in Some problems of philosophy and they were there-
fore given as an appendix (see James, 1911, p. 221). James insists 
that the will to believe in a pluralistic universe is the most import-
ant precursor in actually creating the pluralistic universe (see James, 
1911, pp. 229-230). Once more, James has ratified the importance of 
human volition, and once more, he has implicitly incorporated a ten-
sion between the efficacious consciousness and the physical world of 
objects and relations into his world-view. 
The final 'evidence' that James was returning to the dualistic 
position of the Principles lies in the relationship between percepts 
and concepts and the two types of knowledge they generate about the 
world. James insists that percepts and concepts are substantially 
continuous, so that experientially, they merge into one another and 
the individual has difficulty in knowing where perception ends and con-
ception begins (see James, 1911, pp. 107-109). At the same time he 
insists that concepts are fixed, static, inactive; they are abstract-
ions from the perceptual life and their content is always 'borrowed' 
from experience (see James, 1911, pp. 79-82). He concludes from this 
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that concepts should only be used when they aid in understanding events 
and that they should be dropped when they hinder it. Perceptual reality 
should thus be taken up into philosophy as it comes (see James, 1911, 
p. 95). 
How perceptual reality is to be taken up into conceptualization 
'as it comes' presents a major problem for James and it is a problem 
that results directly from James' definition of the functions and gene- 
sis of conception. He limits his discussion of the growth of conception 
to its powers to designate selected qualities of the physical world and 
to apply these generally to the Wide range of unique objects. The qual-
ities of the mutable world thus become fixed; concept-stuff is made up 
of ideas which are abstractions not directly apprehended in the parti-
culars of experience: 
Nothing happens in the worlds of logic, mathematics or moral and 
aesthetic preference. The static nature of the relations in these 
worlds is what gives to the propositions that express them their 
'eternal' character: the binomial theorem, e.g., expresses the 
value of any power of any sum of two terms, to the end of time. 
These vast unmoving systems of universal terms form the new 
worlds of thought....The terms are elements (or are framed of 
elements) abstracted from the perceptual flux; but in their ab-
stract shape we note relations between them (and again between 
these relations) which enable us to set up various schemes of 
fixed serial orders or of 'more and more'. The terms are indeed 
man-made, but the order, being established solely by comparison, 
is fixed by the nature of the terms on the one hand and by our 
power of perceiving relations on the other. ...the result being 
those skeletons of 'rational' or 'necessary' truth in which our 
logic- and mathematics-books (sometimes our philosophy-books) 
arrange their universal terms (James, 1911, pp. 68-70). 
Further, James writes that: 
The conceiving order of nature built round the perceived order 
and explaining it theoretically, as we say, is only a system 
of hypothetically imagined thats, the whats of which harmon-
iously connect themselves with the what of any that which we 
immediately perceive (James, 1911, p. 66). 
When concepts are juxtaposed, new rational relations appear between 
them which connect them in intimate ways. James writes that these 
new connections among concepts arise from "our faculty of comparison 
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and of our sense of 'more'" (James, 1911, P. 67), and he then refers 
the reader back to the Principles for his account of the genesis of 
the new relations: 
'THE PURE SCIENCES EXPRESS RESULTS OF COMPARISON exclusively; 
comparison is not a conceivable effect of the order in which  
outer impressions are experienced--it is one of the house-born  
portions of our mental structure; therefore the pure sciences 
formao II yo propositions wit wose genesis experience as  II  
nothing to do (James, 1890, 2, p. 641). 
James concluded in the Principles that the mind is assailed in 
two ways: through experience and through spontaneous, or 'brain-born' 
processes, This dualistic model of the genesis of mental tendencies 
is used to account for the individual's adjustment to the world as it 
is, and his opposing tendencies to reconstruct the world in scientific, 
ethical and metaphysical terms. 9 	In Some problems of philosophy James 
appears to ratify this early dualism in order to strengthen the funct-
ional distinction between percepts and . concepts and to.show that our 
great intellectual systems lead us into conflict with the data of exper-
ience. This contrasts with the account of the relationship between 
necessary truth and perception in the Principles where James endeavoured 
to show that the necessary truths, used in scientific/logical theories, 
facilitate the rationalization of the physical world through the 
process of discovery (see Chap. 4, pp. 261-276). 
By the time he came to write Some problems of philosophy, James 
had come to believe that the orderly rationalization of the physical 
world, given in terms of the discovery of objects and events which 
9. while both processes are conceived of as having natural, physical 
causes, James insists that they belong to different physical spheres; 
the first mode of influence comes from the external world of experience; 
the second includes molecular accidents in the brain before birth and 
the accidental results of more direct influences working in the 
unstable and delicate brain tissue (see James, 1890, 2, p. 627). 
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correspond to conceptual abstractions, presents a false view of what 
the physical world is really like, because it neglects the real ap-
pearances of novel events over time. But he simultaneously ratifies 
the 'rationalistic' strand in his philosophy in his account of the 
genesis and function of the necessary truths, and in his definition of 
conception. The problems that he encounters in his search for an effect-
ive means of conceptualizing the pluralistic universe therefore largely 
arise because he insists that relations within the sub-world of the 
necessary truths and ideal relations are static. In short, he is 
caught on the two horns of a dilemma: we have already seen that James 
defined concepts as static objects in order to ensure that the object 
and its properties could be recognized when the object subsequently 
reappeared (in various disguises) to the perceiver (see James, 1911, 
pp. 104-106). He therefore reversed the traditional nominalist doctrine 
to argue that our ideal meanings are always the same, while our per-
ceptual experiences are always novel (see James, 1911, pp. 104-106), 
But he was then faced with the problem of how the temporal mutable 
perceptual flux could be rationalized while still retaining its tempor-
al mutable properties. That is, he was seeking a way to conceptually 
rationalize the physical world in temporal mutable terms, while his 
definition of the function of conception would already appear to pre-
clude success in this venture (see James, 1911, p. 152; quoted above 
p. 670). At the same time, he realized that perception could riot be 
used to determine the nature of any underlying causes which are respons-
ible for the shifting phenomenal flux (see James, 1911, pp. 216-217), 
so that he ended his last work with the intention of taking up these 
problems once again from the perspective of mind-body relations. 
It is impossible, in the end, to really construct hypotheses about 
what James intended to make of mind-body relations in the final 
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philosophy. All that can be reasonably concluded is that he was 
starting once again to make qualitative separations between events, 
and that he had given up on proposing pragmatic solutions to 'real' 
metaphysical problems. If his pluralistic universe was really going 
to come into being, James now seemed to feel that the work involved in 
making it real would be sober, strenuous, and scientific. His prag-
matism and his radical empiricism provided him with the 'outline' of 
the pluralistic universe, and it was now time to begin building it. 
The hypothesis that James was embarking on a new phase of philo-
sophical development isdifficultto substantiate by appeal to the liter-
ature because so many modern theorists end their analysis of James' 
philosophical career with a discussion of radical empiricism and do 
not consider Some problems of philosophy at all. Some problems of  
philosophy did not attract a great deal of critical comment when it 
was published, possibly because it appeared so soon after James' death, 
at the time when James' colleagues were most concerned with paying 
tribute to his wide-ranging achievements.
10 
And modern theorists who 
do consider Some problems of philosophy tend to treat James' final 
philosophy as an extension of the doctrines laid down in pragmatism, 
pluralism, and radical empiricism. 
Dooley summarizes James' contrast between monism and pluralism, 
showing that according to James, monism gives the more 'rational' view 
of the world, while pluralism is more empirical, agrees with the exper-
iences of the 'whole man', and can triumph over monism if any evidence 
of discontinuity is discovered. Pluralism is therefore more ultimately 
10. Those theorists who reviewed Some problems of philosophy tended 
to summarize the contents of the book and to end with a tribute to 
James' philosophical achievements (see Miller, 1911, pp. 240-241; 
Schiller, 1911, pp. 571-573; Jastrow, 1912, pp. 12-14; and Lindsay, 
1912, pp. 489-492). 
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rational because it agrees with perceptual and moral experience (see 
Dooley, 1974, pp. 149-151). Brennan makes similar use of the final 
philosophy: he states that James shows that the conceptualist view of 
the universe means that effects cannot be novel because the effect 
exists in the cause. This limits the options for free will. Brennan 
takes the final philosophy as a fitting conclusion to James' radical 
empiricism and submits that James confirms the role of human volition 
in shaping the world. The perceptual flux contains "masses of moral 
data" (Brennan, 1961, p. 105), and perception therefore has as crucial 
a role to play as abstract conceptualization in generating ethical 
postulates (see Brennan, 1961, pp. 41-43, 105). Stroh simply sum- 
marizes James' view that experience must be brought back into philosophy 
(see Stroh, 1968, pp. 150-151). 
Wilshire intentionally limits his discussion to the Principles, 
and states only that James' discussion of percepts and concepts--as 
given in Some problems of philosophy--is a 'tangled web' (see Wilshire, 
1968, pp. 208, 247). Ayer gives a more detailed analysis of the prob-
lems of percepts and concepts, claiming that while James believes his 
theory isopposed to Kant's, in fact his work shows agreement with Kant's 
dictum that a basic principle is needed to unify experience (see Ayer, 
1968, p. 289). Ayer believes that James presents a consistent view 
of the derivation of concepts from percepts and the dependence of con-
cepts on percepts for verification (see Ayer, 1968, p. 289). At the 
same time, Ayer shows that James is inconsistent regarding the 'dis-
tinguishable' character of percepts from concepts: James tends, when 
treating concepts by themselves, to distinguish them sharply from per-
cepts, and Ayer believes that it was this tendency that drove him in-
to the irrationalism of the Pluralistic universe (see Ayer, 1968, p. 
289). He also shows that James' commitment to a Platonic definition 
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of conception is inconsistent with his later conclusion that experience 
must be taken as a fusion of two elements--the raw material of percepts 
and the intellectual abstractions of concepts. In spite of his Platon-
ic phraseology, Ayer claims, James continued to present the case for 
the cognitive construction of physical reality out of perception. 
Furthermore, concepts are valuable for their cash value alone--concepts 
make inferences about the future, and are verified through actions 
(see Ayer, 1968, pp. 290-291). 
Marcell believes that the appearance of meliorism in the pragmat-
ism acts as a preface for the long discussion of novelty in Some prob-
lems of philosophy. Meliorism therefore acts as the prelude for James' 
notion of the evolving pluralistic universe (see Marcell, 1974, pp. 
173-174). Meliorism, as a developed philosophical statement acts as 
the extension of pragmatism, pluralism, and the will to believe, and 
Marcell uses Some problems of philosophy to show how these elements 
are integrated into a final statement regarding the mutable temporal 
nature of the universe (see Marcell, 1974, pp. 189-190). 
Certainly, as Ayer, Wilshire, Dooley, Brennan, and Marcell indi-
cate, James' final philosophy can be interpreted as a last attempt at 
integrating the various strands of his philosophy. The question that 
arises is whether or not it is something more than this. Was James 
in fact entering a new phase of philosophical development as Perry 
indicates, or is the final philosophy simply a tying together of the 
loose strings of the whole corpus of James' work? The former hypo- 
thesis seems to be the most promising. Although James' final philosophy 
contains several problematic constructions--most notably the problems 
of distinguishing between the functions of percepts and concepts and 
the tendency towards rationalism in defining the structure, and by 
. extension, the functions, of concepts--Some problems of philosophy does 
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present an outline of 'where to go next' in searching out the elusive 
relationship between the temporal mutable world and the similarly 
temporal mutable mind. James' admission that mind-body relations 
are the critical issue, and his insistence that the subject must be 
studied from the perspectives of psychology and physiology as well 
as philosophy is important for all social scientists. The import-
ance he attaches to the study of these relations in conjunction 
with his revival of the will to believe in unverified hypotheses has 
the implicit effect of including science at last in the pursuits which 
demand human effort. If James' pluralistic universe is to become a 
reality, the rationalization of the new world will depend on the accept-
, 
ance of temporalism and mutability as characteristics of the mind and 
the physical world it knows at all levels of human endeavour. 
Conclusions and Retrospect  
We have come at last to the end of our analysis of James' psycho-
logy and philosophy. The analysis has been highly selective for it 
has been based on the attempt to study those aspects of James' psycho-
logy and philosophy which best exemplify the progressive development 
of his conception of consciousness and its relationships with the 
worlds it knows. As the preceding pages have shown, James' con-
ception of consciousness underwent several stages of development, and 
it is more appropriate to talk about his conceptions of consciousness. 
Correspondingly, the nature of the realities known by consciousness 
was redefined a$ James developed his world-view. 
James began his career with an avid enthusiasm for Darwin's theory 
of evolution. So caught up was he in the exciting development of the 
science of his day that he briefly espoused an automatist view of mind 
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for a time. But he found himself unable to sustain this position, 
and fell into a state of depression that was to last for two years. 
He found solace in Renouvier's doctrine of free will, and set about 
developing a conception of an efficacious consciousness that could take 
its place in the world of evolutionary science. In 1878 he expressed 
his outrage against automaton theory and proposed instead that con-
sciousness was 'interested' and that through its interests, it created 
the world it knew. The early papers were basically polemical
11 
and 
they cannot be taken as systematic accounts of the mind's relationship 
with nature. Nevertheless they served as the genesis of James' system-
atic psychology. 
The position that the interested consciousness creates its own 
world could not be sustained in that form. James had to modify his 
position to allow for the coercive properties of objects on the mind 
and if he was to be true to Darwin, he had to show that consciousness 
is equipped with structures (instincts) which facilitate immediate 
adaptation, and which solidify into quasi-automatic structures (habits). 
At the same time, his commitment to Renouvier made it imperative that 
consciousness be given a voice in events and James began to work out 
a conception of consciousness which would be structurally and function-
ally compatible with free will. The result of James' labours was the 
Principles: in this work he reacted against the elementarism of the 
British associationists to produce a definition of thought wherein the 
objective and subjective elements could only be distinguished from 
each other through the secondary process of introspection. At the 
11. The papers referred to include "Remarks on Spencer's definition 
of mind as correspondence" (1878); "Quelques considerations sur la 
methode subjective" (1878); "The sentiment of rationality" (1879); 
and "Are we automata?" (1879). 
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same time, the continuous, changing. personal, selective, cognitive 
stream of consciousness was created to describe the global operations 
of the thinking or feeling process. But consciousness had two major 
functions: if James succeeded in developing a unified structure for 
consciousness, he did not succeed in reconciling the functions of con-
sciousness from either a genetic or 'active' perspective. The result 
was the 'two-man' view, reflected in his theories of reality and 
volition. The two-man view is further reflected in the epistemological 
gap that is created in the functional account of perception and con-
ception in the final philosophy. 
During the psychological stage of his career, James' view of the 
physical world remained largely Newtonian, in contrast to his anti-
associationist model of consciousness. At the same time, he was becom-
ing disenchanted with psychology as a vehicle for his ideas and his 
• commitment to positivism in science interfered more and more with the 
analysis of what he considered to be the significant philosophical 
issues. In order to protect the integrity of the thought itself and 
the corresponding independence of the objects cognized by thoughts, 
James had based his psychology, on a psycho-physical dualism. Never 
content with dualism, but unable to find an alternative that did not 
seem even more problematic, James began to explore the possibility of 
constructing a :system which could function without the supposition of 
an ontological dualism between thoughts and things. The possibility 
that the physical world could be conceived in other than mechanistic/ 
mathematical terms had been growing in James' mind before the Principles  
was completed. He therefore extended the characteristics of his stream 
of consciousness 10 describe the workings of the physical world as 
it is given in perception and affective feeling, his intention being 
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to breach the gap between man and nature that had developed in the 
context of the scientific revolution (see Koyr6, 1968, p. 2). 
But simply creating a parallel between the construction of the 
mind and the construction of the physical world could not solve the 
epistemological problems of how the mind came to know the world. 
James therefore submitted that the epistemological gap could be breached 
if the thought and the object could be taken as one 'piece' of pure 
experience so that the separations into subject and object, knower 
and known, mind and object, followed the experience instead of ante-
dating it. In applying his 'transformed' evolutionary concepts to 
the physical world James was in essence describing a world that was 
radically opposed to the orderly, mathematical/mechanical Newtonian 
universe. Furthermore, James believed that the recognition of novel 
events could not be integrated into the conceptual system which funct-
ioned, by definition, as a reservoir of permanent or universal ideas. 
If, however, mind and object were taken as one piece of experience, 
then perceptual information could be taken as bona fide information 
about what the world was really like. 
Radical empiricism was truly a radical philosophical position, 
and the traditional methods for accumulating knowledge about the sens-
ible world did not appear to lend themselves to discovering the para-
meters of a universe wherein the nature of physical causes was to be 
inferred from the psychological experience of the exertion of effort. 
But James had long been interested in Peirce's pragmatism. Here was 
a potential methodology for describing the world as he envisioned it: 
he had already begun to develop his own version of pragmatism with 
the aim of applying it to some of the problematic metaphysical issues 
which could not be dealt with in the context of scientific psychology. 
The pragmatic wthod appeared to be the answer for 'making radical 
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empiricism prevail'. Pragmatism was in fact James' most productive 
contribution to philosophy; the notion that truth was 'made'--that it 
was not absolute--contributed to the 'relativistic', evolutionary 
view of reality and experience that was gradually emerging in America 
and Europe. Within the context of James' own progress the more or 
less simultaneous development of pragmatism, radical empiricism, and 
pluralism enabled him to construct a view of the physical world that 
really was temporal and mutable. 
But radical empiricism and pluralism as James describes them in 
the Essays in radical empiricism and The pluralistic universe are 
romantic doctrines: while he claimed that the pragmatic method could be 
used to resolve the metaphysical disputes that stood in the way of 
their acceptance, he actually made fairly minimal use of the method it-
self, and appears to have discovered, in any event, that the pragmatic 
method was mainly useful for setting up the terms of the disputes 
(see James, 1905/1967d, pp. 176-189). By the time James was writing 
his final philosophy, he realized that it was necessary to return to 
psychological, physiological, and scientific analyses of the mind-brain 
relationships. He had succeeded in establishing a case for a temporal, 
mutable view of the physical world but found himself enmeshed in the 
problem of how the mind apprehends this world. James once again found 
it necessary to reevaluate the functions of percepts and concepts 
because the world that the mind knows was now radically different from 
the physical world of the Principles. In this sense, the final philo-
sophy is an extension of radical empiricism and pluralism, and the 
commentators who treat it as such are justified in their analyses. In 
another, more important, sense, however, the final philosophy sets 
the stage for future philosophical developments. When James wrote 
the Principles, he evolved a conception of mind that took its form 
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from'evolutionary theory and from Renouvier's doctrine of free will 
but the world that was known by the mind had more in common with the 
mechanistic view of the associationists, wherein the phenomenal ap-
pearances of objects could not be taken as representing the real nature 
of underlying causes. James succeeded in outlining a new conception 
of the physical world where phenomenal appearances did in fact denote 
real underlying causes even if the nature of the causes themselves 
was not apparent. And this meant that James was once again faced 
with the serious task of constructing a psychological account of the 
mind's relationship to the world. 
The pragmatic mergings of thought and object, or subject and ob-
ject are absent in the final philosophy, and the more traditional 
dualisms once again begin to reassert themselves while the will to 
believe is revived as a means for making the pluralistic world 'true'. 
The final philosophy is not without serious problems: the analysis 
of mind-matter relations was cut short by James' untimely death, and 
the reappearance of rationalism in the definition of the structure and 
function of conception and the necessary,truths blocks progress to-
wards the development of a conceptual view of novelty. Simultaneously, 
problems with the nature of causation limit James' attempts to en-
large his perceptual account of the appearance of novelty into a 
rational system. 
What then, did James achieve overall? This thesis has hopefully 
presented a coherent picture of James' progress over the years, but 
has often concentrated on the problems in his theories rather than 
stressing their productivity. This is the result of several factors. 
First of all, from the perspective of psychology, James' theories have 
not prevailed. While he is revered as one of the founding fathers of 
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modern psychology, his actual theories are usually dismissed as being 
• largely irrelevant to modern practices today. A sharp distinction 
is made in the histories of psychology between functionalism and the 
behaviourism that followed it, so that J.B. Watson's manifesto is taken 
as the dividing point between the 'new' and the 'old' psychologies. 
James holds the place of the 'wise man' in psychology--eminently 
quotable to illustrate 'truths' or 'broad philosophical positions', 
but his work is rarely taken seriously when it comes down to the actual 
selection of problems for research. 
Watson claims that James "helped to give psychology an indigenous 
vitality and a freedom from the narrowing influences of an exclusively 
laboratory approach; he served to broaden the field to include the 
whole wealth of human experience" (Watson, 1978, p. 392). He also 
points out that James promoted an efficacious model of consciousness 
while at the same time building his psychology largely around a model 
of physiological determinism. Thus, Watson ascribes to Allport's 'pro-
ductive paradox' view of James' psychology and leaves the matter there 
(see Watson, 1978, p. 392; see also Allport, 1943, pp. 95-120). Boring 
gives James credit for establishing the first psychological laboratory, 
but emphasizes his distaste for experimental work. He claims that the 
only psychological theory of James' that was productive for modern 
psychology was the theory of emotion because he regards James' account 
of emotion as basically behaviouristic (see Boring, 1950, pp. 508-517). 
Marx and Hillix summarize James' psychology briefly and conclude that 
he "seems sometimes to have had an incredible modernity" (Marx & 
Hillix, 1963, p. 146) but do not take their analysis any further. 
Gardner and Lois Murphy emphasize the evolutionary content of 
James psychology in their outline of his major psychological theories 
(see Murphy & Murphy, 1969, pp. 258-282), thus isolating the single 
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most important parameter of James' influence. Unfortunately they 
fail to develop this insight any further. Lowry includes James' 
theory of instinct in his broad discussion of Darwin's influence on 
the growth of modern psychological theory (see Lowry, 1971, pp. 125- 
126), and notes James' rejection of the mind-stuff theory. He claims 
that James failed to replace the mind-stuff theory with a viable theory 
of his own and says he will therefore leave the discussion there (see 
Lowry, 1971, pp. 204-205). 
Chaplin and Krawiec outline James' stream of consciousness model 
and pay tribute to James for his inspirational effect on psychology 
(see Chaplin & Krawiec, 1974, pp. 41, 52-53, 372-373). They also 
note that his theory of emotion was soon replaced by the Cannon-Bard 
model (see Chaplin & Krawiec, 1974, p. 475), so that it ceased to 
have a viable role in modern psychology. Robinson also states that 
the James-Lange theory of emotion was "demolished" by Cannon (see 
Robinson, 1972, p. 231) but he shows that the theory is still appli-
cable to certain aspects of the biological study of emotion (see 
Robinson, 1972, p. 237), and he also demonstrates that modern theories 
of instinct preserve the "flavour" of James' earlier version (see 
Robinson, 1972, pp. 138-139). 
The consensus of the major commentators on the history of psycho-
logy seems to be that James served as an early innovator for modern 
psychological theories, yet it is difficult to document the precise 
influence his work had on the growth of psychology. If James' legacy . 
is largely an inspirational one, then it can perhaps be concluded that 
rather than providing psychology with specific theories, his importance 
lies in providing psychology with a new way of looking at the mind and 
the world. Throughout this thesis we have attempted to show how 
James' psychology differed qualitatively from the older associationist 
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paradigms, and have recorded his disputes with traditional psychology. 
That he helped to change the focus of traditional psychology cannot 
be denied. Furthermore, we have tried to show that he changed the 
focus of psychology by having a substantial part in changing our com-
mon assumptions about the world and our relationship with that world. 
This was his major achievement. But he was not altogether successul 
in dismantling the older psychology: the associationist model still 
constitutes an integral part of our psychology as Clark L. Hull noted: 
During the two and one-half centuries since the beginning of 
the English association movement there has been a slow but 
fairly constant tendency for associationism to stress more 
and more the aspect of physical reaction. This has reached 
its logical limit in the behavioristic psychology of America, 
which, despite its migration to another continent, and its 
general repudiation by present-day English psychologists, 
is a genuine and perfectly natural evolution of English 
associationism (Hull, 1934, quoted in Humphrey, 1951, p.4). 
Furthermore, the.successful integration of James' broad philoso-
phical position into our modern world-view must be balanced against 
the internal difficulties of his system. In other words, his attempt 
to elevate evolutionary postulates into a broad view of the universe 
and all of its objects, events, relations, etc., was only partially 
successful. We suggest then, that insofar as it was not successful, 
some of the answers at least, may lie in an examination of the internal 
difficulties of James' specific theories. Thus the attempt to analyse 
these problems was undertaken. In the introduction to this thesis we 
listed several hypotheses which have now been examined in the fore-
going chapters. It is now appropriate to review these hypotheses in 
a final retrospect. 
It was hypothesized that the two major influences on James' career 
were Darwin and Renouvier. This hypothesis cannot be actually substan-
tiated by a textual examination of James' work for two reasons. In 
the first place,James made few explicit references to the works of 
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either Darwin or Renouvier in comparison to the number of references 
to other thinkers.
12 
In the second place, James' extroverted' ap-
proach to psychology and philosophy makes an attempt to isolate one 
or two particular thinkers as 'the' major influences, appear initially 
to be an exercise in futility; typically James scholars selectively 
concentrate their attention on those figures who appear to have the 
most determinative influence on isolated strands of James' work.
13 
Given these restrictions, the attempt was made to show that James' 
work was consistently directed by his commitment to two major positions 
--that evolutionary theory provided the basis for a psychology describ-
ing man's relationship to the natural world, and that consciousness 
was efficacious. And that James was committed to these two propositions 
has been supported by the examination of the structures and functions 
of consciousness, the psychological theories of reality, instinct, 
and emotion, the will to believe, the epistemology of pragmatism, and 
the metaphysics of radical empiricism and pluralism. Furthermore, the 
problem of the inconsistencies or 'paradoxes' in James' work has been 
discussed as a tension between the 'demands' of the two commitments. 
When James' psychology is analyzed with respect to his joint commitment 
to Darwinian evolution and Renouvier's free-will hypothesis many of 
the inconsistencies disappear as individual anomalies and reappear as 
symptoms of the overriding tension between the two positions. Taking 
Darwin and Renouvier as the critical influences on James' thought is 
therefore at least justified on a pragmatic basis. 
12. Note, for example, references to the Mills, Locke, Lotze, 
Spencer, Bergson, Bradley etc. 
13. For example, Perry basically selects Renouvier and the British 
empiricists, Kuklick selects Royce, Kraushaar selects Lotze, Wiener 
selects Darwin and Thayer selects Peirce. 
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Royce stated that biological evolutionary theory was transformed 
into a philosophical theory in the late nineteenth century and that 
James had a major role in making the transformation between the two 
stages of evolutionary thought (see Royce, 1911/1969, pp. 10-14; 
quoted above, pp. 100-101). That this is a valid and important inter-
pretation of James' achievements has been taken as the substantial 
theme of this dissertation, so that we have studied James' philosophi- 
cal and psychological development with the aim of showing how the trans-
formation was achieved. Under the dual influence of Darwin and Renou-
vier, James set out to create a conception of consciousness that was 
both naturalistic and efficacious. This attempt was significant, 
given that the first reaction to evolution had been the emergence of 
an automaton view of mind. Darwin and Spencer ratified a mechanical, 
associationist model of mind, and James' construction of a new con-
ception of consciousness constitutes one of the first major elevations 
of evolutionary theory to Royce's second, philosophical stage. 
Pragmatism was treated as an evolutionary epistemology, and it 
was shown that its genesis (in the discussions of the Metaphysical 
Club) was dependent upon the particular selection and subsequent trans-
formation of biological postulates into a philosophical position which 
denied the validity of absolute conceptions of truth and meaning In 
the same vein, radical empiricism and pluralism constitute James' 
attempts at an ?volutionary metaphysic, wherein he applied the con-
cepts of temporality and mutability to real events and causes in the 
physical world. 
The next hypothesis can be taken as an extension of Royce's state-
ment: we made the claim that James and his contemporaries were strug-
gling to make changes in the common assumptions about the nature of 
the universe and man's place within that universe. In other words, 
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James wanted to create a new world view. 
The pre-evolutionary world view was examined in terms of the 
notion that each era is guided by certain common assumptions about 
what the cosmos is really like. It was hypothesized that these common 
assumptions dictate the scope of research and the interpretation of 
the 'data', so that the common assumptions serve the function of de-
fining research paradigms by selectively focusing the mind on 
specific issues while excluding others. 
The 'common assumptions' model is a broad attempt to isolate 
some of the fundamental 'guiding' assumptions of the pre- and post-
evolutionary eras. In this model, the scientists and theoreticians 
are discussed as participants who ratify, elaborate, and very occasion-
ally reject the guiding assumptions of their age. These assumptions 
are broad, general principles, comparable perhaps, to James' broad 
metaphysical axioms, which provide directionality without having much 
in the way of specific content themselves. This lack of specific 
content means that the assumptions are plastic: they allow for the 
inclusion of new data so that as science progresses, their exact 'mean-
ings' for research change over time. They are supported by the con-
tents of research and scholarship at all levels and they link the con-
tents of specific disciplines together. They must be resistant to 
change
14 
and that they are resistant to change is demonstrated by 
James' difficulties in breaking away from the Newtonian model--first 
in psychology, and later during his long journey towards the redefini-
tion of the physical world. James' lapses into rationalism, element-
arism, his early ratification of the primary and secondary qualities 
doctrine, and his romanticism are all evidence of the difficulties he 
14. See Kuhn, 1970, pp. 41-42 on the quasi-metaphysical aspects of 
scientific paradigms. 
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encountered in his efforts to dismantle the common assumptions. That 
James did intend to change the way men thought about mind and the 
physical world is evident in all of his writings. There is a strong 
polemical strand that runs throughout his work: he exhorts men to 
believe in free will, to return to perception as the basis of knowledge, 
to affirm pluralism, and to use the pragmatic method to solve meta-
physical issues. Directed towards the same end are his diatribes 
against automatism, against atomistic associationism, against Absolut-
ism, and against the notion of a monistic block-universe. 
In Chap. 1 we claimed that the common psychological assumptions 
of the pre-evolutionary thinkers consisted of a mechanical/mathematical 
view of the universe which was accompanied by an atomistic reductionism. 
'Psychological' accounts of thought process were given in terms of a 
'universal subject' and philosophers made an explicit separation be-
tween the animal 'mind' and at least the 'higher' forms of human reas-
oning. By the mid-nineteenth century, mental philosophers were large-
ly promoting an elementaristic account of mind, and the tendency towards 
passive sensationalism in the empiricist position was easily trans-
formed into an automatist view of mind by the early evolutionists. 
James attempted to 'demolish' all of these assumptions during his 
career: more importantly, he devised new structures with which to re-
place them. He ranted against automatism and against many of the prin-
ciples of associationism, advocating a definition of thoughts as uni-
tary constructions with the stream of consciousness as the vehicle. 
of thought in place of the earlier concepts. He rejected the theory 
of innervation and constructed a model wherein knowledge of the physi-
cal world and the individual's effects upon that world were both des-
cribed in afferent terms. He emphasized individual differences in 
his psychology, detailing personality differences in his theories of 
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volition, reality, emotion, reasoning, instinct, etc. He defended 
•the unique nature of each thought, each feeling, each perception, 
and his lapses into rationalism regarding the status of conception 
and the necessary truths often appear as striking inconsistencies 
within the broad context of his system. 
James' whole philosophy was an attempt to reunite man and nature: 
man was no longer to be cut off from his biological origins, and human 
perceptions were to provide the 'givens' of knowledge about the exter-
nal world. Man's adaptation to the world was therefore of critical 
importance and James promoted theories of insttnct and psychogenesis 
which dictated that man's plastic capacities were products of evolu-
tionary processes. Volition with effort was given the function of bring-
ing mind and nature into a closer relationship so that the epistemo-
logical gap between mind and nature would eventually be closed. Man 
is thus given an active role to play in the continuing evolution of 
the universe, for James proclaimed the efficacy of consciousness in 
facilitating adaptation and in making new ideas 'true'. 
Finally, James discarded the mathematical/mechanical view of the 
universe in favour of a 'temporal mutable' view. The new world view 
would have as its common assumptions:, 1.) the recognition that each 
object, relation, event, and thought is unique; 2) the essential 
unity of man and nature; and 3) the concept that perception, not abstract 
conception nor universal law, best described the actual workings of 
the universe. It would also be recognized within the new world view 
that 4) qualitative changes in the universe take place through time 
so that the universe is characterized by the appearance of novelty; 
and that 5) man has a real role to play in the construction of the 
universe: free will would be taken as a real possibility so that man 
would regard himself as an efficacious participant in the evolving 
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universe and not as a passive observer of the gradual pre-determined 
unravelling of the universe. 15 
Finally, did James succeed (along with his contemporaries) in 
facilitating a shift in the common assumptions, and was his psychologi-
cal-philosophical system sufficient in itself to stand as the basis 
for a new world view? Certainly the twentieth century world-view has 
undergone a radical shift and this shift is conventionally attributed 
to the success of evolutionary theory and the emergence of relativity 
theory in physics. Broadly speaking, then, James and his contempor- 
aries had a major role in shifting the focus of western thought. The 
universe is regarded as an evolving system, individual difference 
provide one of the cornerstones of the social sciences, psychology 
is once again emphasizing the active functions of mental structures 
in cognition (largely through the acceptance of the Piagetian model 
which has roots in Baldwin's work--see Russell, 1978), and scientific 
and philosophical 'truths' are studied to reveal the changes they 
exhibit over time (notably Kuhn's work on paradigm shifts), so that 
the pragmatic theories of truth and meaning are coming into their own, 
granted in modified forms. 
Kuhn emphasizes that after a scientific revolution has taken 
place, phenomena are perceived in new ways, and he makes an analogy 
between these 1)roa4 intellectual shifts and Gestalt phenomena: the 
event or object is now seen as 'something else'--it has a new meaning 
and the old meaning simultaneously disappears with the apprehension 
of the new. At the same time, paradigm shifts are never complete 
15 • It Should be noted that not all of these common assumptions were 
shared by the early pragmatists, particularly in regard to free will 
The early pragmatists did agree on the importance of establishing that 
the world changed over time as a basic assumption in their philosophy. 
See Chap. 7 for the account of the agreements and disagreements 
between the members of the Metaphysical Club. 
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upheavals so that many models, postulates, and pieces of data are 
carried along into the new paradigm; the price of admission is that 
they now have different relations to the new paradigm than they had to 
the old, or else they yield new concrete results in the new paradigm 
(see Kuhn, 1970, pp. 111-135). The 'new' world-view did not do away 
with either associationism nor reductionism; rather both conceptions 
are used in qualitatively 'new' ways in modern science. The associat-
ionism of Clark L. Hull is not the associationism of John Stuart Mill, 
and Kuhn's model would attribute these differences to the new relations 
the old model has to the new paradigm, and to the new concrete results 
yielded when new methods are grafted onto old models. The concretiza-
tion of a world-view therefore includes decisions on the part of theor-
ists as to which portions of the declining view can be productively 
'revitalized' in the new framework, and which portions have been 'dis-
proven' and must therefore be discarded. 
The 'scope' of twentieth century thought was largely determined 
by the crisis which developed in physics in the late nineteenth century 
and, according to Kuhn, paved the way for the emergence of relativity 
theory.16 It was stated earlier that James' view of the physical world 
was centered on human consciousness in part because he believed that 
consciousness formed the 'axis' of the world, and in part because he 
lacked a new physical theory to support his attempts to redefine the 
structure of the physical world. The theory he lacked was in fact em-
erging in physics at the time he wrote, but he did not live long enough 
to become aware of the revolutionary implications of quantum physics 
and relativity theory. The 'success' of relativity theory precluded 
16. See Kuhn, 1970, pp. 72-75 for a description of the crisis in 
physics. 
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• any likelihood that scientists would turn to James' theory of per-
ception as a means of rediscovering and lawfully describing the pro-
perties of the physical world. Reductionism and elementarism took 
on new meanings in the new paradigm of physics, and were 'reinstated' 
in the sciences in general.
17 
The success of relativity theory ensured, 
.finally, that the new world view would continue to be dominated by pro-
gress in science, while James' philosophy progressively tended to 
reduce the role of science as the vehicle of discovery.
18 
In short, 
whether or not James' broad system was sufficiently viable to pro-
vide a significant part of the basis for a new world view, historical 
circumstances went against the concretization of a new world-view 
along specifically Jamesian lines. 
The potential role of James' writings in directing the shift in 
world-view was also vitiated by the problems which are left unresolved 
in his work. On the 'plus' side of the-balance sheet, he has to his 
credit the conception of a unitary definition of thought or feeling and 
the stream of consciousness as the vehicle of thought. His emphasis on 
the pluralistic, temporal nature of the universe was an extremely pro-
ductive conception as was his notion that the efficacious qualities of 
consciousness are guaranteed by the structural nature of consciousness 
itself and its interactions with the world. The success of his prag-
matism speaks for itself. Finally, James' long struggles with dualism 
are among his most important legacies. He showed that epistem- 
17. See Mackenzie, 1977, pp. 24-27, for a discussion of the effects 
of physics on early twentieth century psychology. 
18. Science plays a primary role as the vehicle of discovery in 
the Principles. Its role is diminished in the pragmatic, radical 
empiricist, and pluralistic writings and it is not until the final 
philosophy that James once again gives science a primary role in 
resolving theoretical problems. 
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ological 'cuts' must finally be made so that the knower is distinguish-
ed from the object he knows. But he also showed that the demarcations 
between knower and known are blurred so that the precise point where 
the cut is made is determined by human demands; it is not absolute. 
On the negative side of the balance sheet are the problems James 
failed to resolve to the satisfaction of his audience, and often him-
self. His insistence on leaving,an opening for free will in his psycho-
logy led to protests from his contemporaries over the inclusion of 
metaphysics in psychology, and James' corresponding failure to devise 
naturalistic accounts of the faculties--notably in regard to the 
inclusion of the mysterious fiat of effort--'weakened' his attempt to 
develop an over-all scientific account of psychology at a time when 
experimental methods were rapidly developing and commitment to their 
efficacy was strong. Thus, his psychology was praised for its vivid 
accounts of experience by some and damned for its subjectivity by 
others.
19 
His psychology included a variation of the reflex model 
of the associationists, and a commitment to the efficacious nature of 
mind. These two seemingly incompatible conceptions were incorporated 
into the psychology to provide a scientific account of action while 
at the same time ensuring that-the mind did not function as a sterile 
epiphenomenon, or, as Kuklick says, to ensure that "the motor theory 
of consciousness did not reduce mind to behavior" (Kuklick, 1977, p. 
186). The problem is that James' scientific and 'ethical' commitments 
produced a functional dualism instead of a resolution of the tension. 
In general, James' psychology was criticized as being too metaphysical, 
19. See for example, Baldwin, 1891, pp. 357-371; Hall, 1891, pp. 
578-591; Meyers, 1891, pp. 111-133; Peirce, 1891, pp. 32-33; Royce, 
1891, pp. 143-169; Santayana, 1891, pp. 552-556; Sully, 1891, 
pp, 393-404; and Ladd, 1892, pp. 24-53. 
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and too impressionistic to represent the emerging science; at the 
same time, the book was widely read and adopted as a text by many of 
James' contemporaries and many theorists still regard it as the 'great-
est' psychology book we have. 
The objections to James' subjectivism must also be balanced against 
the substantial contributions he made to psychology as an empirical 
science. While he had a personal dislike for laboratory research, he 
founded the first psychological laboratory in America, and he tried to 
ensure that psychology would continue as an empirical science by turn-
ing his laboratory over to Munsterberg when he left the field to pur-
sue his philosophical interests. He continued, throughout his career, 
to emphasize the importance of physiological investigation, and his 
philosophy is built on the foundations of his psychology. 
James' subjectivism was a major point of contention with many of 
his contemporaries living as they did in an era that set a high pre-
mium on scientific objectivity. Moreover, his lapses into rationalism 
prevented him from developing an acceptable account of scientific 
knowledge. He was inclined to insist throughout his careeer that con-
cepts were static, eternal constructs and he thereby created an epist-
emological gulf between the perceptual and conceptual faculties. At 
the same time, his insistence that metaphysical concepts could be trans-
lated into particular ideas of specific actions so that the truth of 
metaphysical or ethical postulates could be determined by their conse-
quenses was compromised by the problem of whether the translations could 
legitimately be made in the first place and by James' tendency to make 
value judgements on what the consequences of holding certain postulates 
would be.
20 
He was, however, eventually to conclude that the pragmatic 
20. James' insistence that believing in theism would result in 
(contd.) 
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method could not achieve what he had hoped for it in the way of re-
solving metaphysical issues, and towards the end of his life, James 
was inclining once more towards more conventional modes of investi-
gation. 
Moreover, James' attempt to go beyond dualism did not succeed. 
This in itself is not a failing that James can be taken to task for: 
the mind-body, subject-object distinctions seem to be problems that 
are 'built-in' to the western philosophical tradition and whether the 
problems admit of solution or not is still a moot point. While James' 
attempt enabled him to derive new conceptions of the physical universe, 
the fact that his derivations were coloured by his concept of 'pure 
experience' and by his attempt to resolve the mind-body problem caused 
some of his contemporaries to ignore the productive strand in radical 
empiricism and to concentrate instead on its problems. 
Finally, James' commitment to metaphysical and moral problems, 
his concentration of the validity of human experience, and the 'popu-
lar' nature of the bulk of his philosophy placed him somewhat outside 
of the growing tendency towards "establishing paradigmatic modes of 
thinking" as a part of the growth of "professionalization" (Kuklick, 
1977, p. 451). Philosophers were becoming academics, ensconced in 
the internal technical problems of the discipline, and they were dis- 
inclined to ensure that their philosophy had relevance for the general 
• public. 
Science in general was committed to empirical experimentation. A 
positivistic attitude, defining the methodological scope of science, 
was becoming widespread. The eventual successes of quantum mechanics 
and the emergence of relativity theory, and on the psychological front, 
20. (contd.) 'good' consequences is a clear example of this tendency. 
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the concentration on discovering the laws of learning, on behaviour, 
and on controlled experimentation (epitomized by Thorndike's early 
work), meant that science was going to be at the forefront in deter-
mining the specific 'givens' of the emerging world-view. The use of 
the introspective method in American psychology was on its way out 
long before Watson published his behaviourist manifesto (Watson, 1913). 
But it can be.argued that James and his contemporaries had 
a far greater role in the creation of the new world-view than did the 
psychologists and philosophers who followed them, and that the changes 
the early pragmatists made in deriving a new set of common assumptions 
had an immediate and continuous relevance for social science and for 
philosophy. Our long excursion into mid-nineteenth century psychology 
and philosophy was undertaken for the purpose of showing how'men con-
ceived of the mind and its relation to the physical world in the period 
'surrounding' the publication of Darwin's Origin. The contrasts be-
tween the assumptions which described that relationship and the assump-
tions which emerge in the early pragmatist writings are dramatic. We 
have emphasized throughout that James and the other early pragmatists 
changed the focus of empiricism through the selection of evolutionary 
postulates to describe both the structure of mind and the structure of 
the physical world and the relationship between them. It was the selec-
tive drawing out of a new set of assumptions that gives James and his 
contemporaries their central place in the history of western thought. 
Thattheir task was by no means an obvious or an easy one is exemplified 
by the disputes between them, by the problems that remain unresolved 
in their works, and by the fact that their theories were slowly built 
up over several decades. James had completed the construction of his 
evolutionary theory of consciousness by 1890; it was another twenty 
years before he had the confidence to state that the physical world 
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was actually governed by the same temporal mutable factors, without 
indulging in either romanticism or idealism. 
Finally, if the early pragmatists and functionalists did not 
achieve all of the goals they set for themselves, interest in their 
works has been sustained throughout the twentieth century. Critical 
interest in the writings of James, Royce, and Dewey has been consist-
ently maintained, and the reputation of Charles Peirce has steadily 
increased over the past six decades. More recently, critical interest 
has been evinced in the works of Baldwin, Hall, and Cattell (see for 
example, Russell, 1978). Perhaps the only real test of the importance 
of any thinker lies in whether his works continue to excite new com-
mentaries and criticisms: if so, James' reputation for this century 
at least has long been assured. The hypothesis has been put forward 
in this thesis that James' greatness lies in the fact that he had a 
significant role in changing the way men thought about themselves and 
about the nature of the physical world. Whitehead gives a good des-
cription of the difficulties that confront the historian who attempts 
to discover the assumptions which act as the foundations for the philo-
sophies of any given era and thereby implicitly shows the problems 
that await any thinker who attempts to move out of the tradition he 
has inherited in order to build a new one: 
When you are criticizing the philosophy of an epoch, do not 
chiefly direct your attenticn to those intellectual positions 
which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. 
There will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents 
of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously 
presuppose. Such assumptions appear so obvious that people 
do not know what they are assuming because no other way of 
putting things has ever occurred to them. With these assump-
tions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems 
are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the 
philosophy of the epoch (Whitehead, 1925/1948, p. 71). 
James' greatness lies in the fact that he succeeded in isolating 
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the important aasumptions of the rationalist-empiricist tradition 
and treating these assumptions as relative guidelines rather than as 
absolutes. And he then went on to construct alternative systems, 
based on the new set of assumptions which he generated out of evolut-
ionary theory and Renouvier's philosophy. His reading of evolutionary 
theory led him to isolate certain ideas which were implicitly given 
within the theory itself but which had been left undeveloped by Darwin 
and the first generation of evolutionists in their attempt to align 
the new biology with the Newtonian world-view. It was James' highly 
selective reading of evolutionary theory which allowed him to gener-
ate a new set of assumptions and to question the traditional set of 
assumptions, for if the new set of assumptions was implicitly given 
in evolutionary theory as Darwin proposed it, it is certain that Darwin 
and the first generation of evolutionists remained unaware of the 
potential implications of these assumptions or perhaps even of their 
existence as such. That is to say, the generation of the new set of 
assumptions depended on the particular selection of the early prag-
matists--certain ideas were taken up from the theory (while others 
were ignored) and these ideas were then developed along particular lines. 
Once the assumptions were partially developed, James could then go on 
to argue that consciousness need not necessarily be analyzed in the 
elementaristic, mechanical terms of the previous era, and he could 
then construct the stream of consciousness as an alternative. His 
whole psychology and philosophy can be seen as a reexamination of the 
assumptions of the previous era and an attempt to reconstruct philosophy 
and psychology along new lines. Thus his legacy is a three-fold one. 
He showed in practice (if not in a philosophical analysis per se) that 
psychologies and philosophies had been based on a particular set of 
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assumptions, and he drew up a new set of assumptions to act as the 
framework for scientific and philosophical study. He then went on 
to develop particular psychological and philosophical theories based 
on these assumptions. 
That such an undertaking presents tremendous difficulties is 
exemplified by the problems that exist in James' psychology and philo-
sophy; the analysis of these problems therefore has something to say 
about the difficulties that ensue when men try to free themselves 
from a particular set of assumptions which describe a universal world-
view and to construct new assumptions, and with the construction of 
new assumptions, a new world-view. The analysis in this thesis was 
therefore undertaken with the aim of showing something about the ways 
in which new assumptions are derived, old assumptions dismantled, and 
new epistemologies and metaphysics conceived. This type of analysis 
involves a teasing out of the assumptions of the older world-view and 
the research paradigms and empirical observations that maintain and 
support these assumptions. It also involves an analysis of the factors 
which incite men to re-examine the assumptions which guide their philo-
sophical and scientific endeavours--in this case, evolutionary theory 
and the problems it presented. Finally, it involves an analysis of 
how new sets of assumptions are constructed, how these new assumptions 
are used to construct particular philosophical and scientific theories, 
and how these particular theories lead to the collection of 'new' 
empirical 'fact'. The psychology and philosophy of William James 
provide an excellent vehicle for such on undertaking. 
If the foregoing analysis has often been highly critical of James' 
psychological and philosophical theories, it is important to emphas-
ize that any analysis of how common assumptions change from era to 
era cannot be undertaken without a fairly extensive and often critical 
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examination of how successfully the older assumptions are refuted and 
how 'satisfactory' the new constructions are in meeting the demands 
of the new set of assumptions, explaining the phenomena that the older 
theories purported to explain, and in standing up in their own right 
as a set of logical theoretical statements which are consistent with 
observational data. That James' psychology and philosophy can be sub-
jected to such an analysis and still stand as one of the outstanding 
and momentous achievements of the modern age is testimony enough to 
its continuing value for modern thought. It is perhaps significant 
that those theorists who subject James' thought to the most rigorous 
and critical analysis feel compelled to end their commentaries with 
sincere expressions of admiration for James' achievements. Kuklick 
titles his concluding remarks on James' philosophy "Tribute" (see 
Kuklick, 1977, p. 334), and Wilshire writes: 
William James's Principles of Psychology raises more problems 
than it solves. But to raise a problem can be a contribution, 
and in this sense, as well as in others, I believe that James's 
work makes a major contribution to philosophy of mind and to 
the culture generally. Even his errors are important because 
they arise in connection with important problems and provoke 
new thought about them. As James Joyce once put it, the mistakes 
of genius are the portals of discovery. One commentator has 
said that James was a noteworthy psychologist but "was [as a 
philosopher] at best little more than a brilliant and slightly 
irresponsible amateur." While I recognize that James was loose 
in his use of certain philosophical terms, I could not dis-
agree more with the main point of the allegation. I believe 
that it is only because he is an important philosopher, that his 
work in psychology is still noteworthy and timely today. For 
the philosophical problems that his work raises pertain to the 
philosophical foundations of 'psychology, and, as Wittgenstein 
and others have indicated, it is here, in its philosophical 
foundations, that psychology requires the most urgent attention 
(Wilshire, 1968, pp. 215-216). 
The present author is no exception in wishing to pay tribute to James' 
tremendous achievements and the following statement by Kuklick seems 
to best sum up what the modern world owes to James and the other early 
pragmatists. Kuklick writes: 
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Medieval thinkers accepted a common network of assumptions 
and worked diligently within them. What gave the Golden Age 
its character was that it had to create a new network to 
assimilate Darwinian science. Those who came after Royce 
and James were simply working in that network (Kuklick, 1977, 
p. 451). 
This then, was James' achievement: he had a vital part in build-
ing the framework for the new age and if his specific theories are 
no longer used as models for psychology, if philosophy has rejected 
or modified some of the essential contentions of his pragmatism, 
radical empiricism, and pluralism, he was still successful in achieving 
the most important part'of his goal. He had a voice in determining 
the guidelines for a new era: he asked the right questions at the 
right time in history, and therein lies his continuing importance 
for our age. 
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WILLIAM JAMES AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERESTS 
Lynne Mackenzie 
William James attempted to refute automaton theory with the claim 
that consciousness is efficacious because it is selective, and selective 
because it possesses many varied and irreducible interests. But James' theory 
contains several major weaknesses. James never satisfactorily defines the 
interests in terms of their psychogenetic origins not does he give them an 
explicit structure within consciousness itself. Therefore the evidence for 
the existence of interests may be no more than an empirical abstraction from 
the fact that any particular action is performed. From another viewpoint, 
the organism may behave as if it were interested but the interests themselves 
may have only an epiphenomenal status as mere sattachmentsu,  to a biologically 
determined organism, as part of the consciousness of conscious automata. The 
weakness of James' interest theory is important as an early example of the same 
flaw that occurs in many of his later and more systematic theories. 
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section entitled "History of the Sciences of Man." Requests for reprints 
should be sent to Lynne Mackenzie, Department of Psychology, University of 
Tasmania, GPO Box 252 C, Hobart, Tasmania 7001, Australia. 
Lynne Mackenzie is a graduate student at the University of Tasmania. 
. WILLIAM JAMES AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERESTS * 
William James, 1842-1910, began his scientific and philosophical 
career when the evolutionary debate was still raging. In 1865 James joined 
Agassiz's expedition to Brazil; his enthusiasm for the new biology had con-
vinced him that his future might lie in the biological sciences. The Bra-
zilian expedition showed him that he was temperamentally unsuited to a career 
as a biologist, and that any contribution he could make to the extension 
and development of evolutionary theory would not be in the natural sciences 
themselves, but in psychology and philosophy.
1 
This paper will discuss 
the first major outcome of that realization--that is, James' first attempt 
to develop a psychology based upon evolutionary principles. More specifically, 
it will discuss his attempt to establish, within an evolutionary context, 
that consciousness is efficacious because it is 'interested' and therefore 
selective. 
The great evolutionists, Spencer and Darwin, retained an Associa-
tionist paradigm of mind, and sought--Spencer particularly--to integrate 
their evolutionary ideas with the existing empiricist philosophy. The domi-
nant result of this attempt at integration was automaton theory, wherein 
consciousness becomes an epiphenomenon, observant but non-directive. In this 
model, 'consciousness' is the result of brain-cell interaction: it is a pro-
duct and supervenes physiological functioning, but does not intervene to 
produce behaviour on its own. The automaton theory, as put forth by Hodgson, 
Maudsley, Clarke, Tyndall, Spalding, Clifford and Huxley, was the most specific 
way in which the traditional empiricist view of a passive consciousness found 
its new expression. And in his analysis of the automaton position James also 
criticized Bain, Spencer, and Carpenter for advocating the passive consciousness 
view.2 
2 
Originall-Y James aligned himself with the declared automatists. 
In 1869 his scientific studies led him to conclude "that we are Nature 
through and through, that we are wholly conditioned, that not a wiggle of 
our will happens save as the result of physical laws". 3 But James straddled 
two intellectual worlds: the modern world of Darwinian science, and the tra-
ditional world of Unitarian philosophy. He had imbibed enough of a religious 
or spiritual approach to philosophy from his father, Henry James Sr., to 
make a materialist orientation towards consciousness tenable for long. 
James' neurasthenic ills of 1869 were at least partially caused by 
his philosophical dilemma. Rescue came in the form of Charles Renouvier, a 
leading neo-Kantian philosopher, who insisted that knowledge gained through 
empirical methods was often inadequate for the resolution of moral issues 
because absolute empirical knowledge was by definition restricted to moments 
spent in the presence of particular facts. Belief, on the other hand, 
'happened' solely through an act of will, and was not only justified, but 
demanded by moral circumstances when logic and experience failed to pro-
vide all of the 'data' necessary to make a decision. 4 James was convinced 
by Renouvier that in some cases at least, consciousness had an active role 
to play, and in 1870 he wrote: 
I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the 
first part of Renouvier's second Essais and see no reason why his 
definition of free will -- "the sustaining of a thought because I 
choose to when I might have other thoughts" -- need be the defini-
tion of an illusion. ...My first act of free will shall be to be-
lieve in free will.
5 
James now had philosophical grounds for rejecting automaton theory, 
and soon he would declare that survival was no longer a mere hypothesis: 
survival was guaranteed by the possession of an active functional conscious- 
ness.
6 
James realized that simply superimposing Renouvier's doctrine of 
free will onto Darwinian concepts of survival could not guarantee an effi- 
cacious consciousness. Instead, he began to work out the structure of a func- 
tional psychology, based on the interaction between mind and nature. Knox 
shows how closely the new psychology was modelled on Darwinian principles: 
Since the environment to which an organism consciously reacts 
is the environment as it exists for that organism's consciousness, 
and since the environment as so viewed is the product of selective 
elimination on the part of the consciousness concerned, it follows 
that conscious selection creates the known world in precisely the  
same sense in which 'natural selection' creates the species. "Each 
of us literally chooses, by his way of attending to things, what 
sort of universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit." 7 
Darwinian evolution is based upon selectivity in the environment: the well-
adapted or best fitted to their surroundings survive and the lesser so per-
ish, and James expanded this idea into the psychological conception of a 
selective, active mind. This extension of Darwinian principles gave James 
an alternative to automaton theory while allowing him to retain a natural-
istic neurophysiological structure for conscious activity. Interests, 
as the means of conscious selection, are first mentioned in James' 1878 
article "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence". 
James opens his argument by insisting that to be meaningful, Spencer's 
formula that life, including mental evolution, consists of the 'adjustment of 
inner to outer relations' must be rewritten to distinguish between 'mental 
action' per se and 'right mental action'. This redefinition: 
is frankly teleological. It explicitly postulates a distinction 
between mental action pure and simple, and right mental action; 
and furthermore, it proposes, as criteria of this latter, 
certain ideal ends--those of physical prosperity or survival, which 
are pure subjective interests on the animal's part, brought with it 
upon the scene and corresponding to no relation already there. No 
mental action is right or intelligent which fails to fit this stan-
dard.
8 
He then adds that "These interests are the real a priori element in cognition." 9 
A fairly logical criticism of Spencer's position follows, as James shows that 
an interested consciousness is necessary for the particular survival and adjust- 
ment of any individual, and he arrives at the conclusion that: 
I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration forced upon 
me at every turn, that the knower is not simply a mirror floating 
with no foot-hold anywhere, and passively reflecting .an order that 
he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an actor, 
and co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he 
registers the truth which he helps create. Mental interests, hy-
potheses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human action-- 
action which to a great extent transforms the world--help to make 
the truth which they declare. In other words, there belongs to 
mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the 
game, and not a mere looker-on; and its judgments of the should-be, 
its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of the cogitandum  
as if they were excrescences, or meant, at most, survival.
10 
This passage typifies James' early writings on the active, partici- 
pating consciousness, itself determined by its interests and hence determining 
the known world. The passage is lyrical, inspirational, and convincing. But 
James is convincing only on aesthetic grounds. No substantial analysis or 
definition is given and a fuller, more dynamic causal account is essential: 
how are interests determined, and once determined, how do they dominate the 
stream of thought? James appears to feel that he has provided an adequate 
account of the interests, for in 1879, in his paper "Are We Automata?" he 
again uses the idea of interests as a means of justifying his contention that 
consciousness is efficacious, and refers the reader to his 1878 paper as fol-
lows: 
I have treated this matter of teleology being an exclusively 
conscious function more at length in an article on "Spencer's Defi-
nition of Mind" ...to which I take the liberty of referring the 
reader. 11 
That he is satisfied with the account of interest given in 1878 
seems clear when we examine the usage of the concept in the remainder of 
his "Are We Automata?" where interests are used to account for the selection 
of activities: 
We have found that the unaided action of the cerebral hemispheres 
would probably be random and capricious; that the nerve-process 
likely to lead to the animal's interests would not necessarily pre-
dominate at 0 given moment. On the other hand, we have found that 
an impartial consciousness is a non-entity, and that of the many items 
that ever occupy our mental stage Feeling always selects one as 
most congruous with the interests it has taken its stand upon. 
Collating these two results an inference is unavoidable. The 
"items" on the mental stage are the subjective aspects of as many 
nerve-processes, and in emphasising the representations congruous 
with conscious interest and discouraging all others, may not Atten-
tion actually reinforce and inhibit the nerve-processes to which 
the representations severally correspond? 12 
That some kind of a mechanism is required to account for purposive 
behaviour is clear enough: the automatists and 'determinists' themselves 
6 
had developed detailed systems to explain the behavioural repertoires of men 
and animals. The question is whether or not James' concept of interest is 
sufficiently developed to support his conclusion that consciousness is 
efficacious. In James' "Are We Automata?" interests account for the selec-
tions we make, and James tries to explain divergent pieces of behaviour 
solely in terms of the presence of divergent interests. That is, if A 
performs action C, and B does not, the difference is ascribed to a difference 
in interests.
13 
The idea that selection is dependent upon the possession of discrete 
interests is carried over into The Principles of Psychology (hereafter refered 
to as the Principles): 
These aesthetic and practical interests, then, are the weightiest 
factors in making particular ingredients stand out in high relief. 
What they lay their accent on, that we notice: but what they are in 
themselves, we cannOt say. We must content ourselves here with 
simply accepting them as irreducible ultimate factors in determin-
ing the way our knowledge grows.
14 
This statement is both radical and unsatisfactory: James is charging that 
all selections are made in accordance with factors which cannot be defined 
or explained. Interests, because of their 'mysterious' nature are exempted 
from the type of empirical study which is to be applied to all other aspects 
of the conscious process. Nevertheless, James of course does not end his 
discussion of interests with the statement quoted above, and goes on to dis-
cuss the role played by the interests in co-ordinating conscious activity. 
James indicates in the Principles that interests first arise with 
the primitive feelings--those basic 'raw sensations' which later develop 
into conceptually 'meaningful' ideas and extend to incorporate our practical, 
aesthetic, intellectual, emotional, volitional, and ethical lives: 
Man, by his immensely varied instincts, practical wants, and aes-
thetic feelings, to which every sense contributes, would be sure 
to dissociate vastly more characters than any other animal; ... 
The diverse interests lead, too, to a diversification of experi- 
ences, whose accumulation becomes a condition for the play of that 
law of dissociation by varying concomitants. 15 
Interests as they first appear occupy the same dynamic place in 
consciousness as instinctive impulses. Interests must originally be spon-
taneously aroused with instincts, at least insofar as the individual experi-
ences certain feelings (for example, hunger), which prompt certain instinct-
ive responses (for example sucking and biting on presentation of food). 
The feeling of hunger must contain an implicit interest in having the feel-
ing satisfied; and this interest, coerced by the physical needs, becomes 
attached to the particular objects in the external world which satisfy the - 
need. An interesc therefore eventually encompasses internal sensations 
or feelings, and the particular objects in the external world which cor-
respond to internal sensations. As conceptualization develops, our inter-
ests develop and lead us into a greater range of experience. We 'get' more, 
or 'know' more about the world because our varied interests lead us to dis-
sociate more and more particulars out of objects than the first instinctive 
associations yield. Our interests thereby determine what we will experience; 
they determine which objects will be separated as worthy of our attention. 
As James writes: 
My experience is what I agree to attend to.  Only those items which 
• I notice shape my mind--without selective interest, experience is 
an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and 
shade, background and foreground--intelligible perspective, in a word.
16 
The role of interests as determinants of what we shall agree to 
attend to in potential experience is a consistent strand in the Principles. 
Our interests determine which object shall be chosen at any level as the 
most 'significant', 'satisfying', or 'true'. An object theory, relation, 
or event must be satisfactory in two ways: it must satisfy the demands of 
the situation--for example, food in the case of hunger, explanation in the 
case of scientific investigation, and it must appeal to the related needs 
extant in the stream of consciousness at any given time. Thus, an object is 
interesting, and therefore 'selected' not only because it has the particular 
properties sufficient to satisfy the particular need, but because it possesses, 
in addition, properties that appeal to co-existing needs, or interests: 
It is conceivable that several rival theories should equally well 
include the actual order of our sensations in their scheme, much 
as the one-fluid and two-fluid theories of electricity formulated 
all the common electrical phenomena equally well. The sciences are 
full of these alternatives. Which theory is then to be believed? 
That theory will be most generally believed which, besides offering  
us objects able to account for our sensible experience, also offers  
those which are most interesting, those which appeal most urgently  
to our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs. So here, in the 
higher intellectual life, the same selection among general concep-
tions goes on which went on among the sensations themselves.
17 
• Unfortunately, this is about as far as James goes in defining 
interests and their role in conscious selection, so that interests appear 
to be simple additions to the other feelings, ideas, or thoughts that make 
up the stream of consciousness. Because James contends that the interests 
must simply be accepted as irreducible factors which determine the growth of 
knowledge and therefore defines the interests solely in terms of their re- 
lations to other feelings, it is difficult to decide whether their 'exist- 
9 
ence' provides the basis for an adequate refutation of automaton theory. 
If Knox's parallel between selective Nature and selective mind is 
truly applicable as a description of James' epistemology then it must be added 
that the mind, in making its initial separations of reality, is at least at 
the onset, no more consciously selective than Nature. And if the initial se-
lections are made more or less randomly, or are determined by instinctive de-
mands and responses, we are then compelled to assess the influences of these  
selections upon subsequent ones. James' account of the structures of action 
is strongly deterministic, in deliberate contrast to his assertion that free 
will may obtain in special circumstances. The worlds of freedom and the 
worlds of mundane reality clash in the demands they make upon the individual. 
This conflict emphasizes the importance of the status of the interests when 
we ask to what degree we actually create our own reality, and to what degree 
that reality is imposed on us both from within and from without. 
At this stage the case for James' voluntarism rests solely on the 
accidental results of possessing an interactive mind. Interests, as they ini-
tially accompany instincts, can have no more foresight of ends than the in-
stincts themselves. If the instinct is blind, and the individual incapable 
of cognizing ends until experience substitutes other patterns of conscious 
interaction, then interests must be correspondingly blind at the onset. 
James' conception of an efficacious consciousness is based on the possession 
of interests and on the resulting development of unique perceptual and con-
ceptual schemas of reality; it relies on the fortuitous possession of dis-
crete interests, rather than upon a consciously directed structuring of 
experience. 
The problems that arise from James' failure to give an adequate 
teleological account of the interests become more explicit when we look 
at his dualistic model of psychogenesis. This theory proposes that the mind 
10 
is assailed in two ways: the first means is through the 'front-door' of 
sensory experiences and includes those experiences gained through active in-
teraction with the environment. 'Back-door' influences are comprised of the 
indirect causes of mental modification: molecular accidents and other random 
variations in the unstable brain-tissue. These influences are responsible for 
our moral, aesthetic, and intellectual experiences, while 'front-door' pro-
pensities facilitate our comfortable adjustment in the external world.
18 
At 
the same time, the 'back-door' propensities are irrelevant to biological ad-
justment, and may actually be opposed to comfortable adjustment. The final 
consciousness is a product of these separate, independent, and sometimes anti-
thetical types of tendencies; the individual's interests therefore must ori-
ginate in both of the two evolutionarily derived patterns of development. 
That James intended the interests to be taken as the "irreducible•
teleological factors of consciousness"
19 
is confirmed by R. B. Perry. He 
reminds us that James rewrote Spencer's formula to read: "Right or intelligent 
mental action consists in the establishment, corresponding to outward relations, 
of such inward relations and reactions as will favour the survival of the 
thinker, or at least, his physical well-being..
20 
 Later, Perry argues that 
"morality is selective from among interests" 21 but he does not provide any 
insight into how the problem of conflicting interests is to be resolved; in 
this case, the presence of particular moral or instinctive interests can 
only be inferred after the fact of any particular action. 
While Perry cannot really be criticized for not dealing with the 
problem, it is perhaps significant that he does not see the interest theory 
as problematic. In fact he sees it as one of James' most positive achieve-
ments.
22 
He appears to be satisfied that James has dealt satisfactorily with 
the problem by recognizing that there is a problem in deciding which interest 
will prove predominant. For James himself wrote: 
11 
The standard of survival or self-preservation is most potent. But 
there exists a host of other standards, aesthetic and moral, impera- 
tive so long as they do not conflict with this one and sometimes im-
perative over this one. In the preliminary selection by the senses 
of certain objective orders of movement, it is difficult to see 
what standard is subserved.
23 
James concludes that the enactment of any particular interest de-
pends upon the individual's ability to apply the 'right' or 'desired' inter-
ests in appropriate situations; this ability depends upon selecting the cor-
rect concept of the situation and acting accordingly
.24 
But this does little 
to resolve the problem of how the two types of interests are related to one 
another, or how interests influence sophisticated problem solving at all. 
Once again, the concept of interest proves elusive. Instead, we soon find 
ourselves looking towards James' extensive analysis of the development of 
perception and conception to discover the 'mental' basis for selection. And 
this means that the analysis of perception and conception is confounded: if 
we accept James' notion that interests are the teleological basis of conscious-
ness, then the particular development of perceptual and conceptual capacities 
must be assumed to be at least partially dependent upon the play between inter-
ests. 
James makes a distinction between those interests which facilitate 
adjustment and those which appear to be "without any utility at all."
25 
 
Those interests without utility, however, include such tendencies as a liking 
for alcohol or music, and such interests would obviously have a strong influ-
ence on the development of the individual's perceptual and conceptual struc-
tures. Interests, in this case, serve as the impulsive and distinguishing 
characteristics of personality. The only restriction James places upon the 
efficacy of interests at this point are those imposed by 'natural selection' 
12 
which eliminates those tendencies which would imperil the individual's survival 
or that of his species.
26 
The problem with this is that there is no further 
analysis of the mechanism of natural selection itself, or on how it works to 
'weed out' harmful tendencies. The recognition that too much alcohol is harm-
ful to the individual who has a strong 'interest' in it, comes about through 
the individual's conceptualization of his situation.
27 
Individually, if not 
for the race, it is difficult to see how natural selection is an operative 
mechanism here. All that James finally claims regarding natural selection is 
that, numerically, the instinctive interests outweight the 'fortuitous' inter-
ests.
28 
Thus, the relation of interests to perceptual and conceptual develop-
ment is not satisfactorily resolved. 
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that interests are simply synonomous 
with feelings or ideas, because James states in the Principles that interests 
'distinguish' particular thoughts within the stream of consciousness. It is 
the interest attached to the thought, idea, or conclusion, that makes it 
significant: 
In either case it [the conclusion] stands out from the other 
segments of the stream by reason of the peculiar interest atta-
ching to it. This interest arrests it, makes a sort of crisis of 
it when it comes, induces attention upon it and makes us treat it in 
a substantive- way.
29 
James limits any further discussion of differentiation of interests 
to their function. As parts of the structure of consciousness (insofar as 
anything meaningful can be said about the structure of interests), the interests 
do not appear to be differentiated. That is, they operate consistently in 
relation to the rest of the conscious process. James indeed confirms this: 
he uses the terms interest and instinct interchangeably in describing the dis-
tinction between the 'egoistic self' and the rest of the world and writes that 
13 
sympathetic and egoistic instincts appear to arise "on the same psychologic 
level..
30 
 The 'back-door', 'front-door' distinction is a functional distinc-
tion: interests can be functionally distinguished because they facilitate con-
flicting forms of behaviour. While James makes the 'front-door' and 'back-
door' distinction on the basis of how the interests form a part of conscious-
ness in the first place, there is nothing in his work to indicate that they 
can be physiologically distinguished once they are there. Nor, in psycho-
logical terms, is there anything in his writing to suggest that 'front-door' 
and 'back-door' interests act differentially on the stream of consciousness 
itself. 
If the interests provide the selective 'force' of consciousness 
then some definition of their impulsive power is necessary. James' theory 
of instinct is plastic and dynamic in the sense that conflicting instincts 
may be aroused by the same stimulus. The instincts are painstakingly enumera-
ted and described, and the dynamics of internal and external factors which 
determine their differential arousal are largely accounted for.
31 
If interests 
are to achieve a similar status, they must be differentiated from instincts 
per se. Similarly, they must be distinguished from the impulsive character-
istics of the cognitive ideas and feelings as well if they are to come into 
their own as real selective mechanisms. Otherwise, they can only be considered 
as abstractions from past activities. The other alternative is to take the 
term 'interest' in a purely adjectival sense and use it to distinguish the im-
pulsive, and non-impulsive, mental states from an introspective point of view. 
At times James appears to lapse into this type of usage: "If one must have 'a 
single name for the condition upon which the impulsive and inhibitive quality 
of objects depends, one had better call it their interest.
.32 
But what, then, 
happens to the idea of interests as the teleological basis of consciousness? 
James uses the concept of interest to account for sophisticated 
14 
selections, but there is no adequate connection of the 'back-door' propensities 
with the specific selections made. In the example above, 33 of the choice 
between two theories which provide equally comprehensive and rational explan-
ations for a given phenomena, James fails to give an explanation of how the 
interests develop along with the cognitive capacities so that they can give 
the necessary 'push' to conscious selection. There is a substantial gap be-
tween the initial propensity and the sophisticated interest that provokes the 
final selection. 
To sum up, interests are described as the basic teleological units 
of consciousness in some parts of James' work; in others, they are confounded 
with instincts or other feelings or ideas. They are similarly used to describe 
adaptation (through instinct) and the 'accidental' activities or predisposi-
tions of individuals so that 'interest' is said to account for sophisticated 
'conceptual' selections. The term is also used in a descriptive, or introspec-
tive sense where 'interest' simply means 'selection'. Finally, interests 
are 'attached' to ideas in the stream of thought. 
The case for an efficacious consciousness is substantially weakened 
if we try to use interests, as James and Perry suggest, as the teleological 
basis for consciousness, because it is too easy to see the interests as epipi-
phenomena--that is, as products of, or extrapolations from, past behaviour, 
or as mere descriptions of conscious states. The dualistic nature of the 
interests relates to the problem of the possible epiphenomenal status of the 
interests because it intensifies the dilemma of how any particular interest 
acts to propel any particular conscious selection. 
It can be seen, therefore, that interests as James defined them do 
not provide an adequate refutation to automaton theory. It is consistent 
with James' description, although not with his intent, for interests them-
selves to be epiphenomena. The concept of interests has always been open 
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to the potential criticism that the evidence for their existence is no 
more than an empirical abstraction from activity. Nature selects; the or- 
ganism defined by a mechanistic theory may behave as if it selects, may feel 
as if it selects, as if it were interested, but the appearance of an interest 
need not imply that the interest is causally efficacious. Survival 'happens' 
and we may say, after the fact, that the individual had a conscious interest 
in surviving that ensured his particular survival. But the particulars of 
consciousness cannot be abstracted from behaviour or feeling alone; the spe-
cific genesis and operations of the interests must be delineated if we are 
to accept the concept as determinative in the way James intended. 34  The 
conclusion that 'mysterious', 'underlying', teleological units account for 
specific behaviours is not a sufficiently credible explanation, given James' 
commitment to naturalistic explanations. 
When he set up the terms of his conception of consciousness, 
James recognized that "We ought to have some general term by which to 
designate all states of consciousness merely as such and apart from their 
particular quality or cognitive function." 35  The terms he selected were 
feeling and thought.
36 
We have already shown that James did not include 
the interests as types of feelings or thoughts. Thus, all that we can con-
clude is that James did not consistently intend to use the hypothesis as an 
integral part of his psychology, and this conclusion would correlate with his 
contention that the interests are 'mysterious'. In placing positivistic 
limitations on what psychology was to include he wrote: -"Psychology, the 
science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and  
feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist 
and which (3) they know." 37 Interest are excluded, and insofar as they 
cannot be embodied in feelings and thoughts (apart from their role in the 
'fringe' of the stream of consciousness), would seem even to be precluded. 
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In his later writings, James reverts again and . again to renewed discussion 
of the nature of percepts and concepts as the fundamental units of the 
developing consciousness interacting with the world, without any separate 
reference to interests.
38 
We can conclude, then, that James ceased to give 
expression to the doctrine that interests are the fundamental units of con-
scious selection, underlying the feelings themselves, after the Principles. 
So what function was served by the interest hypothesis and why do 
we need to look at it at all? The theory of interests, as a basis to found 
a psychology on, was unsuccessful--indeed, it is doubtful that James long 
intended to do so anyway. But the doctrine itself, and the reasons that it 
was unsuccessful, are of great importance in coming than overall assessment 
of James' thought. The problems with interests and their dualistic basis 
recur on a grander scale in James' delineation of the more systematically 
defined mental faculties such as belief, reasoning, and volition. In each 
case consciousness can be seen structurally as a hierarchical, unified 
system, while operationally, the dualism is apparent in the opposing func-
tions of each faculty. The structural unity of consciousness is maintained 
by the vehicle of the stream of consciousness so that each idea carries its 
own impetus for action. At the same time, whether any idea will actually 
be enacted depends upon the function fulfilled by the particular idea in 
facilitating the individual's adjustment to the external world, or cor-
respondingly, in facilitating his attempts to 'transcend' that world, 
through the implementation of novel ideas or acts of will. 39 
An analysis of James' interest hypothesis is valuable in this 
context because the available material is extremely limited: the interest 
theory can thus represent a microcosm within the macrocosm of James' system. 
The problems that arise in the analysis of the theory of interests reappear 
in James' broader, more systematic psychology and philosophy. The difficulties 
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encountered in attempting to determine the relationship of the interests to•
the rest of conscious activity are repeated when we come to consider the 
relationships between the various mental 'faculties' within the stream of 
thought, and to try to determine how one particular idea is chosen for en-
actment against competing ideas. The weaknesses in the theory of interests 
can thus serve as a key to understanding much of James' more systematic 
work, and the analysis of these weaknesses may help to determine a method-
ology for examining the whole corpus of his thought. 
James' philosophy is built upon the various strands of his psycho-
logy. The world he creates is a particularly 'humanistic' world; pragmatism 
and radical empiricism take their shape from James' conception of consciousness. 
Therefore an understanding of James' psychology and his first attempts to 
work out a context for that psychology
40 
are basic to any analysis of the 
Later philosophy. 
And if the doctrine that consciousness is efficacious because it 
is interested was problematical, 'intuitive', 'unscientific', and ontologi-
cally 'mysterious'--perhaps to such an extent that James himself failed to 
expand it and make it an integral part of his psychology--it was productive 
as well. James explicitly developed the doctrine as a rebuttal to Spencer 
and the declared automatists; 41 if he was to develop a concept of conscious-
ness that was both efficacious and freed of the limits of psychological 
hedonism, it was still necessary for him to find some means of expressing 
his viewpoint in a way that was compatible with Darwinian theory and cur-
rent neurophysiology. James' problem was to find some means of describing 
consciousness as fundamentally and intrinsically efficacious. The idea 
that consciousness was interested served the initial purpose of giving 
James a means of polemicizing against automaton theory. At the same time, 
it focused his work on the fundamental units of consciousness, so that he 
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was able to go on to develop a broad psychological theory where consciousness 
was fundamentally efficacious and where habit formation was a product of the 
first purposive interactions of the individual with the world. Initially, 
he hoped that the conception of an interested consciousness would ensure 
that true voluntary action was as 'naturalistic' and pervasive as automatic 
behaviour. It was not an easy task. 
To conclude then, the idea that consciousness is interested, 
selective, and efficacious, marks James' break with the earlier physiolo-
gically deterministic associationist psychology. It is also James' first 
attempt at a concept of mind which will grow from here, through many tran-
sitions, into a psychology and philosophy that will move evolutionary ideas, 
as we define them today, into philosophy. This perhaps accounts for the 
interest doctrine's respected place in the literature.
42 
The idea that 
consciousness is interested is the beginning of James' attempt to create a 
new and comprehensive world-view. Both as the first expression of the 
concerns that dominated James' mature thought, and as the first example of 
the flaws that prevented his achieving the synthesis he desired, the impor-
tance of the theory of interests cannot be overestimated. 
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